Peirce's 1870 Logic Of Relatives
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Jump to navigationJump to searchAuthor's Note. The text that follows is a collection of notes that will eventually be developed into a paper on Charles Sanders Peirce's 1870 memoir on the logic of relative terms. Jon Awbrey 06:06, 8 October 2007 (PDT)
Selection 1
| The letters of the alphabet will denote logical signs.
| Now logical terms are of three grand classes.
|
| The first embraces those whose logical form involves only the
| conception of quality, and which therefore represent a thing
| simply as "a ---". These discriminate objects in the most
| rudimentary way, which does not involve any consciousness
| of discrimination. They regard an object as it is in
| itself as 'such' ('quale'); for example, as horse,
| tree, or man. These are 'absolute terms'.
|
| The second class embraces terms whose logical form involves the
| conception of relation, and which require the addition of another
| term to complete the denotation. These discriminate objects with a
| distinct consciousness of discrimination. They regard an object as
| over against another, that is as relative; as father of, lover of,
| or servant of. These are 'simple relative terms'.
|
| The third class embraces terms whose logical form involves the
| conception of bringing things into relation, and which require
| the addition of more than one term to complete the denotation.
| They discriminate not only with consciousness of discrimination,
| but with consciousness of its origin. They regard an object
| as medium or third between two others, that is as conjugative;
| as giver of --- to ---, or buyer of --- for --- from ---.
| These may be termed 'conjugative terms'.
|
| The conjugative term involves the conception of 'third', the relative that of
| second or 'other', the absolute term simply considers 'an' object. No fourth
| class of terms exists involving the conception of 'fourth', because when that
| of 'third' is introduced, since it involves the conception of bringing objects
| into relation, all higher numbers are given at once, inasmuch as the conception
| of bringing objects into relation is independent of the number of members of the
| relationship. Whether this 'reason' for the fact that there is no fourth class
| of terms fundamentally different from the third is satisfactory of not, the fact
| itself is made perfectly evident by the study of the logic of relatives.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.63
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce,
|"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives,
| Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic",
|'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870,
|'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 1
I am going to experiment with an interlacing commentary on Peirce's 1870 "Logic of Relatives" paper, revisiting some critical transitions from several different angles and calling attention to a variety of puzzles, problems, and potentials that are not so often remarked or tapped. What strikes me about the initial installment this time around is its use of a certain pattern of argument that I can recognize as invoking a "closure principle", and this is a figure of reasoning that Peirce uses in three other places: his discussion of "continuous relations", his definition of sign relations, and in the pragmatic maxim itself. One might also call attention to the following two statements: | Now logical terms are of three grand classes. | No fourth class of terms exists involving the conception of 'fourth', | because when that of 'third' is introduced, since it involves the | conception of bringing objects into relation, all higher numbers are | given at once, inasmuch as the conception of bringing objects into | relation is independent of the number of members of the relationship.
Selection 2
| Numbers Corresponding to Letters
|
| I propose to use the term "universe" to denote that class of individuals
| 'about' which alone the whole discourse is understood to run. The universe,
| therefore, in this sense, as in Mr. De Morgan's, is different on different
| occasions. In this sense, moreover, discourse may run upon something which
| is not a subjective part of the universe; for instance, upon the qualities
| or collections of the individuals it contains.
|
| I propose to assign to all logical terms, numbers; to an absolute term,
| the number of individuals it denotes; to a relative term, the average
| number of things so related to one individual. Thus in a universe of
| perfect men ('men'), the number of "tooth of" would be 32. The number
| of a relative with two correlates would be the average number of things
| so related to a pair of individuals; and so on for relatives of higher
| numbers of correlates. I propose to denote the number of a logical term
| by enclosing the term in square brackets, thus ['t'].
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.65
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce,
|"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives,
| Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic",
|'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870,
|'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 2
Peirce's remarks at CP 3.65 are so replete with remarkable ideas,
some of them so taken for granted in mathematical discourse that
they usually escape explicit mention, and others so suggestive
of things to come in a future remote from his time of writing,
and yet so smoothly introduced in passing that it's all too
easy to overlook their consequential significance, that I
can do no better here than to highlight these ideas in
other words, whose main advantage is to be a little
more jarring to the mind's sensibilities.
| Numbers Corresponding to Letters
|
| I propose to use the term "universe" to denote that class of individuals
| 'about' which alone the whole discourse is understood to run. The universe,
| therefore, in this sense, as in Mr. De Morgan's, is different on different
| occasions. In this sense, moreover, discourse may run upon something which
| is not a subjective part of the universe; for instance, upon the qualities
| or collections of the individuals it contains.
|
| I propose to assign to all logical terms, numbers; to an absolute term,
| the number of individuals it denotes; to a relative term, the average
| number of things so related to one individual. Thus in a universe of
| perfect men ('men'), the number of "tooth of" would be 32. The number
| of a relative with two correlates would be the average number of things
| so related to a pair of individuals; and so on for relatives of higher
| numbers of correlates. I propose to denote the number of a logical term
| by enclosing the term in square brackets, thus ['t'].
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.65
1. This mapping of letters to numbers, or logical terms to mathematical quantities,
is the very core of what "quantification theory" is all about, and definitely
more to the point than the mere "innovation" of using distinctive symbols
for the so-called "quantifiers". We will speak of this more later on.
2. The mapping of logical terms to numerical measures,
to express it in current language, would probably be
recognizable as some kind of "morphism" or "functor"
from a logical domain to a quantitative co-domain.
3. Notice that Peirce follows the mathematician's usual practice,
then and now, of making the status of being an "individual" or
a "universal" relative to a discourse in progress. I have come
to appreciate more and more of late how radically different this
"patchwork" or "piecewise" approach to things is from the way of
some philosophers who seem to be content with nothing less than
many worlds domination, which means that they are never content
and rarely get started toward the solution of any real problem.
Just my observation, I hope you understand.
4. It is worth noting that Peirce takes the "plural denotation"
of terms for granted, or what's the number of a term for,
if it could not vary apart from being one or nil?
5. I also observe that Peirce takes the individual objects of a particular
universe of discourse in a "generative" way, not a "totalizing" way,
and thus they afford us with the basis for talking freely about
collections, constructions, properties, qualities, subsets,
and "higher types", as the phrase is mint.
Selection 3
| The Signs of Inclusion, Equality, Etc. | | I shall follow Boole in taking the sign of equality to signify identity. | Thus, if v denotes the Vice-President of the United States, and p the | President of the Senate of the United States, | | v = p | | means that every Vice-President of the United States is President of the | Senate, and every President of the United States Senate is Vice-President. | The sign "less than" is to be so taken that | | f < m | | means that every Frenchman is a man, but there are men besides Frenchmen. | Drobisch has used this sign in the same sense. It will follow from these | significations of '=' and '<' that the sign '-<' (or '=<', "as small as") | will mean "is". Thus, | | f -< m | | means "every Frenchman is a man", without saying whether there are any | other men or not. So, | | 'm' -< 'l' | | will mean that every mother of anything is a lover of the same thing; | although this interpretation in some degree anticipates a convention to | be made further on. These significations of '=' and '<' plainly conform | to the indispensable conditions. Upon the transitive character of these | relations the syllogism depends, for by virtue of it, from | | f -< m | | and | | m -< a, | | we can infer that | | f -< a; | | that is, from every Frenchman being a man and every | man being an animal, that every Frenchman is an animal. | | But not only do the significations of '=' and '<' here adopted fulfill all | absolute requirements, but they have the supererogatory virtue of being very | nearly the same as the common significations. Equality is, in fact, nothing | but the identity of two numbers; numbers that are equal are those which are | predicable of the same collections, just as terms that are identical are those | which are predicable of the same classes. So, to write 5 < 7 is to say that 5 | is part of 7, just as to write f < m is to say that Frenchmen are part of men. | Indeed, if f < m, then the number of Frenchmen is less than the number of men, | and if v = p, then the number of Vice-Presidents is equal to the number of | Presidents of the Senate; so that the numbers may always be substituted | for the terms themselves, in case no signs of operation occur in the | equations or inequalities. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.66 | | Charles Sanders Peirce, |"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, | Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic", |'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870, |'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 3
The quantifier mapping from terms to their numbers that Peirce signifies by means of the square bracket notation has one of its principal uses in providing a basis for the computation of frequencies, probabilities, and all of the other statistical measures that can be constructed from these, and thus in affording what may be called a "principle of correspondence" between probability theory and its limiting case in the forms of logic. This brings us once again to the relativity of contingency and necessity, as one way of approaching necessity is through the avenue of probability, describing necessity as a probability of 1, but the whole apparatus of probability theory only figures in if it is cast against the backdrop of probability space axioms, the reference class of distributions, and the sample space that we cannot help but to abdeuce upon the scene of observations. Aye, there's the snake eyes. And with them we can see that there is always an irreducible quantum of facticity to all our necessities. More plainly spoken, it takes a fairly complex conceptual infrastructure just to begin speaking of probabilities, and this setting can only be set up by means of abductive, fallible, hypothetical, and inherently risky mental acts. Pragmatic thinking is the logic of abduction, which is just another way of saying that it addresses the question: "What may be hoped?" We have to face the possibility that it may be just as impossible to speak of "absolute identity" with any hope of making practical philosophical sense as it is to speak of "absolute simultaneity" with any hope of making operational physical sense.
Selection 4
| The Signs for Addition | | The sign of addition is taken by Boole so that | | x + y | | denotes everything denoted by x, and, 'besides', | everything denoted by y. | | Thus | | m + w | | denotes all men, and, besides, all women. | | This signification for this sign is needed for | connecting the notation of logic with that of the | theory of probabilities. But if there is anything | which is denoted by both terms of the sum, the latter | no longer stands for any logical term on account of | its implying that the objects denoted by one term | are to be taken 'besides' the objects denoted by | the other. | | For example, | | f + u | | means all Frenchmen besides all violinists, and, | therefore, considered as a logical term, implies | that all French violinists are 'besides themselves'. | | For this reason alone, in a paper which is published | in the Proceedings of the Academy for March 17, 1867, | I preferred to take as the regular addition of logic | a non-invertible process, such that | | m +, b | | stands for all men and black things, without any implication that | the black things are to be taken besides the men; and the study of | the logic of relatives has supplied me with other weighty reasons for | the same determination. | | Since the publication of that paper, I have found that Mr. W. Stanley Jevons, in | a tract called 'Pure Logic, or the Logic of Quality' [1864], had anticipated me in | substituting the same operation for Boole's addition, although he rejects Boole's | operation entirely and writes the new one with a '+' sign while withholding from | it the name of addition. | | It is plain that both the regular non-invertible addition | and the invertible addition satisfy the absolute conditions. | But the notation has other recommendations. The conception | of 'taking together' involved in these processes is strongly | analogous to that of summation, the sum of 2 and 5, for example, | being the number of a collection which consists of a collection of | two and a collection of five. Any logical equation or inequality | in which no operation but addition is involved may be converted | into a numerical equation or inequality by substituting the | numbers of the several terms for the terms themselves -- | provided all the terms summed are mutually exclusive. | | Addition being taken in this sense, | 'nothing' is to be denoted by 'zero', | for then | | x +, 0 = x, | | whatever is denoted by x; and this is the definition | of 'zero'. This interpretation is given by Boole, and | is very neat, on account of the resemblance between the | ordinary conception of 'zero' and that of nothing, and | because we shall thus have | | [0] = 0. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.67 | | Charles Sanders Peirce, |"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, | Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic", |'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870, |'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 4
A wealth of issues arise here that I hope to take up in depth at a later point, but for the moment I shall be able to mention only the barest sample of them in passing. The two papers that precede this one in CP 3 are Peirce's papers of March and September 1867 in the 'Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences', titled "On an Improvement in Boole's Calculus of Logic" and "Upon the Logic of Mathematics", respectively. Among other things, these two papers provide us with further clues about the motivating considerations that brought Peirce to introduce the "number of a term" function, signified here by square brackets. I have already quoted from the "Logic of Mathematics" paper in a related connection. Here are the links to those excerpts: http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04350.html http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04351.html In setting up a correspondence between "letters" and "numbers", my sense is that Peirce is "nocking an arrow", or constructing some kind of structure-preserving map from a logical domain to a numerical domain, and this interpretation is here reinforced by the careful attention that he gives to the conditions under which precisely which aspects of structure are preserved, plus his telling recognition of the criterial fact that zeroes are preserved by the mapping. But here's the catch, the arrow is from the qualitative domain to the quantitative domain, which is just the opposite of what I tend to expect, since I think of quantitative measures as preserving more information than qualitative measures. To curtail the story, it is possible to sort this all out, but that is a story for another day. Other than that, I just want to red flag the beginnings of another one of those "failures to communicate" that so dogged the disciplines in the 20th Century, namely, the fact that Peirce seemed to have an inkling about the problems that would be caused by using the plus sign for inclusive disjunction, but, as it happens, his advice was overridden by the usages in various different communities, rendering the exchange of information among engineering, mathematical, and philosophical specialties a minefield in place of mindfield to this very day.
Selection 5
| The Signs for Multiplication
|
| I shall adopt for the conception of multiplication
| 'the application of a relation', in such a way that,
| for example, 'l'w shall denote whatever is lover of
| a woman. This notation is the same as that used by
| Mr. De Morgan, although he apears not to have had
| multiplication in his mind.
|
| 's'(m +, w) will, then, denote whatever is
| servant of anything of the class composed
| of men and women taken together. So that:
|
| 's'(m +, w) = 's'm +, 's'w.
|
| ('l' +, 's')w will denote whatever is
| lover or servant to a woman, and:
|
| ('l' +, 's')w = 'l'w +, 's'w.
|
| ('sl')w will denote whatever stands to
| a woman in the relation of servant of
| a lover, and:
|
| ('sl')w = 's'('l'w).
|
| Thus all the absolute conditions
| of multiplication are satisfied.
|
| The term "identical with ---" is a unity
| for this multiplication. That is to say,
| if we denote "identical with ---" by !1!
| we have:
|
| 'x'!1! = 'x',
|
| whatever relative term 'x' may be.
| For what is a lover of something
| identical with anything, is the
| same as a lover of that thing.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.68
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce,
|"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives,
| Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic",
|'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870,
|'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 5
Peirce in 1870 is five years down the road from the Peirce of 1865-1866 who lectured extensively on the role of sign relations in the logic of scientific inquiry, articulating their involvement in the three types of inference, and inventing the concept of "information" to explain what it is that signs convey in the process. By this time, then, the semiotic or sign relational approach to logic is so implicit in his way of working that he does not always take the trouble to point out its distinctive features at each and every turn. So let's take a moment to draw out a few of these characters. Sign relations, like any non-trivial brand of 3-adic relations, can become overwhelming to think about once the cardinality of the object, sign, and interpretant domains or the complexity of the relation itself ascends beyond the simplest examples. Furthermore, most of the strategies that we would normally use to control the complexity, like neglecting one of the domains, in effect, projecting the 3-adic sign relation onto one of its 2-adic faces, or focusing on a single ordered triple of the form <o, s, i> at a time, can result in our receiving a distorted impression of the sign relation's true nature and structure. I find that it helps me to draw, or at least to imagine drawing, diagrams of the following form, where I can keep tabs on what's an object, what's a sign, and what's an interpretant sign, for a selected set of sign-relational triples. Here is how I would picture Peirce's example of equivalent terms: v = p, where "v" denotes the Vice-President of the United States, and "p" denotes the President of the Senate of the United States. o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o | Objective Framework (OF) | Interpretive Framework (IF) | o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o | Objects | Signs | o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o | | | o "v" | | / | | / | | / | | o ... o-----------@ | | \ | | \ | | \ | | o "p" | | | o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o Depending on whether we interpret the terms "v" and "p" as applying to persons who hold these offices at one particular time or as applying to all those persons who have held these offices over an extended period of history, their denotations may be either singular of plural, respectively. As a shortcut technique for indicating general denotations or plural referents, I will use the "elliptic convention" that represents these by means of figures like "o o o" or "o ... o", placed at the object ends of sign relational triads. For a more complex example, here is how I would picture Peirce's example of an equivalence between terms that comes about by applying one of the distributive laws, for relative multiplication over absolute summation. o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o | Objective Framework (OF) | Interpretive Framework (IF) | o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o | Objects | Signs | o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o | | | o "'s'(m +, w)" | | / | | / | | / | | o ... o-----------@ | | \ | | \ | | \ | | o "'s'm +, 's'w" | | | o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
Selection 6
| The Signs for Multiplication (cont.)
|
| A conjugative term like 'giver' naturally requires two correlates,
| one denoting the thing given, the other the recipient of the gift.
|
| We must be able to distinguish, in our notation, the
| giver of A to B from the giver to A of B, and, therefore,
| I suppose the signification of the letter equivalent to such
| a relative to distinguish the correlates as first, second, third,
| etc., so that "giver of --- to ---" and "giver to --- of ---" will
| be expressed by different letters.
|
| Let `g` denote the latter of these conjugative terms. Then, the correlates
| or multiplicands of this multiplier cannot all stand directly after it, as is
| usual in multiplication, but may be ranged after it in regular order, so that:
|
| `g`xy
|
| will denote a giver to x of y.
|
| But according to the notation,
| x here multiplies y, so that
| if we put for x owner ('o'),
| and for y horse (h),
|
| `g`'o'h
|
| appears to denote the giver of a horse
| to an owner of a horse. But let the
| individual horses be H, H', H", etc.
|
| Then:
|
| h = H +, H' +, H" +, etc.
|
| `g`'o'h = `g`'o'(H +, H' +, H" +, etc.)
|
| = `g`'o'H +, `g`'o'H' +, `g`'o'H" +, etc.
|
| Now this last member must be interpreted as a giver
| of a horse to the owner of 'that' horse, and this,
| therefore must be the interpretation of `g`'o'h.
|
| This is always very important.
|
| 'A term multiplied by two relatives shows that
| the same individual is in the two relations.'
|
| If we attempt to express the giver of a horse to
| a lover of a woman, and for that purpose write:
|
| `g`'l'wh,
|
| we have written giver of a woman to a lover of her,
| and if we add brackets, thus,
|
| `g`('l'w)h,
|
| we abandon the associative principle of multiplication.
|
| A little reflection will show that the associative principle must
| in some form or other be abandoned at this point. But while this
| principle is sometimes falsified, it oftener holds, and a notation
| must be adopted which will show of itself when it holds. We already
| see that we cannot express multiplication by writing the multiplicand
| directly after the multiplier; let us then affix subjacent numbers after
| letters to show where their correlates are to be found. The first number
| shall denote how many factors must be counted from left to right to reach
| the first correlate, the second how many 'more' must be counted to reach
| the second, and so on.
|
| Then, the giver of a horse to a lover of a woman may be written:
|
| `g`_12 'l'_1 w h = `g`_11 'l'_2 h w = `g`_2(-1) h 'l'_1 w.
|
| Of course a negative number indicates that
| the former correlate follows the latter
| by the corresponding positive number.
|
| A subjacent 'zero' makes the term itself the correlate.
|
| Thus,
|
| 'l'_0
|
| denotes the lover of 'that' lover or the lover of himself, just as
| `g`'o'h denotes that the horse is given to the owner of itself, for
| to make a term doubly a correlate is, by the distributive principle,
| to make each individual doubly a correlate, so that:
|
| 'l'_0 = L_0 +, L_0' +, L_0" +, etc.
|
| A subjacent sign of infinity may
| indicate that the correlate is
| indeterminate, so that:
|
| 'l'_oo
|
| will denote a lover of something.
| We shall have some confirmation
| of this presently.
|
| If the last subjacent number is a 'one'
| it may be omitted. Thus we shall have:
|
| 'l'_1 = 'l',
|
| `g`_11 = `g`_1 = `g`.
|
| This enables us to retain our former expressions 'l'w, `g`'o'h, etc.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.69-70
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce,
|"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives,
| Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic",
|'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870,
|'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 6
Peirce's way of representing sets as sums may seem archaic, but it is
quite often used, and is actually the tool of choice in many branches
of algebra, combinatorics, computing, and statistics to this very day.
Peirce's application to logic is fairly novel, and the degree of his
elaboration of the logic of relative terms is certainly original with
him, but this particular genre of representation, commonly going under
the handle of "generating functions", goes way back, well before anyone
thought to stick a flag in set theory as a separate territory or to try
to fence off our native possessions of it with expressly decreed axioms.
And back in the days when computers were people, before we had the sorts
of "electronic register machines" that we take so much for granted today,
mathematicians were constantly using generating functions as a rough and
ready type of addressable memory to sort, store, and keep track of their
accounts of a wide variety of formal objects of thought.
Let us look at a few simple examples of generating functions,
much as I encountered them during my own first adventures in
the Fair Land Of Combinatoria.
Suppose that we are given a set of three elements,
say, {a, b, c}, and we are asked to find all the
ways of choosing a subset from this collection.
We can represent this problem setup as the
problem of computing the following product:
(1 + a)(1 + b)(1 + c).
The factor (1 + a) represents the option that we have, in choosing
a subset of {a, b, c}, to leave the 'a' out (signified by the "1"),
or else to include it (signified by the "a"), and likewise for the
other elements 'b' and 'c' in their turns.
Probably on account of all those years I flippered away
playing the oldtime pinball machines, I tend to imagine
a product like this being displayed in a vertical array:
(1 + a)
(1 + b)
(1 + c)
I picture this as a playboard with six "bumpers",
the ball chuting down the board in such a career
that it strikes exactly one of the two bumpers
on each and every one of the three levels.
So a trajectory of the ball where it
hits the "a" bumper on the 1st level,
hits the "1" bumper on the 2nd level,
hits the "c" bumper on the 3rd level,
and then exits the board, represents
a single term in the desired product
and corresponds to the subset {a, c}.
Multiplying out (1 + a)(1 + b)(1 + c), one obtains:
1 + a + b + c + ab + ac + bc + abc.
And this informs us that the subsets of choice are:
{}, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}.
Selection 7
| The Signs for Multiplication (cont.) | | The associative principle does not hold in this counting | of factors. Because it does not hold, these subjacent | numbers are frequently inconvenient in practice, and | I therefore use also another mode of showing where | the correlate of a term is to be found. This is | by means of the marks of reference, † ‡ || § ¶, | which are placed subjacent to the relative | term and before and above the correlate. | Thus, giver of a horse to a lover of | a woman may be written: | | `g`_†‡ †'l'_|| ||w ‡h. | | The asterisk I use exclusively to refer to the last | correlate of the last relative of the algebraic term. | | Now, considering the order of multiplication to be: -- | a term, a correlate of it, a correlate of that correlate, | etc. -- there is no violation of the associative principle. | The only violations of it in this mode of notation are that | in thus passing from relative to correlate, we skip about | among the factors in an irregular manner, and that we | cannot substitute in such an expression as `g`'o'h | a single letter for 'o'h. | | I would suggest that such a notation may be found useful in treating other | cases of non-associative multiplication. By comparing this with what was | said above [in CP 3.55] concerning functional multiplication, it appears | that multiplication by a conjugative term is functional, and that the | letter denoting such a term is a symbol of operation. I am therefore | using two alphabets, the Greek and Kennerly, where only one was | necessary. But it is convenient to use both. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.71-72 | | Charles Sanders Peirce, |"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, | Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic", |'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870, |'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 7
NB. On account of the invideous circumstance that various listservers balk at Peirce's "marks of reference" -- or is it only the Microsoft Cryptkeeper's kryptonizing of them? -- I will make the following substitutions in Peirce's text: @ = dagger symbol # = double dagger || = parallel sign $ = section symbol % = paragraph mark It is clear from our last excerpt that Peirce is already on the verge of a graphical syntax for the logic of relatives. Indeed, it seems likely that he had already reached this point in his own thinking. For instance, it seems quite impossible to read his last variation on the theme of a "giver of a horse to a lover of a woman" without drawing lines of identity to connect up the corresponding marks of reference, like this: o---------------------------------------o | | | @ || | | / \ / \ | | o o o o | | `g`_@# @'l'_|| ||w #h | | o o | | \______________/ | | # | | | o---------------------------------------o Giver of a Horse to a Lover of a Woman
Selection 8
| The Signs for Multiplication (cont.) | | Thus far, we have considered the multiplication of relative terms only. | Since our conception of multiplication is the application of a relation, | we can only multiply absolute terms by considering them as relatives. | | Now the absolute term "man" is really exactly equivalent to | the relative term "man that is ---", and so with any other. | I shall write a comma after any absolute term to show that | it is so regarded as a relative term. | | Then: | | "man that is black" | | will be written | | m,b. | | But not only may any absolute term be thus regarded as a relative term, | but any relative term may in the same way be regarded as a relative with | one correlate more. It is convenient to take this additional correlate | as the first one. | | Then: | | 'l','s'w | | will denote a lover of a woman that is a servant of that woman. | | The comma here after 'l' should not be considered as altering at | all the meaning of 'l', but as only a subjacent sign, serving to | alter the arrangement of the correlates. | | In point of fact, since a comma may be added in this way to any | relative term, it may be added to one of these very relatives | formed by a comma, and thus by the addition of two commas | an absolute term becomes a relative of two correlates. | | So: | | m,,b,r | | interpreted like | | `g`'o'h | | means a man that is a rich individual and | is a black that is that rich individual. | | But this has no other meaning than: | | m,b,r | | or a man that is a black that is rich. | | Thus we see that, after one comma is added, the | addition of another does not change the meaning | at all, so that whatever has one comma after it | must be regarded as having an infinite number. | | If, therefore, 'l',,'s'w is not the same as 'l','s'w (as it plainly is not, | because the latter means a lover and servant of a woman, and the former a | lover of and servant of and same as a woman), this is simply because the | writing of the comma alters the arrangement of the correlates. | | And if we are to suppose that absolute terms are multipliers | at all (as mathematical generality demands that we should}, | we must regard every term as being a relative requiring | an infinite number of correlates to its virtual infinite | series "that is --- and is --- and is --- etc." | | Now a relative formed by a comma of course receives its | subjacent numbers like any relative, but the question is, | What are to be the implied subjacent numbers for these | implied correlates? | | Any term may be regarded as having an | infinite number of factors, those | at the end being 'ones', thus: | | 'l','s'w = 'l','s'w,!1!,!1!,!1!,!1!,!1!,!1!,!1!, etc. | | A subjacent number may therefore be as great as we please. | | But all these 'ones' denote the same identical individual denoted | by w; what then can be the subjacent numbers to be applied to 's', | for instance, on account of its infinite "that is"'s? What numbers | can separate it from being identical with w? There are only two. | The first is 'zero', which plainly neutralizes a comma completely, | since | | 's',_0 w = 's'w | | and the other is infinity; for as 1^oo is indeterminate | in ordinary algbra, so it will be shown hereafter to be | here, so that to remove the correlate by the product of | an infinite series of 'ones' is to leave it indeterminate. | | Accordingly, | | m,_oo | | should be regarded as expressing 'some' man. | | Any term, then, is properly to be regarded as having an infinite | number of commas, all or some of which are neutralized by zeros. | | "Something" may then be expressed by: | | !1!_oo. | | I shall for brevity frequently express this by an antique figure one (`1`). | | "Anything" by: | | !1!_0. | | I shall often also write a straight 1 for 'anything'. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.73 | | Charles Sanders Peirce, |"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, | Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic", |'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870, |'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 8.1
To my way of thinking, CP 3.73 is one of the most remarkable passages
in the history of logic. In this first pass over its deeper contents
I won't be able to accord it much more than a superficial dusting off.
