Changes

Expressed in abstract fashion, the injunction of a reflective capacity and the injunction of a capacity limitation are recognized to impinge on each other in a way that brings to light a number of additional issues.  Expressed in more concrete detail, the experiential instances that lead to the formation of these two points in the first place, as organizing poles of topics explicitly noticed, and that continue to surround their particular arrangements, …

Expressed in abstract fashion, the injunction of a reflective capacity and the injunction of a capacity limitation are recognized to impinge on each other in a way that brings to light a number of additional issues.  Expressed in more concrete detail, the experiential instances that lead to the formation of these two points in the first place, as organizing poles of topics explicitly noticed, and that continue to surround their particular arrangements, …

'''Point 11.'''     Computational models of intelligent agents are limited to the consideration of “finitely informed constructions and computations”, or as I more affectionately call them, “finitely informed creatures” (FICs).

'''Point 11.'''     Computational models of intelligent agents are limited to the consideration of “finitely informed constructions and computations”, or as I more affectionately call them, ''finitely informed creatures'' (FICs).

This point arises as a specialization of the point about capacity limits, where the discussion is restricted to the kinds of interpretive agents and the models of interpretive faculties that are available in a computational framework.

This point arises as a specialization of the point about capacity limits, where the discussion is restricted to the kinds of interpretive agents and the models of interpretive faculties that are available in a computational framework.

As a minimum requirement, a capacity for reflection implies an ability to generate names for the elements, processes, and principles of thought.  Assuming the tenet of pragmatism that all thought takes place in signs, this is tantamount to having signs for signs, signs for sign processes, and signs for sign relations.  Further, each higher order sign that is generated in a process of reflection is required to take its place and to find its meaning within a correspondingly higher order sign relation.

As a minimum requirement, a capacity for reflection implies an ability to generate names for the elements, processes, and principles of thought.  Assuming the tenet of pragmatism that all thought takes place in signs, this is tantamount to having signs for signs, signs for sign processes, and signs for sign relations.  Further, each higher order sign that is generated in a process of reflection is required to take its place and to find its meaning within a correspondingly higher order sign relation.

In this connection, the designation “higher order” (HO) can be used as a generic adjective to describe a sign of any object whose nature it is to involve signs as a part of its being.  The use of this adjective is subject to extension in natural ways to describe not only entire classes of signs but also the kinds of sign relations that involve them.

In this connection, the designation ''higher order'' (HO) can be used as a generic adjective to describe a sign of any object whose nature it is to involve signs as a part of its being.  The use of this adjective is subject to extension in natural ways to describe not only entire classes of signs but also the kinds of sign relations that involve them.

In order to reflect on signs themselves, it is necessary to have signs for signs, a necessary supply of which can be generated by quotation.  But reflection on sign processes requires a much larger supply of signs.  Initially, it requires a HO sign for each sign transition that actually occurs, that is, a name for each ordered pair of signs that is observed.  Eventually, it requires a HO sign for each sign sequence that actually appears in experience, that is, a name for each <math>k\!</math>-tuple of signs seen.  And reflection on sign relations requires an even larger stock of signs.  It requires, initially, a HO sign for each sign transaction of the form <math>(o, s, i)\!</math> that is observed in experience and, ultimately, a HO sign for each sign relation that is encountered in experience or contemplated in a hypothetical situation.

In order to reflect on signs themselves, it is necessary to have signs for signs, a necessary supply of which can be generated by quotation.  But reflection on sign processes requires a much larger supply of signs.  Initially, it requires a HO sign for each sign transition that actually occurs, that is, a name for each ordered pair of signs that is observed.  Eventually, it requires a HO sign for each sign sequence that actually appears in experience, that is, a name for each <math>k\!</math>-tuple of signs seen.  And reflection on sign relations requires an even larger stock of signs.  It requires, initially, a HO sign for each sign transaction of the form <math>(o, s, i)\!</math> that is observed in experience and, ultimately, a HO sign for each sign relation that is encountered in experience or contemplated in a hypothetical situation.

The combinatorial explosion engendered by reflection impinges on the capacity limitations of a FIC with such an impact that neither the standpoints of &ldquo;naive empiricism&rdquo; or &ldquo;naive intuitionism&rdquo; can continue to support viable forms of inquiry.

The combinatorial explosion engendered by reflection impinges on the capacity limitations of a FIC with such an impact that neither the standpoints of &ldquo;naive empiricism&rdquo; or &ldquo;naive intuitionism&rdquo; can continue to support viable forms of inquiry.

