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====Sign relations====

====Sign relations====

{{main|Sign relation}}

: ''Main article'' : [[Sign relation]]

With that hasty map of relations and relatives sketched above, we may now trek into the terrain of ''[[sign relation]]s'', the main subject matter of Peirce's ''[[semeiotic]]'', or theory of signs.

With that hasty map of relations and relatives sketched above, we may now trek into the terrain of ''sign relations'', the main subject matter of Peirce's ''semeiotic'', or theory of signs.

====Types of signs====

====Types of signs====

* An '''index''' is a sign that denotes its objects by virtue of an existential connection that it has with them. For an index to signify, the relation to the object is crucial. The ''representamen'' is directly connected in some way (physically or casually) to the object it denotes (e.g. smoke coming from a building is an index of fire). Hence, an index refers to the object because it is really affected or modified by it, and thus may stand as a trace of the existence of the object.  

* An '''index''' is a sign that denotes its objects by virtue of an existential connection that it has with them. For an index to signify, the relation to the object is crucial. The ''representamen'' is directly connected in some way (physically or casually) to the object it denotes (e.g. smoke coming from a building is an index of fire). Hence, an index refers to the object because it is really affected or modified by it, and thus may stand as a trace of the existence of the object.  

* A '''symbol''' is a sign that denotes its objects solely by virtue of the fact that it is interpreted to do so. The ''representamen'' does not resemble the object signified but is fundamentally conventional, so that the signifying relationship must be learned and agreed upon (e.g. the word “cat”). A symbol thus denotes, primarily, by virtue of its ''interpretant''. Its action (''semeiosis'') is ruled by a convention, a more or less systematic set of associations that guarantees its interpretation, independently of any resemblance or any material relation with its object.

* A '''symbol''' is a sign that denotes its objects solely by virtue of the fact that it is interpreted to do so. The ''representamen'' does not resemble the object signified but is fundamentally conventional, so that the signifying relationship must be learned and agreed upon (e.g. the word "cat"). A symbol thus denotes, primarily, by virtue of its ''interpretant''. Its action (''semeiosis'') is ruled by a convention, a more or less systematic set of associations that guarantees its interpretation, independently of any resemblance or any material relation with its object.

Note that these definitions are specific to Peirce's theory of signs and are not exactly equivalent to general uses of the notion of "[[icon]]", "[[symbol]]" or "[[index]]".

Note that these definitions are specific to Peirce's theory of signs and are not exactly equivalent to general uses of the notion of "[[icon]]", "[[symbol]]" or "[[index]]".

===Theory of inquiry===

===Theory of inquiry===

{{main|Inquiry}}

: ''Main article'' : [[Inquiry]]

: Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:

: Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:

===Logic of information===

===Logic of information===

{{main|Logic of information}}

: ''Main article'' : [[Logic of information]]

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

Let us now return to the information.  The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes — having two legs, being rational, &tc. — which make up the comprehension of ''man''.  Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.  (C.S. Peirce, "The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis" (1866), CE 1, 467.)

Let us now return to the information.  The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes &mdash; having two legs, being rational, &tc. &mdash; which make up the comprehension of ''man''.  Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.  (C.S. Peirce, "The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis" (1866), CE 1, 467.)

</blockquote>

</blockquote>