As always, it is probably best to begin with a concrete example.
So let us initiate a discourse, whose universe X may remind us
a little of the cast of characters in Shakespeare's 'Othello'.
X = {Bianca, Cassio, Clown, Desdemona, Emilia, Iago, Othello}.
The universe X is "that class of individuals 'about' which alone
the whole discourse is understood to run" but its marking out for
special recognition as a universe of discourse in no way rules out
the possibility that "discourse may run upon something which is not
a subjective part of the universe; for instance, upon the qualities
or collections of the individuals it contains" (CP 3.65).
In order to provide ourselves with the convenience of abbreviated terms,
while staying a bit closer to Peirce's conventions about capitalization,
let us rename the universe "u", the Clown "Jeste", and then rewrite the
above description of the universe of discourse in the following fashion:
u = {B, C, D, E, I, J, O}.
This specification of the universe of discourse could be
summed up in Peirce's notation by the following equation:
1 = B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O.
Within this discussion, then, the "individual terms" are
"B", "C", "D", "E", "I", "J", "O", each of which denotes
in a singular fashion the corresponding individual in X.
As "general terms" of this discussion,
we might begin with the following set:
"b" = "black"
"m" = "man"
"w" = "woman"
In Peirce's notation, the denotation of a general term
can be expressed by means of an equation between terms:
b = O
m = C +, I +, J +, O
w = B +, D +, E
Commentary Note 8.2
I will continue with my commentary on CP 3.73, developing
the Othello example as a way of illustrating its concepts.
In the development of the story so far, we have a universe of discourse
that can be characterized by means of the following system of equations:
1 = B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O
b = O
m = C +, I +, J +, O
w = B +, D +, E
This much provides a basis for collection of absolute terms that
I plan to use in this example. Let us now consider how we might
represent a sufficiently exemplary collection of relative terms.
If we consider the genesis of relative terms, for example, "lover of ---",
"betrayer to --- of ---", or "winner over of --- to --- from ---", we may
regard these fill-in-the-blank forms as being derived by way of a kind of
"rhematic abstraction" from the corresponding instances of absolute terms.
In other words:
1. The relative term "lover of ---" can be constructed by abstracting
the absolute term "Emilia" from the absolute term "lover of Emilia".
Since Iago is a lover of Emilia, the relate-correlate pair denoted
by "Iago:Emilia" is a summand of the relative term "lover of ---".
2. The relative term "betrayer to --- of ---" can be constructed
by abstracting the absolute terms "Othello" and "Desdemona"
from the absolute term "betrayer to Othello of Desdemona".
In as much as Iago is a betrayer to Othello of Desdemona,
the relate-correlate-correlate triple denoted by "I:O:D"
belongs to the relative term "betrayer to --- of ---".
3. The relative term "winner over of --- to --- from ---" can be constructed
by abstracting the absolute terms "Othello", "Iago", and "Cassio" from the
absolute term "winner over of Othello to Iago from Cassio". Since Iago is
a winner over of Othello to Iago from Cassio, the elementary relative term
"I:O:I:C" belongs to the relative term "winner over of --- to --- from ---".
Commentary Note 8.3
Speaking very strictly, we need to be careful to
distinguish a "relation" from a "relative term".
1. The relation is an 'object' of thought
that may be regarded "in extension" as
a set of ordered tuples that are known
as its "elementary relations".
2. The relative term is a 'sign' that denotes certain objects,
called its "relates", as these are determined in relation
to certain other objects, called its "correlates". Under
most circumstances, one may also regard the relative term
as denoting the corresponding relation.
Returning to the Othello example, let us take up the
2-adic relatives "lover of ---" and "servant of ---".
Ignoring the many splendored nuances appurtenant to the idea of love,
we may regard the relative term 'l' for "lover of ---" to be given by
the following equation:
'l' = B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D.
If for no better reason than to make the example more interesting,
let us put aside all distinctions of rank and fealty, collapsing
the motley crews of attendant, servant, subordinate, and so on,
under the heading of a single service, denoted by the relative
term 's' for "servant of ---". The terms of this service are:
's' = C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O.
The term I:C may also be implied, but, since it is
so hotly arguable, I will leave it out of the toll.
One more thing that we need to be duly wary about:
There are many different conventions in the field
as to the ordering of terms in their applications,
and it happens that different conventions will be
more convenient under different circumstances, so
there does not appear to be much of a chance that
any one of them can be canonized once and for all.
In the current reading, we are applying relative terms
from right to left, and so our conception of relative
multiplication, or relational composition, will need
to be adjusted accordingly.
Commentary Note 8.4
To familiarize ourselves with the forms of calculation
that are available in Peirce's notation, let us compute
a few of the simplest products that we find at hand in
the Othello case.
Here are the absolute terms:
1 = B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O
b = O
m = C +, I +, J +, O
w = B +, D +, E
Here are the 2-adic relative terms:
'l' = B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D
's' = C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O
Here are a few of the simplest products among these terms:
'l'1 = "lover of anybody"
= (B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D)(B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O)
= B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, O
= "anybody except J"
'l'b = "lover of a black"
= (B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D)O
= D
'l'm = "lover of a man"
= (B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D)(C +, I +, J +, O)
= B +, D +, E
'l'w = "lover of a woman"
= (B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D)(B +, D +, E)
= C +, I +, O
's'1 = "servant of anybody"
= (C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O)(B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O)
= C +, E +, I +, J
's'b = "servant of a black"
= (C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O)O
= C +, I +, J
's'm = "servant of a man"
= (C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O)(C +, I +, J +, O)
= C +, I +, J
's'w = "servant of a woman"
= (C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O)(B +, D +, E)
= E +, J
'ls' = "lover of a servant of ---"
= (B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D)(C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O)
= B:O +, E:O +, I:D
'sl' = "servant of a lover of ---"
= (C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O)(B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D)
= C:D +, E:O +, I:D +, J:D +, J:O
Among other things, one observes that the
relative terms 'l' and 's' do not commute,
that is to say, 'ls' is not equal to 'sl'.
Commentary Note 8.5
Since multiplication by a 2-adic relative term is a logical analogue of matrix multiplication in linear algebra, all of the products that we computed above can be represented in terms of logical matrices and logical vectors. Here are the absolute terms again, followed by their representation as "coefficient tuples", otherwise thought of as "coordinate vectors". 1 = B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O = <1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1> b = O = <0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1> m = C +, I +, J +, O = <0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1> w = B +, D +, E = <1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0> Since we are going to be regarding these tuples as "column vectors", it is convenient to arrange them into a table of the following form: | 1 b m w ---o--------- B | 1 0 0 1 C | 1 0 1 0 D | 1 0 0 1 E | 1 0 0 1 I | 1 0 1 0 J | 1 0 1 0 O | 1 1 1 0 Here are the 2-adic relative terms again, followed by their representation as coefficient matrices, in this case bordered by row and column labels to remind us what the coefficient values are meant to signify. 'l' = B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, O:D = 'l'| B C D E I J O ---o--------------- B | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 C | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 D | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 E | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 I | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 J | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 's' = C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O = 's'| B C D E I J O ---o--------------- B | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 D | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 E | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 I | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 J | 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 O | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Here are the matrix representations of the products that we calculated before: 'l'1 = "lover of anybody" = | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 1 | = | 1 | | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 | 'l'b = "lover of a black" = | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 0 | = | 0 | | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | 'l'm = "lover of a man" = | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 1 | | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 0 | = | 1 | | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | 'l'w = "lover of a woman" = | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 1 | = | 0 | | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 1 | 's'1 = "servant of anybody" = | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | = | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | 's'b = "servant of a black" = | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | = | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 | | 1 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 | | 0 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | 's'm = "servant of a man" = | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | = | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | 's'w = "servant of a woman" = | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | = | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 | | 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 | | 0 | | 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 | 'ls' = "lover of a servant of ---" = | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | = | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | 'sl' = "servant of a lover of ---" = | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | = | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 |
Commentary Note 8.6
The foregoing has hopefully filled in enough background that we
can begin to make sense of the more mysterious parts of CP 3.73.
| Thus far, we have considered the multiplication of relative terms only.
| Since our conception of multiplication is the application of a relation,
| we can only multiply absolute terms by considering them as relatives.
|
| Now the absolute term "man" is really exactly equivalent to
| the relative term "man that is ---", and so with any other.
| I shall write a comma after any absolute term to show that
| it is so regarded as a relative term.
|
| Then:
|
| "man that is black"
|
| will be written
|
| m,b.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.73
In any system where elements are organized according to types,
there tend to be any number of ways in which elements of one
type are naturally associated with elements of another type.
If the association is anything like a logical equivalence,
but with the first type being "lower" and the second type
being "higher" in some sense, then one frequently speaks
of a "semantic ascent" from the lower to the higher type.
For instance, it is very common in mathematics to associate an element m
of a set M with the constant function f_m : X -> M such that f_m (x) = m
for all x in X, where X is an arbitrary set. Indeed, the correspondence
is so close that one often uses the same name "m" for the element m in M
and the function m = f_m : X -> M, relying on the context or an explicit
type indication to tell them apart.
For another instance, we have the "tacit extension" of a k-place relation
L c X_1 x ... x X_k to a (k+1)-place relation L' c X_1 x ... x X_k+1 that
we get by letting L' = L x X_k+1, that is, by maintaining the constraints
of L on the first k variables and letting the last variable wander freely.
What we have here, if I understand Peirce correctly, is another such
type of natural extension, sometimes called the "diagonal extension".
This associates a k-adic relative or a k-adic relation, counting the
absolute term and the set whose elements it denotes as the cases for
k = 0, with a series of relatives and relations of higher adicities.
A few examples will suffice to anchor these ideas.
Absolute terms:
m = "man" = C +, I +, J +, O
n = "noble" = C +, D +, O
w = "woman" = B +, D +, E
Diagonal extensions:
m, = "man that is ---" = C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
n, = "noble that is ---" = C:C +, D:D +, O:O
w, = "woman that is ---" = B:B +, D:D +, E:E
Sample products:
m,n = "man that is noble"
= (C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O)(C +, D +, O)
= C +, O
n,m = "noble that is man"
= (C:C +, D:D +, O:O)(C +, I +, J +, O)
= C +, O
n,w = "noble that is woman"
= (C:C +, D:D +, O:O)(B +, D +, E)
= D
w,n = "woman that is noble"
= (B:B +, D:D +, E:E)(C +, D +, O)
= D
Selection 9
| The Signs for Multiplication (cont.) | | It is obvious that multiplication into | a multiplicand indicated by a comma is | commutative <1>, that is, | | 's','l' = 'l','s'. | | This multiplication is effectively the same as | that of Boole in his logical calculus. Boole's | unity is my 1, that is, it denotes whatever is. | | <1>. It will often be convenient to speak of the whole operation of | affixing a comma and then multiplying as a commutative multiplication, | the sign for which is the comma. But though this is allowable, we shall | fall into confusion at once if we ever forget that in point of fact it is | not a different multiplication, only it is multiplication by a relative | whose meaning -- or rather whose syntax -- has been slightly altered; | and that the comma is really the sign of this modification of the | foregoing term. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.74 | | Charles Sanders Peirce, |"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, | Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic", |'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870, |'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 9.1
Let us backtrack a few years, and consider how Boole explained his twin conceptions of "selective operations" and "selective symbols". | Let us then suppose that the universe of our discourse | is the actual universe, so that words are to be used in | the full extent of their meaning, and let us consider the | two mental operations implied by the words "white" and "men". | The word "men" implies the operation of selecting in thought | from its subject, the universe, all men; and the resulting | conception, 'men', becomes the subject of the next operation. | The operation implied by the word "white" is that of selecting | from its subject, "men", all of that class which are white. | The final resulting conception is that of "white men". | | Now it is perfectly apparent that if the operations above described | had been performed in a converse order, the result would have been the | same. Whether we begin by forming the conception of "'men'", and then by | a second intellectual act limit that conception to "white men", or whether | we begin by forming the conception of "white objects", and then limit it to | such of that class as are "men", is perfectly indifferent so far as the result | is concerned. It is obvious that the order of the mental processes would be | equally indifferent if for the words "white" and "men" we substituted any | other descriptive or appellative terms whatever, provided only that their | meaning was fixed and absolute. And thus the indifference of the order | of two successive acts of the faculty of Conception, the one of which | furnishes the subject upon which the other is supposed to operate, | is a general condition of the exercise of that faculty. It is | a law of the mind, and it is the real origin of that law of | the literal symbols of Logic which constitutes its formal | expression (1) Chap. II, [namely, xy = yx]. | | It is equally clear that the mental operation above described is of such | a nature that its effect is not altered by repetition. Suppose that by | a definite act of conception the attention has been fixed upon men, and | that by another exercise of the same faculty we limit it to those of the | race who are white. Then any further repetition of the latter mental act, | by which the attention is limited to white objects, does not in any way | modify the conception arrived at, viz., that of white men. This is also | an example of a general law of the mind, and it has its formal expression | in the law ((2) Chap. II) of the literal symbols [namely, x^2 = x]. | | Boole, 'Laws of Thought', pp. 44-45. | | George Boole, |'An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, | On Which are Founded the Mathematical | Theories of Logic and Probabilities', | Reprinted, Dover, New York, NY, 1958. | Originally published, Macmillan, 1854.
Commentary Note 9.2
In setting up his discussion of selective operations and their corresponding selective symbols, Boole writes this: | The operation which we really perform is one of 'selection according to | a prescribed principle or idea'. To what faculties of the mind such an | operation would be referred, according to the received classification of | its powers, it is not important to inquire, but I suppose that it would be | considered as dependent upon the two faculties of Conception or Imagination, | and Attention. To the one of these faculties might be referred the formation | of the general conception; to the other the fixing of the mental regard upon | those individuals within the prescribed universe of discourse which answer to | the conception. If, however, as seems not improbable, the power of Attention | is nothing more than the power of continuing the exercise of any other faculty | of the mind, we might properly regard the whole of the mental process above | described as referrible to the mental faculty of Imagination or Conception, | the first step of the process being the conception of the Universe itself, | and each succeeding step limiting in a definite manner the conception | thus formed. Adopting this view, I shall describe each such step, | or any definite combination of such steps, as a 'definite act | of conception'. | | Boole, 'Laws of Thought', p. 43. | | George Boole, |'An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, | On Which are Founded the Mathematical | Theories of Logic and Probabilities', | Reprinted, Dover, New York, NY, 1958. | Originally published, Macmillan, 1854.
Commentary Note 9.3
In algebra, an "idempotent element" x is one that obeys the "idempotent law", that is, it satisfies the equation xx = x. Under most circumstances, it is usual to write this x^2 = x. If the algebraic system in question falls under the additional laws that are necessary to carry out the requisite transformations, then x^2 = x is convertible into x - x^2 = 0, and this into x(1 - x) = 0. If the algebraic system in question happens to be a boolean algebra, then the equation x(1 - x) = 0 says that x & ~x is identically false, in effect, a statement of the classical principle of non-contradiction. We have already seen how Boole found rationales for the commutative law and the idempotent law by contemplating the properties of "selective operations". It is time to bring these threads together, which we can do by considering the so-called "idempotent representation" of sets. This will give us one of the best ways to understand the significance that Boole attached to selective operations. It will also link up with the statements that Peirce makes about his adicity-augmenting comma operation.
Commentary Note 9.4
Boole rationalized the properties of what we now dub "boolean multiplication",
roughly equivalent to logical conjunction, in terms of the laws that apply to
selective operations. Peirce, in his turn, taking a very significant step of
analysis that has seldom been recognized for what it would lead to, much less
followed, does not consider this multiplication to be a fundamental operation,
but derives it as a by-product of relative multiplication by a comma relative.
Thus, Peirce makes logical conjunction a special case of relative composition.
This opens up a very wide field of investigation,
"the operational significance of logical terms",
one might say, but it will be best to advance
bit by bit, and to lean on simple examples.
Back to Venice, and the close-knit party
of absolutes and relatives that we were
entertaining when last we were there.
Here is the list of absolute terms that we were considering before,
to which I have thrown in 1, the universe of "anybody or anything",
just for good measure:
1 = "anybody" = B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O
m = "man" = C +, I +, J +, O
n = "noble" = C +, D +, O
w = "woman" = B +, D +, E
Here is the list of "comma inflexions" or "diagonal extensions" of these terms:
1, = "anybody that is ---" = B:B +, C:C +, D:D +, E:E +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
m, = "man that is ---" = C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
n, = "noble that is ---" = C:C +, D:D +, O:O
w, = "woman that is ---" = B:B +, D:D +, E:E
One observes that the diagonal extension of 1
is the same thing as the identity relation !1!.
Inspired by this identification of "1," with "!1!", and because
the affixed commas of the diagonal extensions tend to get lost
in the ordinary commas of punctuation, I will experiment with
using the alternative notations:
m, = !m!
n, = !n!
w, = !w!
Working within our smaller sample of absolute terms,
we have already computed the sorts of products that
apply the diagonal extension of an absolute term to
another absolute term, for instance, these products:
m,n = !m!n = "man that is noble" = C +, O
n,m = !n!m = "noble that is man" = C +, O
n,w = !n!w = "noble that is woman" = D
w,n = !w!n = "woman that is noble" = D
This exercise gave us a bit of practical insight into
why the commutative law holds for logical conjunction.
Further insight into the laws that govern this realm of logic,
and the underlying reasons why they apply, might be gained by
systematically working through the whole variety of different
products that are generated by the operational means in sight,
namely, the products indicated by {1, m, n, w}<,>{1, m, n, w}.
But before we try to explore this territory more systematically,
let us equip ourselves with the sorts of graphical and matrical
representations that we discovered to provide us with such able
assists to the intuition in so many of our previous adventures.
Commentary Note 9.5
Peirce's comma operation, in its application to an absolute term,
is tantamount to the representation of that term's denotation as
an idempotent transformation, which is commonly represented as a
diagonal matrix. This is why I call it the "diagonal extension".
An idempotent element x is given by the abstract condition that xx = x,
but we commonly encounter such elements in more concrete circumstances,
acting as operators or transformations on other sets or spaces, and in
that action they will often be represented as matrices of coefficients.
Let's see how all of this looks from the graphical and matrical perspectives.
Absolute terms:
1 = "anybody" = B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O
m = "man" = C +, I +, J +, O
n = "noble" = C +, D +, O
w = "woman" = B +, D +, E
Previously, we represented absolute terms as column vectors.
The above four terms are given by the columns of this table:
| 1 m n w
---o---------
B | 1 0 0 1
C | 1 1 1 0
D | 1 0 1 1
E | 1 0 0 1
I | 1 1 0 0
J | 1 1 0 0
O | 1 1 1 0
One way to represent sets in the bigraph picture
is simply to mark the nodes in some way, like so:
B C D E I J O
1 + + + + + + +
B C D E I J O
m o + o o + + +
B C D E I J O
n o + + o o o +
B C D E I J O
w + o + + o o o
Diagonal extensions of the absolute terms:
1, = "anybody that is ---" = B:B +, C:C +, D:D +, E:E +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
m, = "man that is ---" = C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
n, = "noble that is ---" = C:C +, D:D +, O:O
w, = "woman that is ---" = B:B +, D:D +, E:E
Naturally enough, the diagonal extensions are represented by diagonal matrices:
!1!| B C D E I J O
---o---------------
B | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
C | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
D | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
E | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
I | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
J | 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
O | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
!m!| B C D E I J O
---o---------------
B | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
D | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I | 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
J | 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
O | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
!n!| B C D E I J O
---o---------------
B | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C | 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
D | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
E | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
J | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O | 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
!w!| B C D E I J O
---o---------------
B | 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
C | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D | 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
E | 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
I | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
J | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cast into the bigraph picture of 2-adic relations,
the diagonal extension of an absolute term takes on
a very distinctive sort of "straight-laced" character:
B C D E I J O
u o o o o o o o
| | | | | | |
1, | | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
u o o o o o o o
B C D E I J O
B C D E I J O
u o o o o o o o
| | | |
m, | | | |
| | | |
u o o o o o o o
B C D E I J O
B C D E I J O
u o o o o o o o
| | |
n, | | |
| | |
u o o o o o o o
B C D E I J O
B C D E I J O
u o o o o o o o
| | |
w, | | |
| | |
u o o o o o o o
B C D E I J O
Commentary Note 9.6
Just to be doggedly persistent about it all, here is what
ought to be a sufficient sample of products involving the
multiplication of a comma relative onto an absolute term,
presented in both graphical and matrical representations.
Example 1. Anything That Is Anything
1,1 = 1
"anything that is anything" = "anything"
B C D E I J O
+ + + + + + + 1
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | | 1,
| | | | | | |
o o o o o o o =
+ + + + + + + 1
B C D E I J O
| 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 | | 1 | = | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
Example 2. Anything That Is Man
1,m = m
"anything that is man" = "man"
B C D E I J O
o + o o + + + m
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | | 1,
| | | | | | |
o o o o o o o =
o + o o + + + m
B C D E I J O
| 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 |
| 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 |
| 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 | | 0 | = | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
Example 3. Man That Is Anything
m,1 = m
"man that is anything" = "man"
B C D E I J O
+ + + + + + + 1
| | | |
| | | | m,
| | | |
o o o o o o o =
o + o o + + + m
B C D E I J O
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 |
| 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | = | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
Example 4. Man That Is Noble
m,n = "man that is noble"
B C D E I J O
o + + o o o + n
| | | |
| | | | m,
| | | |
o o o o o o o =
o + o o o o + m,n
B C D E I J O
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 |
| 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | = | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 | | 0 | | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
Example 5. Noble That Is Man
n,m = "noble that is man"
B C D E I J O
o + o o + + + m
| | |
| | | n,
| | |
o o o o o o o =
o + o o o o + n,m
B C D E I J O
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 |
| 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 1 |
| 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 0 | = | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | | 1 | | 0 |
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
Commentary Note 9.7
From this point forward we may think of idempotents, selectives, and zero-one diagonal matrices as being roughly equivalent notions. The only reason that I say "roughly" is that we are comparing ideas at different levels of abstraction when we propose these connections. We have covered the way that Peirce uses his invention of the comma modifier to assimilate boolean multiplication, logical conjunction, or what we may think of as "serial selection" under his more general account of relative multiplication. But the comma functor has its application to relative terms of any arity, not just the zeroth arity of absolute terms, and so there will be a lot more to explore on this point. But now I must return to the anchorage of Peirce's text, and hopefully get a chance to revisit this topic later.
Selection 10
| The Signs for Multiplication (cont.) | | The sum 'x' + 'x' generally denotes no logical term. | But 'x',_oo + 'x',_oo may be considered as denoting | some two 'x's. | | It is natural to write: | | 'x' + 'x' = !2!.'x' | | and | | 'x',_oo + 'x',_oo = !2!.'x',_oo | | where the dot shows that this multiplication is invertible. | | We may also use the antique figures so that: | | !2!.'x',_oo = `2`'x' | | just as | | !1!_oo = `1`. | | Then `2` alone will denote some two things. | | But this multiplication is not in general commutative, | and only becomes so when it affects a relative which | imparts a relation such that a thing only bears it | to 'one' thing, and one thing 'alone' bears it to | a thing. | | For instance, the lovers of two women are not | the same as two lovers of women, that is: | | 'l'`2`.w | | and | | `2`.'l'w | | are unequal; | | but the husbands of two women are the | same as two husbands of women, that is: | | 'h'`2`.w = `2`.'h'w | | and in general: | | 'x',`2`.'y' = `2`.'x','y'. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.75 | | Charles Sanders Peirce, |"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, | Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic", |'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870, |'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 10.1
What Peirce is attempting to do in CP 3.75 is absolutely amazing,
and I personally did not see anything on par with it again until
I began to study the application of mathematical category theory
to computation and logic, back in the mid 1980's. To completely
evaluate the success of this attempt, we would have to return to
Peirce's earlier paper "Upon the Logic of Mathematics" (1867) to
pick up some of the ideas about arithmetic that he set out there.
