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==Introduction==

==Introduction==

The study of history is often an uplifting, enriching endeavor because it reveals the triumphs and glories of mankind.  Not so the historical inspection of American strategic bombing of [[Germany]] during [[World War Two]].  Here is found the cold, calculating practice of administering destruction from the air.  Undeniably, was presents to those involved a certain risk of death; however, it has long been accepted, or at least considered, that civilian populations should be spared from unrestricted battle action.  Strategic bombing sidestepped these notions of military ethics and undercut those few people who questioned and opposed the practice.  If the true horror of World War Two was the extent of people's systematic killing of other people, then strategic bombing in its magnitude and obduracy was no exception.

The study of history is often an uplifting, enriching endeavor because it reveals the triumphs and glories of mankind.  Not so the historical inspection of American strategic bombing of [[Germany]] during [[World War Two]].  Here is found the cold, calculating practice of administering destruction from the air.  Undeniably, war presents to those involved a certain risk of death; however, it has long been accepted, or at least considered, that civilian populations should be spared from unrestricted battle action.  Strategic bombing sidestepped these notions of military ethics and undercut those few people who questioned and opposed the practice.  If the true horror of World War Two was the extent of people's systematic killing of other people, then strategic bombing in its magnitude and obduracy was no exception.

During the course of the war, Americans at home stayed informed of the happenings abroad through the media of letters from the front, newspapers, radio, newsreels, and popular news journals. Specifically, news magazines served the dual purpose of passing along first-rate information to the reader while maintaining a brief and entertaining format. Throughout the war, widely-read news journals generated a great amount of print concerning American strategic bombing. '''Reader's Digest''', '''Life''', '''Time''', and '''Newsweek''' contained a rich sampling of articles addressing the bombing, complete with very telling opinions and conclusions. These magazines had enormous circulation rates and reached many American readers.

During the course of the war, Americans at home stayed informed of the happenings abroad through the media of letters from the front, newspapers, radio, newsreels, and popular news journals. Specifically, news magazines served the dual purpose of passing along first-rate information to the reader while maintaining a brief and entertaining format. Throughout the war, widely-read news journals generated a great amount of print concerning American strategic bombing. '''Reader's Digest''', '''Life''', '''Time''', and '''Newsweek''' contained a rich sampling of articles addressing the bombing, complete with very telling opinions and conclusions. These magazines had enormous circulation rates and reached many American readers.

The story of aerial bombing operations over Europe consists primarily of three contrasting efforts: those executed by Germany (the Luftwaffe), by [[Great Britain]] (the R.A.F. Bomber Command), and by the [[United States]] (predominantly the Eighth Air Force).  The year 1940 marked the trial and abandonment, both by the Germans and the British, of long-standing notions about strategic air power.

The story of aerial bombing operations over Europe consists primarily of three contrasting efforts: those executed by Germany (the Luftwaffe), by [[Great Britain]] (the R.A.F. Bomber Command), and by the [[United States]] (predominantly the Eighth Air Force).  The year 1940 marked the trial and abandonment, both by the Germans and the British, of long-standing notions about strategic air power.

===German lessons===

==German lessons==

The Germans learned serious lessons in target selection and aircraft construction.  The first lesson was that the choice targets of Royal Air Force airfields and the seaport docks and shipping yards were too hastily forsaken for the urban areas of London and Coventry.  Many scholars agree that England was virtually on the brink of strategic collapse due to Luftwaffe bombing attacks on airfields and ports, when German high command concluded that these attacks weren't having enough effect and switched to city bombing.

[[File:Surreydocks1941.jpg|thumb|right|140px|A German Heinkel He-111 over London dockyard]]The Germans learned serious lessons in target selection and aircraft construction.  The first lesson was that the choice targets of Royal Air Force airfields and the seaport docks and shipping yards were too hastily forsaken for the urban areas of London and Coventry.  Many scholars agree that England was virtually on the brink of strategic collapse due to Luftwaffe bombing attacks on airfields and ports, when German high command concluded that these attacks weren't having enough effect and switched to city bombing.

Concerning the second lesson, the Luftwaffe's medium-sized bombers were not sufficient to inflict the necessary damage that a strategic campaign supposedly required.  This lack of heavy bombers was not the only handicap.  The German bombers were not adequately armed with power-operated turrets.<ref>"The Uses of Air Power in 1939-1945", Sir Robert Saundby, [http://books.google.com/books?ei=9--ITOWwEMOBlAe_vK3bDw&ct=result&id=8QTQAAAAMAAJ&dq=%22the+impact+of+Air+power%22+Eugene+Emme&q=%22Excerpts+from+a+lecture%22#search_anchor excerpts from a lecture] given on March 18, 1948, at London University, as condensed in '''The Aeroplane''', April 16, 1948.  (From Eugene M. Emme, ed., '''The Impact of Air Power''' (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1959), p. 218.)</ref>  In addition, their fighter escorts flew in close support rather than general support,<ref>"Strategic Air Power in the European War", General Carl A. Spaatz, from "Strategic Air Power: [http://books.google.com/books?ei=9--ITOWwEMOBlAe_vK3bDw&ct=result&id=8QTQAAAAMAAJ&dq=%22the+impact+of+Air+power%22+Eugene+Emme&q=%22Fulfillment+of+a+Concept%22#search_anchor Fulfillment of a Concept]", '''Foreign Affairs''', April 1946.  (From Eugene M. Emme, ed., '''The Impact of Air Power''' (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1959), p. 228.)</ref> thus retarding the ability to dogfight against RAF fighters.  Of course the Germans were not alone in committing crucial mistakes.

