Changes

==Materials needed==

==Materials needed==

[[Image:Cgboatbw conv.jpg|thumb|right|200px|USS Cairo Gunboat]]

[[Image:Cgboatbw conv.jpg|thumb|right|200px|USS Cairo Gunboat]]

The materials needed to build a first-rate navy shifted from the tall timbers found in America and Eastern Europe<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FForests-Sea-Power-1652-1862-Literature%2Fdp%2F1557500215%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168700660%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862], Robert Greenhalgh Albion, '''[[Directory:Naval Institute Press|Naval Institute Press]]''', pages 19/488.</ref> and the pitch and tar produced in the Baltic region, to the metallic ores of Minnesota and the Caucasus.  Also, coal rose to great demand, both to fire the iron mills and to fuel the ships' boilers.  A maritime power was by necessity forced to become an imperial power in order to protect fueling stations at strategic points across the globe.  Later in the 20th century, the switch to oil as a fuel would again place the United States and Russia in rich positions.  These material shifts all worked against the leading naval power, Britain.  Her resources were dispersed along the far reaches of the globe: [[Directory:India|India]], [[Directory:Egypt|Egypt]], [[Borneo]], and [[Directory:South Africa|South Africa]].  In contrast, American and Russian resources were tapped right within the home country and transported to production centers by efficient railroads.<ref>This difference between sea-based and land-based procurement has led many authors to support more fully the visions of Halford MacKinder over those ideas expressed by Alfred Thayer Mahan.</ref>  Paul Kennedy, in ''The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery'', all but writes off the great British naval tradition of supremacy because "other nations with greater resources and manpower were rapidly overhauling her previous industrial lead."<ref>{{Cite book| url=http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FRise-Fall-British-Naval-Mastery%2Fdp%2F1591023742%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168701241%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325|  last=Kennedy| first=Paul| title=The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery | publisher=Humanity Books| pages=185-186| format=paperback| accessdate=2007-01-13}}</ref>  However, Britain wasn't merely a victim of geographically shorthanded resources.  Kennedy notes that a conscious reluctance of British capitalists to invest in new industrial plant also doomed England to losing her place as titan of the seas.

The materials needed to build a first-rate navy shifted from the tall timbers found in America and Eastern Europe<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FForests-Sea-Power-1652-1862-Literature%2Fdp%2F1557500215%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168700660%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862], Robert Greenhalgh Albion, '''[[Directory:Naval Institute Press|Naval Institute Press]]''', pages 19/488.</ref> and the pitch and tar produced in the Baltic region, to the metallic ores of Minnesota and the Caucasus.  Also, coal rose to great demand, both to fire the iron mills and to fuel the ships' boilers.  A maritime power was by necessity forced to become an imperial power in order to protect fueling stations at strategic points across the globe.  Later in the 20th century, the switch to oil as a fuel would again place the United States and Russia in rich positions.  These material shifts all worked against the leading naval power, Britain.  Her resources were dispersed along the far reaches of the globe: [[Directory:India|India]], [[Directory:Egypt|Egypt]], [[Borneo]], and [[Directory:South Africa|South Africa]].  In contrast, American and Russian resources were tapped right within the home country and transported to production centers by efficient railroads.<ref>This difference between sea-based and land-based procurement has led many authors to support more fully the visions of Halford MacKinder over those ideas expressed by Alfred Thayer Mahan.</ref>  Paul Kennedy, in ''The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery'', all but writes off the great British naval tradition of supremacy because "other nations with greater resources and manpower were rapidly overhauling her previous industrial lead."<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FRise-Fall-British-Naval-Mastery%2Fdp%2F1591023742%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168701241%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery], Paul Kennedy, [[Directory:Humanity Books|Humanity Books]], pages 185-186.</ref>  However, Britain wasn't merely a victim of geographically shorthanded resources.  Kennedy notes that a conscious reluctance of British capitalists to invest in new industrial plant also doomed England to losing her place as titan of the seas.

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==Percentage of GDP==

==Percentage of GDP==

But even the strongest of nations cannot afford to bankrupt capital robustness, social harmony, and a balanced economy with over-expenditure on affairs military.  Gibbon's ''Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire''<ref>{{Cite book| url=http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FDecline-Fall-Roman-Empire%2Fdp%2F0375758119%2Fsr%3D1-2%2Fqid%3D1168701724%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325|  last=Gibbon| first=Edward| title=The Decline & Fall of the Roman Empire | publisher=Modern Library| format=paperback| accessdate=2007-01-13}}</ref> advises a 1/100 ratio for military to all other pursuits for a healthy society.  Philip Pugh, in ''The Cost of Seapower'',<ref>{{Cite book| url=http://www.alibris.com/search/detail.cfm?S=R&bookbin=8953230898&bid=8953230898&siteID=OmE0YUiQlCg-PltUy0_uDNmOHFHQdxVsgQ|  last=Pugh| first=Philip| title=The Cost of Seapower | publisher=Conway Maritime Press| format=hardcover| accessdate=2007-01-13}}</ref> suggests a more reasonable estimate for peacetime expenditures for the military: 2%-6% of the [[Gross Domestic Product]] (GDP).  Pugh insists on the importance of wealth, not necessarily resources, in maintaining a strong navy.  He argues that in the industrial age, the factor more central than any other in increasing the costs of building a navy is worker wages.  As the industrial (and computer) age advanced, spiraling costs of technologies and resources were offset somewhat by reduced factory labor requirements.  Even the ratio of sailors to the unit-cost of a vessel has steadily gone down, due to the implementation of manpower-saving equipment on board.  This all illustrates the close tie between military readiness and consumer comfort.