Another branch of the investigation would require that we examine
more careully the entire syntactic mechanics of "subjacent signs"
that Peirce uses to establish linkages among relational domains.
It is important to note that these types of indices constitute
a diacritical, interpretive, syntactic category under which
Peirce also places the comma functor.
The way that I would currently approach both of these branches
of the investigation would be to open up a wider context for
the study of relational compositions, attempting to get at
the essence of what is going on we when relate relations,
possibly complex, to other relations, possibly simple.
But that will take another cup of java ('c'j) ---
or maybe two, `2`'c'j = (!2!.'c',_oo)j ...
Commentary Note 10.2
To say that a relative term "imparts a relation" is to say that it conveys information about the space of tuples in a cartesian product, that is, it determines a particular subset of that space. When we study the combinations of relative terms, from the most elementary forms of composition to the most complex patterns of correlation, we are considering the ways that these constraints, determinations, and informations, as imparted by relative terms, can be compounded in the formation of syntax. Let us go back and look more carefully at just how it happens that Peirce's jacent terms and subjacent indices manage to impart their respective measures of information about relations. I will begin with the two examples illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, where I have drawn in the corresponding lines of identity between the subjacent marks of reference #, $, %. o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | 'l'__# #'s'__$ $w | | o o o o | | \ / \ / | | \ / o | | \ / $ | | o | | # | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 1. Lover of a Servant of a Woman o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | `g`__#__$ #'l'__% %w $h | | o o o o o o | | \ \ / \ / / | | \ \/ o / | | \ /\ % / | | o ------o------ | | # $ | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 2. Giver of a Horse to a Lover of a Woman One way to approach the problem of "information fusion" in Peirce's syntax is to soften the distinction between jacent terms and subjacent signs, and to treat the types of constraints that they separately signify more on a par with each other. To that purpose, I will set forth a way of thinking about relational composition that emphasizes the set-theoretic constraints involved in the construction of a composite. For example, suppose that we are given the relations L c X x Y, M c Y x Z. Table 3 and Figure 4 present a couple of ways of picturing the constraints that are involved in constructing the relational composition L o M c X x Z. Table 3. Relational Composition o---------o---------o---------o---------o | # !1! | !1! | !1! | o=========o=========o=========o=========o | L # X | Y | | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | M # | Y | Z | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | L o M # X | | Z | o---------o---------o---------o---------o The way to read Table 3 is to imagine that you are playing a game that involves placing tokens on the squares of a board that is marked in just this way. The rules are that you have to place a single token on each marked square in the middle of the board in such a way that all of the indicated constraints are satisfied. That is to say, you have to place a token whose denomination is a value in the set X on each of the squares marked "X", and similarly for the squares marked "Y" and "Z", meanwhile leaving all of the blank squares empty. Furthermore, the tokens placed in each row and column have to obey the relational constraints that are indicated at the heads of the corresponding row and column. Thus, the two tokens from X have to denominate the very same value from X, and likewise for Y and Z, while the pairs of tokens on the rows marked "L" and "M" are required to denote elements that are in the relations L and M, respectively. The upshot is that when just this much is done, that is, when the L, M, and !1! relations are satisfied, then the row marked "L o M" will automatically bear the tokens of a pair of elements in the composite relation L o M. o-------------------------------------------------o | | | L L o M M | | @ @ @ | | / \ / \ / \ | | o o o o o o | | X Y X Z Y Z | | o o o o o o | | \ \ / \ / / | | \ / \ / | | \ / \__ __/ \ / | | @ @ @ | | !1! !1! !1! | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 4. Relational Composition Figure 4 merely shows a different way of viewing the same situation.
Commentary Note 10.3
I will devote some time to drawing out the relationships that exist among the different pictures of relations and relative terms that were shown above, or as redrawn here: o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | 'l'__$ $'s'__% %w | | o o o o | | \ / \ / | | \ / o | | \ / % | | o | | $ | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 1. Lover of a Servant of a Woman o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | `g`__$__% $'l'__* *w %h | | o o o o o o | | \ \ / \ / / | | \ \/ o / | | \ /\ * / | | o ------o------ | | $ % | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 2. Giver of a Horse to a Lover of a Woman Table 3. Relational Composition o---------o---------o---------o---------o | # !1! | !1! | !1! | o=========o=========o=========o=========o | L # X | Y | | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | S # | Y | Z | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | L o S # X | | Z | o---------o---------o---------o---------o o-------------------------------------------------o | | | L L o S S | | @ @ @ | | / \ / \ / \ | | o o o o o o | | X Y X Z Y Z | | o o o o o o | | \ \ / \ / / | | \ / \ / | | \ / \__ __/ \ / | | @ @ @ | | !1! !1! !1! | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 4. Relational Composition Figures 1 and 2 exhibit examples of relative multiplication in one of Peirce's styles of syntax, to which I subtended lines of identity to mark the anaphora of the correlates. These pictures are adapted to showing the anatomy of the relative terms, while the forms of analysis illustrated in Table 3 and Figure 4 are designed to highlight the structures of the objective relations themselves. There are many ways that Peirce might have gotten from his 1870 Notation for the Logic of Relatives to his more evolved systems of Logical Graphs. For my part, I find it interesting to speculate on how the metamorphosis might have been accomplished by way of transformations that act on these nascent forms of syntax and that take place not too far from the pale of its means, that is, as nearly as possible according to the rules and the permissions of the initial system itself. In Existential Graphs, a relation is represented by a node whose degree is the adicity of that relation, and which is adjacent via lines of identity to the nodes that represent its correlative relations, including as a special case any of its terminal individual arguments. In the 1870 Logic of Relatives, implicit lines of identity are invoked by the subjacent numbers and marks of reference only when a correlate of some relation is the relate of some relation. Thus, the principal relate, which is not a correlate of any explicit relation, is not singled out in this way. Remarkably enough, the comma modifier itself provides us with a mechanism to abstract the logic of relations from the logic of relatives, and thus to forge a possible link between the syntax of relative terms and the more graphical depiction of the objective relations themselves. Figure 5 demonstrates this possibility, posing a transitional case between the style of syntax in Figure 1 and the picture of composition in Figure 4. o-----------------------------------------------------------o | | | L o S | | ____________@____________ | | / \ | | / L S \ | | / @ @ \ | | / / \ / \ \ | | / / \ / \ \ | | o o o o o o | | X X Y Y Z Z | | 1,__# #'l'__$ $'s'__% %1 | | o o o o o o | | \ / \ / \ / | | \ / \ / \ / | | \ / \ / \ / | | @ @ @ | | !1! !1! !1! | | | o-----------------------------------------------------------o Figure 5. Anything that is a Lover of a Servant of Anything In this composite sketch, the diagonal extension of the universe 1 is invoked up front to anchor an explicit line of identity for the leading relate of the composition, while the terminal argument "w" has been generalized to the whole universe 1, in effect, executing an act of abstraction. This type of universal bracketing isolates the composing of the relations L and S to form the composite L o S. The three relational domains X, Y, Z may be distinguished from one another, or else rolled up into a single universe of discourse, as one prefers.
Commentary Note 10.4
From now on I will use the forms of analysis exemplified in the last set of Figures and Tables as a routine bridge between the logic of relative terms and the logic of their extended relations. For future reference, we may think of Table 3 as illustrating the "solitaire" or "spreadsheet" model of relational composition, while Figure 4 may be thought of as making a start toward the "hyper(di)graph" model of generalized compositions. I will explain the hypergraph model in some detail at a later point. The transitional form of analysis represented by Figure 5 may be called the "universal bracketing" of relatives as relations.
Commentary Note 10.5
We have sufficiently covered the application of the comma functor,
or the diagonal extension, to absolute terms, so let us return to
where we were in working our way through CP 3.73, and see whether
we can validate Peirce's statements about the "commifications" of
2-adic relative terms that yield their 3-adic diagonal extensions.
| But not only may any absolute term be thus regarded as
| a relative term, but any relative term may in the same
| way be regarded as a relative with one correlate more.
| It is convenient to take this additional correlate as
| the first one.
|
| Then:
|
| 'l','s'w
|
| will denote a lover of a woman
| that is a servant of that woman.
|
| The comma here after 'l' should not be considered
| as altering at all the meaning of 'l', but as only
| a subjacent sign, serving to alter the arrangement
| of the correlates.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.73
Just to plant our feet on a more solid stage,
let's apply this idea to the Othello example.
For this performance only, just to make the example more interesting,
let us assume that Jeste (J) is secretly in love with Desdemona (D).
Then we begin with the modified data set:
w = "woman" = B +, D +, E
'l' = "lover of ---" = B:C +, C:B +, D:O +, E:I +, I:E +, J:D +, O:D
's' = "servant of ---" = C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O
And next we derive the following results:
'l', = "lover that is --- of ---"
= B:B:C +, C:C:B +, D:D:O +, E:E:I +, I:I:E +, J:J:D +, O:O:D
'l','s'w = (B:B:C +, C:C:B +, D:D:O +, E:E:I +, I:I:E +, J:J:D +, O:O:D)
x (C:O +, E:D +, I:O +, J:D +, J:O)
x (B +, D +, E)
Now what are we to make of that?
If we operate in accordance with Peirce's example of `g`'o'h
as the "giver of a horse to an owner of that horse", then we
may assume that the associative law and the distributive law
are by default in force, allowing us to derive this equation:
'l','s'w = 'l','s'(B +, D +, E)
= 'l','s'B +, 'l','s'D +, 'l','s'E
Evidently what Peirce means by the associative principle,
as it applies to this type of product, is that a product
of elementary relatives having the form (R:S:T)(S:T)(T)
is equal to R but that no other form of product yields
a non-null result. Scanning the implied terms of the
triple product tells us that only the following case
is non-null: J = (J:J:D)(J:D)(D). It follows that:
'l','s'w = "lover and servant of a woman"
= "lover that is a servant of a woman"
= "lover of a woman that is a servant of that woman"
= J
And so what Peirce says makes sense in this case.
Commentary Note 10.6
As Peirce observes, it is not possible to work with relations in general without eventually abandoning all of one's algebraic principles, in due time the associative and maybe even the distributive, just as we have already left behind the commutative. It cannot be helped, as we cannot reflect on a law if not from a perspective outside it, that is to say, at any rate, virtually so. One way to do this would be from the standpoint of the combinator calculus, and there are places where Peirce verges on systems that are very similar, but I am making a deliberate effort to remain here as close as possible within the syntactoplastic chronism of his 1870 Logic of Relatives. So let us make use of the smoother transitions that are afforded by the paradigmatic Figures and Tables that I drew up earlier. For the next few episodes, then, I will examine the examples that Peirce gives at the next level of complication in the multiplication of relative terms, for instance, the three that I have redrawn below. o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | `g`__$__% $'l'__* *w %h | | o o o o o o | | \ \ / \ / / | | \ \/ @ / | | \ /\______ ______/ | | @ @ | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 6. Giver of a Horse to a Lover of a Woman o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | `g`__$__% $'o'__* *%h | | o o o o oo | | \ \ / \ // | | \ \/ @/ | | \ /\____ ____/ | | @ @ | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 7. Giver of a Horse to an Owner of It o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | 'l',__$__% $'s'__* *%w | | o o o o oo | | \ \ / \ // | | \ \/ @/ | | \ /\____ ____/ | | @ @ | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 8. Lover that is a Servant of a Woman
Commentary Note 10.7
Here is what I get when I try to analyze Peirce's "giver of a horse to a lover of a woman" example along the same lines as the 2-adic compositions. We may begin with the mark-up shown in Figure 6. o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | `g`__$__% $'l'__* *w %h | | o o o o o o | | \ \ / \ / / | | \ \/ @ / | | \ /\______ ______/ | | @ @ | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 6. Giver of a Horse to a Lover of a Woman If we analyze this in accord with the "spreadsheet" model of relational composition, the core of it is a particular way of composing a 3-adic "giving" relation G c T x U x V with a 2-adic "loving" relation L c U x W so as to obtain a specialized sort of 3-adic relation (G o L) c T x W x V. The applicable constraints on tuples are shown in Table 9. Table 9. Composite of Triadic and Dyadic Relations o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o | # !1! | !1! | !1! | !1! | o=========o=========o=========o=========o=========o | G # T | U | | V | o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o | L # | U | W | | o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o | G o L # T | | W | V | o---------o---------o---------o---------o---------o The hypergraph picture of the abstract composition is given in Figure 10. o---------------------------------------------------------------------o | | | G o L | | ___________@___________ | | / \ \ | | / G L \ \ | | / @ @ \ \ | | / /|\ / \ \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ \ | | o o o o o o o o | | T T U V U W W V | | 1,_# #`g`_$____% $'l'______* *1 %1 | | o o o o o o o o | | \ / \ \ / \ / / | | @ \ \/ @ / | | !1! \ /\ !1! / | | \ / \_______ _______/ | | @ @ | | !1! !1! | | | o---------------------------------------------------------------------o Figure 10. Anything that is a Giver of Anything to a Lover of Anything
Commentary Note 10.8
In taking up the next example of relational composition, let's exchange the relation 't' = "trainer of ---" for Peirce's relation 'o' = "owner of ---", simply for the sake of avoiding conflicts in the symbols that we use. In this way, Figure 7 is transformed into Figure 11. o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | `g`__$__% $'t'__* *%h | | o o o o oo | | \ \ / \ // | | \ \/ @/ | | \ /\____ ____/ | | @ @ | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 11. Giver of a Horse to a Trainer of It Now here's an interesting point, in fact, a critical transition point, that we see resting in potential but a stone's throw removed from the chronism, the secular neigborhood, the temporal vicinity of Peirce's 1870 LOR, and it's a vertex that turns on the teridentity relation. The hypergraph picture of the abstract composition is given in Figure 12. o---------------------------------------------------------------------o | | | G o T | | _________________@_________________ | | / \ | | / G T \ | | / @ @ \ | | / /|\ / \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ | | o o o o o o o | | X X Y Z Y Z Z | | 1,_# #`g`_$____% $'t'______% %1 | | o o o o o o o | | \ / \ \ / | / | | \ / \ \/ | / | | \ / \ /\ | / | | \ / \ / \__________|__________/ | | @ @ @ | | !1! !1! !1! | | | o---------------------------------------------------------------------o Figure 12. Anything that is a Giver of Anything to a Trainer of It If we analyze this in accord with the "spreadsheet" model of relational composition, the core of it is a particular way of composing a 3-adic "giving" relation G c X x Y x Z with a 2-adic "training" relation T c Y x Z in such a way as to determine a certain 2-adic relation (G o T) c X x Z. Table 13 schematizes the associated constraints on tuples. Table 13. Another Brand of Composition o---------o---------o---------o---------o | # !1! | !1! | !1! | o=========o=========o=========o=========o | G # X | Y | Z | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | T # | Y | Z | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | G o T # X | | Z | o---------o---------o---------o---------o So we see that the notorious teridentity relation, which I have left equivocally denoted by the same symbol as the identity relation !1!, is already implicit in Peirce's discussion at this point.
Commentary Note 10.9
The use of the concepts of identity and teridentity is not to identify a thing in itself with itself, much less twice or thrice over, since there is no need and thus no utility in that. I can imagine Peirce asking, on Kantian principles if not entirely on Kantian premisses, "Where is the manifold to be unified?" The manifold that demands unification does not reside in the object but in the phenomena, that is, in the appearances that might have been appearances of different objects but that happen to be constrained by these identities to being just so many aspects, facets, parts, roles, or signs of one and the same object. For example, notice how the various identity concepts actually functioned in the last example, where they had the opportunity to show their behavior in something like their natural habitat. The use of the teridentity concept in the case of the "giver of a horse to a trainer of it" is to stipulate that the thing appearing with respect to its quality under the aspect of an absolute term, a horse, and the thing appearing with respect to its recalcitrance in the role of the correlate of a 2-adic relative, a brute to be trained, and the thing appearing with respect to its synthesis in the role of a correlate of a 3-adic relative, a gift, are one and the same thing.
Commentary Note 10.10
Figure 8 depicts the last of the three examples involving the composition of 3-adic relatives with 2-adic relatives: o-------------------------------------------------o | | | | | 'l',__$__% $'s'__* *%w | | o o o o oo | | \ \ / \ // | | \ \/ @/ | | \ /\____ ____/ | | @ @ | | | | | o-------------------------------------------------o Figure 8. Lover that is a Servant of a Woman The hypergraph picture of the abstract composition is given in Figure 14. o---------------------------------------------------------------------o | | | L , S | | __________________^__________________ | | / \ | | / L_, S \ | | / @ @ \ | | / /|\ / \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ | | / / | \ / \ \ | | o o o o o o o | | X X X Y X Y Y | | 1,_# #'l',_$_____% $'t'________% %1 | | o o o o o o o | | \ / \ \ / | / | | \ / \ \ | / | | \ / \ / \ | / | | \ / \ / \___________|___________/ | | @ @ @ | | !1! !1! !1! | | | o---------------------------------------------------------------------o Figure 14. Anything that's a Lover of Anything and that's a Servant of It This example illustrates the way that Peirce analyzes the logical conjunction, we might even say the "parallel conjunction", of a couple of 2-adic relatives in terms of the comma extension and the same style of composition that we saw in the last example, that is, according to a pattern of anaphora that invokes the teridentity relation. If we lay out this analysis of conjunction on the spreadsheet model of relational composition, the gist of it is the diagonal extension of a 2-adic "loving" relation L c X x Y to the corresponding 3-adic "loving and being" relation L_, c X x X x Y, which is then composed in a specific way with a 2-adic "serving" relation S c X x Y, so as to determine the 2-adic relation L,S c X x Y. Table 15 schematizes the associated constraints on tuples. Table 15. Conjunction Via Composition o---------o---------o---------o---------o | # !1! | !1! | !1! | o=========o=========o=========o=========o | L, # X | X | Y | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | S # | X | Y | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | L , S # X | | Y | o---------o---------o---------o---------o
Commentary Note 10.11
I return to where we were in unpacking the contents of CP 3.73.
Peirce remarks that the comma operator can be iterated at will:
| In point of fact, since a comma may be added in this way to any
| relative term, it may be added to one of these very relatives
| formed by a comma, and thus by the addition of two commas
| an absolute term becomes a relative of two correlates.
|
| So:
|
| m,,b,r
|
| interpreted like
|
| `g`'o'h
|
| means a man that is a rich individual and
| is a black that is that rich individual.
|
| But this has no other meaning than:
|
| m,b,r
|
| or a man that is a black that is rich.
|
| Thus we see that, after one comma is added, the
| addition of another does not change the meaning
| at all, so that whatever has one comma after it
| must be regarded as having an infinite number.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.73
Again, let us check whether this makes sense
on the stage of our small but dramatic model.
Let's say that Desdemona and Othello are rich,
and, among the persons of the play, only they.
With this premiss we obtain a sample of absolute terms
that is sufficiently ample to work through our example:
1 = B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O
b = O
m = C +, I +, J +, O
r = D +, O
One application of the comma operator
yields the following 2-adic relatives:
1, = B:B +, C:C +, D:D +, E:E +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
b, = O:O
m, = C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
r, = D:D +, O:O
Another application of the comma operator
generates the following 3-adic relatives:
1,, = B:B:B +, C:C:C +, D:D:D +, E:E:E +, I:I:I +, J:J:J +, O:O:O
b,, = O:O:O
m,, = C:C:C +, I:I:I +, J:J:J +, O:O:O
r,, = D:D:D +, O:O:O
Assuming the associativity of multiplication among 2-adic relatives,
we may compute the product m,b,r by a brute force method as follows:
m,b,r = (C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O)(O:O)(D +, O)
= (C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O)(O)
= O
This avers that a man that is black that is rich is Othello,
which is true on the premisses of our universe of discourse.
The stock associations of `g`'o'h lead us to multiply out the
product m,,b,r along the following lines, where the trinomials
of the form (X:Y:Z)(Y:Z)(Z) are the only ones that produce any
non-null result, specifically, of the form (X:Y:Z)(Y:Z)(Z) = X.
m,,b,r = (C:C:C +, I:I:I +, J:J:J +, O:O:O)(O:O)(D +, O)
= (O:O:O)(O:O)(O)
= O
So we have that m,,b,r = m,b,r.
In closing, observe that the teridentity relation has turned up again
in this context, as the second comma-ing of the universal term itself:
1,, = B:B:B +, C:C:C +, D:D:D +, E:E:E +, I:I:I +, J:J:J +, O:O:O.
Selection 11
| The Signs for Multiplication (concl.) | | The conception of multiplication we have adopted is that of | the application of one relation to another. So, a quaternion | being the relation of one vector to another, the multiplication | of quaternions is the application of one such relation to a second. | | Even ordinary numerical multiplication involves the same idea, for | 2 x 3 is a pair of triplets, and 3 x 2 is a triplet of pairs, where | "triplet of" and "pair of" are evidently relatives. | | If we have an equation of the form: | | xy = z | | and there are just as many x's per y as there are, | 'per' things, things of the universe, then we have | also the arithmetical equation: | | [x][y] = [z]. | | For instance, if our universe is perfect men, and there | are as many teeth to a Frenchman (perfect understood) | as there are to any one of the universe, then: | | ['t'][f] = ['t'f] | | holds arithmetically. | | So if men are just as apt to be black as things in general: | | [m,][b] = [m,b] | | where the difference between [m] and [m,] must not be overlooked. | | It is to be observed that: | | [!1!] = `1`. | | Boole was the first to show this connection between logic and | probabilities. He was restricted, however, to absolute terms. | I do not remember having seen any extension of probability to | relatives, except the ordinary theory of 'expectation'. | | Our logical multiplication, then, satisfies the essential conditions | of multiplication, has a unity, has a conception similar to that of | admitted multiplications, and contains numerical multiplication as | a case under it. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.76 | | Charles Sanders Peirce, |"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives, | Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic", |'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870, |'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
Commentary Note 11.1
We have reached in our reading of Peirce's text a suitable place to pause -- actually, it is more like to run as fast as we can along a parallel track -- where I can due quietus make of a few IOU's that I've used to pave my way. The more pressing debts that come to mind are concerned with the matter of Peirce's "number of" function, that maps a term t into a number [t], and with my justification for calling a certain style of illustration by the name of the "hypergraph" picture of relational composition. As it happens, there is a thematic relation between these topics, and so I can make my way forward by addressing them together. At this point we have two good pictures of how to compute the relational compositions of arbitrary 2-adic relations, namely, the bigraph and the matrix representations, each of which has its differential advantages in different types of situations. But we do not have a comparable picture of how to compute the richer variety of relational compositions that involve 3-adic or any higher adicity relations. As a matter of fact, we run into a non-trivial classification problem simply to enumerate the different types of compositions that arise in these cases. Therefore, let us inaugurate a systematic study of relational composition, general enough to explicate the "generative potency" of Peirce's 1870 LOR.
Commentary Note 11.2
Let's bring together the various things that Peirce has said
about the "number of function" up to this point in the paper.
NOF 1.
| I propose to assign to all logical terms, numbers;
| to an absolute term, the number of individuals it denotes;
| to a relative term, the average number of things so related
| to one individual.
|
| Thus in a universe of perfect men ('men'),
| the number of "tooth of" would be 32.
|
| The number of a relative with two correlates would be the
| average number of things so related to a pair of individuals;
| and so on for relatives of higher numbers of correlates.
|
| I propose to denote the number of a logical term by
| enclosing the term in square brackets, thus ['t'].
