Changes

Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics, while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics.  By way of definition, a ''monitory function'' is a duty, a role, or a task that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline, checking the feasibility of its intentions and its proposed operations, evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions, and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity of its acts in accord with its aims.  A definite attitude and particular perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role with any hope or measure of success.  The necessary station arises from the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once, and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature within a finite creation.  Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty needs to help the agency that is involved in the effort or the endeavor it monitors to observe the due limits of its proper arena, the higher considerations, and the inherent constraints that force a fallible and finite agent to choose among the available truths, acts, and aims.

Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics, while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics.  By way of definition, a ''monitory function'' is a duty, a role, or a task that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline, checking the feasibility of its intentions and its proposed operations, evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions, and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity of its acts in accord with its aims.  A definite attitude and particular perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role with any hope or measure of success.  The necessary station arises from the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once, and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature within a finite creation.  Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty needs to help the agency that is involved in the effort or the endeavor it monitors to observe the due limits of its proper arena, the higher considerations, and the inherent constraints that force a fallible and finite agent to choose among the available truths, acts, and aims.

To recapitulate the pragmatic ''priorism of normative sciences'' (PONS):

To recapitulate the pragmatic "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS):

Logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, cannot succeed in any of

Logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, cannot succeed in any of their aims, whether they turn to contemplating the natures of the true, the just, and the beautiful, respectively, for their own sakes, whether they turn to speculating on the certificates, the semblances, or the more species tokens of these goods, as they might be utilized toward a divergent conception of their values, or whether they convert from the one forum to the other market, and back again, in an endless series of exchanges, that is, unless their prospective agents possess the initial capital that can only be supplied by competencies at the corresponding intellectual virtues, and until they are willing to risk the stakes of adequately generous overhead investments, on orders that are demanded to fund the performance of the associated practical disciplines, namely, those that are appropriate to the good of signs, the good of acts, and the good of aims in themselves.  In sum, the domains and the disciplines of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, are placed so aptly in regard to one another that each one waits on the order of its watch and each one maintains its own proper monitory function with respect to all of the ones that follow on after it.

their aims, whether they turn to contemplating the natures of the true,

the just, and the beautiful, respectively, for their own sakes, whether

they turn to speculating on the certificates, the semblances, or the more

species tokens of these goods, as they might be utilized toward a divergent

conception of their values, or whether they convert from the one forum to the

other market, and back again, in an endless series of exchanges, that is, unless

their prospective agents possess the initial capital that can only be supplied by

competencies at the corresponding intellectual virtues, and until they are willing

to risk the stakes of adequately generous overhead investments, on orders that are

demanded to fund the performance of the associated practical disciplines, namely,

those that are appropriate to the good of signs, the good of acts, and the good

of aims in themselves.  In sum, the domains and the disciplines of logic, ethics,

and aesthetics, in that order, are placed so aptly in regard to one another that

each one waits on the order of its watch and each one maintains its own proper

monitory function with respect to all of the ones that follow on after it.

Why do things have to be this way?  Why is it necessary to impose

Why do things have to be this way?  Why is it necessary to impose a PONS, much less a pragmatic PONS, on the array of goods and quests? If everyone who reflects on the issue for a sufficient spell of time seems to agree that the Beautiful, the Just, and the True are one and the same in the End, then why is any PONS necessary?  Its necessity is apparently relative to a certain contingency affecting the typical agent, namely, the contingency of being a fallible and finite creature.  Perhaps from a ''God's Eye View'' (GEV), Beauty, Justice, and Truth all amount to a single Good, the only Good there is.  But the imperfect creature is not given this view as its realized actuality and cannot contain its vision within the ''point of view'' (POV) that is proper to it.  Even if it sees the possibility of this unity, it cannot actualize what it sees at once, at best being driven to work toward its realization measure by measure, and that is only if the agent is capable of reason and reflection at all.

a PONS, much less a pragmatic PONS, on the array of goods and quests?

If everyone who reflects on the issue for a sufficient spell of time

seems to agree that the Beautiful, the Just, and the True are one and

the same in the End, then why is any PONS necessary?  Its necessity is

apparently relative to a certain contigency affecting the typical agent,

namely, the contingency of being a fallible and finite creature.  Perhaps

from a "God's Eye View" (GEV), Beauty, Justice, and Truth all amount to

a single Good, the only Good there is.  But the imperfect creature is

not given this view as its realized actuality and cannot contain its

vision within the "point of view" (POV) that is proper to it.  Even

if it sees the possibility of this unity, it cannot actualize what

it sees at once, at best being driven to work toward its realization

measure by measure, and that is only if the agent is capable of reason

and reflection at all.

