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"Knowledge" is a referring back:  in its essence a regressus in infinitum.  That which comes to a standstill (at a supposed causa prima, at something unconditioned, etc.) is laziness, weariness —

<p>"Knowledge" is a referring back:  in its essence a regressus in infinitum.  That which comes to a standstill (at a supposed causa prima, at something unconditioned, etc.) is laziness, weariness &mdash;</p>

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| align="right" | Nietzsche, ''The Will to Power'' S575, 309

| align="right" | Nietzsche, ''The Will to Power'' S575, 309

With this preamble, I return to develop my own account of formalization, with special attention to the kind of step that leads from the inchoate chaos of casual discourse to a well-founded discussion of formal models.  A formalization step, of the incipient kind being considered here, has the peculiar property that one can say with some definiteness where it ends, since it leads precisely to a well-defined formal model, but not with any definiteness where it begins.  Any attempt to trace the steps of formalization backward toward their ultimate beginnings can lead to an interminable multiplicity of open-ended explorations.  In view of these circumstances, let me limit my attention to the frame of the present inquiry and try to sum up what brings me to this point.

With this preamble, I return to develop my own account of formalization, with special attention to the kind of step that leads from the inchoate chaos of casual discourse to a well-founded discussion of formal models.  A formalization step, of the incipient kind being considered here, has the peculiar property that one can say with some definiteness where it ends, since it leads precisely to a well-defined formal model, but not with any definiteness where it begins.  Any attempt to trace the steps of formalization backward toward their ultimate beginnings can lead to an interminable multiplicity of open-ended explorations.  In view of these circumstances, let me limit my attention to the frame of the present inquiry and try to sum up what brings me to this point.

I ask whether it is possible to reason about inquiry in a way that leads to a productive end.  I pose this question as an inquiry into inquiry, and I use the formula "y0 = y·y" to express the relationship between the present inquiry, y0, and a generic inquiry, y.  Then I propose a couple of components of inquiry, expressed in the form "y >= {d, f}", that appear to be worth investigating.  Applying these components to each other, as must be done in the present inquiry, I am led to the current discussion of formalization, y0 = y·y >= f·d.

I ask whether it is possible to reason about inquiry in a way that leads to a productive end.  I pose this question as an inquiry into inquiry, and I use the formula <math>y_0 = y \cdot y</math> to express the relationship between the present inquiry, <math>y_0,\!</math> and a generic inquiry, <math>y.\!</math> Then I propose a couple of components of inquiry, expressed in the form <math>y \succ \{ d, f \},</math> that appear to be worth investigating.  Applying these components to each other, as must be done in the present inquiry, I am led to the current discussion of formalization, <math>y_0 = y \cdot y \succ f \cdot d.</math>

There is already much to question here.  At least, so many repetitions of the same mysterious formula are bound to lead the reader to question its meaning.

There is already much to question here.  At least, so many repetitions of the same mysterious formula are bound to lead the reader to question its meaning.