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.65
NOF 2.
| But not only do the significations of '=' and '<' here adopted fulfill all
| absolute requirements, but they have the supererogatory virtue of being very
| nearly the same as the common significations. Equality is, in fact, nothing
| but the identity of two numbers; numbers that are equal are those which are
| predicable of the same collections, just as terms that are identical are those
| which are predicable of the same classes. So, to write 5 < 7 is to say that 5
| is part of 7, just as to write f < m is to say that Frenchmen are part of men.
| Indeed, if f < m, then the number of Frenchmen is less than the number of men,
| and if v = p, then the number of Vice-Presidents is equal to the number of
| Presidents of the Senate; so that the numbers may always be substituted
| for the terms themselves, in case no signs of operation occur in the
| equations or inequalities.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.66
NOF 3.
| It is plain that both the regular non-invertible addition
| and the invertible addition satisfy the absolute conditions.
| But the notation has other recommendations. The conception
| of 'taking together' involved in these processes is strongly
| analogous to that of summation, the sum of 2 and 5, for example,
| being the number of a collection which consists of a collection of
| two and a collection of five. Any logical equation or inequality
| in which no operation but addition is involved may be converted
| into a numerical equation or inequality by substituting the
| numbers of the several terms for the terms themselves --
| provided all the terms summed are mutually exclusive.
|
| Addition being taken in this sense,
| 'nothing' is to be denoted by 'zero',
| for then:
|
| x +, 0 = x
|
| whatever is denoted by x; and this is the definition
| of 'zero'. This interpretation is given by Boole, and
| is very neat, on account of the resemblance between the
| ordinary conception of 'zero' and that of nothing, and
| because we shall thus have
|
| [0] = 0.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.67
NOF 4.
| The conception of multiplication we have adopted is
| that of the application of one relation to another. ...
|
| Even ordinary numerical multiplication involves the same idea,
| for 2 x 3 is a pair of triplets, and 3 x 2 is a triplet of pairs,
| where "triplet of" and "pair of" are evidently relatives.
|
| If we have an equation of the form:
|
| xy = z
|
| and there are just as many x's per y as there are,
| 'per' things, things of the universe, then we have
| also the arithmetical equation:
|
| [x][y] = [z].
|
| For instance, if our universe is perfect men, and there
| are as many teeth to a Frenchman (perfect understood)
| as there are to any one of the universe, then:
|
| ['t'][f] = ['t'f]
|
| holds arithmetically.
|
| So if men are just as apt to be black as things in general:
|
| [m,][b] = [m,b]
|
| where the difference between [m] and [m,] must not be overlooked.
|
| It is to be observed that:
|
| [!1!] = `1`.
|
| Boole was the first to show this connection between logic and
| probabilities. He was restricted, however, to absolute terms.
| I do not remember having seen any extension of probability to
| relatives, except the ordinary theory of 'expectation'.
|
| Our logical multiplication, then, satisfies the essential conditions
| of multiplication, has a unity, has a conception similar to that of
| admitted multiplications, and contains numerical multiplication as
| a case under it.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.76
Before I can discuss Peirce's "number of" function in greater detail
I will need to deal with an expositional difficulty that I have been
very carefully dancing around all this time, but that will no longer
abide its assigned place under the rug.
Functions have long been understood, from well before Peirce's time to ours,
as special cases of 2-adic relations, so the "number of" function itself is
already to be numbered among the types of 2-adic relatives that we've been
explictly mentioning and implicitly using all this time. But Peirce's way
of talking about a 2-adic relative term is to list the "relate" first and
the "correlate" second, a convention that goes over into functional terms
as making the functional value first and the functional antecedent second,
whereas almost anyone brought up in our present time frame has difficulty
thinking of a function any other way than as a set of ordered pairs where
the order in each pair lists the functional argument, or domain element,
first and the functional value, or codomain element, second.
It is possible to work all this out in a very nice way within a very general context
of flexible conventions, but not without introducing an order of anachronisms into
Peirce's presentation that I am presently trying to avoid as much as possible.
Thus, I will need to experiment with various sorts of compromise formations.
Commentary Note 11.3
Having spent a fair amount of time in earnest reflection on the issue, I cannot see a way to continue my interpretation of Peirce's 1870 LOR, to master the distance between his conventions of presentation and my present personal perspectives on relations, without introducing a few interpretive anachronisms and other artifacts in the process, and the only excuse that I can make for myself is that at least these will be novel sorts of anachronisms and artifacts in comparison with the ones that the reeder may alreedy have seen. A poor excuse, but all I have. The least that I can do, then, and I'm something of an expert on that, is to exposit my personal interpretive apparatus on a separate thread, where it will not distract too much from the intellectual canon, that is to opine, the "thinking panpipe" that we find in Peirce's 1870 LOR. Ripped from the pages of my dissertation, then, I will lay out some samples of background material on "Relations In General", as spied from a combinatorial point of view, that I hope will serve in reeding Peirce's text, if we draw on it judiciously.
Commentary Note 11.4
The task before us now is to get very clear about the relationships among relative terms, relations, and the special cases of relations that are constituted by equivalence relations, functions, and so on. I am optimistic that the some of the tethering material that I spun along the "Relations In General" (RIG) thread will help us to track the equivalential and functional properties of special relations in a way that will not weigh too heavy on the rather capricious lineal embedding of syntax in 1-dimensional strings on 2-dimensional pages. But I cannot see far enough ahead to forsee all the consequences of trying this tack, and so I cannot help but to be a bit experimental. The first obstacle to get past is the order convention that Peirce's orientation to relative terms causes him to use for functions. By way of making our discussion concrete, and directing our attentions to an immediate object example, let us say that we desire to represent the "number of" function, that Peirce denotes by means of square brackets, by means of a 2-adic relative term, say 'v', where 'v'(t) = [t] = the number of the term t. To set the 2-adic relative term 'v' within a suitable context of interpretation, let us suppose that 'v' corresponds to a relation V c R x S, where R is the set of real numbers and S is a suitable syntactic domain, here described as "terms". Then the 2-adic relation V is evidently a function from S to R. We might think to use the plain letter "v" to denote this function, as v : S -> R, but I worry this may be a chaos waiting to happen. Also, I think that we should anticipate the very great likelihood that we cannot always assign numbers to every term in whatever syntactic domain S that we choose, so it is probably better to account the 2-adic relation V as a partial function from S to R. All things considered, then, let me try out the following impedimentaria of strategies and compromises. First, I will adapt the functional arrow notation so that it allows us to detach the functional orientation from the order in which the names of domains are written on the page. Second, I will need to change the notation for "pre-functions", or "partial functions", from one likely confound to a slightly less likely confound. This gives the scheme: q : X -> Y means that q is functional at X. q : X <- Y means that q is functional at Y. q : X ~> Y means that q is pre-functional at X. q : X <~ Y means that q is pre-functional at Y. For now, I will pretend that v is a function in R of S, v : R <- S, amounting to the functional alias of the 2-adic relation V c R x S, and associated with the 2-adic relative term 'v' whose relate lies in the set R of real numbers and whose correlate lies in the set S of syntactic terms.
Commentary Note 11.5
It always helps me to draw lots of pictures of stuff,
so let's extract the somewhat overly compressed bits
of the "Relations In General" thread that we'll need
right away for the applications to Peirce's 1870 LOR,
and draw what icons we can within the frame of Ascii.
For the immediate present, we may start with 2-adic relations
and describe the customary species of relations and functions
in terms of their local and numerical incidence properties.
Let P c X x Y be an arbitrary 2-adic relation.
The following properties of P can be defined:
P is "total" at X iff P is (>=1)-regular at X.
P is "total" at Y iff P is (>=1)-regular at Y.
P is "tubular" at X iff P is (=<1)-regular at X.
P is "tubular" at Y iff P is (=<1)-regular at Y.
To illustrate these properties, let us fashion
a "generic enough" example of a 2-adic relation,
E c X x Y, where X = Y = {0, 1, ..., 8, 9}, and
where the bigraph picture of E looks like this:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
\ |\ /|\ \ \ | |\
\ | / | \ \ \ | | \ E
\|/ \| \ \ \| | \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
If we scan along the X dimension we see that the "Y incidence degrees"
of the X nodes 0 through 9 are 0, 1, 2, 3, 1, 1, 1, 2, 0, 0, in order.
If we scan along the Y dimension we see that the "X incidence degrees"
of the Y nodes 0 through 9 are 0, 0, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 0, in order.
Thus, E is not total at either X or Y,
since there are nodes in both X and Y
having incidence degrees that equal 0.
Also, E is not tubular at either X or Y,
since there exist nodes in both X and Y
having incidence degrees greater than 1.
Clearly, then, E cannot qualify as a pre-function
or a function on either of its relational domains.
Commentary Note 11.6
Let's continue to work our way through the rest of the first
set of definitions, making up appropriate examples as we go.
| Let P c X x Y be an arbitrary 2-adic relation.
| The following properties of P can be defined:
|
| P is "total" at X iff P is (>=1)-regular at X.
|
| P is "total" at Y iff P is (>=1)-regular at Y.
|
| P is "tubular" at X iff P is (=<1)-regular at X.
|
| P is "tubular" at Y iff P is (=<1)-regular at Y.
E_1 exemplifies the quality of "totality at X".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
\ \ |\ /|\ \ \ | |\ \ |
\ \ | / | \ \ \ | | \ \ | E_1
\ \|/ \| \ \ \| | \ \|
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
E_2 exemplifies the quality of "totality at Y".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
|\ \ |\ /|\ \ \ | |\ \
| \ \ | / | \ \ \ | | \ \ E_2
| \ \|/ \| \ \ \| | \ \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
E_3 exemplifies the quality of "tubularity at X".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
\ | / \ \ | |
\ | / \ \ | | E_3
\|/ \ \| |
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
E_4 exemplifies the quality of "tubularity at Y".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
/|\ \ \ |\
/ | \ \ \ | \ E_4
/ | \ \ \ | \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
| If P c X x Y is tubular at X, then P is known as a "partial function"
| or a "pre-function" from X to Y, frequently signalized by renaming P
| with an alternative lower case name, say "p", and writing p : X ~> Y.
|
| Just by way of formalizing the definition:
|
| P is a "pre-function" P : X ~> Y iff P is tubular at X.
|
| P is a "pre-function" P : X <~ Y iff P is tubular at Y.
So, E_3 is a pre-function e_3 : X ~> Y,
and E_4 is a pre-function e_4 : X <~ Y.
Commentary Note 11.7
We come now to the very special cases of 2-adic relations that are
known as functions. It will serve a dual purpose on behalf of the
exposition if we take the class of functions as a source of object
examples to clarify the more abstruse concepts in the RIG material.
To begin, let's recall the definition of a local flag:
L_x@j = {<x_1, ..., x_j, ..., x_k> in L : x_j = x}.
In the case of a 2-adic relation L c X_1 x X_2 = X x Y,
we can reap the benefits of a radical simplification in
the definitions of the local flags. Also in this case,
we tend to denote L_u@1 by "L_u@X" and L_v@2 by "L_v@Y".
In the light of these considerations, the local flags of
a 2-adic relation L c X x Y may be formulated as follows:
L_u@X = {<x, y> in L : x = u}
= the set of all ordered pairs in L incident with u in X.
L_v@Y = {<x, y> in L : y = v}
= the set of all ordered pairs in L incident with v in Y.
A sufficient illustration is supplied by the earlier example E.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
\ |\ /|\ \ \ | |\
\ | / | \ \ \ | | \ E
\|/ \| \ \ \| | \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The local flag E_3@X is displayed here:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
/|\
/ | \ E_3@X
/ | \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The local flag E_2@Y is displayed here:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
\ | /
\ | / E_2@Y
\|/
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Commentary Note 11.8
Now let's re-examine the "numerical incidence properties" of relations,
concentrating on the definitions of the assorted regularity conditions.
| For instance, L is said to be "c-regular at j" if and only if
| the cardinality of the local flag L_x@j is c for all x in X_j,
| coded in symbols, if and only if |L_x@j| = c for all x in X_j.
|
| In a similar fashion, one can define the NIP's "<c-regular at j",
| ">c-regular at j", and so on. For ease of reference, I record a
| few of these definitions here:
|
| L is c-regular at j iff |L_x@j| = c for all x in X_j.
|
| L is (<c)-regular at j iff |L_x@j| < c for all x in X_j.
|
| L is (>c)-regular at j iff |L_x@j| > c for all x in X_j.
|
| L is (=<c)-regular at j iff |L_x@j| =< c for all x in X_j.
|
| L is (>=c)-regular at j iff |L_x@j| >= c for all x in X_j.
Clearly, if any relation is (=<c)-regular on one
of its domains X_j and also (>=c)-regular on the
same domain, then it must be (=c)-regular on the
affected domain X_j, in effect, c-regular at j.
For example, let G = {r, s, t} and H = {1, ..., 9},
and consider the 2-adic relation F c G x H that is
bigraphed here:
r s t
o o o G
/|\ /|\ /|\
/ | \ / | \ / | \ F
/ | \ / | \ / | \
o o o o o o o o o H
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
We observe that F is 3-regular at G and 1-regular at H.
Commentary Note 11.9
Among the vast variety of conceivable regularities affecting 2-adic relations,
we pay special attention to the c-regularity conditions where c is equal to 1.
| Let P c X x Y be an arbitrary 2-adic relation.
| The following properties of P can be defined:
|
| P is "total" at X iff P is (>=1)-regular at X.
|
| P is "total" at Y iff P is (>=1)-regular at Y.
|
| P is "tubular" at X iff P is (=<1)-regular at X.
|
| P is "tubular" at Y iff P is (=<1)-regular at Y.
We have already looked at 2-adic relations that
separately exemplify each of these regularities.
Also, we introduced a few bits of additional terminology and
special-purpose notations for working with tubular relations:
| P is a "pre-function" P : X ~> Y iff P is tubular at X.
|
| P is a "pre-function" P : X <~ Y iff P is tubular at Y.
Thus, we arrive by way of this winding stair at the very special stamps
of 2-adic relations P c X x Y that are "total prefunctions" at X (or Y),
"total and tubular" at X (or Y), or "1-regular" at X (or Y), more often
celebrated as "functions" at X (or Y).
| If P is a pre-function P : X ~> Y that happens to be total at X, then P
| is known as a "function" from X to Y, typically indicated as P : X -> Y.
|
| To say that a relation P c X x Y is totally tubular at X is to say that
| it is 1-regular at X. Thus, we may formalize the following definitions:
|
| P is a "function" p : X -> Y iff P is 1-regular at X.
|
| P is a "function" p : X <- Y iff P is 1-regular at Y.
For example, let X = Y = {0, ..., 9} and let F c X x Y be
the 2-adic relation that is depicted in the bigraph below:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
\ / /|\ \ | |\ \
\ / | \ \ | | \ \ F
/ \ / | \ \ | | \ \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
We observe that F is a function at Y,
and we record this fact in either of
the manners F : X <- Y or F : Y -> X.
Commentary Note 11.10
In the case of a 2-adic relation F c X x Y that has
the qualifications of a function f : X -> Y, there
are a number of further differentia that arise:
| f is "surjective" iff f is total at Y.
|
| f is "injective" iff f is tubular at Y.
|
| f is "bijective" iff f is 1-regular at Y.
For example, or more precisely, contra example,
the function f : X -> Y that is depicted below
is neither total at Y nor tubular at Y, and so
it cannot enjoy any of the properties of being
sur-, or in-, or bi-jective.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
| \ | / \ \ | | \ /
| \ | / \ \ | | \ f
| \|/ \ \| | / \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
A cheap way of getting a surjective function out of any function
is to reset its codomain to its range. For example, the range
of the function f above is Y'= {0, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. Thus,
if we form a new function g : X -> Y' that looks just like
f on the domain X but is assigned the codomain Y', then
g is surjective, and is described as mapping "onto" Y'.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
| \ | / \ \ | | \ /
| \ | / \ \ | | \ g
| \|/ \ \| | / \
o o o o o o o Y'
0 2 5 6 7 8 9
The function h : Y' -> Y is injective.
0 2 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o Y'
| | \ / | \ /
| | \ | \ h
| | / \ | / \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The function m : X -> Y is bijective.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
o o o o o o o o o o X
| | | \ / \ / | \ /
| | | \ \ | \ m
| | | / \ / \ | / \
o o o o o o o o o o Y
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Commentary Note 11.11
The preceding exercises were intended to beef-up our
functional literacy skills to the point where we can
read our functional alphabets backwards and forwards
and to ferret out the local functionalites that may
be immanent in relative terms no matter where they
locate themselves within the domains of relations.
I am hopeful that these skills will serve us in
good stead as we work to build a catwalk from
Peirce's platform to contemporary scenes on
the logic of relatives, and back again.
By way of extending a few very tentative plancks,
let us experiment with the following definitions:
1. A relative term 'p' and the corresponding relation P c X x Y are both
called "functional on relates" if and only if P is a function at X,
in symbols, P : X -> Y.
2. A relative term 'p' and the corresponding relation P c X x Y are both
called "functional on correlates" if and only if P is function at Y,
in symbols, P : X <- Y.
When a relation happens to be a function, it may be excusable
to use the same name for it in both applications, writing out
explicit type markers like P : X x Y, P : X -> Y, P : X <- Y,
as the case may be, when and if it serves to clarify matters.
From this current, perhaps transient, perspective, it appears that
our next task is to examine how the known properties of relations
are modified when an aspect of functionality is spied in the mix.
Let us then return to our various ways of looking at relational composition,
and see what changes and what stays the same when the relations in question
happen to be functions of various different kinds at some of their domains.
Here is one generic picture of relational composition,
cast in a style that hews pretty close to the line of
potentials inherent in Peirce's syntax of this period.
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
| |
| P o Q |
| ____________^____________ |
| / \ |
| / P Q \ |
| / @ @ \ |
| / / \ / \ \ |
| / / \ / \ \ |
| o o o o o o |
| X X Y Y Z Z |
| 1,__# #'p'__$ $'q'__% %1 |
| o o o o o o |
| \ / \ / \ / |
| \ / \ / \ / |
| \ / \ / \ / |
| @ @ @ |
| !1! !1! !1! |
| |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 16. Anything that is a 'p' of a 'q' of Anything
From this we extract the "hypergraph picture" of relational composition:
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
| |
| P P o Q Q |
| @ @ @ |
| / \ / \ / \ |
| / \ / \ / \ |
| o o o o o o |
| X Y X Z Y Z |
| o o o o o o |
| \ \ / \ / / |
| \ \ / \ / / |
| \ / \ / |
| \ / \ / \ / |
| \ / \___ ___/ \ / |
| @ @ @ |
| !1! !1! !1! |
| |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 17. Relational Composition P o Q
All of the relevant information of these Figures can be compressed
into the form of a "spreadsheet", or constraint satisfaction table:
Table 18. Relational Composition P o Q
o---------o---------o---------o---------o
| # !1! | !1! | !1! |
o=========o=========o=========o=========o
| P # X | Y | |
o---------o---------o---------o---------o
| Q # | Y | Z |
o---------o---------o---------o---------o
| P o Q # X | | Z |
o---------o---------o---------o---------o
So the following presents itself as a reasonable plan of study:
Let's see how much easy mileage we can get in our exploration
of functions by adopting the above templates as a paradigm.
Commentary Note 11.12
Since functions are special cases of 2-adic relations, and since the space of 2-adic relations is closed under relational composition, in other words, the composition of a couple of 2-adic relations is again a 2-adic relation, we know that the relational composition of a couple of functions has to be a 2-adic relation. If it is also necessarily a function, then we would be justified in speaking of "functional composition", and also of saying that the space of functions is closed under this functional form of composition. Just for novelty's sake, let's try to prove this for relations that are functional on correlates. So our task is this: Given a couple of 2-adic relations, P c X x Y and Q c Y x Z, that are functional on correlates, P : X <- Y and Q : Y <- Z, we need to determine whether the relational composition P o Q c X x Z is also P o Q : X <- Z, or not. It always helps to begin by recalling the pertinent definitions. For a 2-adic relation L c X x Y, we have: L is a "function" L : X <- Y iff L is 1-regular at Y. As for the definition of relational composition, it is enough to consider the coefficient of the composite on an arbitrary ordered pair like i:j. (P o Q)_ij = Sum_k (P_ik Q_kj). So let us begin. P : X <- Y, or P being 1-regular at Y, means that there is exactly one ordered pair i:k in P for each k in Y. Q : Y <- Z, or Q being 1-regular at Z, means that there is exactly one ordered pair k:j in Q for each j in Z. Thus, there is exactly one ordered pair i:j in P o Q for each j in Z, which means that P o Q is 1-regular at Z, and so we have the function P o Q : X <- Z. And we are done. Bur proofs after midnight must be checked the next day.
Commentary Note 11.13
As we make our way toward the foothills of Peirce's 1870 LOR, there is one piece of equipment that we dare not leave the plains without -- for there is little hope that "l'or dans les montagnes là" will lie among our prospects without the ready use of its leverage and lifts -- and that is a facility with the utilities that are variously called "arrows", "morphisms", "homomorphisms", "structure-preserving maps", and several other names, in accord with the altitude of abstraction at which one happens to be working, at the given moment in question. As a middle but not too beaten track, I will lay out the definition of a morphism in the forms that we will need right off, in a slight excess of formality at first, but quickly bringing the bird home to roost on more familiar perches. Let's say that we have three functions J, K, L that have the following types and that satisfy the equation that follows: | J : X <- Y | | K : X <- X x X | | L : Y <- Y x Y | | J(L(u, v)) = K(Ju, Jv) Our sagittarian leitmotif can be rubricized in the following slogan: >-> The image of the ligature is the compound of the images. <-< Where J is the "image", K is the "compound", and L is the "ligature". Figure 19 presents us with a picture of the situation in question. o-----------------------------------------------------------o | | | K L | | @ @ | | /|\ /|\ | | / | \ / | \ | | v | \ v | \ | | o o o o o o | | X X X Y Y Y | | o o o o o o | | ^ ^ ^ / / / | | \ \ \ / / | | \ \ / \ / / | | \ \ \ / | | \ / \ / \ / | | @ @ @ | | J J J | | | o-----------------------------------------------------------o Figure 19. Structure Preserving Transformation J : K <- L Here, I have used arrowheads to indicate the relational domains at which each of the relations J, K, L happens to be functional. Table 20 gives the constraint matrix version of the same thing. Table 20. Arrow: J(L(u, v)) = K(Ju, Jv) o---------o---------o---------o---------o | # J | J | J | o=========o=========o=========o=========o | K # X | X | X | o---------o---------o---------o---------o | L # Y | Y | Y | o---------o---------o---------o---------o One way to read this Table is in terms of the informational redundancies that it schematizes. In particular, it can be read to say that when one satisfies the constraint in the L row, along with all of the constraints in the J columns, then the constraint in the K row is automatically true. That is one way of understanding the equation: J(L(u, v)) = K(Ju, Jv).
Commentary Note 11.14
First, a correction. Ignore for now the
gloss that I gave in regard to Figure 19:
| Here, I have used arrowheads to indicate the relational domains
| at which each of the relations J, K, L happens to be functional.
It is more like the feathers of the arrows that serve to mark the
relational domains at which the relations J, K, L are functional,
but it would take yet another construction to make this precise,
as the feathers are not uniquely appointed but many splintered.
Now, as promised, let's look at a more homely example of a morphism,
say, any one of the mappings J : R -> R (roughly speaking) that are
commonly known as "logarithm functions", where you get to pick your
favorite base. In this case, K(r, s) = r + s and L(u, v) = u . v,
and the defining formula J(L(u, v)) = K(Ju, Jv) comes out looking
like J(u . v) = J(u) + J(v), writing a dot (.) and a plus sign (+)
for the ordinary 2-ary operations of arithmetical multiplication
and arithmetical summation, respectively.
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
| |
| {+} {.} |
| @ @ |
| /|\ /|\ |
| / | \ / | \ |
| v | \ v | \ |
| o o o o o o |
| X X X Y Y Y |
| o o o o o o |
| ^ ^ ^ / / / |
| \ \ \ / / |
| \ \ / \ / / |
| \ \ \ / |
| \ / \ / \ / |
| @ @ @ |
| J J J |
| |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 21. Logarithm Arrow J : {+} <- {.}
Thus, where the "image" J is the logarithm map,
the "compound" K is the numerical sum, and the
the "ligature" L is the numerical product, one
obtains the immemorial mnemonic motto:
| The image of the product is the sum of the images.
|
| J(u . v) = J(u) + J(v)
|
| J(L(u, v)) = K(Ju, Jv)
Commentary Note 11.15
I'm going to elaborate a little further on the subject
of arrows, morphisms, or structure-preserving maps, as
a modest amount of extra work at this point will repay
ample dividends when it comes time to revisit Peirce's
"number of" function on logical terms.
The "structure" that is being preserved by a structure-preserving map
is just the structure that we all know and love as a 3-adic relation.
Very typically, it will be the type of 3-adic relation that defines
the type of 2-ary operation that obeys the rules of a mathematical
structure that is known as a "group", that is, a structure that
satisfies the axioms for closure, associativity, identities,
and inverses.
For example, in the previous case of the logarithm map J, we have the data:
| J : R <- R (properly restricted)
|
| K : R <- R x R, where K(r, s) = r + s
|
| L : R <- R x R, where L(u, v) = u . v
Real number addition and real number multiplication (suitably restricted)
are examples of group operations. If we write the sign of each operation
in braces as a name for the 3-adic relation that constitutes or defines
the corresponding group, then we have the following set-up:
| J : {+} <- {.}
|
| {+} c R x R x R
|
| {.} c R x R x R
In many cases, one finds that both groups are written with the same
sign of operation, typically ".", "+", "*", or simple concatenation,
but they remain in general distinct whether considered as operations
or as relations, no matter what signs of operation are used. In such
a setting, our chiasmatic theme may run a bit like these two variants:
| The image of the sum is the sum of the images.
|
| The image of the product is the product of the images.
Figure 22 presents a generic picture for groups G and H.
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
| |
| G H |
| @ @ |
| /|\ /|\ |
| / | \ / | \ |
| v | \ v | \ |
| o o o o o o |
| X X X Y Y Y |
| o o o o o o |
| ^ ^ ^ / / / |
| \ \ \ / / |
| \ \ / \ / / |
| \ \ \ / |
| \ / \ / \ / |
| @ @ @ |
| J J J |
| |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 22. Group Homomorphism J : G <- H
In a setting where both groups are written with a plus sign,
perhaps even constituting the very same group, the defining
formula of a morphism, J(L(u, v)) = K(Ju, Jv), takes on the
shape J(u + v) = Ju + Jv, which looks very analogous to the
distributive multiplication of a sum (u + v) by a factor J.
Hence another popular name for a morphism: a "linear" map.
