Changes

How are these riddles from the origins of intellectual history, whether one finds them far or near and whether one views it as bright or dim, relevant to the present inquiry?  There are a number of reasons why I am paying such close attention to these ancient and apparently distant concerns.  The classical question as to what virtues are teachable is resurrected in the modern question, material to the present inquiry, as to what functions are computable, indeed, most strikingly in regard to the formal structures that each question engenders.  Along with a related question about the nature of the true philosopher, as one hopes to distinguish it from the most sophisticated imitations, all of which is echoed on the present scene in the guise of Turing's test for a humane intelligence, this body of riddles inspires the corpus of most work in artificial intelligence, if not the cognitive and the computer sciences at large.

How are these riddles from the origins of intellectual history, whether one finds them far or near and whether one views it as bright or dim, relevant to the present inquiry?  There are a number of reasons why I am paying such close attention to these ancient and apparently distant concerns.  The classical question as to what virtues are teachable is resurrected in the modern question, material to the present inquiry, as to what functions are computable, indeed, most strikingly in regard to the formal structures that each question engenders.  Along with a related question about the nature of the true philosopher, as one hopes to distinguish it from the most sophisticated imitations, all of which is echoed on the present scene in the guise of Turing's test for a humane intelligence, this body of riddles inspires the corpus of most work in artificial intelligence, if not the cognitive and the computer sciences at large.

{| align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="90%"

| Reason alone teaches us to know good and bad.

|

|

| Rousseau, 'Emile', or 'On Education', [Rou_1, 67].

| align="right" | Rousseau, ''Emile, or On Education'', [Rou_1, 67].

Aesthetics, ethics, and logic are categorized as "normative sciences"

Aesthetics, ethics, and logic are categorized as ''normative sciences'' because they pursue knowledge about the ways that things ought to be, their objects being beauty, justice, and truth, respectively.  It is generally appreciated that there are intricate patterns of deep and subtle interrelationships that exist among these subjects, and among their objects, but different people seem to intuit different patterns, perhaps at different times.  At least, it seems that they must be seeing different patterns of interrelation from the different ways that they find to enact their insights and intuitions in customs, methods, and practices. In particular, one's conception of science, indeed, one's whole approach to life, is determined by the ''priorism'' or the ''precedence ordering'' that one senses among these normative subjects and employs to order their normative objects.  This Section considers a sample of the choices that people typically make in building up a personal or a cultural ''priorism of normative sciences'' (PONS).

because they pursue knowledge about the ways that things ought to be,

their objects being beauty, justice, and truth, respectively.  It is

generally appreciated that there are intricate patterns of deep and

subtle interrelationships that exist among these subjects, and among

their objects, but different people seem to intuit different patterns,

perhaps at different times.  At least, it seems that they must be seeing

different patterns of interrelation from the different ways that they find

to enact their insights and intuitions in customs, methods, and practices.

In particular, one's conception of science, indeed, one's whole approach

to life, is determined by the "priorism" or the "precedence ordering"

that one senses among these normative subjects and employs to order

their normative objects.  This Section considers a sample of the

choices that people typically make in building up a personal or

a cultural "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS).

For example, on the modern scene, among people trained to sport

For example, on the modern scene, among people trained to sport all of the modern fashions of scientific reasoning, it is almost a reflex of their modern identities to echo in their doctrines, if not always to follow in their disciplines, those ancients who taught that "knowledge is virtue".  This means that to know the truth about anything is to know how to act rightly in regard to it, but more yet, to be compelled to act that way.  It is usually understood that this maxim posits a relation between the otherwise independent realms of knowledge and action, where knowledge resides in domains of signs and ideas, and where action presides over domains of objects, states of being, and their changes through time.  However, it is not so frequently remembered that this connection cuts both ways, causing the evidence of virtue as exercised in practice to reflect on the presumption of knowledge as possessed in theory, where each defect of virtue necessarily reflects a defect of knowledge.

all of the modern fashions of scientific reasoning, it is almost

a reflex of their modern identities to echo in their doctrines,

if not always to follow in their disciplines, those ancients who

taught that "knowledge is virtue".  This means that to know the

truth about anything is to know how to act rightly in regard to

it, but more yet, to be compelled to act that way.  It is usually

understood that this maxim posits a relation between the otherwise

independent realms of knowledge and action, where knowledge resides

in domains of signs and ideas, and where action presides over domains

of objects, states of being, and their changes through time.  However,

it is not so frequently remembered that this connection cuts both ways,

causing the evidence of virtue as exercised in practice to reflect on

the presumption of knowledge as possessed in theory, where each defect

of virtue necessarily reflects a defect of knowledge.

In other words, converting the rule through its contrapositive yields

In other words, converting the rule through its contrapositive yields the equivalent proposition "evil is ignorance", making every fault of conduct traceable to a fault of knowledge.  Everyone knows the typical objection to this claim, saying that one often knows better than to do a certain thing while going ahead and doing it anyway, but the axiom is meant to be taken as a new definition of knowledge, ruling overall that if one really, really knows better, then one simply does not do it, by virtue of the definition.  This sort of reasoning issues in the setting of priorities, putting knowledge before virtue, theory before practice, beauty and justice after truth, or reason itself before rhyme and right.

the equivalent proposition "evil is ignorance", making every fault of

conduct traceable to a fault of knowledge.  Everyone knows the typical

objection to this claim, saying that one often knows better than to do

a certain thing while going ahead and doing it anyway, but the axiom is

meant to be taken as a new definition of knowledge, ruling overall that

if one really, really knows better, then one simply does not do it, by

virtue of the definition.  This sort of reasoning issues in the setting

of priorities, putting knowledge before virtue, theory before practice,

beauty and justice after truth, or reason itself before rhyme and right.

