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A '''truth theory''' or a '''theory of truth''' is a [[conceptual framework]] that underlies a particular conception of [[truth]], such as those used in [[art]], [[ethics]], [[logic]], [[mathematics]], [[philosophy]], the [[science]]s, or any discussion that either mentions or makes use of a notion of truth. A truth theory can be anything from a ''casual theory'', based on implicit, informal, and vaguely articulated ideas, to a ''[[formal theory]]'', constructed from explicit [[axiom]]s and [[definition]]s and developed by means of definite ''[[rules of inference]]''. The scope of a truth theory can be restricted to tightly-controlled and well-bounded universes of discourse or its horizon may extend to the limits of the human imagination.
<font size="3">☞</font> This page belongs to resource collections on [[Logic Live|Logic]] and [[Inquiry Live|Inquiry]].
A '''truth theory''' or a '''theory of truth''' is a conceptual framework that underlies a particular conception of truth, such as those used in art, ethics, logic, mathematics, philosophy, the sciences, or any discussion that either mentions or makes use of a notion of truth. A truth theory can be anything from an informal theory, based on implicit or tacit ideas, to a formal theory, constructed from explicit axioms and definitions and developed by means of definite rules of inference. The scope of a truth theory can be restricted to tightly-controlled and well-bounded universes of discourse or its horizon may extend to the limits of the human imagination.
==Truth in perspective==
==Truth in perspective==
Notions of truth are notoriously difficult to disentangle from many of our most basic [[concept]]s — [[meaning]], [[reality]], and [[value (personal and cultural)|value]]s in general, to mention just a few.
Notions of truth are notoriously difficult to disentangle from many of our most basic concepts — meaning, reality, and values in general, to mention just a few.
The subjects of meaning and truth are commonly treated together, the idea being that a thing must be meaningful before it can be true or false. This association is found in ancient times, and has become standard in modern times under the heading of ''[[semantics]]'', especially ''[[formal semantics]]'' and ''[[model theory]]''. Another association of longstanding interest is the relation between truth and ''[[logical validity]]'', "because the fundamental notion of logic is validity and this is definable in terms of truth and falsehood" (Kneale & Kneale, 16). Though not the main subjects of this article, meaning and validity are truth's neighbors, and incidental inquiries of them can serve to cast light on truth's character.
The subjects of meaning and truth are commonly treated together, the idea being that a thing must be meaningful before it can be true or false. This association is found in ancient times, and has become standard in modern times under the heading of ''semantics'', especially ''formal semantics'' and ''model theory''. Another association of longstanding interest is the relation between truth and ''logical validity'', "because the fundamental notion of logic is validity and this is definable in terms of truth and falsehood" (Kneale and Kneale, 16). Though not the main subjects of this article, meaning and validity are truth's neighbors, and incidental inquiries of them can serve to cast light on truth's character.
Beyond this minor note of accord, hardly universal, suggesting that meaning is necessary to truth, reflectors on the idea of truth just as quickly disperse into schools of thought that barely comprehend each other's thinking. A few of the more notable points of departure are these:
Beyond this minor note of accord, hardly universal, suggesting that meaning is necessary to truth, reflectors on the idea of truth just as quickly disperse into schools of thought that barely comprehend each other's thinking. A few of the more notable points of departure are these:
# One of the first partings of the ways occurs at the watershed between literal and symbolic meanings, leading to a corresponding division in truths. People often speak of truth in art, truth in drama, truth in fiction, human truth, moral, religious, and spiritual truth, along with the difference between truth in principle and truth in practice. These topics demand a perspective on meaning, reality, and truth that looks beyond the bounds of literal truth and the branches of philosophy that are limited to it.
# One of the first partings of the ways occurs at the watershed between literal and symbolic meanings, leading to a corresponding division in truths. People often speak of truth in art, truth in drama, truth in fiction, human truth, moral, religious, and spiritual truth, along with the difference between truth in principle and truth in practice. These topics demand a perspective on meaning, reality, and truth that looks beyond the bounds of literal truth and the branches of philosophy that are limited to it.
# Merely resolving that meaning precedes truth, logically speaking, only brings up a host of new questions, since the meaning of the word ''meaning'' is notoriously hard to pin down. There are just to start at least two different dimensions of meaning that are commonly recognized, namely, ''[[connotation|connotative meaning]]'' and ''[[denotation|denotative meaning]]''.
