Changes

==Political influence==

==Political influence==

Navies can grow in other ways, too.  The Japanese naval build up prior to WWII can be explained in large part by the Imperial Navy's decision to "bargain" with its counterpart, the Imperial Army.  Knowing that its future adversary the United States was materially and strategically more powerful than Japan, the Imperial Navy sought a composed path in foreign affairs.  The Army was more aggressive, though.  So, in exchange for agreement to a more hostile approach by the Army in southeast Asia, the Navy was awarded a greater allocation of resources and an augmented industrial program.<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FJapan-Prepares-Total-War-1919-1941%2Fdp%2F0801495296%2Fsr%3D1-1%2Fqid%3D1168702325%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941], Michael A. Barnhart, [[Directory:Cornell University Press|Cornell University Press]].</ref>  Likewise, personal influence in high places has often allowed a disproportionately large share of national resources to go toward beefing up a fleet.  Certainly, this was the case with both the Roosevelts and with Churchill.

Navies can grow in other ways, too.  The Japanese naval build-up prior to WWII can be explained in large part by the Imperial Navy's decision to "bargain" with its counterpart, the Imperial Army.  Knowing that its future adversary the United States was materially and strategically more powerful than Japan, the Imperial Navy sought a composed path in foreign affairs.  The Army was more aggressive, though.  So, in exchange for agreement to a more hostile approach by the Army in southeast Asia, the Navy was awarded a greater allocation of resources and an augmented industrial program.<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FJapan-Prepares-Total-War-1919-1941%2Fdp%2F0801495296%2Fsr%3D1-1%2Fqid%3D1168702325%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941], Michael A. Barnhart, [[Directory:Cornell University Press|Cornell University Press]].</ref>  Likewise, personal influence in high places has often allowed a disproportionately large share of national resources to go toward beefing up a fleet.  Certainly, this was the case with both the Roosevelts and with Churchill.

 

==Impact of the information age==

==Impact of the information age==

The information age has presented to us another transformation in naval design and construction.  Both World Wars and the [[Falklands War]] have shown that ships built for the sole purpose of firing guns at long range are vulnerable:  to air attack, submarine attack, missile attack, and close-in engagements with vessels encountered unexpectedly at night or in fog.  An answer to this vulnerability has been an increased dependance on electronics and a host of weapons systems for varying roles of defense.  The American cruiser of WWII has been replaced by modern [[Ticonderoga class cruiser]]s now specializing in Anti-Air, Anti-Sub, and Ship-to-Ship Warfare carried out almost solely by missiles, torpedoes, and ship-based helicopters.  The only conventional gun defenses are two 5-inchers and a "last-ditch" [[Directory:Phalanx CIWS|Phalanx]] system.  So representative of technology's multi-role place in the modern navy, these 9,000-ton fossil-fueled<ref>The choice of a conventional power plant for the AEGIS was an economic one.  The expense of the electronic package married to a nuclear plant could not remain fiscally viable in the tight budgets of the late 1970's.</ref> missile cruisers have supplanted the 58,000-ton battleships of yesterday as the navy's flagships, highlighting the fiscal advantages of a larger fleet comprised of smaller, more capable boats.

The information age has presented to us another transformation in naval design and construction.  Both World Wars and the [[Falklands War]] have shown that ships built for the sole purpose of firing guns at long range are vulnerable:  to air attack, submarine attack, missile attack, and close-in engagements with vessels encountered unexpectedly at night or in fog.  An answer to this vulnerability has been an increased dependance on electronics and a host of weapons systems for varying roles of defense.  The American cruiser of WWII has been replaced by modern [[Ticonderoga class cruiser]]s now specializing in Anti-Air, Anti-Sub, and Ship-to-Ship Warfare carried out almost solely by missiles, torpedoes, and ship-based helicopters.  The only conventional gun defenses are two 5-inchers and a "last-ditch" [[Directory:Phalanx CIWS|Phalanx]] system.  So representative of technology's multi-role place in the modern navy, these 9,000-ton fossil-fueled<ref>The choice of a conventional power plant for the AEGIS was an economic one.  The expense of the electronic package married to a nuclear plant could not remain fiscally viable in the tight budgets of the late 1970's.</ref> missile cruisers have supplanted the 58,000-ton battleships of yesterday as the navy's flagships, highlighting the fiscal advantages of a larger fleet comprised of smaller, more capable boats.