Changes

[[Image:Cgboatbw conv.jpg|thumb|right|200px|USS Cairo Gunboat]]

[[Image:Cgboatbw conv.jpg|thumb|right|200px|USS Cairo Gunboat]]

The materials needed to build a first-rate navy shifted from the tall timbers found in America and Eastern Europe<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FForests-Sea-Power-1652-1862-Literature%2Fdp%2F1557500215%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168700660%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862], Robert Greenhalgh Albion, '''[[Directory:Naval Institute Press|Naval Institute Press]]''', pages 19/488.</ref> and the pitch and tar produced in the Baltic region, to the metallic ores of Minnesota and the Caucasus.  Also, coal rose to great demand, both to fire the iron mills and to fuel the ships' boilers.  A maritime power was by necessity forced to become an imperial power in order to protect fueling stations at strategic points across the globe.  Later in the 20th century, the switch to oil as a fuel would again place the United States and Russia in rich positions.  These material shifts all worked against the leading naval power, Britain.  Her resources were dispersed along the far reaches of the globe: [[Directory:India|India]], [[Directory:Egypt|Egypt]], [[Borneo]], and [[Directory:South Africa|South Africa]].  In contrast, American and Russian resources were tapped right within the home country and transported to production centers by efficient railroads.<ref>This difference between sea-based and land-based procurement has led many authors to support more fully the visions of Halford MacKinder over those ideas expressed by Alfred Thayer Mahan.</ref>  Paul Kennedy, in ''The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery'', all but writes off the great British naval tradition of supremacy because "other nations with greater resources and manpower were rapidly overhauling her previous industrial lead."<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FRise-Fall-British-Naval-Mastery%2Fdp%2F1591023742%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168701241%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery], Paul Kennedy, [[Directory:Humanity Books|Humanity Books]], pages 185-186.</ref>  However, Britain wasn't merely a victim of geographically shorthanded resources.  Kennedy notes that a conscious reluctance of British capitalists to invest in new industrial plant also doomed England to losing her place as titan of the seas.

The materials needed to build a first-rate navy shifted from the tall timbers found in America and Eastern Europe<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FForests-Sea-Power-1652-1862-Literature%2Fdp%2F1557500215%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168700660%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862], Robert Greenhalgh Albion, '''[[Directory:Naval Institute Press|Naval Institute Press]]''', pages 19/488.</ref> and the pitch and tar produced in the Baltic region, to the metallic ores of Minnesota and the Caucasus.  Also, coal rose to great demand, both to fire the iron mills and to fuel the ships' boilers.  A maritime power was by necessity forced to become an imperial power in order to protect fueling stations at strategic points across the globe.  Later in the 20th century, the switch to oil as a fuel would again place the United States and Russia in rich positions.  These material shifts all worked against the leading naval power, Britain.  Her resources were dispersed along the far reaches of the globe: [[Directory:India|India]], [[Directory:Egypt|Egypt]], [[Borneo]], and [[Directory:South Africa|South Africa]].  In contrast, American and Russian resources were tapped right within the home country and transported to production centers by efficient railroads.<ref>This difference between sea-based and land-based procurement has led many authors to support more fully the visions of Halford MacKinder over those ideas expressed by Alfred Thayer Mahan.</ref>  Paul Kennedy, in ''The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery'', all but writes off the great British naval tradition of supremacy because "other nations with greater resources and manpower were rapidly overhauling her previous industrial lead."<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html?ie=UTF8&location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FRise-Fall-British-Naval-Mastery%2Fdp%2F1591023742%2Fsr%3D8-1%2Fqid%3D1168701241%3Fie%3DUTF8%26s%3Dbooks&tag=mywikibizcom-20&linkCode=ur2&camp=1789&creative=9325 The Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery], Paul Kennedy, [[Directory:Humanity Books|Humanity Books]], pages 185-186.</ref>  However, Britain wasn't merely a victim of geographically shorthanded resources.  Kennedy notes that a conscious reluctance of British capitalists to invest in new industrial plant also doomed England to losing her place as titan of the seas.

==Percentage of GDP==

==Percentage of GDP==