# Merely resolving that meaning precedes truth, logically speaking, only brings up a host of new questions, since the meaning of the word ''meaning'' is notoriously hard to pin down. There are just to start at least two different dimensions of meaning that are commonly recognized, namely, ''connotative meaning'' and ''denotative meaning''.
In one classical formulation, truth is defined as the good of [[logic]], where logic is treated as a [[normative science]], that is, an [[inquiry]] into a ''[[goodness and value theory|good]]'' or a ''[[value theory|value]]'' that seeks [[knowledge]] of it and the means to achieve it. In this scheme of ideas, truth is the positive quality of a sign that indicates the right course of action for reaching a value that we value for its own sake. As such, truth takes its place among [[justice]] and [[beauty]], whose normative sciences are [[ethics]] and [[aesthetics]], respectively. Viewed in this light, it is pointless to discuss truth in isolation from a frame of reference that encompasses the topics of inquiry, knowledge, logic, meaning, practice, and value, all very broadly conceived.
In one classical formulation, truth is defined as the good of [[logic]], where logic is treated as a [[normative science]], that is, an [[inquiry]] into a ''good'' or a ''value'' that seeks knowledge of it and the means to achieve it. In this scheme of ideas, truth is the positive quality of a sign that indicates the right course of action for reaching a value that we value for its own sake. As such, truth takes its place among justice and beauty, whose normative sciences are ethics and aesthetics, respectively. Viewed in this light, it is pointless to discuss truth in isolation from a frame of reference that encompasses the topics of inquiry, knowledge, logic, meaning, practice, and value, all very broadly conceived.
==Historical overview==
==Historical overview==
In an ancient fragment of text called the ''Dissoi Logoi'', a writer is evidently trying to prove the impossibility of speaking consistently about truth and falsehood. One of the conundrums put forward to confound the reader cites the case of the verbal form, "I am an initiate", which is true when ''A'' says it but false when ''B'' says it. Escape from befuddlement seems easy enough if one observes that it is not the verbal expression, the sentence, to which the predicates of truth and falsity apply but what the sentence expresses, the proposition that it states. (Cf. Kneale & Kneale, 16). This same tension between strings of characters and their meanings remains with us to this day.
In an ancient fragment of text called the ''Dissoi Logoi'', a writer is evidently trying to prove the impossibility of speaking consistently about truth and falsehood. One of the conundrums put forward to confound the reader cites the case of the verbal form, "I am an initiate", which is true when ''A'' says it but false when ''B'' says it. Escape from befuddlement seems easy enough if one observes that it is not the verbal expression, the sentence, to which the predicates of truth and falsity apply but what the sentence expresses, the proposition that it states. (Cf. Kneale and Kneale, 16). This same tension between strings of characters and their meanings remains with us to this day.
In his early work Περι Ερμηνειαs (''Peri Hermeneias'' or ''[[On Interpretation]]'') [[Aristotle]] strikes a chord that not only sets the key for a number of philosophical movements down through the ages but supplies the initial motif for many themes in the logic of meaning and truth that are still undergoing active development in our time.
In his early work Περι Ερμηνειαs (''Peri Hermeneias'' or ''On Interpretation'') Aristotle strikes a chord that not only sets the key for a number of philosophical movements down through the ages but supplies the initial motif for many themes in the logic of meaning and truth that are still undergoing active development in our time.
<blockquote>
<blockquote>
Some of the points to be noted in this passage are these:
Some of the points to be noted in this passage are these:
# Aristotle employs a distinction in Greek that is drawn between natural or physical signs (semeia) and artificial or cultural signs (symbola).
# Aristotle employs a distinction in Greek that is drawn between natural or physical signs (semeia) and artificial or cultural signs (symbola).
# The passage mentions three principal domains of elements, namely, the ''objects'' (pragmata), the ''signs'' (semeia, symbola), and the psychological elements (pathemata). The last domain extends over the full range of a human being's affective and cognitive experiences, for brevity summed up as ''ideas'' and ''impressions'', where these words are taken in their broadest conceivable senses.
# The passage mentions three principal domains of elements, namely, the ''objects'' (pragmata), the ''signs'' (semeia, symbola), and the psychological elements (pathemata). The last domain extends over the full range of a human being's affective and cognitive experiences, for brevity summed up as ''ideas'' and ''impressions'', where these words are taken in their broadest conceivable senses.
# This means that the phenomena under investigation have to do with the types of [[three-place relation]]s that conceivably exist among three domains of this sort. As a general rule, three-place relations can be very complex, and a commonly-tried strategy for approaching their complexity is to consider the [[two-place relation]]s that are left when the presence of a selected domain is simply ignored.
