Changes

A certain arbitrariness has to be faced in the terms that one uses to talk about reasoning, to split it up into different parts and to sort it out into different types.  It is like the arbitrary choice that one makes in assigning the midpoint of an interval to the subintervals on its sides.  In setting out the forms of a nomenclature, in fitting the schemes of my terminology to the territory that it disturbs in the process of mapping, I cannot avoid making arbitrary choices, but I can aim for a strategy that is flexible enough to recognize its own alternatives and to accommodate the other options that lie within their scope.

A certain arbitrariness has to be faced in the terms that one uses to talk about reasoning, to split it up into different parts and to sort it out into different types.  It is like the arbitrary choice that one makes in assigning the midpoint of an interval to the subintervals on its sides.  In setting out the forms of a nomenclature, in fitting the schemes of my terminology to the territory that it disturbs in the process of mapping, I cannot avoid making arbitrary choices, but I can aim for a strategy that is flexible enough to recognize its own alternatives and to accommodate the other options that lie within their scope.

If I make the mark of deduction the fact that it reduces the number of terms, as it moves from the grounds to the end of an argument, then I am due to devise a name for the process that augments the number of terms, and thus prepares the grounds for any account of experience.

If I make the mark of ''deduction'' the fact that it reduces the number of terms, as it moves from the grounds to the end of an argument, then I am due to devise a name for the process that augments the number of terms, and thus prepares the grounds for any account of experience.

What name hints at the many ways that signs arise in regard to things? What name covers the manifest ways that a map takes over its territory? What name fits this naming of names, these proceedings that inaugurate a sign in the first place, that duly install it on the office of a term? What name suits all the actions of addition, annexation, incursion, and invention that instigate the initial bearing of signs on an object domain?

: What name hints at the many ways that signs arise in regard to things?

 

: What name covers the manifest ways that a map takes over its territory?

 

: What name fits this naming of names, these proceedings that inaugurate <br>a sign in the first place, that duly install it on the office of a term?

 

: What name suits all these actions of addition, annexation, incursion, and <br>invention that instigate the initial bearing of signs on an object domain?

In the interests of a ''maximal analytic precision'' (MAP), it is fitting that I should try to sharpen this notion to the point where it applies purely to a simple act, that of entering a new term on the lists, in effect, of enlisting a new term to the ongoing account of experience.  Thus, let me style this process as ''adduction'' or ''production'', in spite of the fact that the aim of precision is partially blunted by the circumstance that these words have well-worn uses in other contexts.  In this way, I can isolate to some degree the singular step of adding a term, leaving it to a later point to distinguish the role that it plays in an argument.

In the interests of a ''maximal analytic precision'' (MAP), it is fitting that I should try to sharpen this notion to the point where it applies purely to a simple act, that of entering a new term on the lists, in effect, of enlisting a new term to the ongoing account of experience.  Thus, let me style this process as ''adduction'' or ''production'', in spite of the fact that the aim of precision is partially blunted by the circumstance that these words have well-worn uses in other contexts.  In this way, I can isolate to some degree the singular step of adding a term, leaving it to a later point to distinguish the role that it plays in an argument.

Consider the adjunction to one's vocabulary that is comprised of these three words:  ''adduction'', ''production'', ''obduction''.  In particular, how do they appear in the light of their mutual applications to each other and especially with respect to their own reflexivities?  Notice that the terms ''adduction'' and ''production'' apply to the ways that all three terms enter this general discussion, but that ''obduction'' applies only to their introduction only in specific contexts of argument.

Consider the adjunction to one's vocabulary that is comprised of these three words:  ''adduction'', ''production'', ''obduction''.  In particular, how do they appear in the light of their mutual applications to each other and especially with respect to their own reflexivities?  Notice that the terms ''adduction'' and ''production'' apply to the ways that all three terms enter this general discussion, but that ''obduction'' applies only to their introduction only in specific contexts of argument.

Another dimension of variation that needs to be noted among these different types of processes is their status with regard to determinism.  Given the ordinary case of a well-formed syllogism, deduction is a fully deterministic process, since the middle term to be eliminated is clearly marked by its appearance in a pair of premisses.  But if one is given nothing but the fact that forms this conclusion, or starts with a fact that is barely suspected to be the conclusion of a possible deduction, then there are many other middle terms and many other premisses that might be construed to result in this fact.  Therefore, adduction and production, for all their uncontrolled generality, but even obduction, in spite of its specificity, cannot be treated as deterministic processes.  Only in degenerate cases, where the number of terms in a discussion is extremely limited, or where the availability of middle terms is otherwise restricted, can it happen that these processes become deterministic.

Another dimension of variation that needs to be noted among these different types of processes is their status with regard to determimism.  Given the ordinary case of a well-formed syllogism, deduction is a fully deterministic process, since the middle term to be eliminated is clearly marked by its appearance in a couple of premisses.  But if one is given nothing but the fact that forms this conclusion, or starts with a fact that is barely suspected to be the conclusion of a possible deduction, then there are many other middle terms and many other premisses that might be construed to result in this fact.  Therefore, adduction and production, for all of their uncontrolled generality, but even obduction, in spite of its specificity, cannot be treated as deterministic processes.  Only in degenerate cases, where the number of terms in a discussion is extremely limited, or where the availability of middle terms is otherwise restricted, can it happen that these processes become deterministic.

=====1.3.5.3. A Fork in the Road=====

=====1.3.5.3. A Fork in the Road=====