Changes

====3.1.2.  The Moment of Inquiry====

====3.1.2.  The Moment of Inquiry====

<p>Every young man &mdash; not to speak of old men &mdash; on hearing or seeing anything unusual and strange, is likely to avoid jumping to a hasty and impulsive solution of his doubts about it, and to stand still;  just as a man who has come to a crossroads and is not quite sure of his way, if he be travelling alone, will question himself, or if travelling with others, will question them too about the matter in doubt, and refuse to proceed until he has made sure by investigation of the direction of his path.</p>

<p>Every young man &mdash; not to speak of old men &mdash; on hearing or seeing anything unusual and strange, is likely to avoid jumping to a hasty and impulsive solution of his doubts about it, and to stand still;  just as a man who has come to a crossroads and is not quite sure of his way, if he be travelling alone, will question himself, or if travelling with others, will question them too about the matter in doubt, and refuse to proceed until he has made sure by investigation of the direction of his path.</p>

 

<p>(Plato, ''Laws'', VII, 799C).</p>

| align="right" | (Plato, ''Laws'', VII, 799C).

Observe the paradox of this precise ambiguity:  That both the occasion and the impulse of inquiry are instances of a negative moment.  But the immediate discussion is aimed at the positive aspects of inquiry, and so I convert this issue into its corresponding positive form.

Observe the paradox of this precise ambiguity:  That both the occasion and the impulse of inquiry are instances of a negative moment.  But the immediate discussion is aimed at the positive aspects of inquiry, and so I convert this issue into its corresponding positive form.

====3.1.3.  The Modes of Inquiry====

====3.1.3.  The Modes of Inquiry====

<p>Let the strange fact be granted, we say, that our hymns are now made into "nomes" (laws), just as the men of old, it would seem, gave this name to harp-tunes, &mdash; so that they, too, perhaps, would not wholly disagree with our present suggestion, but one of them may have divined it vaguely, as in a dream by night or a waking vision:  anyhow, let this be the decree on the matter: &mdash;  In violation of public tunes and sacred songs and the whole choristry of the young, just as in violation of any other "nome" (law), no person shall utter a note or move a limb in the dance.</p>

<p>Let the strange fact be granted, we say, that our hymns are now made into "nomes" (laws), just as the men of old, it would seem, gave this name to harp-tunes, &mdash; so that they, too, perhaps, would not wholly disagree with our present suggestion, but one of them may have divined it vaguely, as in a dream by night or a waking vision:  anyhow, let this be the decree on the matter: &mdash;  In violation of public tunes and sacred songs and the whole choristry of the young, just as in violation of any other "nome" (law), no person shall utter a note or move a limb in the dance.</p>

 

<p>(Plato, ''Laws'', VII, 799E&ndash;800A).</p>

| align="right" | (Plato, ''Laws'', VII, 799E&ndash;800A).

In the present section, I am concerned with the kinds of reasoning that might be involved in the choice of a method, that is, in discovering a way to go about inquiry, in constructing a way to carry it through, and in justifying the way that one chooses.  If the choice of a method can be established on the basis of reasoning, if it can be rationalized or reconstructed on grounds that are commonly thought to be sensible, or if it is likely to be affected or influenced in any way by a rational argument, then there is reason to examine the kinds of reasoning that go into this choice.  All of this requires a minimal discussion of different modes of reasoning.

In the present section, I am concerned with the kinds of reasoning that might be involved in the choice of a method, that is, in discovering a way to go about inquiry, in constructing a way to carry it through, and in justifying the way that one chooses.  If the choice of a method can be established on the basis of reasoning, if it can be rationalized or reconstructed on grounds that are commonly thought to be sensible, or if it is likely to be affected or influenced in any way by a rational argument, then there is reason to examine the kinds of reasoning that go into this choice.  All of this requires a minimal discussion of different modes of reasoning.

The ''first figure'' of the syllogism is explained as follows:

The ''first figure'' of the syllogism is explained as follows:

<p>When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism.  By "middle term" I mean that which both is contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also;  and by "extremes" (a) that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained.  For if A is predicated of all B, and B of all C, A must necessarily be predicated of all C. ...  I call this kind of figure the First.</p>

 

<p>When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism.  By "middle term" I mean that which both is contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also;  and by "extremes" (a) that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained.  For if A is predicated of all B, and B of all C, A must necessarily be predicated of all C. &hellip; I call this kind of figure the First.</p>

<p>(Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.4).</p>

| align="right" | (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.4).

For example, suppose A is "animal", B is "bird", and C is "canary".  Then there is a deductive conclusion to be drawn in the first figure.

For example, suppose A is "animal", B is "bird", and C is "canary".  Then there is a deductive conclusion to be drawn in the first figure.

The ''second figure'' of the syllogism is explained as follows:

The ''second figure'' of the syllogism is explained as follows:

<p>When the same term applies to all of one subject and to none of the other, or to all or none of both, I call this kind of figure the Second;  and in it by the middle term I mean that which is predicated of both subjects;  by the extreme terms, the subjects of which the middle is predicated;  by the major term, that which comes next to the middle;  and by the minor that which is more distant from it.  The middle is placed outside the extreme terms, and is first by position.</p>

<p>When the same term applies to all of one subject and to none of the other, or to all or none of both, I call this kind of figure the Second;  and in it by the middle term I mean that which is predicated of both subjects;  by the extreme terms, the subjects of which the middle is predicated;  by the major term, that which comes next to the middle;  and by the minor that which is more distant from it.  The middle is placed outside the extreme terms, and is first by position.</p>

 

<p>(Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.5).</p>

| align="right" | (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.5).

For example, suppose M is "mammal", N is "newt", and O is "opossum".  Then there is a deductive conclusion to be drawn in the second figure.

For example, suppose M is "mammal", N is "newt", and O is "opossum".  Then there is a deductive conclusion to be drawn in the second figure.

The ''third figure'' of the syllogism is explained as follows:

The ''third figure'' of the syllogism is explained as follows:

<p>If one of the terms applies to all and the other to none of the same subject, or if both terms apply to all or none of it, I call this kind of figure the Third;  and in it by the middle I mean that of which both the predications are made;  by extremes the predicates;  by the major term that which is [further from] the middle;  and by the minor that which is nearer to it.  The middle is placed outside the extremes, and is last by position.</p>

<p>If one of the terms applies to all and the other to none of the same subject, or if both terms apply to all or none of it, I call this kind of figure the Third;  and in it by the middle I mean that of which both the predications are made;  by extremes the predicates;  by the major term that which is [further from] the middle;  and by the minor that which is nearer to it.  The middle is placed outside the extremes, and is last by position.</p>

 

<p>(Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.6).</p>

| align="right" | (Aristotle, ''Prior Analytics'', 1.6).

It appears that this passage is only meant to mark out the limiting cases of the type.  From the examples that Aristotle gives it is clear that he includes many other kinds of logical situation under this figure.  Perhaps the phrase "applies to all or none" is intended to specify that a term applies "affirmatively or negatively" to another term, but is not meant to require that it applies universally so.

It appears that this passage is only meant to mark out the limiting cases of the type.  From the examples that Aristotle gives it is clear that he includes many other kinds of logical situation under this figure.  Perhaps the phrase "applies to all or none" is intended to specify that a term applies "affirmatively or negatively" to another term, but is not meant to require that it applies universally so.