The imperfect agent lives in a world of seeming beauty, seeming justice,

The imperfect agent lives in a world of seeming beauty, seeming justice, and seeming truth.  Fortunately, the symmetry of this seeming insipidity can break up in relation to itself, and with the loss of the objective world's equipoise and indifference goes all the equanimity and most of the insouciance of the agent in question.  It happens like this:  Among the number of apparent goods and amid the manifold of good appearances, one soon discovers that not all seeming goods are alike.  Seeming beauty is the most seemly and the least deceptive, since it does not vitiate its own intention in merely seeming to achieve it, and does not destroy what it reaches for in merely seeming to grasp it.

and seeming truth.  Fortunately, the symmetry of this seeming insipidity

can break up in relation to itself, and with the loss of the objective

world's equipoise and indifference goes all the equanimity and most of

the insouciance of the agent in question.  It happens like this:  Among

the number of apparent goods and amid the manifold of good appearances,

one soon discovers that not all seeming goods are alike.  Seeming beauty

is the most seemly and the least deceptive, since it does not vitiate its

own intention in merely seeming to achieve it, and does not destroy what

it reaches for in merely seeming to grasp it.

Monitory functions, as a rule, tend to shade off in extreme directions,

Monitory functions, as a rule, tend to shade off in extreme directions, on the one hand becoming a bit too prescriptive before the act, whether the hopeful effects are hortatory or prohibitory, and on the other hand becoming much too reactionary after the fact, whether the tardy effects are exculpatory or recriminatory.  In the midst of these extremes, that is, within the scheme of monitory functions at large, it is possible to distinguish subtler variations in the nuances of their action that work toward the accomplishment the same general purpose, but that achieve it with a form of such gentle urging all throughout the continuing process of gaining a good, that affect a promise of such laudatory rewards, and that afford an array of incidental senses of such ongoing satisfaction, even before, while, and after the aimed for good is effected, that this class of moderate measures is aptly known as ''advisory functions'' (AFs).

on the one hand becoming a bit too prescriptive before the act, whether

the hopeful effects are hortatory or prohibitory, and on the other hand

becoming much too reactionary after the fact, whether the tardy effects

are exculpatory or recriminatory.  In the midst of these extremes, that

is, within the scheme of monitory functions at large, it is possible to

distinguish subtler variations in the nuances of their action that work

toward the accomplishment the same general purpose, but that achieve it

with a form of such gentle urging all throughout the continuing process

of gaining a good, that affect a promise of such laudatory rewards, and

that afford an array of incidental senses of such ongoing satisfaction,

even before, while, and after the aimed for good is effected, that this

class of moderate measures is aptly known as "advisory functions" (AF's).

In the process of noticing what is necessary and what is impossible,

In the process of noticing what is necessary and what is impossible, and in distinguishing itself from the general run of monitory functions, an AF is able to adapt itself to get a better grip on what is possible, to the point that it is eventually able to make constructive suggestions to the agent that it monitors, and thus to give advice that is both apt and applicable, positive and practical, or usable and useful.  If this is beginning to sound familiar, then it is not entirely an accident. As I see it, it is from these very grounds that the facility for ''abductive simile'' or the faculty of ''abductive synthesis'' (AS) first arises, to wit, just on the horizon of monitory observation and just on the advent of advisory contemplation that an agent of inquiry, learning, and reasoning first acquires the ''quasi'' ability to regard one thing just as if it were construed to be another and to consider each thing just inasmuch as it haps to be like another.

and in distinguishing itself from the general run of monitory functions,

an AF is able to adapt itself to get a better grip on what is possible,

to the point that it is eventually able to make constructive suggestions

to the agent that it monitors, and thus to give advice that is both apt

and applicable, positive and practical, or usable and useful.  If this

is beginning to sound familiar, then it is not entirely an accident.

As I see it, it is from these very grounds that the facility for

"abductive simile" or the faculty of "abductive synthesis" (AS)

first arises, to wit, just on the horizon of monitory observation

and just on the advent of advisory contemplation that an agent of

inquiry, learning, and reasoning first acquires the "quasi" ability

to regard one thing just as if it were construed to be another and

to consider each thing just inasmuch as it haps to be like another.

