Changes

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

Every mind which passes from doubt to belief must have ideas which follow after one another in time.  Every mind which reasons must have ideas which not only follow after others but are caused by them.  Every mind which is capable of logical criticism of its inferences, must be aware of this determination of its ideas by previous ideas.  (Peirce, "On Time and Thought", CE 3, 68-69.)

Every mind which passes from doubt to belief must have ideas which follow after one another in time.  Every mind which reasons must have ideas which not only follow after others but are caused by them.  Every mind which is capable of logical criticism of its inferences, must be aware of this determination of its ideas by previous ideas.  (Peirce, "On Time and Thought", CE&nbsp;3, 68&ndash;69.)

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

The distinction between signs denoting and objects denoted is critical to the discussion of Peirce's  theory of signs.  Wherever needed in the rest of this article, therefore, in order to mark this distinction a little more emphatically than usual, double quotation marks placed around a given sign, for example, a string of zero or more characters, will be used to create a new sign that denotes the given sign as its object.

The distinction between signs denoting and objects denoted is critical to the discussion of Peirce's  theory of signs.  Wherever needed in the rest of this article, therefore, in order to mark this distinction a little more emphatically than usual, double quotation marks placed around a given sign, for example, a string of zero or more characters, will be used to create a new sign that denotes the given sign as its object.

===Theory of signs, or semiotic===

===Semeiotic : Peirce's theory of signs===

Peirce referred to his general study of signs, based on the concept of a [[triadic relation|triadic]] [[sign relation]], as ''[[semiotic]]'' or ''[[semeiotic]]'', either of which terms are currently used in either singular of plural form.  Peirce began writing on semeiotic in the 1860s, around the time that he devised his system of three categories.  He eventually defined ''[[semiosis]]'' as an "action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of ''three'' subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs".  (Houser 1998: 411, written 1907).  This triadic relation grounds the semeiotic.

Peirce referred to his general study of signs, based on the concept of a [[triadic relation|triadic]] [[sign relation]], as ''[[semeiotic]]'' or ''[[semiotic]]'', either of which terms are currently used in both singular of plural forms.  Peirce began writing on semeiotic in the 1860s, around the time that he devised his system of three categories.  He eventually defined ''[[semiosis]]'' as an "action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of ''three'' subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs".  (Houser 1998: 411, written 1907).  This triadic relation grounds the semeiotic.

In order to understand what a ''[[sign (semiotics)|sign]]'' is we need to understand what a ''[[sign relation]]'' is, for signhood is a way of being in relation, not a way of being in itself.  In order to understand what a sign relation is we need to understand what a ''[[triadic relation]]'' is, for the role of a sign is constituted as one among three, where roles in general are distinct even when the things that fill them are not.  In order to understand what a triadic relation is we need to understand what a ''[[relation (mathematics)|relation]]'' is, and here there are traditionally two ways of understanding what a relation is, both of which are necessary if not sufficient to complete understanding, namely, the way of ''[[extension (semantics)|extension]]'' and the way of ''[[intension]]''.  To these traditional approximations, Peirce adds a third way, the way of ''[[semiotic information theory|information]]'', that integrates the other two approaches in a unified whole.

In order to understand what a ''sign'' is we need to understand what a ''[[sign relation]]'' is, for signhood is a way of being in relation, not a way of being in itself.  In order to understand what a sign relation is we need to understand what a ''[[triadic relation]]'' is, for the role of a sign is constituted as one among three, where roles in general are distinct even when the things that fill them are not.  In order to understand what a triadic relation is we need to understand what a ''[[relation (mathematics)|relation]]'' is, and here there are traditionally two ways of understanding what a relation is, both of which are necessary if not sufficient to complete understanding, namely, the way of ''[[extension (semantics)|extension]]'' and the way of ''[[intension]]''.  To these traditional approximations, Peirce adds a third way, the way of ''[[semiotic information theory|information]]'', that integrates the other two approaches in a unified whole.

====Sign relations====

====Sign relations====

{{main|Sign relation}}

: ''Main article'' : [[Sign relation]]

With that hasty map of relations and relatives sketched above, we may now trek into the terrain of ''[[sign relation]]s'', the main subject matter of Peirce's ''[[semeiotic]]'', or theory of signs.

With that hasty map of relations and relatives sketched above, we may now trek into the terrain of ''sign relations'', the main subject matter of Peirce's ''semeiotic'', or theory of signs.