# This means that the phenomena under investigation have to do with the types of [[three-place relation]]s that conceivably exist among three domains of this sort. As a general rule, three-place relations can be very complex, and a commonly-tried strategy for approaching their complexity is to consider the [[two-place relation]]s that are left when the presence of a selected domain is simply ignored.
# There are two types of [[two-place relation]] on the face of the overall three-place relation that Aristotle takes the trouble to mention, namely these: <p> Sign <math>\longrightarrow</math> Idea. Words spoken are signs or symbols of pathemata. <p> Idea <math>\longrightarrow</math> Object. Pathemata are icons (homoiomata) of pragmata.
# There are two types of two-place relation on the face of the overall three-place relation that Aristotle takes the trouble to mention, namely these:<p>Sign <math>\longrightarrow</math> Idea. Words spoken are signs or symbols of pathemata.</p><p>Idea <math>\longrightarrow</math> Object. Pathemata are icons (homoiomata) of pragmata.</p>
# More incidentally, but still bearing heavily on many later discussions, Aristotle holds that the relation between writing and speech is analogous to the relation between speech and the realm of experiences, feelings, and thoughts. <p> Writing <math>\longrightarrow</math> Speech. Written words are symbols of spoken words. <p> Speech <math>\longrightarrow</math> Ideation. Spoken words are symbols of impressions.
# More incidentally, but still bearing heavily on many later discussions, Aristotle holds that the relation between writing and speech is analogous to the relation between speech and the realm of experiences, feelings, and thoughts.<p>Writing <math>\longrightarrow</math> Speech. Written words are symbols of spoken words.</p><p> Speech <math>\longrightarrow</math> Ideation. Spoken words are symbols of impressions.</p>
==Elements of theory==
==Elements of theory==
===Signs===
===Signs===
In some branches of philosophy and fields of science the domain of potentially meaningful entities may include almost any kind of informative or significant element. The generic terms ''sign'' or ''representation'' suffice for these, with the qualification that the terms are used equivocally up and down a full spectrum from the more abstract ''[[type]]s'' to the more concrete ''[[token]]s'' that are associated with each other. More specifically, the [[linguistic turn]] in [[analytic philosophy]] begins with a focus on the syntactic character of the ''sentence'', from which is abstracted its meaningful content, referred to as the corresponding ''proposition''. A proposition is the content expressed by a sentence, held in a belief, or affirmed in an assertion or judgment.
In some branches of philosophy and fields of science the domain of potentially meaningful entities may include almost any kind of informative or significant element. The generic terms ''sign'' or ''representation'' suffice for these, with the qualification that the terms are used equivocally up and down a full spectrum from the more abstract ''types'' to the more concrete ''tokens'' that are associated with each other. More specifically, the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy begins with a focus on the syntactic character of the ''sentence'', from which is abstracted its meaningful content, referred to as the corresponding ''proposition''. A proposition is the content expressed by a sentence, held in a belief, or affirmed in an assertion or judgment.
''[[Truthbearer]]'' is used by a number of writers to refer to any entity that can be judged true or false. The term ''truthbearer'' may be applied to [[proposition]]s, [[sentence (linguistics)|sentence]]s, [[statement]]s, [[idea]]s, [[belief]]s, and [[judgment]]s. Some writers exclude one or more of these categories, or argue that some of them are true (or false) only in a derivative sense. Other writers may add additional entities to the list.
''Truthbearer'' is used by a number of writers to refer to any entity that can be judged true or false. The term ''truthbearer'' may be applied to propositions, sentences, statements, ideas, beliefs, and judgments. Some writers exclude one or more of these categories, or argue that some of them are true (or false) only in a derivative sense. Other writers may add additional entities to the list.
Truthbearers typically have two possible values, true or false. Fictional forms of expression are usually regarded as false if interpreted literally, but may be said to bear a species of truth if interpreted suitably. Still other truthbearers may be judged true or false to a greater or lesser degree.
Truthbearers typically have two possible values, true or false. Fictional forms of expression are usually regarded as false if interpreted literally, but may be said to bear a species of truth if interpreted suitably. Still other truthbearers may be judged true or false to a greater or lesser degree.
Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions in many different modalities are in the air at once. In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, we have no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves. Thus we are brought back to matters of language and logic. Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interaction.
Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions in many different modalities are in the air at once. In order to compare propositions of different colors and flavors, as it were, we have no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying propositions themselves. Thus we are brought back to matters of language and logic. Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interaction.
The variety of attitudes that a proposer can bear toward a single proposition is a critical factor in evaluating its truth. One topic of central concern is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, especially when viewed in the light of the proposer's intentions. For example, we frequently find ourselves faced with the question of whether a person's assertions conform to his or her beliefs. Discrepancies here can occur for many reasons, but when the departure of assertion from belief is intentional, we usually call that a ''[[lie]]''.
The variety of attitudes that a proposer can bear toward a single proposition is a critical factor in evaluating its truth. One topic of central concern is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, especially when viewed in the light of the proposer's intentions. For example, we frequently find ourselves faced with the question of whether a person's assertions conform to his or her beliefs. Discrepancies here can occur for many reasons, but when the departure of assertion from belief is intentional, we usually call that a ''lie''.
Other comparisons of multiple modalities that frequently arise are the relationships between belief and knowledge and the discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions. Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as ''[[surprise (emotion)|surprise]]s'', phenomena that call for ''[[explanation]]s'' to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as ''[[problem]]s'', situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to ''[[inquiry]]'' (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995).
Other comparisons of multiple modalities that frequently arise are the relationships between belief and knowledge and the discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions. Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as ''surprises'', phenomena that call for ''explanations'' to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as ''problems'', situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to ''[[inquiry]]'' (Awbrey and Awbrey 1995).
===Reflection and quotation===
===Reflection and quotation===
The study of propositional attitudes is no sooner begun than it leads to the all-important philosophical distinction between (1) using a meaning-bearer to bear its meaning in an active manner and (2) mentioning a meaning-bearer in a form that keeps its meaning in a more inert or inhibited state. The reasons for doing the latter are various, but involve the need to reflect on a potential meaning, to compare and contrast it with others, to criticize and evaluate both its logical implications and its practical consequences, all before deciding whether to put its meaning into action or not.
The study of propositional attitudes is no sooner begun than it leads to the all-important philosophical distinction between (1) using a meaning-bearer to bear its meaning in an active manner and (2) mentioning a meaning-bearer in a form that keeps its meaning in a more inert or inhibited state. The reasons for doing the latter are various, but involve the need to reflect on a potential meaning, to compare and contrast it with others, to criticize and evaluate both its logical implications and its practical consequences, all before deciding whether to put its meaning into action or not.
The word "quote" derives from the Latin verb ''quotare'', which refers to the practice of numbering references and referring to pieces of text by marking their numbers. There is a certain [[aesthetic distance]] involved in this practice, and it leads, if only for moments at a time, to viewing each piece of text as a string of characters that bears its own litter of meanings, but meanings to be reflected on and critically compared with others, both in and out of their litter. It is hardly an accident, then, that matters of [[Gödel number|numbering phrases]], [[quotation]], and [[reflection (computer science)|reflection]] are bound up with each other in [[mathematical logic]] and [[computation theory]].
The word “quote” derives from the Latin verb ''quotare'', which refers to the practice of numbering references and referring to pieces of text by marking their numbers. There is a certain aesthetic distance involved in this practice, and it leads, if only for moments at a time, to viewing each piece of text as a string of characters that bears its own litter of meanings, but meanings to be reflected on and critically compared with others, both in and out of their litter. It is hardly an accident, then, that matters of Gödel numbers, quotation, and reflection are bound up with each other in mathematical logic and computation theory.
==Varieties of truth theory==
==Varieties of truth theory==
===Nominal truth theories===
===Nominal truth theories===
A ''nominal truth'' theory is defined by the axiom that the concept ''truth'' is a mere name. In traditional systems of logic, a concept is always a symbol, specifically, a mental symbol, and so the word ''mere'' in the nominal axiom says that ''truth'' is nothing more than a symbol. One of the aims of nominal philosophies, generally speaking, is to clear away the conceptual clutter of excess metaphysical ideas through the searching examination of their verbal formulations. Thus the question arises whether ''truth'' is one of the essentials or one of the excesses of rational thought. One method of critical analysis that is commonly brought to bear at this juncture is based on the nominal corollary that if one can do without the word in every linguistic context, then one can do without the concept, which is after all nothing but the word.