This is what makes the mediation of a &ldquo;higher order hypothesis&rdquo; (HOH), a hypothesis about the qualifications of a hypothesis, or a hypothesis about what can count as a hypothesis, so essential to the life of a FIC.

This is what makes the mediation of a ''higher order hypothesis'' (HOH), a hypothesis about the qualifications of a hypothesis, or a hypothesis about what can count as a hypothesis, so essential to the life of a FIC.

The process of generating signs that refer to things already signs is incited by a syntactic operation that is commonly called a &ldquo;quotation&rdquo;.  Strictly speaking, the descriptive term &ldquo;quotation&rdquo; refers to generic class of syntactic functions, each of which maps one order of signs into the next higher order of signs.  A proper form of quotation function is required to map signs in a one to one or &ldquo;injective&rdquo; fashion, and thus associates each element of its source domain with a HO sign that denotes it and it alone.  In short, a quotation produces a unique &ldquo;name&rdquo; or a distinctive &ldquo;number&rdquo; to index each piece its source material.

The process of generating signs that refer to things already signs is incited by a syntactic operation that is commonly called a &ldquo;quotation&rdquo;.  Strictly speaking, the descriptive term &ldquo;quotation&rdquo; refers to generic class of syntactic functions, each of which maps one order of signs into the next higher order of signs.  A proper form of quotation function is required to map signs in a one to one or &ldquo;injective&rdquo; fashion, and thus associates each element of its source domain with a HO sign that denotes it and it alone.  In short, a quotation produces a unique &ldquo;name&rdquo; or a distinctive &ldquo;number&rdquo; to index each piece its source material.

But a level of genuine reflection on sign processes and sign relations exceeds the generative capacity of mere quotation.

But a level of genuine reflection on sign processes and sign relations exceeds the generative capacity of mere quotation.

'''Point 13.''' &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A &ldquo;finitely informed creature&rdquo; (FIC), if it is reflective up to the point that it reflects on its own nature as such, crosses a singular threshold of reflection, whereupon it not only obeys its own capacity limitations, as it instinctively and necessarily must, but also observes and reflects on their character.

'''Point 13.''' &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A ''finitely informed creature'' (FIC), if it is reflective up to the point that it reflects on its own nature as such, crosses a singular threshold of reflection, whereupon it not only obeys its own capacity limitations, as it instinctively and necessarily must, but also observes and reflects on their character.

'''Point 14.''' &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Higher order sign relations tax the pragmatic resources of an interpretive agent to such a severe extent that they impinge on the practical limits of its representational capacity and computational ability.

'''Point 14.''' &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Higher order sign relations tax the pragmatic resources of an interpretive agent to such a severe extent that they impinge on the practical limits of its representational capacity and computational ability.

'''Point 24.''' &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Reflective projects being partial, their refractory parts are likely to remain partial to their outward projections.

'''Point 24.''' &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Reflective projects being partial, their refractory parts are likely to remain partial to their outward projections.

An &ldquo;unreflective framework&rdquo; (UF), if it does not devolve into a condition of total confusion, and thus deserves to be called a framework at all, ordinarily maintains a clear separation between the objective and the interpretive parts of its organization.  This pragmatic division of labor coincides with a substantive distinction that is ordained to exist between the object system that is subject to observation or interpretation and the agent system that observes or interprets it.

An ''unreflective framework'' (UF), if it does not devolve into a condition of total confusion, and thus deserves to be called a framework at all, ordinarily maintains a clear separation between the objective and the interpretive parts of its organization.  This pragmatic division of labor coincides with a substantive distinction that is ordained to exist between the object system that is subject to observation or interpretation and the agent system that observes or interprets it.

But the goal of reflection is to make one's own conduct an object among other objects, something that can be critically evaluated as one choice among many and subsequently amended if found wanting.  In this aim a realistic project of reflection never sees more than partial success.  There is always a refractory residue of ongoing conduct that resists analysis and remains unreflected in any clear form of representation.  Thus, the actual effect of a reflective project is to represent only a part of one's interpretive conduct as a part of one's objective regard, in other words, to reconfigure a part of one's IF as a part of one's OF.

But the goal of reflection is to make one's own conduct an object among other objects, something that can be critically evaluated as one choice among many and subsequently amended if found wanting.  In this aim a realistic project of reflection never sees more than partial success.  There is always a refractory residue of ongoing conduct that resists analysis and remains unreflected in any clear form of representation.  Thus, the actual effect of a reflective project is to represent only a part of one's interpretive conduct as a part of one's objective regard, in other words, to reconfigure a part of one's IF as a part of one's OF.