Concerning the second lesson, the Luftwaffe's medium-sized bombers were not sufficient to inflict the necessary damage that a strategic campaign supposedly required.  This lack of heavy bombers was not the only handicap.  The German bombers were not adequately armed with power-operated turrets.<ref>"The Uses of Air Power in 1939-1945", Sir Robert Saundby, [http://books.google.com/books?ei=9--ITOWwEMOBlAe_vK3bDw&ct=result&id=8QTQAAAAMAAJ&dq=%22the+impact+of+Air+power%22+Eugene+Emme&q=%22Excerpts+from+a+lecture%22#search_anchor excerpts from a lecture] given on March 18, 1948, at London University, as condensed in '''The Aeroplane''', April 16, 1948.  (From Eugene M. Emme, ed., '''The Impact of Air Power''' (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1959), p. 218.)</ref>  In addition, their fighter escorts flew in close support rather than general support,<ref>"Strategic Air Power in the European War", General Carl A. Spaatz, from "Strategic Air Power: [http://books.google.com/books?ei=9--ITOWwEMOBlAe_vK3bDw&ct=result&id=8QTQAAAAMAAJ&dq=%22the+impact+of+Air+power%22+Eugene+Emme&q=%22Fulfillment+of+a+Concept%22#search_anchor Fulfillment of a Concept]", '''Foreign Affairs''', April 1946.  (From Eugene M. Emme, ed., '''The Impact of Air Power''' (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1959), p. 228.)</ref> thus retarding the ability to dogfight against RAF fighters.  Of course the Germans were not alone in committing crucial mistakes.

===The British approach===

==The British approach==

 

Britain's Bomber Command tried in late 1939 to fly daylight precision bombing raids over Germany. Although pre-war theory stressed the invulnerability of bombers flying in close formation with guns blazing, the small-caliber armaments on the Whitley and Wellington bombers were not effective against Luftwaffe Me-109s coming from behind or across the beam.<ref>Robin Higham, '''Air Power: A Concise History''', (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), p. 131.</ref>  The decision was made to switch to bombing specific oil and transportation facilities at night. [[File:Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris.jpg|thumb|left|160px|The RAF's Air Marshal Arthur Harris]]However, the precision aspect of bombing went out the window. Bombers flying at night were often unable to hit a prescribed city, much less a specific factory or rail yard. With the failure of both daylight and nighttime precision raids, the British settled upon the practice of area bombing--that is, "dehousing and demoralizing" the German populace by placing bombs in a loose pattern on city centers. Aerial photographs were then taken in the summer of 1941. The results, compiled in the Butt Report, were disheartening. It was found that only 20% of the bombers were putting their payload within five miles of the target.<ref>Lee Kennett, '''A History of Strategic Bombing''', (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982), p. 129.</ref>  Nonetheless, the new bombing policy was staunchly adhered to under the guidance of Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris. The underlying fault with Harris' obstinacy was its rejection of traditional grand strategy:

Britain's Bomber Command tried in late 1939 to fly daylight precision bombing raids over Germany. Although pre-war theory stressed the invulnerability of bombers flying in close formation with guns blazing, the small-caliber armaments on the Whitley and Wellington bombers were not effective against Luftwaffe Me-109s coming from behind or across the beam.<ref>Robin Higham, '''Air Power: A Concise History''', (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), p. 131.</ref>  The decision was made to switch to bombing specific oil and transportation facilities at night. However, the precision aspect of bombing went out the window. Bombers flying at night were often unable to hit a prescribed city, much less a specific factory or rail yard. With the failure of both daylight and nighttime precision raids, the British settled upon the practice of area bombing--that is, "dehousing and demoralizing" the German populace by placing bombs in a loose pattern on city centers. Aerial photographs were then taken in the summer of 1941. The results, compiled in the Butt Report, were

disheartening. It was found that only 20% of the bombers were putting their payload within five miles of the target.<ref>Lee Kennett, '''A History of Strategic Bombing''', (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982), p. 129.</ref>  Nonetheless, the new bombing policy was staunchly adhered to under the guidance of Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris. The underlying fault with Harris' obstinacy was its rejection of traditional grand strategy:

<blockquote>''Area attacks ... vitiated forces rather than concentrating them against a decisive point, they were uneconomical of force, and they strengthened the enemy will to resist and innoculated [sic] him against later onslaughts.''<ref>Higham, '''Air Power''', p. 132.</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>''Area attacks ... vitiated forces rather than concentrating them against a decisive point, they were uneconomical of force, and they strengthened the enemy will to resist and innoculated [sic] him against later onslaughts.''<ref>Higham, '''Air Power''', p. 132.</ref></blockquote>

So convinced of the correctness of their method, the British air authorities encouraged American leaders to adopt the area methodology. While Bomber Command went on its nightly raids, the world stood back to analyze, admire, or condemn the fires in the German cities.