A ''nominal truth'' theory is defined by the axiom that the concept ''truth'' is a mere name. In traditional systems of logic, a concept is always a symbol, specifically, a mental symbol, and so the word ''mere'' in the nominal axiom says that ''truth'' is nothing more than a symbol. One of the aims of nominal philosophies, generally speaking, is to clear away the conceptual clutter of excess metaphysical ideas through the searching examination of their verbal formulations. Thus the question arises whether ''truth'' is one of the essentials or one of the excesses of rational thought. One method of critical analysis that is commonly brought to bear at this juncture is based on the nominal corollary that if one can do without the word in every linguistic context, then one can do without the concept, which is after all nothing but the word.
===Real truth theories===
===Real truth theories===
===Formal truth theories===
===Formal truth theories===
<blockquote>
<blockquote>
Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation ([[arete (excellence)|αρετηs]] κυβερνητικηs), do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow sailors? ([[Plato]], ''[[Alcibiades]]'', 135A).
Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation ([[arete (excellence)|αρετηs]] κυβερνητικηs), do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow sailors? (Plato, ''Alcibiades'', 135A).
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
==References==
==References==
* [[Aristotle]], "On Interpretation", [[Harold P. Cooke]] (trans.), pp. 111?179 in ''Aristotle, Volume 1'', [[Loeb Classical Library]], [[William Heinemann]], London, UK, 1938.
* Aristotle, “On Interpretation”, Harold P. Cooke (trans.), pp. 111–179 in ''Aristotle, Volume 1'', Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.
* Awbrey, Jon, and Awbrey, Susan (1995), "Interpretation as Action: The Risk of Inquiry", ''Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'', 15, 40?52. [http://www.chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Eprint]
* Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, ''Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines'' 15(1), pp. 40–52. [https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Archive]. [https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052 Journal]. [https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry Online].
* [[Simon Blackburn|Blackburn, Simon]] (1996), ''The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1994. Paperback edition with new Chronology, 1996.
* Blackburn, S. (1996), ''The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1994. Paperback edition with new Chronology, 1996.
* Blackburn, Simon, and [[Keith Simmons|Simmons, Keith]] (eds., 1999), ''Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* Blackburn, S., and Simmons, K. (eds., 1999), ''Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* [[Alonzo Church|Church, Alonzo]] (1962a), "Name Relation, or Meaning Relation", p. 204 in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.
* Church, A. (1962a), “Name Relation, or Meaning Relation”, p. 204 in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.
* Church, Alonzo (1962b), "Truth, Semantical", p. 322 in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.
* Church, A. (1962b), “Truth, Semantical”, p. 322 in Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ.
* [[William Kneale|Kneale, W.]], and [[Martha Kneale|Kneale, M.]] (1962), ''The Development of Logic'', Oxford University Press, London, UK, 1962. Reprinted with corrections, 1975.
* Kneale, W., and Kneale, M. (1962), ''The Development of Logic'', Oxford University Press, London, UK, 1962. Reprinted with corrections, 1975.
* [[Plato]], "Alcibiades 1", [[W.R.M. Lamb]] (trans.), pp. 93?223 in ''Plato, Volume 12'', [[Loeb Classical Library]], [[William Heinemann]], London, UK, 1927.
* Plato, “Alcibiades 1”, W.R.M. Lamb (trans.), pp. 93–223 in ''Plato, Volume 12'', Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1927.
* Russell, Bertrand (1918), "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", ''The Monist'', 1918. Reprinted, pp. 177?281 in ''Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901?1950'', [[Robert Charles Marsh]] (ed.), Unwin Hyman, London, UK, 1956. Reprinted, pp. 35?155 in ''The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'', [[David Pears]] (ed.), Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1985.
* Russell, B. (1918), “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”, ''The Monist'', 1918. Reprinted, pp. 177–281 in ''Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950'', Robert Charles Marsh (ed.), Unwin Hyman, London, UK, 1956. Reprinted, pp. 35–155 in ''The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'', David Pears (ed.), Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1985.
==Further reading==
==Further reading==
* [[Michael Beaney|Beaney, Michael]] (ed., 1997), ''The Frege Reader'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
* Beaney, M. (ed., 1997), ''The Frege Reader'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
* [[John Dewey|Dewey, John]] (1900?1901), ''Lectures on Ethics 1900?1901'', Donald F. Koch (ed.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1991.
* Dewey, J. (1900–1901), ''Lectures on Ethics 1900?1901'', Donald F. Koch (ed.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1991.
* Dewey, John (1932), ''Theory of the Moral Life'', Part 2 of John Dewey and [[James H. Tufts]], ''Ethics'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1908. 2nd edition, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1932. Reprinted, Arnold Isenberg (ed.), Victor Kestenbaum (pref.), Irvington Publishers, New York, NY, 1980.