====Types of signs====

====Types of signs====

* An '''index''' is a sign that denotes its objects by virtue of an existential connection that it has with them. For an index to signify, the relation to the object is crucial. The ''representamen'' is directly connected in some way (physically or casually) to the object it denotes (e.g. smoke coming from a building is an index of fire). Hence, an index refers to the object because it is really affected or modified by it, and thus may stand as a trace of the existence of the object.  

* An '''index''' is a sign that denotes its objects by virtue of an existential connection that it has with them. For an index to signify, the relation to the object is crucial. The ''representamen'' is directly connected in some way (physically or casually) to the object it denotes (e.g. smoke coming from a building is an index of fire). Hence, an index refers to the object because it is really affected or modified by it, and thus may stand as a trace of the existence of the object.  

* A '''symbol''' is a sign that denotes its objects solely by virtue of the fact that it is interpreted to do so. The ''representamen'' does not resemble the object signified but is fundamentally conventional, so that the signifying relationship must be learned and agreed upon (e.g. the word “cat”). A symbol thus denotes, primarily, by virtue of its ''interpretant''. Its action (''semeiosis'') is ruled by a convention, a more or less systematic set of associations that guarantees its interpretation, independently of any resemblance or any material relation with its object.

* A '''symbol''' is a sign that denotes its objects solely by virtue of the fact that it is interpreted to do so. The ''representamen'' does not resemble the object signified but is fundamentally conventional, so that the signifying relationship must be learned and agreed upon (e.g. the word "cat"). A symbol thus denotes, primarily, by virtue of its ''interpretant''. Its action (''semeiosis'') is ruled by a convention, a more or less systematic set of associations that guarantees its interpretation, independently of any resemblance or any material relation with its object.

Note that these definitions are specific to Peirce's theory of signs and are not exactly equivalent to general uses of the notion of "[[icon]]", "[[symbol]]" or "[[index]]".

Note that these definitions are specific to Peirce's theory of signs and are not exactly equivalent to general uses of the notion of "[[icon]]", "[[symbol]]" or "[[index]]".

===Theory of inquiry===

===Theory of inquiry===

{{main|Inquiry}}

: ''Main article'' : [[Inquiry]]

: Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:

: Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:

===Logic of information===

===Logic of information===

{{main|Logic of information}}

: ''Main article'' : [[Logic of information]]

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

Let us now return to the information.  The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes — having two legs, being rational, &tc. — which make up the comprehension of ''man''.  Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.  (C.S. Peirce, "The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis" (1866), CE 1, 467.)

Let us now return to the information.  The information of a term is the measure of its superfluous comprehension.  That is to say that the proper office of the comprehension is to determine the extension of the term.  For instance, you and I are men because we possess those attributes &mdash; having two legs, being rational, &tc. &mdash; which make up the comprehension of ''man''.  Every addition to the comprehension of a term lessens its extension up to a certain point, after that further additions increase the information instead.  (C.S. Peirce, "The Logic of Science, or, Induction and Hypothesis" (1866), CE 1, 467.)

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

Charles Sanders Peirce, MS 215, 1873, [&ldquo;On Time and Thought&rdquo;], pp. 68&ndash;71 in ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 3, 1872&ndash;1878'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1986.

Charles Sanders Peirce, MS 215, 1873, [&ldquo;On Time and Thought&rdquo;], pp. 68&ndash;71 in ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 3, 1872&ndash;1878'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1986.

==Document history==

==Document history==

* [http://www.getwiki.net/-Dynamics_of_Inquiry_(C.S._Peirce) Dynamics of Inquiry], [http://www.getwiki.net/ GetWiki]

* [http://www.wikinfo.org/index.php/Dynamics_of_inquiry Dynamics of Inquiry], [http://www.wikinfo.org/ Wikinfo]

 

* [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Dynamics_of_inquiry Dynamics of Inquiry], [http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/ InterSciWiki]

* [http://mywikibiz.com/Dynamics_of_inquiry Dynamics of Inquiry], [http://mywikibiz.com/ MyWikiBiz]

* [http://semanticweb.org/wiki/Dynamics_of_inquiry Dynamics of Inquiry], [http://semanticweb.org/ SemanticWeb]

* [http://wikinfo.org/w/index.php/Dynamics_of_inquiry Dynamics of Inquiry], [http://wikinfo.org/w/ Wikinfo]

 

[[Category:Systems Science]]