Changes

[[Image:Cgboatbw conv.jpg|thumb|right|200px|USS Cairo Gunboat]]

[[Image:Cgboatbw conv.jpg|thumb|right|200px|USS Cairo Gunboat]]

The materials needed to build a first-rate navy shifted from the tall timbers found in America and Eastern Europe<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FForests-Sea-Power-1652-1862-Literature%2Fdp%2F1557500215%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168700660%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862], Robert Greenhalgh Albion, '''[[Directory:Naval Institute Press|Naval Institute Press]]''', pages 19/488.</ref> and the pitch and tar produced in the Baltic region, to the metallic ores of Minnesota and the Caucasus.  Also, coal rose to great demand, both to fire the iron mills and to fuel the ships' boilers.  A maritime power was by necessity forced to become an imperial power in order to protect fueling stations at strategic points across the globe.  Later in the 20th century, the switch to oil as a fuel would again place the United States and Russia in rich positions.  These material shifts all worked against the leading naval power, Britain.  Her resources were dispersed along the far reaches of the globe: [[Directory:India|India]], [[Directory:Egypt|Egypt]], [[Borneo]], and [[Directory:South Africa|South Africa]].  In contrast, American and Russian resources were tapped right within the home country and transported to production centers by efficient railroads.<ref>This difference between sea-based and land-based procurement has led many authors to support more fully the visions of Halford MacKinder over those ideas expressed by Alfred Thayer Mahan.</ref>  Paul Kennedy, in ''The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery'', all but writes off the great British naval tradition of supremacy because "other nations with greater resources and manpower were rapidly overhauling her previous industrial lead."<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FRise-Fall-British-Naval-Mastery%2Fdp%2F1591023742%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168701241%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery], Paul Kennedy, [[Directory:Humanity Books|Humanity Books]], pages 185-186.</ref>  However, Britain wasn't merely a victim of geographically shorthanded resources.  Kennedy notes that a conscious reluctance of British capitalists to invest in new industrial plant also doomed England to losing her place as titan of the seas.

The materials needed to build a first-rate navy shifted from the tall timbers found in America and Eastern Europe<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FForests-Sea-Power-1652-1862-Literature%2Fdp%2F1557500215%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168700660%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862], Robert Greenhalgh Albion, '''[[Directory:Naval Institute Press|Naval Institute Press]]''', pages 19/488.</ref> and the pitch and tar produced in the Baltic region, to the metallic ores of Minnesota and the Caucasus.  Also, coal rose to great demand, both to fire the iron mills and to fuel the ships' boilers.  A maritime power was by necessity forced to become an imperial power in order to protect fueling stations at strategic points across the globe.  Later in the 20th century, the switch to oil as a fuel would again place the United States and Russia in rich positions.  These material shifts all worked against the leading naval power, Britain.  Her resources were dispersed along the far reaches of the globe: [[Directory:India|India]], [[Directory:Egypt|Egypt]], [[Borneo]], and [[Directory:South Africa|South Africa]].  In contrast, American and Russian resources were tapped right within the home country and transported to production centers by efficient railroads.<ref>This difference between sea-based and land-based procurement has led many authors to support more fully the visions of Halford MacKinder over those ideas expressed by Alfred Thayer Mahan.</ref>  Paul Kennedy, in ''The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery'', all but writes off the great British naval tradition of supremacy because "other nations with greater resources and manpower were rapidly overhauling her previous industrial lead."<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FRise-Fall-British-Naval-Mastery%2Fdp%2F1591023742%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168701241%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery], Paul Kennedy, [[Directory:Humanity Books|Humanity Books]], pages 185-186.</ref>  However, Britain wasn't merely a victim of geographically shorthanded resources.  Kennedy notes that a conscious reluctance of British capitalists to invest in new industrial plant also doomed England to losing her place as titan of the seas.