* Dewey, John (1932), ''Theory of the Moral Life'', Part 2 of John Dewey and James H. Tufts, ''Ethics'', Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1908. 2nd edition, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1932. Reprinted, Arnold Isenberg (ed.), Victor Kestenbaum (Preface), Irvington Publishers, New York, NY, 1980.
* [[Michael Dummett|Dummett, Michael]] (1991), ''Frege and Other Philosophers'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* Dummett, M. (1991), ''Frege and Other Philosophers'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* Dummett, Michael (1993), ''Origins of Analytical Philosophy'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Dummett, M. (1993), ''Origins of Analytical Philosophy'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
* [[Michel Foucault|Foucault, Michel]] (1997), ''Essential Works of Foucault, 1954?1984, Volume 1, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth'', Paul Rabinow (ed.), Robert Hurley et al. (trans.), The New Press, New York, NY.
* Foucault, M. (1997), ''Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, Volume 1, Ethics : Subjectivity and Truth'', Paul Rabinow (ed.), Robert Hurley et al. (trans.), The New Press, New York, NY.
* [[Hans-Georg Gadamer|Gadamer, Hans-Georg]] (1986), ''The Idea of the Good in Platonic?Aristotelian Philosophy'', P. Christopher Smith (trans.), Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 1st published, ''Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles'', J.C.B. Mohr, Heidelberg, Germany, 1978.
* Gadamer, H.-G. (1986), ''The Idea of the Good in Platonic–Aristotelian Philosophy'', P. Christopher Smith (trans.), Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 1st published, ''Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles'', J.C.B. Mohr, Heidelberg, Germany, 1978.
* Grover, Dorothy (1992), ''A Prosentential Theory of Truth'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
* Grover, Dorothy (1992), ''A Prosentential Theory of Truth'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
* [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermas, Jürgen]] (1979), ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA.
* Habermas, J. (1979), ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA.
* Habermas, Jürgen (1990), ''Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action'', Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (trans.), Thomas McCarthy (intro.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Habermas, J. (1990), ''Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action'', Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (trans.), Thomas McCarthy (intro.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Habermas, Jürgen (2003), ''Truth and Justification'', Barbara Fultner (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Habermas, J. (2003), ''Truth and Justification'', Barbara Fultner (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Kirkham, Richard L. (1992), ''Theories of Truth'', MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Kirkham, R.L. (1992), ''Theories of Truth'', MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
* [[Saul A. Kripke|Kripke, Saul A.]] (1975), "An Outline of a Theory of Truth", ''Journal of Philosophy'' 72 (1975), 690?716.
* Kripke, S.A. (1975), “An Outline of a Theory of Truth”, ''Journal of Philosophy'' 72 (1975), 690?716.
* Kripke, Saul A. (1980), ''Naming and Necessity'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Kripke, S.A. (1980), ''Naming and Necessity'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
* [[Clarence Irving Lewis|Lewis, C.I.]] (1946), ''An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation'', 'The Paul Carus Lectures, Series 8', Open Court, La Salle, IL.
* Lewis, C.I. (1946), ''An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation'', The Paul Carus Lectures, Series 8, Open Court, La Salle, IL.
* [[Leonard Linsky|Linsky, Leonard]] (ed., 1971), ''Reference and Modality'', Oxford University Press, London, UK.
* Linsky, L. (ed., 1971), ''Reference and Modality'', Oxford University Press, London, UK.
* [[Robert L. Martin|Martin, Robert L.]] (ed., 1984), ''Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* Martin, R.L. (ed., 1984), ''Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* [[Ernest A. Moody|Moody, Ernest A.]] (1953), ''Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic'', North-Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1953. Reprinted, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1976.
* Moody, E.A. (1953), ''Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic'', North-Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1953. Reprinted, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1976.
* Nietzsche, Friedrich [1873] (1968). "Uber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn", ("On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense"), in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), ''Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften'', Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Germany.
* Nietzsche, Friedrich (1873/1968). “Uber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn”, (“On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense”), in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), ''Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften'', Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Germany.
* [[Hilary Putnam|Putnam, Hilary]] (1981), ''Reason, Truth, and History'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
* Putnam, Hilary (1981), ''Reason, Truth, and History'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
* Quine, W.V. (1982), ''Methods of Logic'', (1st ed. 1950), (2nd ed. 1959), (3rd ed. 1972), 4th edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Quine, W.V. (1982), ''Methods of Logic'', (1st ed. 1950), (2nd ed. 1959), (3rd ed. 1972), 4th edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Quine, W.V. (1992), ''Pursuit of Truth'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. Revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992.