All in all, a RIF involves the close coordination of an OF and an IF, plus mechanisms for carrying out the so called ''reflective operations'' (ROs) that go to negotiate between the objective and the interpretive realms.  The work of ROing permits processes of interpretation, initially taking place largely in the IF and impinging on the OF only at isolated points, to be formalized and objectified, thereby becoming segments of the OF.  Taken over time the cumulative effect of this ROing motion gradually turns more and more of the IF into new sectors and layers of the OF.

All in all, a RIF involves the close coordination of an OF and an IF, plus mechanisms for carrying out the so called ''reflective operations'' (ROs) that go to negotiate between the objective and the interpretive realms.  The work of ROing permits processes of interpretation, initially taking place largely in the IF and impinging on the OF only at isolated points, to be formalized and objectified, thereby becoming segments of the OF.  Taken over time the cumulative effect of this ROing motion gradually turns more and more of the IF into new sectors and layers of the OF.

Point 27.

'''Point 27.'''

There is a portion of reasoning that consists in drawing distinctions, signifying the features thereby distinguished by means of logical terms, recognizing constraints on the conjoint occurrences of these features, expressing these constraints in the form of logical premisses, and then drawing the implications of these premisses as the occasion warrants.  This part of logic, in its formalizable aspects, is generally referred to as ''propositional calculus'' (PropC), ''sentential logic'' (SL), or sometimes as ''zeroth order logic'' (ZOL).

There is a portion of reasoning that consists in drawing distinctions, signifying the features thereby distinguished by means of logical terms, recognizing constraints on the conjoint occurrences of these features, expressing these constraints in the form of logical premisses, and then drawing the implications of these premisses as the occasion warrants.  This part of logic, in its formalizable aspects, is generally referred to as ''propositional calculus'' (PropC), ''sentential logic'' (SL), or sometimes as ''zeroth order logic'' (ZOL).

With any system of logic, at least, that does not propose a purely syntactic rationale for itself, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the logical object that is denoted, expressed, or represented in thinking and the logical sign that denotes, expresses, or represents it.  Often one uses the contrast between ''proposition'' and ''expression'' or the shade of difference between ''statement'' and ''sentence'' to convey the distinction between the logical object signified and the syntactic assemblage that signifies it.  Another option is to let the division lie between a ''position'' and a ''proposition'', with the suggestion being that the function of a symbolic proposition is to indicate indifferently a plurality of logical positions.  In accord with my personal preference, I use the term ''proposition'' ambiguously, expecting context to resolve the question, and resorting to the term ''expression'' when it does not.

With any system of logic, at least, that does not propose a purely syntactic rationale for itself, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the logical object that is denoted, expressed, or represented in thinking and the logical sign that denotes, expresses, or represents it.  Often one uses the contrast between ''proposition'' and ''expression'' or the shade of difference between ''statement'' and ''sentence'' to convey the distinction between the logical object signified and the syntactic assemblage that signifies it.  Another option is to let the division lie between a ''position'' and a ''proposition'', with the suggestion being that the function of a symbolic proposition is to indicate indifferently a plurality of logical positions.  In accord with my personal preference, I use the term ''proposition'' ambiguously, expecting context to resolve the question, and resorting to the term ''expression'' when it does not.

'''Point 28.''' &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Adequate reasoning about the propositional constitution or the sentential representation of POVs and PODs requires a logical system that can work with ''higher order propositions'' (HOPs).

Point 28. Adequate reasoning about the propositional constitution or the sentential representatation of POV's and POD's requires a logical system that can work with "higher order propositions" (HOP's).

Point 29.

'''Point 29.'''

Finally, interlaced with the structures of the OF and the IF, there is a need for a structure that I call a "dynamic evaluative framework" (DEF).  This is intended to isolate the twin aspects of process and purpose that are observable on either side of the objective interpretive divide and to assist in formalizing the graded notions of directed change that are able to be actualized in the medium of a RIF.

Finally, interlaced with the structures of the OF and the IF, there is a need for a structure that I call a ''dynamic evaluative framework'' (DEF).  This is intended to isolate the twin aspects of process and purpose that are observable on either side of the objective interpretive divide and to assist in formalizing the graded notions of directed change that are able to be actualized in the medium of a RIF.

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[[Category:Artificial Intelligence]]

[[Category:Artificial Intelligence]]