Commentary Note 11.16
I think that we have enough material on morphisms now
to go back and cast a more studied eye on what Peirce
is doing with that "number of" function, the one that
we apply to a logical term 't', absolute or relative
of any number of correlates, by writing it in square
brackets, as ['t']. It is frequently convenient to
have a prefix notation for this function, and since
Peirce reserves 'n' to signify 'not', I will try to
use 'v', personally thinking of it as a Greek 'nu',
which stands for frequency in physics, and which
kind of makes sense if we think of frequency as
it's habitual in statistics. End of mnemonics.
My plan will be nothing less plodding than to work through
all of the principal statements that Peirce has made about
the "number of" function up to our present stopping place
in the paper, namely, those that I collected once before
and placed at this location:
LOR.COM 11.2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001814.html
NOF 1.
| I propose to assign to all logical terms, numbers;
| to an absolute term, the number of individuals it denotes;
| to a relative term, the average number of things so related
| to one individual.
|
| Thus in a universe of perfect men ('men'),
| the number of "tooth of" would be 32.
|
| The number of a relative with two correlates would be the
| average number of things so related to a pair of individuals;
| and so on for relatives of higher numbers of correlates.
|
| I propose to denote the number of a logical term by
| enclosing the term in square brackets, thus ['t'].
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.65
We may formalize the role of the "number of" function by assigning it
a local habitation and a name 'v' : S -> R, where S is a suitable set
of signs, called the "syntactic domain", that is ample enough to hold
all of the terms that we might wish to number in a given discussion,
and where R is the real number domain.
Transcribing Peirce's example, we may let m = "man" and 't' = "tooth of ---".
Then 'v'('t') = ['t'] = ['t'm]/[m], that is to say, in a universe of perfect
human dentition, the number of the relative term "tooth of ---" is equal to
the number of teeth of humans divided by the number of humans, that is, 32.
The 2-adic relative term 't' determines a 2-adic relation T c U x V,
where U and V are two universes of discourse, possibly the same one,
that hold among other things all of the teeth and all of the people
that happen to be under discussion, respectively.
A rough indication of the bigraph for T
might be drawn as follows, where I have
tried to sketch in just the toothy part
of U and the peoply part of V.
t_1 t_32 t_33 t_64 t_65 t_96 ... ...
o ... o o ... o o ... o o ... o U
\ | / \ | / \ | / \ | /
\ | / \ | / \ | / \ | / T
\|/ \|/ \|/ \|/
o o o o V
m_1 m_2 m_3 ...
Notice that the "number of" function 'v' : S -> R
needs the data that is represented by this entire
bigraph for T in order to compute the value ['t'].
Finally, one observes that this component of T is a function
in the direction T : U -> V, since we are counting only those
teeth that ideally occupy one and only one mouth of a creature.
Commentary Note 11.17
I think that the reader is beginning to get an inkling of the crucial importance of the "number of" map in Peirce's way of looking at logic, for it's one of the plancks in the bridge from logic to the theories of probability, statistics, and information, in which logic forms but a limiting case at one scenic turnout on the expanding vista. It is, as a matter of necessity and a matter of fact, practically speaking, at any rate, one way that Peirce forges a link between the "eternal", logical, or rational realm and the "secular", empirical, or real domain. With that little bit of encouragement and exhortation, let us return to the nitty gritty details of the text. NOF 2. | But not only do the significations of '=' and '<' here adopted fulfill all | absolute requirements, but they have the supererogatory virtue of being very | nearly the same as the common significations. Equality is, in fact, nothing | but the identity of two numbers; numbers that are equal are those which are | predicable of the same collections, just as terms that are identical are those | which are predicable of the same classes. So, to write 5 < 7 is to say that 5 | is part of 7, just as to write f < m is to say that Frenchmen are part of men. | Indeed, if f < m, then the number of Frenchmen is less than the number of men, | and if v = p, then the number of Vice-Presidents is equal to the number of | Presidents of the Senate; so that the numbers may always be substituted | for the terms themselves, in case no signs of operation occur in the | equations or inequalities. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.66 Peirce is here remarking on the principle that the measure 'v' on terms "preserves" or "respects" the prevailing implication, inclusion, or subsumption relations that impose an ordering on those terms. In these initiatory passages of the text, Peirce is using a single symbol "<" to denote the usual linear ordering on numbers, but also what amounts to the implication ordering on logical terms and the inclusion ordering on classes. Later, of course, he will introduce distinctive symbols for logical orders. Now, the links among terms, sets, and numbers can be pursued in all directions, and Peirce has already indicated in an earlier paper how he would "construct" the integers from sets, that is, from the aggregate denotations of terms. We will get back to that at another time. In the immediate example, we have this sort of statement: "if f < m, then the number of Frenchmen is less than the number of men" In symbolic form, this would be written: f < m => [f] < [m] Here, the "<" on the left is a logical ordering on syntactic terms while the "<" on the right is an arithmetic ordering on real numbers. The type of principle that comes up here is usually discussed under the question of whether a map between two ordered sets is "order-preserving" or not. The general type of question may be formalized in the following way. Let X_1 be a set with an ordering denoted by "<_1". Let X_2 be a set with an ordering denoted by "<_2". What makes an ordering what it is will commonly be a set of axioms that defines the properties of the order relation in question. Since one frequently has occasion to view the same set in the light of several different order relations, one will often resort to explicit forms like (X, <_1), (X, <_2), and so on, to invoke a set with a given ordering. A map F : (X_1, <_1) -> (X_2, <_2) is "order-preserving" if and only if a statement of a particular form holds for all x and y in (X_1, <_1), specifically, this: x <_1 y => Fx <_2 Fy The action of the "number of" map 'v' : (S, <_1) -> (R, <_2) has just this character, as exemplified by its application to the case where x = f = "frenchman" and y = m = "man", like so: | f < m => [f] < [m] | | f < m => 'v'f < 'v'm Here, to be more exacting, we may interpret the "<" on the left as "proper subsumption", that is, excluding the equality case, while we read the "<" on the right as the usual "less than".
Commentary Note 11.18
There is a comment that I ought to make on the concept of a "structure preserving map", including as a special case the idea of an "order-preserving map". It seems to be a peculiarity of mathematical usage in general -- at least, I don't think it's just me -- that "preserving structure" always means "preserving 'some', not of necessity 'all', of the structure in question". People sometimes express this by speaking of "structure preservation in measure", the implication being that any property that is amenable to being qualified in manner is potentially amenable to being quantified in degree, perhaps in such a way as to answer questions like "How structure-preserving is it?". Let's see how this remark applies to the order-preserving property of the "number of" mapping 'v' : S -> R. For any pair of absolute terms x and y in the syntactic domain S, we have the following implications, where "-<" denotes the logical subsumption relation on terms and "=<" is the "less than or equal to" relation on the real number domain R. x -< y => 'v'x =< 'v'y Equivalently: x -< y => [x] =< [y] It is easy to see that nowhere near all of the distinctions that make up the structure of the ordering on the left hand side will be preserved as one passes to the right hand side of these implication statements, but that is not required in order to call the map 'v' "order-preserving", or what is also known as an "order morphism".
Commentary Note 11.19
Up to this point in the LOR of 1870, Peirce has introduced the
"number of" measure on logical terms and discussed the extent
to which this measure, 'v' : S -> R such that 'v' : s ~> [s],
exhibits a couple of important measure-theoretic principles:
1. The "number of" map exhibits a certain type of "uniformity property",
whereby the value of the measure on a uniformly qualified population
is in fact actualized by each member of the population.
2. The "number of" map satisfies an "order morphism principle", whereby
the illative partial ordering of logical terms is reflected up to a
partial extent by the arithmetical linear ordering of their measures.
Peirce next takes up the action of the "number of" map on the two types of,
loosely speaking, "additive" operations that we normally consider in logic.
NOF 3.
| It is plain that both the regular non-invertible addition and the
| invertible addition satisfy the absolute conditions. (CP 3.67).
The "regular non-invertible addition" is signified by "+,",
corresponding to what we'd call the inclusive disjunction
of logical terms or the union of their extensions as sets.
The "invertible addition" is signified in algebra by "+",
corresponding to what we'd call the exclusive disjunction
of logical terms or the symmetric difference of their sets,
ignoring many details and nuances that are often important,
of course.
| But the notation has other recommendations. The conception of 'taking together'
| involved in these processes is strongly analogous to that of summation, the sum
| of 2 and 5, for example, being the number of a collection which consists of a
| collection of two and a collection of five. (CP 3.67).
A full interpretation of this remark will require us to pick up the precise
technical sense in which Peirce is using the word "collection", and that will
take us back to his logical reconstruction of certain aspects of number theory,
all of which I am putting off to another time, but it is still possible to get
a rough sense of what he's saying relative to the present frame of discussion.
The "number of" map 'v' : S -> R evidently induces
some sort of morphism with respect to logical sums.
If this were straightforwardly true, we could write:
|?| 'v'(x +, y) = 'v'x + 'v'y
|?|
|?| Equivalently:
|?|
|?| [x +, y] = [x] + [y]
Of course, things are just not that simple in the case
of inclusive disjunction and set-theoretic unions, so
we'd "probably" invent a word like "sub-additive" to
describe the principle that does hold here, namely:
| 'v'(x +, y) =< 'v'x + 'v'y
|
| Equivalently:
|
| [x +, y] =< [x] + [y]
This is why Peirce trims his discussion of this point with the following hedge:
| Any logical equation or inequality in which no operation but addition
| is involved may be converted into a numerical equation or inequality by
| substituting the numbers of the several terms for the terms themselves --
| provided all the terms summed are mutually exclusive. (CP 3.67).
Finally, a morphism with respect to addition,
even a contingently qualified one, must do the
right stuff on behalf of the additive identity:
| Addition being taken in this sense,
|'nothing' is to be denoted by 'zero',
| for then:
|
| x +, 0 = x
|
| whatever is denoted by x; and this is the definition
| of 'zero'. This interpretation is given by Boole, and
| is very neat, on account of the resemblance between the
| ordinary conception of 'zero' and that of nothing, and
| because we shall thus have
|
| [0] = 0.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.67
With respect to the nullity 0 in S and the number 0 in R, we have:
'v'0 = [0] = 0.
In sum, therefor, it also serves that only preserves
a due respect for the function of a vacuum in nature.
Commentary Note 11.20
We arrive at the last, for the time being, of
Peirce's statements about the "number of" map.
NOF 4.
| The conception of multiplication we have adopted is
| that of the application of one relation to another. ...
|
| Even ordinary numerical multiplication involves the same idea,
| for 2 x 3 is a pair of triplets, and 3 x 2 is a triplet of pairs,
| where "triplet of" and "pair of" are evidently relatives.
|
| If we have an equation of the form:
|
| xy = z
|
| and there are just as many x's per y as there are
|'per' things, things of the universe, then we have
| also the arithmetical equation:
|
| [x][y] = [z].
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.76
Peirce is here observing what we might dub a "contingent morphism"
or a "skeptraphotic arrow", if you will. Provided that a certain
condition, to be named and, what is more hopeful, to be clarified
in short order, happens to be satisfied, we would find it holding
that the "number of" map 'v' : S -> R such that 'v's = [s] serves
to preserve the multiplication of relative terms, that is as much
to say, the composition of relations, in the form: [xy] = [x][y].
So let us try to uncross Peirce's manifestly chiasmatic encryption
of the condition that is called on in support of this preservation.
Proviso for [xy] = [x][y] --
| there are just as many x's per y
| as there are 'per' things<,>
| things of the universe ...
I have placed angle brackets around
a comma that CP shows but CE omits,
not that it helps much either way.
So let us resort to the example:
| For instance, if our universe is perfect men, and there
| are as many teeth to a Frenchman (perfect understood)
| as there are to any one of the universe, then:
|
| ['t'][f] = ['t'f]
|
| holds arithmetically. (CP 3.76).
Now that is something that we can sink our teeth into,
and trace the bigraph representation of the situation.
In order to do this, it will help to recall our first
examination of the "tooth of" relation, and to adjust
the picture that we sketched of it on that occasion.
Transcribing Peirce's example, we may let m = "man" and 't' = "tooth of ---".
Then 'v'('t') = ['t'] = ['t'm]/[m], that is to say, in a universe of perfect
human dentition, the number of the relative term "tooth of ---" is equal to
the number of teeth of humans divided by the number of humans, that is, 32.
The 2-adic relative term 't' determines a 2-adic relation T c U x V,
where U and V are two universes of discourse, possibly the same one,
that hold among other things all of the teeth and all of the people
that happen to be under discussion, respectively. To make the case
as simple as we can and still cover the point, let's say that there
are just four people in our initial universe of discourse, and that
just two of them are French. The bigraphic composition below shows
all of the pertinent facts of the case.
T_1 T_32 T_33 T_64 T_65 T_96 T_97 T_128
o ... o o ... o o ... o o ... o U
\ | / \ | / \ | / \ | /
\ | / \ | / \ | / \ | / 't'
\|/ \|/ \|/ \|/
o o o o V = m = 1
| |
| | 'f'
| |
o o o o V = m = 1
J K L M
Here, the order of relational composition flows up the page.
For convenience, the absolute term f = "frenchman" has been
converted by using the comma functor to give the idempotent
representation 'f' = f, = "frenchman that is ---", and thus
it can be taken as a selective from the universe of mankind.
By way of a legend for the figure, we have the following data:
| m = J +, K +, L +, M = 1
|
| f = K +, M
|
|'f' = K:K +, M:M
|
|'t' = (T_001 +, ... +, T_032):J +,
| (T_033 +, ... +, T_064):K +,
| (T_065 +, ... +, T_096):L +,
| (T_097 +, ... +, T_128):M
Now let's see if we can use this picture
to make sense of the following statement:
| For instance, if our universe is perfect men, and there
| are as many teeth to a Frenchman (perfect understood)
| as there are to any one of the universe, then:
|
| ['t'][f] = ['t'f]
|
| holds arithmetically. (CP 3.76).
In the lingua franca of statistics, Peirce is saying this:
That if the population of Frenchmen is a "fair sample" of
the general population with regard to dentition, then the
morphic equation ['t'f] = ['t'][f], whose transpose gives
['t'] = ['t'f]/[f], is every bite as true as the defining
equation in this circumstance, namely, ['t'] = ['t'm]/[m].
Commentary Note 11.21
One more example and one more general observation, and then we will be all caught up with our homework on Peirce's "number of" function. | So if men are just as apt to be black as things in general: | | [m,][b] = [m,b] | | where the difference between [m] and [m,] must not be overlooked. | | C.S. Peirce, CP 3.76 The protasis, "men are just as apt to be black as things in general", is elliptic in structure, and presents us with a potential ambiguity. If we had no further clue to its meaning, it might be read as either: 1. Men are just as apt to be black as things in general are apt to be black. 2. Men are just as apt to be black as men are apt to be things in general. The second interpretation, if grammatical, is pointless to state, since it equates a proper contingency with an absolute certainty. So I think it is safe to assume this paraphrase of what Peirce intends: 3. Men are just as likely to be black as things in general are likely to be black. Stated in terms of the conditional probability: 4. P(b|m) = P(b) From the definition of conditional probability: 5. P(b|m) = P(b m)/P(m) Equivalently: 6. P(b m) = P(b|m)P(m) Thus we may derive the equivalent statement: 7. P(b m) = P(b|m)P(m) = P(b)P(m) And this, of course, is the definition of independent events, as applied to the event of being Black and the event of being a Man. It seems like a likely guess, then, that this is the content of Peirce's statement about frequencies, [m,b] = [m,][b], in this case normalized to produce the equivalent statement about probabilities: P(m b) = P(m)P(b). Let's see if this checks out. Let n be the number of things in general, in Peirce's lingo, n = [1]. On the assumption that m and b are associated with independent events, we get [m,b] = P(m b)n = P(m)P(b)n = P(m)[b] = [m,][b], so we have to interpret [m,] = "the average number of men per things in general" as P(m) = the probability of a thing in general being a man. Seems okay.
Commentary Note 11.22
Let's look at that last example from a different angle.
| So if men are just as apt to be black as things in general:
|
| [m,][b] = [m,b]
|
| where the difference between [m] and [m,] must not be overlooked.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.76
In different lights the formula [m,b] = [m,][b] presents itself
as an "aimed arrow", "fair sample", or "independence" condition.
The example apparently assumes a universe of "things in general",
encompassing among other things the denotations of the absolute
terms m = "man" and b = "black". That suggests to me that we
might well illustrate this case in relief, by returning to
our earlier staging of 'Othello' and seeing how well that
universe of dramatic discourse observes the premiss that
"men are just as apt to be black as things in general".
Here is the relevant data:
| 1 = B +, C +, D +, E +, I +, J +, O
|
| b = O
|
| m = C +, I +, J +, O
|
| 1, = B:B +, C:C +, D:D +, E:E +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
|
| b, = O:O
|
| m, = C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O
The "fair sampling" or "episkeptral arrow" condition is tantamount to this:
"Men are just as apt to be black as things in general are apt to be black".
In other words, men are a fair sample of things in general with respect to
the factor of being black.
Should this hold, the consequence would be:
[m,b] = [m,][b].
When [b] is not zero, we obtain the result:
[m,] = [m,b]/[b].
Once again, the absolute term b = "black" is most felicitously depicted
by way of its idempotent representation 'b' = b, = "black that is ---",
and thus it can be taken as a selective from the universe of discourse.
Here is the bigraph for the composition:
m,b = "man that is black",
here represented in the equivalent form:
m,b, = "man that is black that is ---".
B C D E I J O
o o o o o o o 1
| | | |
| | | | m,
| | | |
o o o o o o o 1
|
| b,
|
o o o o o o o 1
B C D E I J O
Thus we observe one of the more factitious facts
that hold in this universe of discourse, namely:
m,b = b.
Another way of saying that is:
b -< m.
That in itself is enough to puncture any notion
that b and m are statistically independent, but
let us continue to develop the plot a bit more.
Putting all of the general formulas and particular facts together,
we arrive at following summation of situation in the Othello case:
If the fair sampling condition holds:
[m,] = [m,b]/[b] = [b]/[b] = `1`,
In fact, however, it is the case that:
[m,] = [m,1]/[1] = [m]/[1] = 4/7.
In sum, it is not the case in the Othello example that
"men are just as apt to be black as things in general".
Expressed in terms of probabilities: P(m) = 4/7 and P(b) = 1/7.
If these were independent we'd have: P(mb) = 4/49.
On the contrary, P(mb) = P(b) = 1/7.
Another way to see it is as follows: P(b|m) = 1/4 while P(b) = 1/7.
Commentary Note 11.23
Let me try to sum up as succinctly as possible the lesson
that we ought to take away from Peirce's last "number of"
example, since I know that the account that I have given
of it so far may appear to have wandered rather widely.
| So if men are just as apt to be black as things in general:
|
| [m,][b] = [m,b]
|
| where the difference between [m] and [m,] must not be overlooked.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.76
In different lights the formula [m,b] = [m,][b] presents itself
as an "aimed arrow", "fair sample", or "independence" condition.
I had taken the tack of illustrating this polymorphous theme in
bas relief, that is, via detour through a universe of discourse
where it fails. Here's a brief reminder of the Othello example:
B C D E I J O
o o o o o o o 1
| | | |
| | | | m,
| | | |
o o o o o o o 1
|
| b,
|
o o o o o o o 1
B C D E I J O
The condition, "men are just as apt to be black as things in general",
is expressible in terms of conditional probabilities as P(b|m) = P(b),
written out, the probability of the event Black given the event Male
is exactly equal to the unconditional probability of the event Black.
Thus, for example, it is sufficient to observe in the Othello setting
that P(b|m) = 1/4 while P(b) = 1/7 in order to cognize the dependency,
and thereby to tell that the ostensible arrow is anaclinically biased.
This reduction of a conditional probability to an absolute probability,
in the form P(A|Z) = P(A), is a familiar disguise, and yet in practice
one of the ways that we most commonly come to recognize the condition
of independence P(AZ) = P(A)P(Z), via the definition of a conditional
probability according to the rule P(A|Z) = P(AZ)/P(Z). To recall the
familiar consequences, the definition of conditional probability plus
the independence condition yields P(A|Z) = P(AZ)/P(Z) = P(A)P(Z)/P(Z),
to wit, P(A|Z) = P(A).
As Hamlet discovered, there's a lot to be learned from turning a crank.
Commentary Note 11.24
And so we come to the end of the "number of" examples
that we found on our agenda at this point in the text:
| It is to be observed that:
|
| [!1!] = `1`.
|
| Boole was the first to show this connection between logic and
| probabilities. He was restricted, however, to absolute terms.
| I do not remember having seen any extension of probability to
| relatives, except the ordinary theory of 'expectation'.
|
| Our logical multiplication, then, satisfies the essential conditions
| of multiplication, has a unity, has a conception similar to that of
| admitted multiplications, and contains numerical multiplication as
| a case under it.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.76
There appears to be a problem with the printing of the text at this point.
Let us first recall the conventions that I am using in this transcription:
`1` for the "antique 1" that Peirce defines as !1!_oo = "something", and
!1! for the "bold 1" that signifies the ordinary 2-identity relation.
CP 3 gives [!1!] = `1`, which I cannot make any sense of.
CE 2 gives [!1!] = 1 , which makes sense on the reading
of "1" as denoting the natural number 1, and not as the
absolute term "1" that denotes the universe of discourse.
On this reading, [!1!] is the average number of things
related by the identity relation !1! to one individual,
and so it makes sense that [!1!] = 1 : N, where "N" is
the set or type of the natural numbers {0, 1, 2, ...}.
With respect to the 2-identity !1! in the syntactic domain S
and the number 1 in the non-negative integers N c R, we have:
'v'!1! = [!1!] = 1.
And so the "number of" mapping 'v' : S -> R has another one
of the properties that would be required of an arrow S -> R.
The manner in which these arrows and qualified arrows help us
to construct a suspension bridge that unifies logic, semiotics,
statistics, stochastics, and information theory will be one of
the main themes that I aim to elaborate throughout the rest of
this inquiry.
Selection 12
| The Sign of Involution
|
| I shall take involution in such a sense that x^y
| will denote everything which is an x for every
| individual of y.
|
| Thus
|
| 'l'^w
|
| will be a lover of every woman.
|
| Then
|
| ('s'^'l')^w
|
| will denote whatever stands to every woman in
| the relation of servant of every lover of hers;
|
| and
|
| 's'^('l'w)
|
| will denote whatever is a servant of
| everything that is lover of a woman.
|
| So that
|
| ('s'^'l')^w = 's'^('l'w).
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.77
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce,
|"Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives,
| Resulting from an Amplification of the Conceptions of Boole's Calculus of Logic",
|'Memoirs of the American Academy', Volume 9, pages 317-378, 26 January 1870,
|'Collected Papers' (CP 3.45-149), 'Chronological Edition' (CE 2, 359-429).
LOR. Commentary Note 12
Let us make a few preliminary observations about the
"logical sign of involution", as Peirce uses it here:
| The Sign of Involution
|
| I shall take involution in such a sense that x^y
| will denote everything which is an x for every
| individual of y.
|
| Thus
|
| 'l'^w
|
| will be a lover of every woman.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.77
In arithmetic, the "involution" x^y, or the "exponentiation" of x
to the power of y, is the iterated multiplication of the factor x,
repeated as many times as there are ones making up the exponent y.
In analogous fashion, 'l'^w is the iterated multiplication of 'l',
repeated as many times as there are individuals under the term w.
For example, suppose that the universe of discourse has,
among other things, just the three women, W_1, W_2, W_3.
This could be expressed in Peirce's notation by writing:
w = W_1 +, W_2 +, W_3.
In this setting, we would have:
'l'^w = 'l'^(W_1 +, W_2 +, W_3) = 'l'W_1 , 'l'W_2 , 'l'W_3.
That is, a lover of every woman in the universe of discourse
would be a lover of W_1 and a lover of W_2 and lover of W_3.
LOR. Note 13
LOR. Work Area
Up to this point in the discussion, we have observed that
the "number of" map 'v' : S -> R such that 'v's = [s] has
the following morphic properties:
0. [0] = 0
1. 'v'
2. x -< y => [x] =< [y]
3. [x +, y] =< [x] + [y]
contingent:
4. [xy] = [x][y]
view relation P c X x Y x Z as related to three functions:
`p_1` c
`p_3` c X x Y x Pow(Z)
f(x)
f(x+y) = f(x) + f(y)
f(p(x, y)) = q(f(x), f(y))
P(x, y, z)
(f^-1)(y)
f(z(x, y)) = z'(f(x), f(y))
Definition. f(x:y:z) = (fx:fy:fz).
f(x:y:z) = (fx:fy:
x:y:z in R => fx:fy:fz in fR
R(x, y, z) => (fR)(fx, fy, fz)
(L, x, y, z) => (fL, fx, fy, fz)
(x, y, z, L) => (xf, yf, zf, Lf)
(x, y, z, b) => (xf, yf, zf, bf)
fzxy = z'(fx)(fy)
F
o
|
o
/ \
o o
o
. | .
. | .
. | .
. o .
. / \ .
. / \ .
. / \ .
. o o .
. . .
. . .
.
C o . / \ . o
| . / \ . | CF
| . o o . |
f o . . . o fF
/ \ . . . / \
/ . \ . o o
X o o Y XF YF
<u, v, w> in P ->
o---------o---------o---------o---------o
| # h | h | f |
o=========o=========o=========o=========o
| P # X | Y | Z |
o---------o---------o---------o---------o
| Q # U | V | W |
o---------o---------o---------o---------o
Products of diagonal extensions:
1,1, = !1!!1!