* Quine, W.V. (1992), ''Pursuit of Truth'', Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. Revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992.
* Quine, W.V., and [[J.S. Ullian|Ullian, J.S.]] (1978), ''The Web of Belief'', Random House, New York, NY, 1970. 2nd edition, Random House, New York, NY, 1978.
* Quine, W.V., and Ullian, J.S. (1978), ''The Web of Belief'', Random House, New York, NY, 1970. 2nd edition, Random House, New York, NY, 1978.
* Rawls, J. (2000), ''Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy'', Barbara Herman (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Rescher, N. (1973), ''The Coherence Theory of Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* Rorty, R. (1991), ''Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth : Philosophical Papers, Volume 1'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
* Russell, B. (1913), ''Theory of Knowledge (The 1913 Manuscript)'', Elizabeth Ramsden Eames (ed.), Kenneth Blackwell (collab.), George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Reprinted, Routledge, London, UK, 1992.
* Russell, B. (1940), ''An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth'', 'The William James Lectures for 1940 Delivered at Harvard University', George Allen & Unwin, 1950. Reprinted, Thomas Baldwin (intro.), Routledge, London, UK, 1992.
* Salmon, N., and [[Scott Soames|Soames, Scott]] (eds., 1988), ''Propositions and Attitudes'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* [[John Rawls|Rawls, John]] (2000), ''Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy'', Barbara Herman (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
* Smart, N. (1969), ''The Religious Experience of Mankind'', Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY.
* Rescher, Nicholas (1973), ''The Coherence Theory of Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* Tarski, A. (1944), “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics”, ''Philosophy and Phenomenological Research'' 4 (3), 341–376.
* [[Richard Rorty|Rorty, Richard]] (1991), ''Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1'', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
* Wallace, A.F.C.]] (1966), ''Religion, An Anthropological View'', Random House, New York, NY.
* [[Bertrand Russell|Russell, Bertrand]] (1913), ''Theory of Knowledge (The 1913 Manuscript)'', Elizabeth Ramsden Eames (ed.), Kenneth Blackwell (collab.), George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Reprinted, Routledge, London, UK, 1992.
* Williams, B. (2002), ''Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy'', Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
==Syllabus==
===Focal nodes===
* [[Ninian Smart|Smart, Ninian]] (1969), ''The Religious Experience of Mankind'', Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY.
* [[Inquiry Live]]
* [[Logic Live]]
===Peer nodes===
* [[Anthony F.C. Wallace|Wallace, Anthony F.C.]] (1966), ''Religion, An Anthropological View'', Random House, New York, NY.
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Truth_theory Truth Theory @ InterSciWiki]
* [http://mywikibiz.com/Truth_theory Truth Theory @ MyWikiBiz]
* [http://ref.subwiki.org/wiki/Truth_theory Truth Theory @ Subject Wikis]
* [http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Truth_theory Truth Theory @ Wikiversity]
* [http://beta.wikiversity.org/wiki/Truth_theory Truth Theory @ Wikiversity Beta]
===Logical operators===
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* [[Belief]]
* [[Exclusive disjunction]]
* [[Confirmation holism]]
* [[Logical conjunction]]
* [[Honesty]]
* [[Logical disjunction]]
* [[Inquiry]]
* [[Logical equality]]
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* [[Slingshot argument]]
* [[Logical implication]]
* [[Tabula rasa]]
* [[Logical NAND]]
* [[Tautology (logic)]]
* [[Logical NNOR]]
* [[Tautology (rhetoric)]]
* [[Logical negation|Negation]]
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===Truth in logic and mathematics===
===Related topics===
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* [[Ampheck]]
* [[Ampheck]]
* [[Boolean domain]]
* [[Boolean domain]]
* [[Boolean function]]
* [[Boolean function]]
* [[Boolean-valued function]]
* [[Boolean-valued function]]
* [[Continuous predicate]]
* [[Differential logic]]
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* [[Logical graph]]
* [[Logical graph]]
* [[Logical value]]
* [[Minimal negation operator]]
* [[Multigrade operator]]
* [[Parametric operator]]
* [[Peirce's law]]
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* [[Propositional calculus]]
* [[Propositional calculus]]
* [[T-schema]]
* [[Sole sufficient operator]]
* [[Truth table]]
* [[Truth table]]
* [[Venn diagram]]
* [[Universe of discourse]]
* [[Zeroth order logic]]
* [[Zeroth order logic]]
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===Theories of truth===
===Relational concepts===
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* [[Continuous predicate]]
* [[Hypostatic abstraction]]
* [[Logic of relatives]]
* [[Logical matrix]]
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* [[Relation (mathematics)|Relation]]