In the abode of the monitor I thus discover the first clues I can grasp

In the abode of the monitor I thus discover the first clues I can grasp as to how the ''abductive bearing'' (AB) of hypothetical reasoning can be bound together from the primitive elements of the most uncertain states that the mind can ever know.  To my way of thinking, this derivation of ABs from the general conduct of monitory duties and the specific ethos of advisory roles, all as pursuant to the PONS, seems to strike a chord with the heart of wonder beating at the core of every agent of inquiry, and accordingly to fashion an answer to the central query, in the words of William Shakespeare:  "Where is fancy bred?"  Beyond the responsibility to continue driving the cycle of inquiry and to keep on circulating the fresh communication of provisional answers, this form of speculation on the origin of the AB points out at least one way whence these faculties of guessing widely but guessing well can lead me from the conditions of amazement, bewilderment, and consternation that the start of an inquiry all but constantly finds me in.

as to how the "abductive bearing" (AB) of hypothetical reasoning can be

bound together from the primitive elements of the most uncertain states

that the mind can ever know.  To my way of thinking, this derivation of

AB's from the general conduct of monitory duties and the specific ethos

of advisory roles, all as pursuant to the PONS, seems to strike a chord

with the heart of wonder beating at the core of every agent of inquiry,

and accordingly to fashion an answer to the central query, in the words

of Wm. Shakespeare:  "Where is fancy bred?"  Beyond the responsibility

to continue driving the cycle of inquiry and to keep on circulating the

fresh communication of provisional answers, this form of speculation on

the origin of the AB points out at least one way whence these faculties

of guessing widely but guessing well can lead me from the conditions of

amazement, bewilderment, and consternation that the start of an inquiry

all but constantly finds me in.

The anchoring or the inauguration of an "abductive bearing" (AB) within

The anchoring or the inauguration of an ''abductive bearing'' (AB) within the operations of an ''advisory function'' (AF), and the ensconcement or the installation of this positively constructive advisory, in its turn,within the office of an irreducibly negative monitory function, one that watches over the active, aesthetic, and affective aspects of experience with an eye to the circumstance that not all goods can be actualized at once — this array of inferences from the apical structure of the PONS ought to suffice to remind each agent of inquiry of how it all hinges on the affective values that one feels and the effective acts that one does.

the operations of an "advisory function" (AF), and the enscouncement or

the installation of this positively constructive advisory, in its turn,

within the office of an irreducibly negative monitory function, one that

watches over the active, aesthetic, and affective aspects of experience

with an eye to the circumstance that not all goods can be actualized at

once -- this array of inferences from the apical structure of the PONS

ought to suffice to remind each agent of inquiry of how it all hinges

on the affective values that one feels and the effective acts that

one does.

In principle, therefore, logic assumes a purely ancillary role in regard

In principle, therefore, logic assumes a purely ancillary role in regard to the ethics of active conduct and the aesthetics of affective values. On balance, however, logic can achieve heights of abstraction, points of perspective, and summits of reflection that are otherwise unavailable to a mind embroiled in the tangle of its continuing actions and immersed in the flow of its current passions.  By rising above this plain immersion in the dementias swept out by action and passion, logic can acquire the status of a handle, something an agent can use in its situation to avoid being swept along with the tide of affairs, something that keeps it from being swept up with all that the times press on it to sweep out of mind. By means of this instrument, logic affords the mind an ability to survey the passing scene in ways that it cannot hope to imagine while engaged in the engrossing business of keeping its gnosis to the grindstone, and so it becomes apt to adopt the attitude that it needs in order to become capable of reflecting on its very own actions, affects, and axioms.

to the ethics of active conduct and the aesthetics of affective values.

On balance, however, logic can achieve heights of abstraction, points of

perspective, and summits of reflection that are otherwise unavailable to

a mind embroiled in the tangle of its continuing actions and immersed in

the flow of its current passions.  By rising above this plain immersion

in the dementias swept out by action and passion, logic can acquire the

status of a handle, something an agent can use in its situation to avoid

being swept along with the tide of affairs, something that keeps it from

being swept up with all that the times press on it to sweep out of mind.

By means of this instrument, logic affords the mind an ability to survey

the passing scene in ways that it cannot hope to imagine while engaged in

the engrossing business of keeping its gnosis to the grindstone, and so it

becomes apt to adopt the attitude that it needs in order to become capable

of reflecting on its very own actions, affects, and axioms.

===3.3. Reflection on Reflection===

===3.3. Reflection on Reflection===