= "anything that is anything that is ---"
= "anything that is ---"
= !1!
m,n = "man that is noble"
= (C:C +, I:I +, J:J +, O:O)(C +, D +, O)
= C +, O
n,m = "noble that is man"
= (C:C +, D:D +, O:O)(C +, I +, J +, O)
= C +, O
n,w = "noble that is woman"
= (C:C +, D:D +, O:O)(B +, D +, E)
= D
w,n = "woman that is noble"
= (B:B +, D:D +, E:E)(C +, D +, O)
= D
Given a set X and a subset M c X, define e_M,
the "idempotent representation" of M over X,
as the 2-adic relation e_M c X x X which is
the identity relation on M. In other words,
e_M = {<x, x> : x in M}.
Transposing this by steps into Peirce's notation:
e_M = {<x, x> : x in M}
= {x:x : x in M}
= Sum_X |x in M| x:x
'l' = "lover of ---"
's' = "servant of ---"
'l', = "lover that is --- of ---"
's', = "servant that is --- of ---"
| But not only may any absolute term be thus regarded as a relative term,
| but any relative term may in the same way be regarded as a relative with
| one correlate more. It is convenient to take this additional correlate
| as the first one.
|
| Then:
|
| 'l','s'w
|
| will denote a lover of a woman that is a servant of that woman.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.73
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~+~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~+~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
| Objective Framework (OF) | Interpretive Framework (IF) |
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
| Objects | Signs |
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
| |
| C o--------------- |
| |
| F o--------------- |
| |
| I o--------------- |
| |
| O o--------------- |
| |
| B o--------------- |
| |
| D o--------------- |
| |
| E o--------------- |
| o "m" |
| / |
| / |
| / |
| o o o-----------@ |
| \ |
| \ |
| \ |
| o |
| |
o-----------------------------o-----------------------------o
†‡||§¶
@#||$%
quality, reflection, synecdoche
1. neglect of
2. neglect of
3. neglect of nil?
Now, it's not the end of the story, of course, but it's a start.
The significant thing is what is usually the significant thing
in mathematics, at least, that two distinct descriptions refer
to the same things. Incidentally, Peirce is not really being
as indifferent to the distinctions between signs and things
as this ascii text makes him look, but uses a host of other
type-faces to distinguish the types and the uses of signs.
LOR. Discussion Note 1
GR = Gary Richmond
GR: I wonder if the necessary "elementary triad" spoken of
below isn't somehow implicated in those discussions
"invoking a 'closure principle'".
GR, quoting CSP:
| CP 1.292. It can further be said in advance, not, indeed,
| purely a priori but with the degree of apriority that is
| proper to logic, namely, as a necessary deduction from
| the fact that there are signs, that there must be an
| elementary triad. For were every element of the
| phaneron a monad or a dyad, without the relative
| of teridentity (which is, of course, a triad),
| it is evident that no triad could ever be
| built up. Now the relation of every sign
| to its object and interpretant is plainly
| a triad. A triad might be built up of
| pentads or of any higher perissad
| elements in many ways. But it
| can be proved -- and really
| with extreme simplicity,
| though the statement of
| the general proof is
| confusing -- that no
| element can have
| a higher valency
| than three.
GR: (Of course this passage also directly relates
to the recent thread on Identity and Teridentity.)
Yes, generally speaking, I think that there are deep formal principles here
that manifest themselves in these various guises: the levels of intention
or the orders of reflection, the sign relation, pragmatic conceivability,
the generative sufficiency of 3-adic relations for all practical intents,
and the irreducibility of continuous relations. I have run into themes
in combinatorics, group theory, and Lie algebras that are tantalizingly
reminiscent of the things that Peirce says here, but it will take me
some time to investigate them far enough to see what's going on.
GR: PS. I came upon the above passage last night reading through
the Peirce selections in John J. Stuhr's 'Classical American
Philosophy: Essential Readings and Interpretive Essays',
Oxford University, 1987 (the passage above is found on
pp 61-62), readily available in paperback in a new
edition, I believe.
GR: An aside: These excerpts in Sturh include versions of a fascinating
"Intellectual Autobiography", Peirce's summary of his scientific,
especially, philosophic accomplishments. I've seen them published
nowhere else.
LOR. Discussion Note 2
BU = Ben Udell
JA = Jon Awbrey
BU: I'm in the process of moving back to NYC and have had little opportunity
to do more than glance through posts during the past few weeks, but this
struck me because it sounds something I really would like to know about,
but I didn't understand it:
JA: Notice that Peirce follows the mathematician's usual practice,
then and now, of making the status of being an "individual" or
a "universal" relative to a discourse in progress. I have come
to appreciate more and more of late how radically different this
"patchwork" or "piecewise" approach to things is from the way of
some philosophers who seem to be content with nothing less than
many worlds domination, which means that they are never content
and rarely get started toward the solution of any real problem.
Just my observation, I hope you understand.
BU: "Many worlds domination", "nothing less than many worlds domination" --
as opposed to the patchwork or piecewise approach. What is many worlds
domination? When I hear "many worlds" I think of Everett's Many Worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Yes, it is a resonance of Edward, Everett, and All the Other Whos in Whoville,
but that whole microcosm is itself but the frumious reverberation of Leibniz's
Maenadolatry.
More sequitur, though, this is an issue that has simmered beneath
the surface of my consciousness for several decades now and only
periodically percolates itself over the hyper-critical thrashold
of expression. Let me see if I can a better job of it this time.
The topic is itself a patchwork of infernally recurrent patterns.
Here are a few pieces of it that I can remember arising recently:
| Zeroth Law Of Semantics
|
| Meaning is a privilege not a right.
| Not all pictures depict.
| Not all signs denote.
|
| Never confuse a property of a sign,
| for instance, existence,
| with a sign of a property,
| for instance, existence.
|
| Taking a property of a sign,
| for a sign of a property,
| is the zeroth sign of
| nominal thinking,
| and the first
| mistake.
|
| Also Sprach Zero*
A less catchy way of saying "meaning is a privilege not a right"
would most likely be "meaning is a contingency not a necessity".
But if I reflect on that phrase, it does not quite satisfy me,
since a deeper lying truth is that contingency and necessity,
connections in fact and connections beyond the reach of fact,
depend on a line of distinction that is itself drawn on the
scene of observation from the embodied, material, physical,
non-point massive, non-purely-spectrelative point of view
of an agent or community of interpretation, a discursive
universe, an engauged interpretant, a frame of at least
partial self-reverence, a hermeneutics in progress, or
a participant observer. In short, this distinction
between the contingent and the necessary is itself
contingent, which means, among other things, that
signs are always indexical at some least quantum.
LOR. Discussion Note 3
JR = Joe Ransdell
JR: Would the Kripke conception of the "rigid designator" be an instance
of the "many worlds domination"? I was struck by your speaking of
the "patchwork or piecewise" approach as well in that it seemed to
me you might be expressing the same general idea that I have usually
thought of in terms of contextualism instead: I mean the limits it
puts upon what you can say a priori if you really take contextualism
seriously, which is the same as recognizing indexicality as incapable
of elimination, I think.
Yes, I think this is the same ballpark of topics.
I can't really speak for what Kripke had in mind,
but I have a practical acquaintance with the way
that some people have been trying to put notions
like this to work on the applied ontology scene,
and it strikes me as a lot of nonsense. I love
a good parallel worlds story as much as anybody,
but it strikes me that many worlds philosophers
have the least imagination of anybody as to what
an alternative universe might really be like and
so I prefer to read more creative writers when it
comes to that. But serially, folks, I think that
the reason why some people evidently feel the need
for such outlandish schemes -- and the vast majority
of the literature on counterfactual conditionals falls
into the same spaceboat as this -- is simply that they
have failed to absorb, through the fault of Principian
filters, a quality that Peirce's logic is thoroughly
steeped in, namely, the functional interpretation
of logical terms, that is, as signs referring to
patterns of contingencies. It is why he speaks
more often, and certainly more sensibly and to
greater effect, of "conditional generals" than
of "modal subjunctives". This is also bound up
with that element of sensibility that got lost in
the transition from Peircean to Fregean quantifiers.
Peirce's apriorities are always hedged with risky bets.
LOR. Discussion Note 4
BU = Benjamin Udell
BU: I wish I had more time to ponder the "many-worlds" issue (& that my books
were not currently disappearing into heavily taped boxes). I had thought
of the piecemeal approach's opposite as the attempt to build a kind of
monolithic picture, e.g., to worry that there is not an infinite number
of particles in the physical universe for the infinity integers. But
maybe the business with rigid designators & domination of many worlds
has somehow to do with monolithism.
Yes, that's another way of saying it. When I look to my own priorities,
my big worry is that logic as a discipline is not fulfilling its promise.
I have worked in too many settings where the qualitative researchers and
the quantitative researchers could barely even talk to one an Other with
any understanding, and this I recognized as a big block to inquiry since
our first notice of salient facts and significant phenomena is usually
in logical, natural language, or qualitative forms, while our eventual
success in resolving anomalies and solving practical problems depends
on our ability to formalize, operationalize, and quantify the issues,
even if only to a very partial degree, as it generally turns out.
When I look to the history of how logic has been deployed in mathematics,
and through those media in science generally, it seems to me that the
Piece Train started to go off track with the 'Principia Mathematica'.
All pokes in the rib aside, however, I tend to regard this event
more as the symptom of a localized cultural phenomenon than as
the root cause of the broader malaise.
LOR. Discussion Note 5
CG = Clark Goble
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA, quoting CSP:
| For example,
|
| f + u
|
| means all Frenchmen besides all violinists, and,
| therefore, considered as a logical term, implies
| that all French violinists are 'besides themselves'.
CG: Could you clarify your use of "besides"?
CG: I think I am following your thinking in that you
don't want the logical terms to be considered
to have any necessary identity between them.
Is that right?
I use vertical sidebars "|" for long quotations, so this
is me quoting Peirce at CP 3.67 who is explaining in an
idiomatic way Boole's use of the plus sign for a logical
operation that is strictly speaking limited to terms for
mutually exclusive classes. The operation would normally
be extended to signify the "symmetric difference" operator.
But Peirce is saying that he prefers to use the sign "+,"
for inclusive disjunction, corresponding to the union of
the associated classes. Peirce calls Boole's operation
"invertible" because it amounts to the sum operation in
a field, whereas the inclusive disjunction or union is
"non-invertible", since knowing that A |_| B = C does
not allow one to say determinately that A = C - B.
I can't recall if Boole uses this 'besides' idiom,
but will check later.
LOR. Discussion Note 6
CG = Clark Goble
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA: I use vertical sidebars "|" for long quotations, so this
is me quoting Peirce at CP 3.67 who is explaining in an
idiomatic way Boole's use of the plus sign for a logical
operation that is strictly speaking limited to terms for
mutually exclusive classes.
CG: Is that essay related to any of the essays
in the two volume 'Essential Peirce'? I'm
rather interested in how he speaks there.
No, the EP volumes are extremely weak on logical selections.
I see nothing there that deals with the logic of relatives.
JA: But Peirce is saying that he prefers to use the sign "+,"
for inclusive disjunction, corresponding to the union of
the associated classes.
CG: The reason I asked was more because it seemed
somewhat interesting in light of the logic of
operators in quantum mechanics. I was curious
if the use of "beside" might relate to that.
But from what you say it probably was just me
reading too much into the quote. The issue of
significance was whether the operation entailed
the necessity of mutual exclusivity or whether
some relationship between the classes might be
possible. I kind of latched on to Peirce's
odd statement about "all French violinists
are 'beside themselves'".
CG: Did Peirce have anything to say about
what we'd call non-commuting operators?
In general, 2-adic relative terms are non-commutative.
For example, a brother of a mother is not identical to
a mother of a brother.
LOR. Discussion Note 7
GR = Gary Richmond
GR: I am very much enjoying, which is to say,
learning from your interlacing commentary
on Peirce's 1870 "Logic of Relatives" paper.
GR: What an extraordinary paper the 1870 "LOG" is! Your notes helped
me appreciate the importance of the unanticipated proposal of P's
to "assign to all logical terms, numbers". On the other hand,
the excerpts suggested to we why Peirce finally framed his
Logic of Relatives into graphical form. Still, I think
that a thorough examination of the 1970 paper might
serve as propaedeutic (and of course, much more)
for the study of the alpha and beta graphs.
Yes, there's gold in them thar early logic papers that has been "panned"
but nowhere near mined in depth yet. The whole quiver of arrows between
terms and numbers harks back to the 'numeri characteristici' of Leibniz,
of course, but Leibniz attended more on the intensional chains of being
while Peirce will here start to "escavate" the extensional hierarchies.
I consider myself rewarded that you see the incipient impulse toward
logical graphs, as one of the most striking things to me about this
paper is to see these precursory seeds already planted here within
it and yet to know how long it will take them to sprout and bloom.
Peirce is obviously struggling to stay within the linotyper's art --
a thing that we, for all our exorbitant hype about markable text,
are still curiously saddled with -- but I do not believe that it
is possible for any mind equipped with a geometrical imagination
to entertain these schemes for connecting up terminological hubs
with their terminological terminals without perforce stretching
imaginary strings between the imaginary gumdrops.
GR: I must say though that the pace at which you've been throwing this at us
is not to be kept up with by anyone I know "in person or by reputation".
I took notes on the first 5 or 6 Notes, but can now just barely find
time to read through your posts.
Oh, I was trying to burrow as fast as I could toward the more untapped veins --
I am guessing that things will probably "descalate" a bit over the next week,
but then, so will our attention spans ...
Speaking of which, I will have to break here, and pick up the rest later ...
LOR. Discussion Note 8
GR = Gary Richmond
GR: In any event, I wish that you'd comment on Note 5 more directly (though
you do obliquely in your own diagramming of "every [US] Vice-President(s) ...
[who is] every President(s) of the US Senate".
There are several layers of things to say about that,
and I think that it would be better to illustrate the
issues by way of the examples that Peirce will soon be
getting to, but I will see what I can speak to for now.
GR: But what interested me even more in LOR, Note 5, was the sign < ("less than"
joined to the sign of identity = to yield P's famous sign -< (or more clearly,
=<) of inference, which combines the two (so that -< (literally, "as small as")
means "is". I must say I both "get" this and don't quite (Peirce's example(s) of
the frenchman helped a little). Perhaps your considerably more mathematical mind
can help clarify this for a non-mathematician such as myself. (My sense is that
"as small as" narrows the terms so that "everything that occurs in the conclusion
is already contained in the premise.) I hope I'm not being obtuse here. I'm sure
it's "all too simple for words".
Then let us draw a picture.
"(F (G))", read "not F without G", means that F (G), that is, F and not G,
is the only region exempted from the occupation of being in this universe:
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
|`X`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````|
|```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````|
|`````````````o-------------o```o-------------o`````````````|
|````````````/ \`/```````````````\````````````|
|```````````/ o`````````````````\```````````|
|``````````/ /`\`````````````````\``````````|
|`````````/ /```\`````````````````\`````````|
|````````/ /`````\`````````````````\````````|
|```````o o```````o`````````````````o```````|
|```````| |```````|`````````````````|```````|
|```````| |```````|`````````````````|```````|
|```````| F |```````|````````G````````|```````|
|```````| |```````|`````````````````|```````|
|```````| |```````|`````````````````|```````|
|```````o o```````o`````````````````o```````|
|````````\ \`````/`````````````````/````````|
|`````````\ \```/`````````````````/`````````|
|``````````\ \`/`````````````````/``````````|
|```````````\ o`````````````````/```````````|
|````````````\ /`\```````````````/````````````|
|`````````````o-------------o```o-------------o`````````````|
|```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````|
|```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````|
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Collapsing the vacuous region like soapfilm popping on a wire frame,
we draw the constraint (F (G)) in the following alternative fashion:
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
|`X`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````|
|```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````|
|```````````````````````````````o-------------o`````````````|
|``````````````````````````````/```````````````\````````````|
|`````````````````````````````o`````````````````\```````````|
|````````````````````````````/`\`````````````````\``````````|
|```````````````````````````/```\`````````````````\`````````|
|``````````````````````````/`````\`````````````````\````````|
|`````````````````````````o```````o`````````````````o```````|
|`````````````````````````|```````|`````````````````|```````|
|`````````````````````````|```````|`````````````````|```````|
|`````````````````````````|```F```|````````G````````|```````|
|`````````````````````````|```````|`````````````````|```````|
|`````````````````````````|```````|`````````````````|```````|
|`````````````````````````o```````o`````````````````o```````|
|``````````````````````````\`````/`````````````````/````````|
|```````````````````````````\```/`````````````````/`````````|
|````````````````````````````\`/`````````````````/``````````|
|`````````````````````````````o`````````````````/```````````|
|``````````````````````````````\```````````````/````````````|
|```````````````````````````````o-------------o`````````````|
|```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````|
|```````````````````````````````````````````````````````````|
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
So, "(F (G))", "F => G", "F =< G", "F -< G", "F c G",
under suitable mutations of interpretation, are just
so many ways of saying that the denotation of "F" is
contained within the denotation of "G".
Now, let us look to the "characteristic functions" or "indicator functions"
of the various regions of being. It is frequently convenient to ab-use the
same letters for them and merely keep a variant interpretation "en thy meme",
but let us be more meticulous here, and reserve the corresponding lower case
letters "f" and "g" to denote the indicator functions of the regions F and G,
respectively.
Taking B = {0, 1} as the boolean domain, we have:
f, g : X -> B
(f^(-1))(1) = F
(g^(-1))(1) = G
In general, for h : X -> B, an expression like "(h^(-1))(1)"
can be read as "the inverse of h evaluated at 1", in effect,
denoting the set of points in X where h evaluates to "true".
This is called the "fiber of truth" in h, and I have gotten
where I like to abbreviate it as "[|h|]".
Accordingly, we have:
F = [|f|] = (f^(-1))(1) c X
G = [|g|] = (g^(-1))(1) c X
This brings us to the question, what sort
of "functional equation" between f and g
goes with the regional constraint (F (G))?
Just this, that f(x) =< g(x) for all x in X,
where the '=<' relation on the values in B
has the following operational table for
the pairing "row head =< column head".
o---------o---------o---------o
| =< # 0 | 1 |
o=========o=========o=========o
| 0 # 1 | 1 |
o---------o---------o---------o
| 1 # 0 | 1 |
o---------o---------o---------o
And this, of course, is the same thing as the truth table
for the conditional connective or the implication relation.
GR: By the way, in the semiosis implied by the modal gamma graphs,
could -< (were it used there, which of course it is not) ever
be taken to mean,"leads to" or "becomes" or "evolves into"?
I informally use it that way myself, using the ordinary
arrow for implication.
I am a bit insensitive to the need for modal logic,
since necessity in mathematics always seems to come
down to being a matter of truth for all actual cases,
if under an expanded sense of actuality that makes it
indiscernible from possibility, so I must beg off here.
But there are places where Peirce makes a big deal about
the advisability of drawing the '-<' symbol in one fell
stroke of the pen, kind of like a "lazy gamma" -- an old
texican cattle brand -- and I have seen another place where
he reads "A -< B" as "A, in every way that it can be, is B",
as if this '-<' fork in the road led into a veritable garden
of branching paths.
And out again ...
LOR. Discussion Note 9
GR = Gary Richmond
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA: I am a bit insensitive to the need for modal logic,
since necessity in mathematics always seems to come
down to being a matter of truth for all actual cases,
if under an expanded sense of actuality that makes it
indiscernible from possibility, so I must beg off here.
GR: I cannot agree with you regarding modal logic. Personally
I feel that the gamma part of the EG's is of the greatest
interest and potential importance, and as Jay Zeman has
made clear in his dissertation, Peirce certainly thought
this as well.
You disagree that I am insensitive? Well, certainly nobody has ever done that before!
No, I phrased it that way to emphasize the circumstance that it ever hardly comes up
as an issue within the limited purview of my experience, and when it does -- as in
topo-logical boundary situations -- it seems to require a sort of analysis that
doesn't comport all that well with the classical modes and natural figures of
speech about it. Then again, I spent thirty years trying to motorize Alpha,
have only a few good clues how I would go about Beta, and so Gamma doesn't
look like one of those items on my plate.
Speeching Of Which ---
Best Of The Season ...
And Happy Trailing ...
LOR. Discussion Note 10
BM = Bernard Morand
JA = Jon Awbrey
BM: Thanks for your very informative talk. There
is a point that I did not understand in note 35:
JA: If we operate in accordance with Peirce's example of `g`'o'h
as the "giver of a horse to an owner of that horse", then we
may assume that the associative law and the distributive law
are by default in force, allowing us to derive this equation:
JA: 'l','s'w = 'l','s'(B +, D +, E) = 'l','s'B +, 'l','s'D +, 'l','s'E
BM: May be because language or more probably my lack of training in logic, what
does mean that "associative law and distributive law are by default in force"?
Those were some tricky Peirces,
and I was trying to dodge them
as artful as could be, but now
you have fastly apprehended me!
It may be partly that I left out the initial sections of this paper where Peirce
discusses how he will regard the ordinarily applicable principles in the process
of trying to extend and generalize them (CP 3.45-62), but there may be also an
ambiguity in Peirce's use of the phrase "absolute conditions" (CP 3.62-68).
Does he mean "absolutely necessary", "indispensable", "inviolate", or
does he mean "the conditions applying to the logic of absolute terms",
in which latter case we would expect to alter them sooner or later?
We lose the commutative law, xy = yx, as soon as we extend to 2-adic relations,
but keep the associative law, x(yz) = (xy)z, as the multiplication of 2-adics
is the logical analogue of ordinary matrix multiplication, and Peirce like
most mathematicians treats the double distributive law, x(y + z) = xy + xz
and (x + y)z = xz + yz, and as something that must be striven to preserve
as far as possible.
Strictly speaking, Peirce is already using a principle that goes beyond
the ordinary associative law, but that is recognizably analogous to it,
for example, in the modified Othello case, where (J:J:D)(J:D)(D) = J.
If it were strictly associative, then we would have the following:
1. (J:J:D)((J:D)(D)) = (J:J:D)(J) = 0?
2. ((J:J:D)(J:D))(D) = (J)(D) = 0?
In other words, the intended relational linkage would be broken.
However, the type of product that Peirce is taking for granted
in this situation often occurs in mathematics in just this way.
There is another location where he comments more fully on this,
but I have the sense that it was a late retrospective remark,
and I do not recall if it was in CP or in the microfilm MS's
that I read it.
By "default" conditions I am referring more or less to what
Peirce says at the end of CP 3.69, where he use an argument
based on the distributive principle to rationalize the idea
that 'A term multiplied by two relatives shows that the same
individual is in the two relations'. This means, for example,
that one can let "`g`'o'h", without subjacent marks or numbers,
be interpreted on the default convention of "overlapping scopes",
where the two correlates of `g` are given by the next two terms
in line, namely, 'o' and h, and the single correlate of 'o' is
given by the very next term in line, namely, h. Thus, it is
only when this natural scoping cannot convey the intended
sense that we have to use more explicit mark-up devices.
BM: About another point: do you think that the LOR could be of some help to solve
the puzzle of the "second way of dividing signs" where CSP concludes that 66
classes could be made out of the 10 divisions (Letters to lady Welby)?
(As I see them, the ten divisions involve a mix of relative terms,
dyadic relations and a triadic one. In order to make 66 classes
it is clear that these 10 divisions have to be stated under some
linear order. The nature of this order is at the bottom of the
disagreements on the subject).
This topic requires a longer excuse from me
than I am able to make right now, but maybe
I'll get back to it later today or tomorrow.
LOR. Discussion Note 11
BM = Bernard Morand
BM: About another point: do you think that the LOR could be of some help
to solve the puzzle of the "second way of dividing signs" where CSP
concludes that 66 classes could be made out of the 10 divisions
(Letters to lady Welby)? (As I see them, the ten divisions
involve a mix of relative terms, dyadic relations and
a triadic one. In order to make 66 classes it is
clear that these 10 divisions have to be stated
under some linear order. The nature of this
order is at the bottom of the disagreements
on the subject).
Yes. At any rate, I have a pretty clear sense from reading Peirce's work
in the period 1865-1870 that the need to understand the function of signs
in scientific inquiry is one of the main reasons he found himself forced
to develop both the theory of information and the logic of relatives.
Peirce's work of this period is evenly distributed across the extensional
and intensional pans of the balance in a way that is very difficult for us
to follow anymore. I remember when I started looking into this I thought of
myself as more of an "intensional, synthetic" than an "extensional, analytic"
type of thinker, but that seems like a long time ago, as it soon became clear
that much less work had been done in the Peirce community on the extensional
side of things, while that was the very facet that needed to be polished up
in order to reconnect logic with empirical research and mathematical models.
So I fear that I must be content that other able people are working on the
intensional classification of sign relations.
Still, the way that you pose the question is very enticing,
so maybe it is time for me to start thinking about this
aspect of sign relations again, if you could say more
about it.
LOR. Discussion Note 12
BM = Bernard Morand
BM: The pairing "intensional, synthetic" against the other "extensional, analytic"
is not one that I would have thought so. I would have paired synthetic with
extensional because synthesis consists in adding new facts to an already made
conception. On the other side analysis looks to be the determination of
features while neglecting facts. But may be there is something like
a symmetry effect leading to the same view from two different points.
Oh, it's not too important, as I don't put a lot of faith in such divisions,
and the problem for me is always how to integrate the facets of the object,
or the faculties of the mind -- but there I go being synthetic again!