* [[Relation composition]]
* [[Relation construction]]
* [[Relation reduction]]
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* [[Relation theory]]
* [[Relative term]]
* [[Sign relation]]
* [[Triadic relation]]
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===Information, Inquiry===
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* [[Coherentism]]
* [[Inquiry]]
* [[Coherence theory of truth]]
* [[Dynamics of inquiry]]
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* [[Correspondence theory of truth]]
* [[Semeiotic]]
* [[Deflationary theory of truth]]
* [[Logic of information]]
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* [[Epistemic theories of truth]]
* [[Descriptive science]]
* [[Indefinability theory of truth]]
* [[Normative science]]
* [[Pragmatic theory of truth]]
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* [[Pragmatic maxim]]
* [[Semantic theory of truth]]
* [[Truth theory]]
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===Major theorists===
===Related articles===
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* [[Aristotle]]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semiotic_Information Semiotic Information]
* [[Thomas Aquinas]]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Futures_Of_Logical_Graphs Futures Of Logical Graphs]
* [[J.L. Austin]]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Propositional_Equation_Reasoning_Systems Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems]
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* [[Paul Horwich]]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Logic_:_Introduction Differential Logic : Introduction]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Propositional_Calculus Differential Propositional Calculus]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Logic_and_Dynamic_Systems_2.0 Differential Logic and Dynamic Systems]
* [[Charles Sanders Peirce]]
* [[Plato]]
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* [[W.V. Quine]]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Introduction_to_Inquiry_Driven_Systems Introduction to Inquiry Driven Systems]
* [[Frank P. Ramsey]]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Prospects_for_Inquiry_Driven_Systems Prospects for Inquiry Driven Systems]
* [[Bertrand Russell]]
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems Inquiry Driven Systems : Inquiry Into Inquiry]
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Portions of the above article were adapted from the following sources under the [[GNU Free Documentation License]], under other applicable licenses, or by permission of the copyright holders.
Portions of the above article were adapted from the following sources under the [[GNU Free Documentation License]], under other applicable licenses, or by permission of the copyright holders.
* [http://www.getwiki.net/-Truth_theory Truth theory], [http://www.getwiki.net/ GetWiki].
* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Truth_theory Truth Theory], [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/ InterSciWiki]
* [http://mywikibiz.com/Truth_theory Truth Theory], [http://mywikibiz.com/ MyWikiBiz]
* [http://semanticweb.org/wiki/Truth_theory Truth Theory], [http://semanticweb.org/ Semantic Web]
* [http://ref.subwiki.org/wiki/Truth_theory Truth Theory], [http://ref.subwiki.org/ Subject Wikis]
* [http://wikinfo.org/w/index.php/Truth_theory Truth Theory], [http://wikinfo.org/w/ Wikinfo]
* [http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Truth_theory Truth Theory], [http://en.wikiversity.org/ Wikiversity]
* [http://beta.wikiversity.org/wiki/Truth_theory Truth Theory], [http://beta.wikiversity.org/ Wikiversity Beta]
* [http://web.archive.org/web/20060913000000/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_Theory Truth Theory], [http://en.wikipedia.org/ Wikipedia]
* [http://wikinfo.org/index.php/Truth_theory Truth theory], [http://wikinfo.org/index.php/Main_Page Wikinfo].
This article contains material from an earlier version of the former Wikipedia article, [http://web.archive.org/web/20060913000000/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_Theory Truth Theory], no longer extant. The Wikipedia article was deleted and its edit history destroyed by Wikipedia administrators, in violation of the GNU Free Documentation License. A record of the Wikipedia AFD (Article For Deletion) proceedings can be found at the following locations:
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* [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Articles_for_deletion/Truth_theory&oldid=54630517 1st AFD proceeding]
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* [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Articles_for_deletion/Truth_theory(2)&oldid=71295142 2nd AFD proceeding]
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* [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Articles_for_deletion/Truth_theory_(3rd_nomination)&oldid=81774680 3rd AFD proceeding]
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