But even the strongest of nations cannot afford to bankrupt capital robustness, social harmony, and a balanced economy with over-expenditure on affairs military.  Gibbon's ''Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire''<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FDecline-Fall-Roman-Empire%2Fdp%2F0375758119%2Fsr%3D1-2%2Fqid%3D1168701724%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 The Decline & Fall of the Roman Empire], Edward Gibbon, Modern Library.</ref> advises a 1/100 ratio for military to all other pursuits for a healthy society.  Philip Pugh, in ''The Cost of Seapower'',<ref>[http://www.alibris.com/search/detail.cfm?S=R&bookbin=8953230898&bid=8953230898&siteID=OmE0YUiQlCg-PltUy0_uDNmOHFHQdxVsgQ The Cost of Seapower], Philip Pugh, [[Directory:Conway Maritime Press|Conway Maritime Press]].</ref> suggests a more reasonable estimate for peacetime expenditures for the military: 2%-6% of the [[Gross Domestic Product]] (GDP).  Pugh insists on the importance of wealth, not necessarily resources, in maintaining a strong navy.  He argues that in the industrial age, the factor more central than any other in increasing the costs of building a navy is worker wages.  As the industrial (and computer) age advanced, spiraling costs of technologies and resources were offset somewhat by reduced factory labor requirements.  Even the ratio of sailors to the unit-cost of a vessel has steadily gone down, due to the implementation of manpower-saving equipment on board.  This all illustrates the close tie between military readiness and consumer comfort.

The often-made comparison between Germany and Britain in [[World War Two]] is appropriate here.  Faced with the crisis of war, Brits under the leadership of [[Winston Churchill]] were able to divert perhaps 40% of their GDP to the defense burden, thereby accepting a 30% drop in the standard of living by 1942 and nearly a 50% drop by 1943.  Conversely, the German economy under [[Adolf Hitler]] was manipulated in such a way that the population was not to feel a drop in its standard of living until 1943, and then a drop of only perhaps 15%.  This consumer happiness was achieved at the expense of, among other things, a lazy shipbuilding program.  Thus, the [[Battle of the Atlantic]] might have been decided in large part by home-front sacrifice and vigorous application of funds to the Royal Navy.

The often-made comparison between Germany and Britain in [[World War Two]] is appropriate here.  Faced with the crisis of war, Brits under the leadership of [[Winston Churchill]] were able to divert perhaps 40% of their GDP to the defense burden, thereby accepting a 30% drop in the standard of living by 1942 and nearly a 50% drop by 1943.  Conversely, the German economy under [[Adolf Hitler]] was manipulated in such a way that the population was not to feel a drop in its standard of living until 1943, and then a drop of only perhaps 15%.  This consumer happiness was achieved at the expense of, among other things, a lazy shipbuilding program.  Thus, the [[Battle of the Atlantic]] might have been decided in large part by home-front sacrifice and vigorous application of funds to the Royal Navy.

==Political influence==

==Political influence==

Navies can grow in other ways, too.  The Japanese naval build up prior to WWII can be explained in large part by the Imperial Navy's decision to "bargain" with its counterpart, the Imperial Army.  Knowing that its future adversary the United States was materially and strategically more powerful than Japan, the Imperial Navy sought a composed path in foreign affairs.  The Army was more aggressive, though.  So, in exchange for agreement to a more hostile approach by the Army in southeast Asia, the Navy was awarded a greater allocation of resources and an augmented industrial program.<ref>{{Cite book| url=http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FJapan-Prepares-Total-War-1919-1941%2Fdp%2F0801495296%2Fsr%3D1-1%2Fqid%3D1168702325%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325|  last=Barnhart| first=Michael A.| title=Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 | publisher=Cornell University Press| format=paperback| accessdate=2007-01-13}}</ref>  Likewise, personal influence in high places has often allowed a disproportionately large share of national resources to go toward beefing up a fleet.  Certainly, this was the case with both the Roosevelts and with Churchill.

Navies can grow in other ways, too.  The Japanese naval build up prior to WWII can be explained in large part by the Imperial Navy's decision to "bargain" with its counterpart, the Imperial Army.  Knowing that its future adversary the United States was materially and strategically more powerful than Japan, the Imperial Navy sought a composed path in foreign affairs.  The Army was more aggressive, though.  So, in exchange for agreement to a more hostile approach by the Army in southeast Asia, the Navy was awarded a greater allocation of resources and an augmented industrial program.<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FJapan-Prepares-Total-War-1919-1941%2Fdp%2F0801495296%2Fsr%3D1-1%2Fqid%3D1168702325%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941], Michael A. Barnhart, [[Directory:Cornell University Press|Cornell University Press]].</ref>  Likewise, personal influence in high places has often allowed a disproportionately large share of national resources to go toward beefing up a fleet.  Certainly, this was the case with both the Roosevelts and with Churchill.

    

    

==Impact of the information age==

==Impact of the information age==