I was only thinking of a conventional contrast that used to be drawn
between different styles of thinking in mathematics, typically one
points to Descartes, and the extensionality of analytic geometry,
versus Desargues, and the intensionality of synthetic geometry.
It may appear that one has side-stepped the issue of empiricism
that way, but then all that stuff about the synthetic a priori
raises its head, and we have Peirce's insight that mathematics
is observational and even experimental, and so I must trail off
into uncoordinated elliptical thoughts ...
The rest I have to work at a while, and maybe go back to the Welby letters.
LOR. Discussion Note 13
BM = Bernard Morand
BM: I will try to make clear the matter, at least as far as I understand it
for now. We can summarize in a table the 10 divisions with their number
in a first column, their title in current (peircean) language in the second
and some kind of logical notation in the third. The sources come mainly from
the letters to Lady Welby. While the titles come from CP 8.344, the third column
comes from my own interpretation.
BM: So we get:
I - According to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself - S
II - According to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object - Oi
III - According to the Mode of Being of the Dynamical Object - Od
IV - According to the Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object - S-Od
V - According to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant - Ii
VI - According to the Mode of Being of the Dynamical Interpretant - Id
VII - According to the relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant - S-Id
VIII - According to the Nature of the Normal Interpretant - If
IX - According to the the relation of the Sign to the Normal Interpretant - S-If
X - According to the Triadic Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object
and to its Normal Interpretant - S-Od-If
For my future study, I will reformat the table in a way that I can muse upon.
I hope the roman numerals have not become canonical, as I cannot abide them.
Table. Ten Divisions of Signs (Peirce, Morand)
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
| | According To: | Of: | To: | |
o===o===============o==================o==================o===============o
| 1 | Apprehension | Sign Itself | | S |
| 2 | Presentation | Immediate Object | | O_i |
| 3 | Being | Dynamical Object | | O_d |
| 4 | Relation | Sign | Dynamical Object | S : O_d |
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
| 5 | Presentation | Immediate Interp | | I_i |
| 6 | Being | Dynamical Interp | | I_d |
| 7 | Relation | Sign | Dynamical Interp | S : I_d |
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
| 8 | Nature | Normal Interp | | I_f |
| 9 | Relation | Sign | Normal Interp | S : I_f |
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
| A | Relation | Sign | Dynamical Object | |
| | | | & Normal Interp | S : O_d : I_f |
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
Just as I have always feared, this classification mania
appears to be communicable! But now I must definitely
review the Welby correspondence, as all this stuff was
a blur to my sensibilities the last 10 times I read it.
LOR. Discussion Note 14
BM = Bernard Morand
[Table. Ten Divisions of Signs (Peirce, Morand)]
BM: Yes this is clearer (in particular in expressing relations with :)
This is what Peirce used to form elementary relatives, for example,
o:s:i = <o, s, i>, and I find it utterly ubertous in a wide variety
of syntactic circumstances.
BM: I suggest making a correction to myself if
the table is destinate to become canonic.
Hah! Good one!
BM: I probably made a too quick jump from Normal Interpretant to Final Interpretant.
As we know, the final interpretant, the ultimate one is not a sign for Peirce
but a habit. So for the sake of things to come it would be more careful to
retain I_n in place of I_f for now.
This accords with my understanding of how the word is used in mathematics.
In my own work it has been necessary to distinguish many different species
of expressions along somewhat similar lines, for example: arbitrary, basic,
canonical, decidable, normal, periodic, persistent, prototypical, recurrent,
representative, stable, typical, and so on. So I will make the changes below:
Table. Ten Divisions of Signs (Peirce, Morand)
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
| | According To: | Of: | To: | |
o===o===============o==================o==================o===============o
| 1 | Apprehension | Sign Itself | | S |
| 2 | Presentation | Immediate Object | | O_i |
| 3 | Being | Dynamical Object | | O_d |
| 4 | Relation | Sign | Dynamical Object | S : O_d |
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
| 5 | Presentation | Immediate Interp | | I_i |
| 6 | Being | Dynamical Interp | | I_d |
| 7 | Relation | Sign | Dynamical Interp | S : I_d |
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
| 8 | Nature | Normal Interp | | I_n |
| 9 | Relation | Sign | Normal Interp | S : I_n |
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
| A | Tri. Relation | Sign | Dynamical Object | |
| | | | & Normal Interp | S : O_d : I_n |
o---o---------------o------------------o------------------o---------------o
BM: Peirce gives the following definition (CP 8.343):
BM, quoting CSP:
| It is likewise requisite to distinguish
| the 'Immediate Interpretant', i.e. the
| Interpretant represented or signified in
| the Sign, from the 'Dynamic Interpretant',
| or effect actually produced on the mind
| by the Sign; and both of these from
| the 'Normal Interpretant', or effect
| that would be produced on the mind by
| the Sign after sufficient development
| of thought.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 8.343.
Well, you've really tossed me in the middle of the briar patch now!
I must continue with my reading from the 1870 LOR, but now I have
to add to my do-list the problems of comparing the whole variorum
of letters and drafts of letters to Lady Welby. I only have the
CP 8 and Wiener versions here, so I will depend on you for ample
excerpts from the Lieb volume.
LOR. Discussion Note 15
I will need to go back and pick up the broader contexts of your quotes.
For ease of study I break Peirce's long paragraphs into smaller pieces.
| It seems to me that one of the first useful steps toward a science
| of 'semeiotic' ([Greek 'semeiootike']), or the cenoscopic science
| of signs, must be the accurate definition, or logical analysis,
| of the concepts of the science.
|
| I define a 'Sign' as anything which on the one hand
| is so determined by an Object and on the other hand
| so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this
| latter determination, which I term the 'Interpretant'
| of the sign, is thereby mediately determined by that
| Object.
|
| A sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to
| its Object and to its Interpretant. But it is
| necessary to distinguish the 'Immediate Object',
| or the Object as the Sign represents it, from
| the 'Dynamical Object', or really efficient
| but not immediately present Object.
|
| It is likewise requisite to distinguish
| the 'Immediate Interpretant', i.e. the
| Interpretant represented or signified in
| the Sign, from the 'Dynamic Interpretant',
| or effect actually produced on the mind
| by the Sign; and both of these from
| the 'Normal Interpretant', or effect
| that would be produced on the mind by
| the Sign after sufficient development
| of thought.
|
| On these considerations I base a recognition of ten respects in which Signs
| may be divided. I do not say that these divisions are enough. But since
| every one of them turns out to be a trichotomy, it follows that in order
| to decide what classes of signs result from them, I have 3^10, or 59049,
| difficult questions to carefully consider; and therefore I will not
| undertake to carry my systematical division of signs any further,
| but will leave that for future explorers.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 8.343.
You never know when the future explorer will be yourself.
LOR. Discussion Note 16
Burks, the editor of CP 8, attaches this footnote
to CP 8.342-379, "On the Classification of Signs":
| From a partial draft of a letter to Lady Welby, bearing
| the dates of 24, 25, and 28 December 1908, Widener IB3a,
| with an added quotation in 368n23. ...
There is a passage roughly comparable to CP 8.343 in a letter
to Lady Welby dated 23 December 1908, pages 397-409 in Wiener,
which is incidentally the notorious "sop to Cerberus" letter:
| It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign,
| the Mediate without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its
| Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with
| its Object must be gained by collateral experience.
|
| The Mediate Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call
| it the 'Dynamoid' Object. The Sign must indicate it by a hint;
| and this hint, or its substance, is the 'Immediate' Object.
|
| Each of these two Objects may be said to be capable of either of
| the three Modalities, though in the case of the Immediate Object,
| this is not quite literally true.
|
| Accordingly, the Dynamoid Object may be a Possible; when I term
| the Sign an 'Abstractive'; such as the word Beauty; and it will be
| none the less an Abstractive if I speak of "the Beautiful", since it is
| the ultimate reference, and not the grammatical form, that makes the sign
| an 'Abstractive'.
|
| When the Dynamoid Object is an Occurrence (Existent thing or Actual fact
| of past or future), I term the Sign a 'Concretive'; any one barometer
| is an example; and so is a written narrative of any series of events.
|
| For a 'Sign' whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at present
| no better designation than a 'Collective', which is not quite so bad a
| name as it sounds to be until one studies the matter: but for a person,
| like me, who thinks in quite a different system of symbols to words, it
| is so awkward and often puzzling to translate one's thought into words!
|
| If the Immediate Object is a "Possible", that is, if the Dynamoid Object
| is indicated (always more or less vaguely) by means of its Qualities, etc.,
| I call the Sign a 'Descriptive';
|
| if the Immediate is an Occurrence, I call the Sign a 'Designative';
|
| and if the Immediate Object is a Necessitant, I call the Sign a
| 'Copulant'; for in that case the Object has to be so identified
| by the Interpreter that the Sign may represent a necessitation.
| My name is certainly a temporary expedient.
|
| It is evident that a possible can determine nothing but a Possible,
| it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but
| a Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that
| since the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object,
|
| Which determines the Sign itself,
| which determines the Destinate Interpretant
| which determines the Effective Interpretant
| which determines the Explicit Interpretant
|
| the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs,
| as they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes;
| and if, as I strongly opine (not to say almost prove), there
| are four other trichotomies of signs of the same order of
| importance, instead of making 59,049 classes, these will
| only come to 66.
|
| The additional 4 trichotomies are undoubtedly, first:
|
| Icons*, Symbols, Indices,
|
|*(or Simulacra, Aristotle's 'homoiomata'), caught from Plato, who I guess took it
| from the Mathematical school of logic, for it earliest appears in the 'Phaedrus'
| which marks the beginning of Plato's being decisively influenced by that school.
| Lutoslowski is right in saying that the 'Phaedrus' is later than the 'Republic'
| but his date 379 B.C. is about eight years too early.
|
| and then 3 referring to the Interpretants. One of these I am pretty confident
| is into: 'Suggestives', 'Imperatives', 'Indicatives', where the Imperatives
| include the Interrogatives. Of the other two I 'think' that one must be
| into Signs assuring their Interpretants by:
|
| Instinct, Experience, Form.
|
| The other I suppose to be what, in my 'Monist'
| exposition of Existential Graphs, I called:
|
| Semes, Phemes, Delomes.
|
| CSP, 'Selected Writings', pp. 406-408.
|
|'Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance)',
| edited with an introduction and notes by Philip P. Wiener, Dover,
| New York, NY, 1966. Originally published under the subtitle
| in parentheses above, Doubleday & Company, 1958.
But see CP 4.549-550 for a significant distinction between
the categories (or modalities) and the orders of intention.
LOR. Discussion Note 17
HC = Howard Callaway
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA: In closing, observe that the teridentity relation has turned up again
in this context, as the second comma-ing of the universal term itself:
1,, = B:B:B +, C:C:C +, D:D:D +, E:E:E +, I:I:I +, J:J:J +, O:O:O.
HC: I see that you've come around to a mention of teridentity again, Jon.
Still, if I recall the prior discussions, then no one doubts that we
can have a system of notation in which teridentity appears (I don't
actually see it here).
Perhaps we could get at the root of the misunderstanding
if you tell me why you don't actually see the concept of
teridentity being exemplified here.
If it's only a matter of having lost the context of the
present discussion over the break, then you may find the
previous notes archived at the distal ends of the ur-links
that I append below (except for the first nine discussion
notes that got lost in a disk crash at the Arisbe Dev site).
HC: Also, I think we can have a system of notation in which
teridentity is needed. Those points seem reasonably clear.
The advantage of a concept is the integration of a species of manifold.
The necessity of a concept is the incapacity to integrate it otherwise.
Of course, no one should be too impressed with a concept that
is only the artifact of a particular system of representation.
So before we accord a concept the status of addressing reality,
and declare it a term of some tenured office in our intellects,
we would want to see some evidence that it helps us to manage
a reality that we cannot see a way to manage any other way.
Granted.
Now how in general do we go about an investiture of this sort?
That is the big question that would serve us well to consider
in the process of the more limited investigation of identity.
Indeed, I do not see how it is possible to answer the small
question if no understanding is reached on the big question.
HC: What remains relatively unclear is why we should need a system of notation
in which teridentity appears or is needed as against one in which it seems
not to be needed -- since assertion of identity can be made for any number
of terms in the standard predicate calculus.
This sort of statement totally non-plusses me.
It seems like a complete non-sequitur or even
a contradiction in terms to me.
The question is about the minimal adequate resource base for
defining, deriving, or generating all of the concepts that we
need for a given but very general type of application that we
conventionally but equivocally refer to as "logic". You seem
to be saying something like this: We don't need 3-identity
because we have 4-identity, 5-identity, 6-identity, ..., in
the "standard predicate calculus". The question is not what
concepts are generated in all the generations that follow the
establishment of the conceptual resource base (axiom system),
but what is the minimal set of concepts that we can use to
generate the needed collection of concepts. And there the
answer is, in a way that is subject to the usual sorts of
mathematical proof, that 3-identity is the minimum while
2-identity is not big enough to do the job we want to do.
Logic Of Relatives 01-41, LOR Discussion Notes 10-17.
LOR. Discussion Note 18
BM = Bernard Morand
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA: but now I have to add to my do-list the problems of comparing the
whole variorum of letters and drafts of letters to Lady Welby.
I only have the CP 8 and Wiener versions here, so I will
depend on you for ample excerpts from the Lieb volume.
BM: I made such a kind of comparison some time ago. I selected
the following 3 cases on the criterium of alternate "grounds".
Hoping it could save some labor. The first rank expressions
come from the MS 339 written in Oct. 1904 and I label them
with an (a). I think that it is interesting to note that
they were written four years before the letters to Welby
and just one or two years after the Syllabus which is the
usual reference for the classification in 3 trichotomies
and 10 classes. The second (b) is our initial table (from
a draft to Lady Welby, Dec. 1908, CP 8.344) and the third
(c) comes from a letter sent in Dec. 1908 (CP 8.345-8.376).
A tabular presentation would be better but I can't do it.
Comparing (c) against (a) and (b) is informative, I think.
Is this anywhere that it can be linked to from Arisbe?
I've seen many pretty pictures of these things over the
years, but may have to follow my own gnosis for a while.
Pages I have bookmarked just recently,
but not really had the chance to study:
http://www.digitalpeirce.org/hoffmann/p-sighof.htm
http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~merkle/thesis/Introduction.html
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/merkle/hci-abstract.htm
LOR. Discussion Note 19
BM = Bernard Morand
JA = Jon Awbrey
I now have three partially answered messages on the table,
so I will just grab this fragment off the top of the deck.
BM: Peirce gives the following definition (CP 8.343):
BM, quoting CSP:
| It is likewise requisite to distinguish
| the 'Immediate Interpretant', i.e. the
| Interpretant represented or signified in
| the Sign, from the 'Dynamic Interpretant',
| or effect actually produced on the mind
| by the Sign; and both of these from
| the 'Normal Interpretant', or effect
| that would be produced on the mind by
| the Sign after sufficient development
| of thought.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 8.343.
JA: Well, you've really tossed me in the middle of the briar patch now!
I must continue with my reading from the 1870 LOR, ...
BM: Yes indeed! I am irritated by having not the necessary
turn of mind to fully grasp it. But it seems to be a
prerequisite in order to understand the very meaning
of the above table. It could be the same for:
BM, quoting CSP:
| I define a 'Sign' as anything which on the one hand
| is so determined by an Object and on the other hand
| so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this
| latter determination, which I term the 'Interpretant'
| of the sign, is thereby mediately determined by that
| Object.
BM: The so-called "latter determination" would make the 'Interpretant'
a tri-relative term into a teridentity involving Sign and Object.
Isn't it?
BM: I thought previously that the Peirce's phrasing was just applying the
principle of transitivity. From O determines S and S determines I,
it follows: O determines I. But this is not the same as teridentity.
Do you think so or otherwise?
My answers are "No" and "Otherwise".
Continuing to discourse about definite universes thereof,
the 3-identity term over the universe 1 = {A, B, C, D, ...} --
I only said it was definite, I didn't say it wasn't vague! --
designates, roughly speaking, the 3-adic relation that may
be hinted at by way of the following series:
1,, = A:A:A +, B:B:B +, C:C:C +, D:D:D +, ...
I did a study on Peirce's notion of "determination".
As I understand it so far, we need to keep in mind
that it is more fundamental than causation, can be
a form of "partial determination", and is roughly
formal, mathematical, or "information-theoretic",
not of necessity invoking any temporal order.
For example, when we say "The points A and B determine the line AB",
this invokes the concept of a 3-adic relation of determination that
does not identify A, B, AB, is not transitive, as transitivity has
to do with the composition of 2-adic relations and would amount to
the consideration of a degenerate 3-adic relation in this context.
Now, it is possible to have a sign relation q whose sum enlists
an elementary sign relation O:S:I where O = S = I. For example,
it makes perfect sense to me to say that the whole universe may
be a sign of itself to itself, so the conception is admissable.
But this amounts to a very special case, by no means general.
More generally, we are contemplating sums like the following:
q = O1:S1:I1 +, O2:S2:I2 +, O3:S3:I3 +, ...
LOR. Discussion Note 20
HC = Howard Callaway
JR = Joe Ransdell
HC: Though I certainly hesitate to think that we are separated
from the world by a veil of signs, it seems clear, too, on
Peircean grounds, that no sign can ever capture its object
completely.
JR: Any case of self-representation is a case of sign-object identity,
in some sense of "identity". I have argued in various places that
this is the key to the doctrine of immediate perception as it occurs
in Peirce's theory.
To put the phrase back on the lathe:
| We are not separated from the world by a veil of signs --
| we are the veil of signs.
LOR. Discussion Note 21
AS = Armando Sercovich
AS: We are not separated from the world by a veil of signs nor we are a veil of signs.
Simply we are signs.
AS, quoting CSP:
| The *man-sign* acquires information, and comes to mean more than he did before.
| But so do words. Does not electricity mean more now than it did in the days
| of Franklin? Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man
| has not made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can think
| only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round
| and say: "You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only
| so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought".
| In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other;
| each increase of a man's information involves, and is involved by,
| a corresponding increase of a word's information.
|
| Without fatiguing the reader by stretching this parallelism too far, it is
| sufficient to say that there is no element whatever of man's consciousness
| which has not something corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is
| obvious. It is that the word or sign which man uses *is* the man itself.
| For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with
| the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so,
| that every thought is an *external* sign proves that man is an external
| sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical, in
| the same sense in which the words 'homo' and 'man' are identical. Thus
| my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought ...
|
|'Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance)',
| edited with an introduction and notes by Philip P. Wiener, Dover,
| New York, NY, 1966. Originally published under the subtitle
| in parentheses above, Doubleday & Company, 1958.
I read you loud and clear.
Every manifold must have
its catalytic converter.
<Innumerate Continuation:>
TUC = The Usual CISPEC
TUC Alert:
| E.P.A. Says Catalytic Converter Is
| Growing Cause of Global Warming
| By Matthew L. Wald
| Copyright 1998 The New York Times
| May 29, 1998
| -----------------------------------------------------------------------
| WASHINGTON -- The catalytic converter, an invention that has sharply
| reduced smog from cars, has now become a significant and growing cause
| of global warming, according to the Environmental Protection Agency
Much as I would like to speculate ad libitum on these exciting new prospects for the
application of Peirce's chemico-algebraic theory of logic to the theorem-o-dynamics
of auto-semeiosis, I must get back to "business as usual" (BAU) ...
And now a word from our sponsor ...
http://www2.naias.com/
Reporting from Motown ---
Jon Awbrey
LOR. Discussion Note 22
HC = Howard Callaway
HC: You quote the following passage from a prior posting of mine:
HC: What remains relatively unclear is why we should need a system of notation
in which teridentity appears or is needed as against one in which it seems
not to be needed -- since assertion of identity can be made for any number
of terms in the standard predicate calculus.
HC: You comment as follows:
JA: This sort of statement totally non-plusses me.
It seems like a complete non-sequitur or even
a contradiction in terms to me.
JA: The question is about the minimal adequate resource base for
defining, deriving, or generating all of the concepts that we
need for a given but very general type of application that we
conventionally but equivocally refer to as "logic". You seem
to be saying something like this: We don't need 3-identity
because we have 4-identity, 5-identity, 6-identity, ..., in
the "standard predicate calculus". The question is not what
concepts are generated in all the generations that follow the
establishment of the conceptual resource base (axiom system),
but what is the minimal set of concepts that we can use to
generate the needed collection of concepts. And there the
answer is, in a way that is subject to the usual sorts of
mathematical proof, that 3-identity is the minimum while
2-identity is not big enough to do the job we want to do.
HC: I have fallen a bit behind on this thread while attending to some other
matters, but in this reply, you do seem to me to be coming around to an
understanding of the issues involved, as I see them. You put the matter
this way, "We don't need 3-identity because we have 4-identity, 5-identity,
6-identity, ..., in the 'standard predicate calculus'". Actually, as I think
you must know, there is no such thing as "4-identity", "5-identity", etc., in
the standard predicate calculus. It is more that such concepts are not needed,
just as teridentity is not needed, since the general apparatus of the predicate
calculus allows us to express identity among any number of terms without special
provision beyond "=".
No, that is not the case. Standard predicate calculus allows the expression
of predicates I_k, for k = 2, 3, 4, ..., such that I_k (x_1, ..., x_k) holds
if and only if all x_j, for j = 1 to k, are identical. So predicate calculus
contains a k-identity predicate for all such k. So whether "they're in there"
is not an issue. The question is whether these or any other predicates can be
constructed or defined in terms of 2-adic relations alone. And the answer is
no, they cannot. The vector of the misconception counterwise appears to be
as various a virus as the common cold, and every bit as resistant to cure.
I have taken the trouble to enumerate some of the more prevalent strains,
but most of them appear to go back to the 'Principia Mathematica', and
the variety of nominalism called "syntacticism" -- Ges-und-heit! --
that was spread by it, however unwittedly by some of its carriers.
LOR. Discussion Note 23
In trying to answer the rest of your last note,
it seems that we cannot go any further without
achieving some concrete clarity as to what is
denominated by "standard predicate calculus",
that is, "first order logic", or whatever.
There is a "canonical" presentation of the subject, as I remember it, anyway,
in the following sample of materials from Chang & Keisler's 'Model Theory'.
(There's a newer edition of the book, but this part of the subject hasn't
really changed all that much in ages.)
Model Theory 01-39
LOR. Discussion Note 24
HC = Howard Callaway
HC: I might object that "teridentity" seems to come
to a matter of "a=b & b=c", so that a specific
predicate of teridentity seems unnecessary.
I am presently concerned with expositing and interpreting
the logical system that Peirce laid out in the LOR of 1870.
It is my considered opinion after thirty years of study that
there are untapped resources remaining in this work that have
yet to make it through the filters of that ilk of syntacticism
that was all the rage in the late great 1900's. I find there
to be an appreciably different point of view on logic that is
embodied in Peirce's work, and until we have made the minimal
effort to read what he wrote it is just plain futile to keep
on pretending that we have already assimilated it, or that
we are qualified to evaluate its cogency.
The symbol "&" that you employ above denotes a mathematical object that
qualifies as a 3-adic relation. Independently of my own views, there
is an abundance of statements in evidence that mathematical thinkers
from Peirce to Goedel consider the appreciation of facts like this
to mark the boundary between realism and nominalism in regard to
mathematical objects.
LOR. Discussion Note 25
HC = Howard Callaway
JA = Jon Awbrey
HC: I might object that "teridentity" seems to come
to a matter of "a=b & b=c", so that a specific
predicate of teridentity seems unnecessary.
JA: I am presently concerned with expositing and interpreting
the logical system that Peirce laid out in the LOR of 1870.
It is my considered opinion after thirty years of study that
there are untapped resources remaining in this work that have
yet to make it through the filters of that ilk of syntacticism
that was all the rage in the late great 1900's. I find there
to be an appreciably different point of view on logic that is
embodied in Peirce's work, and until we have made the minimal
effort to read what he wrote it is just plain futile to keep
on pretending that we have already assimilated it, or that
we are qualified to evaluate its cogency.
JA: The symbol "&" that you employ above denotes a mathematical object that
qualifies as a 3-adic relation. Independently of my own views, there
is an abundance of statements in evidence that mathematical thinkers
from Peirce to Goedel consider the appreciation of facts like this
to mark the boundary between realism and nominalism in regard to
mathematical objects.
HC: I would agree, I think, that "&" may be thought of
as a function mapping pairs of statements onto the
conjunction of that pair.
Yes, indeed, in the immortal words of my very first college algebra book:
"A binary operation is a ternary relation". As it happens, the symbol "&"
is equivocal in its interpretation -- computerese today steals a Freudian
line and dubs it "polymorphous" -- it can be regarded in various contexts
as a 3-adic relation on syntactic elements called "sentences", on logical
elements called "propositions", or on truth values collated in the boolean
domain B = {false, true} = {0, 1}. But the mappings and relations between
all of these interpretive choices are moderately well understood. Still,
no matter how many ways you enumerate for looking at a B-bird, the "&" is
always 3-adic. And that is sufficient to meet your objection, so I think
I will just leave it there until next time.
On a related note, that I must postpone until later:
We seem to congrue that there is a skewness between
the way that most mathematicians use logic and some
philosophers talk about logic, but I may not be the
one to set it adjoint, much as I am inclined to try.