It is not that reason sees any reason to disparage the just deserts that

It is not that reason sees any reason to disparage the just deserts that it places after or intends to diminish the gratifications that it defers. Indeed, it aims to give these latter values a place of honor by placing them more in the direction of its aims, and it thinks that it can take them up in this order without risking a consequential loss of geniality. According to this rationale, it is the first order of business to know what is true, while purely an afterthought to do what is good.

it places after or intends to diminish the gratifications that it defers.

Indeed, it aims to give these latter values a place of honor by placing

them more in the direction of its aims, and it thinks that it can take

them up in this order without risking a consequential loss of geniality.

According to this rationale, it is the first order of business to know

what is true, while purely an afterthought to do what is good.

It is not too surprising that reason assigns a priority to itself in its

It is not too surprising that reason assigns a priority to itself in its own lists of aims, goods, values, and virtues, but this only renders its bias, its favor, its preference, and its prejudice all the more evident. And since the patent favoritism that reason displays is itself a reason of the most aesthetic kind, it thus knocks itself out of its first place ranking, the ranking that reason assumes for itself in the first place, by dint of the prerogative that it exercises and in view of the category of excuse that it uses, from then on deferring to beauty, to happiness, or to pleasure, and all that is admirable in and of itself, or desired for its own sake.  This self-demotion of reason is one of the unintended consequences of its own argumentation, that leads it down the garden path to a self-deprecation.  It is an immediate corollary of reason trying to distinguish itself from the other goods, granting to itself an initially arbitrary distinction, and then reflecting on the unjustified presumption of this self-devotion.  This condition, that reason suffers and that reason endures, is one that continues through all of the rest of its argumentations, that is, unless it can find a better reason than the one it gives itself to begin, or until such time as it can show that all good reasons are one and the same.

own lists of aims, goods, values, and virtues, but this only renders its

bias, its favor, its preference, and its prejudice all the more evident.

And since the patent favoritism that reason displays is itself a reason

of the most aesthetic kind, it thus knocks itself out of its first place

ranking, the ranking that reason assumes for itself in the first place,

by dint of the prerogative that it exercises and in view of the category

of excuse that it uses, from then on deferring to beauty, to happiness,

or to pleasure, and all that is admirable in and of itself, or desired

for its own sake.  This self-demotion of reason is one of the unintended

consequences of its own argumentation, that leads it down the garden path

to a self-deprecation.  It is an immediate corollary of reason trying to

distinguish itself from the other goods, granting to itself an initially

arbitrary distinction, and then reflecting on the unjustified presumption

of this self-devotion.  This condition, that reason suffers and that reason

endures, is one that continues through all of the rest of its argumentations,

that is, unless it can find a better reason than the one it gives itself to

begin, or until such time as it can show that all good reasons are one and

the same.

So the maxim "knowlege is virtue", in its modern interpretation,

So the maxim "knowlege is virtue", in its modern interpretation, at least, leads to the following results.  It makes just action, right behavior, and virtuous conduct not merely one among many practical tests but the only available criterion of knowledge, reason, and truth.  Sufficient criterion?  If a conceptual rule is the only available test of some property, then it must be an essential criterion of that property.  This conceives the essence of knowledge to lie in a conception of action.  This maxim can be taken, by way of its contrapositive, as a pragmatic principle, positing a rule to the effect that any defect of virtue reflects a defect of knowledge.  This makes truth the ''sine qua non'' of justice, right action, or virtuous conduct, that is, it makes reason the ''without which not'' of morality.  Since virtuous conduct is distinguished as that action which leads to what we call ''beauty'', ''beatitude'', or ''happiness'', by any other name just that which is admirable in and of itself, desired for its own sake, or sought as an end in itself, whether it is only in the conduct itself or in a distinct product that the beauty is held to abide, this makes logic the sublimest art.  (Why be logical?  Because it pleases me to be logical.)

at least, leads to the following results.  It makes just action,

right behavior, and virtuous conduct not merely one among many

practical tests but the only available criterion of knowledge,

reason, and truth.  Sufficient criterion?  If a conceptual rule

is the only available test of some property, then it must be an

essential criterion of that property.  This conceives the essence

of knowledge to lie in a conception of action.  This maxim can

be taken, by way of its contrapositive, as a pragmatic principle,

positing a rule to the effect that any defect of virtue reflects

a defect of knowledge.  This makes truth the "sine qua non" of

justice, right action, or virtuous conduct, that is, it makes

reason the "without which not" of morality.  Since virtuous

conduct is distinguished as that action which leads to what

we call "beauty", "beatitude", or "happiness", by any other

name just that which is admirable in and of itself, desired

for its own sake, or sought as an end in itself, whether it

is only in the conduct itself or in a distinct product that

the beauty is held to abide, this makes logic the sublimest

art.  (Why be logical?  Becuase it pleases me to be logical.)

| It depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is.

{| align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="90%"

|

| <p>It depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is.</p>

| President William Jefferson Clinton, August ?, 1998

|-

| align="right" | President William Jefferson Clinton, August ?, 1998.

Of course, there is much that is open to interpretation about the maxim

Of course, there is much that is open to interpretation about the maxim "knowledge is virtue".  In particular, does the copula "is" represent a necessary implication (<math>\Rightarrow</math>), a sufficient reduction ("is only", <math>\Leftarrow</math>), or a necessary and sufficient identification (<math>\Leftrightarrow</math>)?

"knowledge is virtue".  In particular, does the copula "is" represent a

necessary implication ("=>"), a sufficient reduction ("is only", "<="),

or a necessary and sufficient identification ("<=>")?

</pre>

====3.2.9. Principle of Rational Action====

====3.2.9. Principle of Rational Action====