==Percentage of GDP==

==Percentage of GDP==

==Political influence==

==Political influence==

Navies can grow in other ways, too.  The Japanese naval build up prior to WWII can be explained in large part by the Imperial Navy's decision to "bargain" with its counterpart, the Imperial Army.  Knowing that its future adversary the United States was materially and strategically more powerful than Japan, the Imperial Navy sought a composed path in foreign affairs.  The Army was more aggressive, though.  So, in exchange for agreement to a more hostile approach by the Army in southeast Asia, the Navy was awarded a greater allocation of resources and an augmented industrial program.<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FJapan-Prepares-Total-War-1919-1941%2Fdp%2F0801495296%2Fsr%3D1-1%2Fqid%3D1168702325%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941], Michael A. Barnhart, [[Directory:Cornell University Press|Cornell University Press]].</ref>  Likewise, personal influence in high places has often allowed a disproportionately large share of national resources to go toward beefing up a fleet.  Certainly, this was the case with both the Roosevelts and with Churchill.

Navies can grow in other ways, too.  The Japanese naval build-up prior to WWII can be explained in large part by the Imperial Navy's decision to "bargain" with its counterpart, the Imperial Army.  Knowing that its future adversary the United States was materially and strategically more powerful than Japan, the Imperial Navy sought a composed path in foreign affairs.  The Army was more aggressive, though.  So, in exchange for agreement to a more hostile approach by the Army in southeast Asia, the Navy was awarded a greater allocation of resources and an augmented industrial program.<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FJapan-Prepares-Total-War-1919-1941%2Fdp%2F0801495296%2Fsr%3D1-1%2Fqid%3D1168702325%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941], Michael A. Barnhart, [[Directory:Cornell University Press|Cornell University Press]].</ref>  Likewise, personal influence in high places has often allowed a disproportionately large share of national resources to go toward beefing up a fleet.  Certainly, this was the case with both the Roosevelts and with Churchill.

 

==Impact of the information age==

==Impact of the information age==

The information age has presented to us another transformation in naval design and construction.  Both World Wars and the [[Falklands War]] have shown that ships built for the sole purpose of firing guns at long range are vulnerable:  to air attack, submarine attack, missile attack, and close-in engagements with vessels encountered unexpectedly at night or in fog.  An answer to this vulnerability has been an increased dependance on electronics and a host of weapons systems for varying roles of defense.  The American cruiser of WWII has been replaced by modern [[Ticonderoga class cruiser]]s now specializing in Anti-Air, Anti-Sub, and Ship-to-Ship Warfare carried out almost solely by missiles, torpedoes, and ship-based helicopters.  The only conventional gun defenses are two 5-inchers and a "last-ditch" [[Directory:Phalanx CIWS|Phalanx]] system.  So representative of technology's multi-role place in the modern navy, these 9,000-ton fossil-fueled<ref>The choice of a conventional power plant for the AEGIS was an economic one.  The expense of the electronic package married to a nuclear plant could not remain fiscally viable in the tight budgets of the late 1970's.</ref> missile cruisers have supplanted the 58,000-ton battleships of yesterday as the navy's flagships, highlighting the fiscal advantages of a larger fleet comprised of smaller, more capable boats.

The information age has presented to us another transformation in naval design and construction.  Both World Wars and the [[Falklands War]] have shown that ships built for the sole purpose of firing guns at long range are vulnerable:  to air attack, submarine attack, missile attack, and close-in engagements with vessels encountered unexpectedly at night or in fog.  An answer to this vulnerability has been an increased dependance on electronics and a host of weapons systems for varying roles of defense.  The American cruiser of WWII has been replaced by modern [[Ticonderoga class cruiser]]s now specializing in Anti-Air, Anti-Sub, and Ship-to-Ship Warfare carried out almost solely by missiles, torpedoes, and ship-based helicopters.  The only conventional gun defenses are two 5-inchers and a "last-ditch" [[Directory:Phalanx CIWS|Phalanx]] system.  So representative of technology's multi-role place in the modern navy, these 9,000-ton fossil-fueled<ref>The choice of a conventional power plant for the AEGIS was an economic one.  The expense of the electronic package married to a nuclear plant could not remain fiscally viable in the tight budgets of the late 1970's.</ref> missile cruisers have supplanted the 58,000-ton battleships of yesterday as the navy's flagships, highlighting the fiscal advantages of a larger fleet comprised of smaller, more capable boats.