At the moment I have this long-post-poned exponency
to carry out. I will simply recommend for your due
consideration Peirce's 1870 Logic Of Relatives, and
leave it at that. There's a cornucopiousness to it
that's yet to be dreamt of in the philosophy of the
1900's. I am doing what I can to infotain you with
the Gardens of Mathematical Recreations that I find
within Peirce's work, and that's in direct response
to many, okay, a couple of requests. Perhaps I can
not hope to attain the degree of horticultural arts
that Gardners before me have exhibited in this work,
but then again, who could? Everybody's a critic --
but the better ones read first, and criticize later.
LOR. Discussion Note 26
HC = Howard Callaway
HC: But on the other hand, it is not customary to think of "&" as
a relation among statements or sentences -- as, for instance,
logical implication is considered a logical relation between
statements or sentences.
Actually, it is the custom in many quarters to treat all of the
boolean operations, logical connectives, propositional relations,
or whatever you want to call them, as "equal citizens", having each
their "functional" (f : B^k -> B) and their "relational" (L c B^(k+1))
interpretations and applications. From this vantage, the interpretive
distinction that is commonly regarded as that between "assertion" and
mere "contemplation" is tantamount to a "pragmatic" difference between
computing the values of a function on a given domain of arguments and
computing the inverse of a function vis-a-vis a prospective true value.
This is the logical analogue of the way that our mathematical models
of reality have long been working, unsuspected and undisturbed by
most philosophers of science, I might add. If only the logical
side of the ledger were to be developed rather more fully than
it is at present, we might wake one of these days to find our
logical accounts of reality, finally, at long last, after an
overweaningly longish adolescence, beginning to come of age.
LOR. Discussion Note 27
HC = Howard Callaway
HC: For, if I make an assertion A&B, then I am not asserting
that the statement A stands in a relation to a statement B.
Instead, I am asserting the conjunction A&B (which logically
implies both the conjuncts in view of the definition of "&").
Please try to remember where we came in. This whole play of
animadversions about 3-adicity and 3-identity is set against
the backdrop of a single point, over the issue as to whether
3-adic relations are wholly dispensable or somehow essential
to logic, mathematics, and indeed to argument, communication,
and reasoning in general. Some folks clamor "Off with their
unnecessary heads!" -- other people, who are forced by their
occupations to pay close attention to the ongoing complexity
of the processes at stake, know that, far from finding 3-ads
in this or that isolated corner of the realm, one can hardly
do anything at all in the ways of logging or mathing without
running smack dab into veritable hosts of them.
I have just shown that "a=b & b=c" involves a 3-adic relation.
Some people would consider this particular 3-adic relation to
be more complex than the 3-identity relation, but that may be
a question of taste. At any rate, the 3-adic aspect persists.
HC: If "&" counts as a triadic relation, simply because it serves
to conjoin two statements into a third, then it would seem that
any binary relation 'R' will count as triadic, simply because
it places two things into a relation, which is a "third" thing.
By the same kind of reasoning a triadic relation, as ordinarily
understood would be really 4-adic.
The rest of your comments are just confused,
and do not use the terms as they are defined.
LOR. Discussion Note 28
JA = Jon Awbrey
JR = Joseph Ransdell
JA: Notice that Peirce follows the mathematician's usual practice,
then and now, of making the status of being an "individual" or
a "universal" relative to a discourse in progress. I have come
to appreciate more and more of late how radically different this
"patchwork" or "piecewise" approach to things is from the way of
some philosophers who seem to be content with nothing less than
many worlds domination, which means that they are never content
and rarely get started toward the solution of any real problem.
Just my observation, I hope you understand.
JR: Yes, I take this as underscoring and explicating the import of
making logic prior to rather than dependent upon metaphysics.
I think that Peirce, and of course many math folks, would take math
as prior, on a par, or even identical with logic. Myself I've been
of many minds about this over the years. The succinctest picture
that I get from Peirce is always this one:
| [Riddle of the Sphynx]
|
| Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics;
| Metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 1.186 (1903)
|
|
| o Metaphysics
| /|
| / |
| / |
| Normative Science o |
| / \ |
| / \ |
| / \|
| Mathematics o o Phenomenology
|
|
| ROTS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-March/001262.html
Logic being a normative science must depend on math and phenomenology.
Of course, it all depends on what a person means by "logic" ...
JA: I also observe that Peirce takes the individual objects of
a particular universe of discourse in a "generative" way,
not a "totalizing" way, and thus they afford us with the
basis for talking freely about collections, constructions,
properties, qualities, subsets, and "higher types", as
the phrase is mint.
JR: Would this be essentially the same as regarding quantification as
distributive rather than collective, i.e. we take the individuals
of a class one-by-one as selectable rather than as somehow given
all at once, collectively?
Gosh, that's a harder question. Your suggestion reminds me
of the way that some intuitionist and even some finitist
mathematicians talk when they reflect on math practice.
I have leanings that way, but when I have tried to
give up the classical logic axioms, I have found
them too built in to my way of thinking to quit.
Still, a healthy circumspection about about our
often-wrongly vaunted capacties to conceive of
totalities is a habitual part of current math.
Again, I think individuals are made not born,
that is, to some degree factitious and mere
compromises of this or that conveniency.
This is one of the reasons that I have
been trying to work out the details
of a functional approach to logic,
propostional, quantificational,
and relational.
Cf: INTRO 30. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001765.html
In: INTRO. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1720
LOR. Discussion Note 29
JA = Jon Awbrey
GR = Gary Richmond
Re: LOR.COM 11.24. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001836.html
In: LOR.COM. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1755
JA: The manner in which these arrows and qualified arrows help us
to construct a suspension bridge that unifies logic, semiotics,
statistics, stochastics, and information theory will be one of
the main themes that I aim to elaborate throughout the rest of
this inquiry.
GR: Pretty ambitious, Jon. I'm sure you're up to it.
GR: I'd like to anticipate 3 versions: The mathematical (cactus diagrams, etc.),
the poetic, and the commonsensical -- ordinary language for those who are
NEITHER logicians NOR poets.
GR: Are you up to THAT?
Riddle A Body: "Time Enough, And Space, Excalibrate Co-Arthurs Should Apply"
LOR. Discussion Note 30
JA = Jon Awbrey
GR = Gary Richmond
Re: LOR.DIS 29. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001838.html
In: LOR.DIS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1768
JA: Riddle A Body: "Time Enough, And Space, Excalibrate Co-Arthurs Should Apply"
GR: Well said, and truly!
Body A Riddle: TEASE CASA = Fun House.
LOR. Discussion Note 31
Many illusions of selective reading -- like the myth that Peirce did not
discover quantification over indices until 1885 -- can be dispelled by
looking into his 1870 "Logic of Relatives". I started a web study of
this in 2002, reworked again in 2003 and 2004, the current version
of which can be found here:
LOR. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1750
LOR-COM. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1755
LOR-DIS. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1768
I've only gotten as far as the bare infrastructure of Peirce's 1870 LOR,
but an interesting feature of the study is that, if one draws the pictures
that seem almost demanded by his way of linking up indices over expressions,
then one can see a prototype of his much later logical graphs developing in
the text.
LOR. Discussion Note 32
LOR. Work 1
BM: Several discussions could take place there,
as to the reasons for the number of divisions,
the reasons of the titles themselves. Another
one is my translation from "normal interpretant"
into "final interpretant" (which one is called
elsewhere "Eventual Interpretant" or "Destinate
Interpretant" by CSP). I let all this aside
to focus on the following remark:
BM: 6 divisions correspond to individual correlates:
(S, O_i, O_d, I_i, I_d, I_n),
3 divisions correspond to dyads:
(S : O_d, S : I_d, S : I_n),
and the tenth to a triad:
(S : O_d : I_n).
This remark would itself deserve
a lot of explanations but one
more time I let this aside.
BM: Then we have the following very clear statement from Peirce:
| It follows from the Definition of a Sign
| that since the Dynamoid Object determines
| the Immediate Object,
| which determines the Sign,
| which determines the Destinate Interpretant
| which determines the Effective Interpretant
| which determines the Explicit Interpretant
|
| the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs,
| as they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes; and
| if, as I strongly opine (not to say almost prove) there are four other
| trichotomies of signs of the same order of importance, instead of making
| 59049 classes, these will only come to 66.
|
| CSP, "Letter to Lady Welby", 14 Dec 1908, LW, p. 84.
BM: The separation made by CSP between 6 divisions and four others
seems to rely upon the suggested difference between individual
correlates and relations. We get the idea that the 10 divisions
are ordered on the whole and will end into 66 classes (by means of
three ordered modal values on each division: maybe, canbe, wouldbe).
Finally we have too the ordering for the divisions relative to the
correlates that I write in my notation:
Od -> Oi -> S -> If -> Id -> Ii.
BM: This order of "determinations" has bothered many people
but if we think of it as operative in semiosis, it seems
to be correct (at least to my eyes). Thus the question is:
where, how, and why the "four other trichotomies" fit in this
schema to obtain a linear ordering on the whole 10 divisions?
May be the question can be rephrased as: how intensional
relationships fit into an extensional one? Possibly the
question could be asked the other way. R. Marty responds
that in a certain sense the four trichotomies give nothing
more than the previous six ones but I strongly doubt of this.
BM: I put the problem in graphical form in an attached file
because my message editor will probably make some mistakes.
I make a distinction between arrow types drawing because I am
not sure that the sequence of correlates determinations is of
the same nature than correlates determination inside relations.
BM: It looks as if the problem amounts to some kind of projection
of relations on the horizontal axis made of correlates.
BM: If we consider some kind of equivalence (and this seems necessary to
obtain a linear ordering), by means of Agent -> Patient reductions on
relations, then erasing transitive determinations leads to:
Od -> Oi -> S -> S-Od -> If -> S-If -> S-Od-If -> Id -> S-Id -> Ii
BM: While it is interesting to compare the subsequence
S-Od -> If -> S-If -> S-Od-If with the pragmatic maxim,
I have no clear idea of the (in-) validity of such a result.
But I am convinced that the clarity has to come from the
Logic Of Relatives.
BM: I will be very grateful if you can make something with all that stuff.
LOR. Work 2
BM: I also found this passage which may be of some interest
(CP 4.540, Prolegomena to an Apology of Pragmatism):
| But though an Interpretant is not necessarily a Conclusion, yet a
| Conclusion is necessarily an Interpretant. So that if an Interpretant is
| not subject to the rules of Conclusions there is nothing monstrous in my
| thinking it is subject to some generalization of such rules. For any
| evolution of thought, whether it leads to a Conclusion or not, there is a
| certain normal course, which is to be determined by considerations not in
| the least psychological, and which I wish to expound in my next
| article;†1 and while I entirely agree, in opposition to distinguished
| logicians, that normality can be no criterion for what I call
| rationalistic reasoning, such as alone is admissible in science, yet it
| is precisely the criterion of instinctive or common-sense reasoning,
| which, within its own field, is much more trustworthy than rationalistic
| reasoning. In my opinion, it is self-control which makes any other than
| the normal course of thought possible, just as nothing else makes any
| other than the normal course of action possible; and just as it is
| precisely that that gives room for an ought-to-be of conduct, I mean
| Morality, so it equally gives room for an ought-to-be of thought, which
| is Right Reason; and where there is no self-control, nothing but the
| normal is possible. If your reflections have led you to a different
| conclusion from mine, I can still hope that when you come to read my next
| article, in which I shall endeavor to show what the forms of thought are,
| in general and in some detail, you may yet find that I have not missed
| the truth.
JA: Just as I have always feared, this classification mania
appears to be communicable! But now I must definitely
review the Welby correspondence, as all this stuff was
a blur to my sensibilities the last 10 times I read it.
BM: I think that I understand your reticence. I wonder if:
a. the fact that the letters to Lady Welby have been published as such,
has not lead to approach the matter in a certain way.
b. other sources, eventually unpublished, would give another lighting on
the subject, namely a logical one. I think of MS 339 for example that
seems to be part of the Logic Notebook. I have had access to some pages
of it, but not to the whole MS.
BM: A last remark. I don't think that classification is a mania for CSP but I
know that you know that! It is an instrument of thought and I think that
it is in this case much more a plan for experimenting than the exposition
of a conclusion. Experimenting what ? There is a strange statement in a
letter to W. James where CSP says that what is in question in his "second
way of dividing signs" is the logical theory of numbers. I give this from
memory. I have not the quote at hand now but I will search for it if needed.
LOR. Work 3
BM = Bernard Morand
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA: ... but now I have to add to my do-list the problems of comparing
the whole variorum of letters and drafts of letters to Lady Welby.
I only have the CP 8 and Wiener versions here, so I will depend
on you for ample excerpts from the Lieb volume.
BM: I made such a kind of comparison some time ago. I selected the following
3 cases on the criterium of alternate "grounds". Hoping it could save
some labor. The first rank expressions come from the MS 339 written in
Oct. 1904 and I label them with an (a). I think that it is interesting to
note that they were written four years before the letters to Welby and
just one or two years after the Syllabus which is the usual reference for
the classification in 3 trichotomies and 10 classes. The second (b) is
our initial table (from a draft to Lady Welby, Dec. 1908, CP 8.344) and
the third (c) comes from a letter sent in Dec. 1908 (CP 8.345-8.376). A
tabular presentation would be better but I can't do it. Comparing (c)
against (a) and (b) is informative, I think.
Division 1
(a) According to the matter of the Sign
(b) According to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself
(c) Signs in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation
Division 2
(a) According to the Immediate Object
(b) According to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object
(c) Objects, as they may be presented
Division 3
(a) According to the Matter of the Dynamic Object
(b) According to the Mode of Being of the Dynamical Object
(c) In respect to the Nature of the Dynamical Objects of Signs
Division 4
(a) According to the mode of representing object by the Dynamic Object
(b) According to the Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object
(c) The fourth Trichotomy
Division 5
(a) According to the Immédiate Interpretant
(b) According to the Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant
(c) As to the nature of the Immediate (or Felt ?) Interpretant
Division 6
(a) According to the Matter of Dynamic Interpretant
(b) According to the Mode of Being of the Dynamical Interpretant
(c) As to the Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant
Division 7
(a) According to the Mode of Affecting Dynamic Interpretant
(b) According to the relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Interpretant
(c) As to the Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Interpretant
Division 8
(a) According to the Matter of Representative Interpretant
(b) According to the Nature of the Normal Interpretant
(c) According to the Purpose of the Eventual Interpretant
Division 9
(a) According to the Mode of being represented by Representative Interpretant
(b) According to the the relation of the Sign to the Normal Interpretant
(c) As to the Nature of the Influence of the Sign
Division 10
(a) According to the Mode of being represented to represent object by Sign, Truly
(b) According to the Triadic Relation of the Sign to its Dynamical Object and to
its Normal Interpretant
(c) As to the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance
LOR. Work 4
JA: It may appear that one has side-stepped the issue of empiricism
that way, but then all that stuff about the synthetic a priori
raises its head, and we have Peirce's insight that mathematics
is observational and even experimental, and so I must trail off
into uncoordinated elliptical thoughts ...
HC: In contrast with this it strikes me that not all meanings of "analytic"
and "synthetic" have much, if anything, to do with the "analytic and the
synthetic", say, as in Quine's criticism of the "dualism" of empiricism.
Surely no one thinks that a plausible analysis must be analytic or that
synthetic materials tell us much about epistemology. So, it is not
clear that anything connected with analyticity or a priori knowledge
will plausibly or immediately arise from a discussion of analytical
geometry. Prevalent mathematical assumptions or postulates, yes --
but who says these are a prior? Can't non-Euclidean geometry also
be treated in the style of analytic geometry?
HC: I can imagine the a discussion might be forced in
that direction, but the connections don't strike me
as at all obvious or pressing. Perhaps Jon would just
like to bring up the notion of the synthetic apriori?
But why?
LOR. Work 5
HC = Howard Callaway
HC: But I see you as closer to my theme or challenge, when you say
"The question is about the minimal adequate resource base for
defining, deriving, or generating all of the concepts that we
need for a given but very general type of application that we
conventinally but equivocally refer to as 'logic'".
HC: I think it is accepted on all sides of the discussion that there
is some sort of "equivalence" between the standard predicate logic
and Peirce's graphs.
There you would be mistaken, except perhaps for the fact that
"some sort of equivalence" is vague to the depths of vacuity.
It most particularly does not mean "all sorts of equivalence"
or even "all important sorts of equivalence". It is usually
interpreted to mean an extremely abstract type of syntactic
equivalence, and that is undoubtedly one important type of
equivalence that it is worth examining whether two formal
systems have or not. But it precisely here that we find
another symptom of syntacticism, namely, the deprecation
of all other important qualities of formal systems, most
pointedly their "analystic, "semantic", and "pragmatic"
qualities, which make all the difference in how well the
system actually serves its users in a real world practice.
You can almost hear the whining and poohing coming from the
syntactic day camp, but those are the hard facts of the case.
HC: But we find this difference in relation to the vocabulary used to express
identity. From the point of view of starting with the predicate calculus,
we don't need "teridentity". So, this seems to suggest there is something
of interesting contrast in Peirce's logic, which brings in this concept.
The obvious question may be expressed by asking why we need teridentity
in Peirce's system and how Peirce's system may recommend itself in contrast
to the standard way with related concepts. This does seem to call for
a comparative evaluation of distinctive systems. That is not an easy task,
as I think we all understand. But I do think that if it is a goal to have
Peirce's system better appreciated, then that kind of question must be
addressed. If "=" is sufficient in the standard predicate calculus,
to say whatever we may need to say about the identity of terms, then
what is the advantage of an alternative system which insists on always
expressing identity of triples?
HC: The questions may look quite different, depending on where we start.
But in any case, I thought I saw some better appreciation of the
questions in your comments above.
LOR. Work 6
It's been that way for about as long as anybody can remember, and
it will remain so, in spite of the spate of history rewriting and
image re-engineering that has become the new rage in self-styled
"analytic" circles.
LOR. Work 7
The brands of objection that you continue to make, with no evidence
of reflection on the many explanations that I and others have taken
the time to write out for you, lead me to believe that you are just
not interested in making that effort. That's okay, life is short,
the arts are long and many, there is always something else to do.
HC: For, if I make an assertion A&B, then I am not asserting
that the statement A stands in a relation to a statement B.
Instead, I am asserting the conjunction A&B (which logically
implies both the conjuncts in view of the definition of "&").
If "&" counts as a triadic relation, simply because it serves
to conjoin two statements into a third, then it would seem that
any binary relation 'R' will count as triadic, simply because
it places two things into a relation, which is a "third" thing.
By the same kind of reasoning a triadic relation, as ordinarily
understood would be really 4-adic.
HC: Now, I think this is the kind of argument you are making, ...
No, it's the kind of argument that you are making.
I am not making that kind of argument, and Peirce
did not make that kind of argument. Peirce used
his terms subject to definitions that would have
been understandable, and remain understandable,
to those of his readers who understand these
elementary definitions, either though their
prior acquaintance with standard concepts
or through their basic capacity to read
a well-formed, if novel definition.
Peirce made certain observations about the structure of logical concepts
and the structure of their referents. Those observations are accurate
and important. He expressed those observations in a form that is clear
to anybody who knows the meanings of the technical terms that he used,
and he is not responsible for the interpretations of those who don't.
HC: ... and it seems to both trivialize the claimed argument
for teridentity, by trivializing the conception of what
is to count as a triadic, as contrasted with a binary
relation, and it also seems to introduce a confusion
about what is is count as a binary, vs. a triadic
relation.
Yes, the argument that you are making trivializes
just about everything in sight, but that is the
common and well-known property of any argument
that fails to base itself on a grasp of the
first elements of the subject matter.
HC: If this is mathematical realism, then so much the worse for
mathematical realism. I am content to think that we do not
have a free hand in making up mathematical truth.
No, it's not mathematical realism. It is your reasoning,
and it exhibits all of the symptoms of syntacticism that
I have already diagnosed. It's a whole other culture
from what is pandemic in the practice of mathematics,
and it never fails to surprise me that people who
would never call themselves "relativists" in any
other matter of culture suddenly turn into just
that in matters of simple mathematical fact.
Logic Of Relatives : Old Series
00. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd20.html#04416 01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04416.html 02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04417.html 03. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04418.html 04. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04419.html 05. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04421.html 06. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04422.html 07. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04423.html 08. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04424.html 09. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04425.html 10. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04426.html 11. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04427.html 12. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04431.html 13. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04432.html 14. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04435.html 15. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04436.html 16. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04437.html 17. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04438.html 18. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04439.html 19. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04440.html 20. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04441.html 21. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04442.html 22. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04443.html 23. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04444.html 24. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04445.html 25. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04446.html 26. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04447.html 27. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04448.html 28. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04449.html 29. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04450.html 30. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04451.html 31. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04452.html 32. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04453.html 33. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04454.html 34. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04456.html 35. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04457.html 36. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04458.html 37. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04459.html 38. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04462.html 39. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04464.html 40. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04473.html 41. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04478.html 42. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04484.html 43. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04487.html 44. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04488.html 45. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04492.html 46. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04497.html 47. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04498.html 48. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04499.html 49. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04500.html 50. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04501.html 51. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04502.html 52. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04503.html 53. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04504.html 54. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04506.html 55. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04508.html 56. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04509.html 57. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04510.html 58. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04511.html 59. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04512.html 60. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04513.html 61. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04516.html 62. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04517.html 63. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04518.html 64. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04521.html 65. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04539.html 66. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04541.html 67. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04542.html 68. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04543.html
Logic of Relatives : Discussion
00. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd19.html#04460 10. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04460.html 11. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04461.html 12. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04471.html 13. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04472.html 14. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04475.html 15. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04476.html 16. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04477.html 17. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04479.html 18. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04480.html 19. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04481.html 20. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04482.html 21. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04483.html 22. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04485.html 23. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04486.html 24. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04493.html 25. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04494.html 26. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04495.html 27. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04496.html
Logic Of Relatives : 2003
LOR. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/thread.html#186 LOR. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/thread.html#245 01. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000186.html 02. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000187.html 03. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000188.html 04. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000189.html 05. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000190.html 06. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000191.html 07. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000194.html 08. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000195.html 09. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000245.html 10. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000246.html 11. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000247.html 12. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000248.html 13. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000249.html 14. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000250.html 15. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000251.html 16. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000252.html 17. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000253.html 18. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000254.html 19. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000255.html 20. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000256.html 21. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000257.html 22. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000258.html 23. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000259.html 24. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000260.html 25. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000261.html 26. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000262.html 27. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000263.html 28. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000264.html 29. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000265.html 30. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000267.html 31. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000268.html 32. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000269.html 33. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000270.html 34. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000271.html 35. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000273.html 36. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000274.html 37. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000275.html 38. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000276.html 39. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000277.html 40. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000278.html 41. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000279.html 42. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000280.html 43. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000281.html 44. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000282.html 45. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000283.html 46. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000284.html 47. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000285.html 48. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000286.html 49. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000287.html 50. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000288.html 51. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000289.html 52. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000290.html 53. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000291.html 54. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000294.html 55. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000295.html 56. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000296.html 57. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000297.html 58. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000298.html 59. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000299.html 60. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000300.html 61. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000301.html 62. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000302.html 63. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000303.html 64. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000305.html 65. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000306.html 66. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000307.html 67. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000308.html 68. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000309.html
Logic Of Relatives : 2004
00. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1750 01. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001750.html 02. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001751.html 03. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001752.html 04. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001753.html 05. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001754.html 06. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001760.html 07. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001769.html 08. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001774.html 09. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001783.html 10. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001794.html 11. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001812.html 12. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001842.html
Logic Of Relatives : Commentary
00. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1755 01. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001755.html 02. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001756.html 03. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001757.html 04. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001758.html 05. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001759.html 06. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001761.html 07. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001770.html 08.1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001775.html 08.2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001776.html 08.3. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001777.html 08.4. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001778.html 08.5. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001781.html 08.6. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001782.html 09.1. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001787.html 09.2. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001788.html 09.3. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001789.html 09.4. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001790.html 09.5. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001791.html 09.6. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001792.html 09.7. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001793.html 10.01. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001795.html 10.02. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001796.html 10.03. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001797.html 10.04. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001798.html 10.05. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001799.html 10.06. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001800.html 10.07. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001801.html 10.08. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001802.html 10.09. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001803.html 10.10. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001804.html 10.11. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001805.html 11.01. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001813.html 11.02. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001814.html 11.03. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001815.html 11.04. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001816.html 11.05. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001817.html 11.06. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001818.html 11.07. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001819.html 11.08. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001820.html 11.09. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001821.html 11.10. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001822.html 11.11. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001823.html 11.12. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001824.html 11.13. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001825.html 11.14. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001826.html 11.15. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001827.html 11.16. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001828.html 11.17. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001829.html 11.18. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001830.html 11.19. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001831.html 11.20. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001832.html 11.21. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001833.html 11.22. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001834.html 11.23. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001835.html 11.24. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001836.html 12. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001843.html
Logic Of Relatives : Discussion
00. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd20.html#04460 00. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1768 00. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/thread.html#2301 10. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04460.html 11. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04461.html 12. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04471.html 13. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04472.html 14. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04475.html 15. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04476.html 16. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04477.html 17. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04479.html 18. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04480.html 19. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04481.html 20. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04482.html 21. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04483.html 22. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04485.html 23. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04486.html 24. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04493.html 25. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04494.html 26. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04495.html 27. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04496.html 28. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001768.html 29. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001838.html 30. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001840.html 31. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/002301.html
