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| ''B'' leaves ''A'' for ''C''

| ''B'' leaves ''A'' for ''C''

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: These six sentences express one and the same indivisible phenomenon. (C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", MS 308 (1903), EP 2, 170-171).

: These six sentences express one and the same indivisible phenomenon. (C.S. Peirce, "The Categories Defended", MS 308 (1903), EP 2, 170–171).

===IOS===

===IOS===

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

Logic will here be defined as ''formal semiotic''.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.  Namely, a sign is something, ''A'', which brings something, ''B'', its ''interpretant'' sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, ''C'', its ''object'', as that in which itself stands to ''C''.  It is from this definition, together with a definition of "formal", that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has ''virtually'' been quite generally held, though not generally recognized. (C.S. Peirce, "Application to the [[Carnegie Institution]]", L75 (1902), NEM 4, 20-21).

Logic will here be defined as ''formal semiotic''.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.  Namely, a sign is something, ''A'', which brings something, ''B'', its ''interpretant'' sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, ''C'', its ''object'', as that in which itself stands to ''C''.  It is from this definition, together with a definition of "formal", that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has ''virtually'' been quite generally held, though not generally recognized. (C.S. Peirce, "Application to the [[Carnegie Institution]]", L75 (1902), NEM 4, 20&ndash;21).

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

A ''Sign'' is anything which is related to a Second thing, its ''Object'', in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its ''Interpretant'', into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ''ad infinitum''.  (CP 2.92; quoted in Fisch 1986: 274)

A ''Sign'' is anything which is related to a Second thing, its ''Object'', in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its ''Interpretant'', into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ''ad infinitum''.  (CP 2.92, cited in Fisch 1986, p. 274)

</blockquote>

</blockquote>