So convinced of the correctness of their method, the British air authorities encouraged American leaders to adopt the area methodology. While Bomber Command went on its nightly raids, the world stood back to analyze, admire, or condemn the fires in the German cities.

===American approach to bombing===

==The American effort==

The entry of the American Eighth Air Force in Europe was slow and staggered. The American force had no desire, at least initially, to join in on the night raids with the British. Instead, minor attacks were carried out against precision targets (usually railways, factories, and submarine pens)<ref>Kennett, '''History''', p. 136.</ref> in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. With their Norden bombsights American bombardiers wished to flaunt their daylight precision bombing technique, thoroughly practiced on the home front bombing ranges. However, the early needs of Operation TORCH in North Africa siphoned away many American bombers from the western European theater. After the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the Eighth was back in Britain ready to bomb "around-the-clock" with the RAF. The bloody RAF raid on Hamburg<ref>Note: The city of Hamburg was devastated by the air raid. Over one million civilians fled the burning city; yet, 31,000 to 50,000 people unfortunate enough to remain were killed. The deaths were often due to asphyxiation, crushing, or intense burns and heat from the notorious fire storm which ensued.</ref> was complemented by American daylight raids on July 25-26, 1943. Paying little attention to earlier British trials and errors, the American bomber leaders learned for themselves, quite senselessly, the same lessons their RAF counterparts had learned three years before.

[[File:Norden Bomb Sight B17G.jpg|thumb|200px|right|The Norden bombsight in an American B-17]]The entry of the American Eighth Air Force in Europe was slow and staggered. The American force had no desire, at least initially, to join in on the night raids with the British. Instead, minor attacks were carried out against precision targets (usually railways, factories, and submarine pens)<ref>Kennett, '''History''', p. 136.</ref> in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. With their Norden bombsights American bombardiers wished to flaunt their daylight precision bombing technique, thoroughly practiced on the home front bombing ranges. However, the early needs of Operation TORCH in North Africa siphoned away many American bombers from the western European theater. After the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the Eighth was back in Britain ready to bomb "around-the-clock" with the RAF. The bloody RAF raid on Hamburg<ref>Note: The city of Hamburg was devastated by the air raid. Over one million civilians fled the burning city; yet, 31,000 to 50,000 people unfortunate enough to remain were killed. The deaths were often due to asphyxiation, crushing, or intense burns and heat from the notorious fire storm which ensued.</ref> was complemented by American daylight raids on July 25-26, 1943. Paying little attention to earlier British trials and errors, the American bomber leaders learned for themselves, quite senselessly, the same lessons their RAF counterparts had learned three years before.

   

   

The cloudy continental weather and the haze of the industrial Ruhr valley greatly reduced the Norden sight's accuracy. Also its necessity for a long straight approach to guarantee accuracy made the bomber more vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire (flak).<ref>Higham, '''Air Power''', p. 133.</ref> Because fighter escorts with acceptable ranges were not yet available, the lone B-17 and B-24 bombers in their stacked formations learned like the British that on-board defensive armament alone was simply not enough. The lack of insight was quick to show. On August 17, 1943, 315 B-17s made an attack on ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt in which sixty Flying Fortresses were shot down.<ref>Note: Although 376 B-I7s were dispatched, only 315 made it to the target run. The raid also included an attack on the Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg.</ref> A loss rate of 19% was clearly intolerable, but another raid on Schweinfurt was made on October 14. On this raid the bombers were incessantly harassed while out of fighter escort range, and 62 planes out of 228 were destroyed. The ratio was now up over one-in-four, and each Fortress carried ten men. The Eighth Air Force, for the time, had to give up any more raids of this type.

The cloudy continental weather and the haze of the industrial Ruhr valley greatly reduced the Norden sight's accuracy. Also its necessity for a long straight approach to guarantee accuracy made the bomber more vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire (flak).<ref>Higham, '''Air Power''', p. 133.</ref> Because fighter escorts with acceptable ranges were not yet available, the lone B-17 and B-24 bombers in their stacked formations learned like the British that on-board defensive armament alone was simply not enough. The lack of insight was quick to show. On August 17, 1943, 315 B-17s made an attack on ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt in which sixty Flying Fortresses were shot down.<ref>Note: Although 376 B-I7s were dispatched, only 315 made it to the target run. The raid also included an attack on the Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg.</ref> [[File:B-17F formation over Schweinfurt, Germany, August 17, 1943.jpg|thumb|300px|right|Eighth Air Force raid on Schweinfurt]]A loss rate of 19% was clearly intolerable, but another raid on Schweinfurt was made on October 14. On this raid the bombers were incessantly harassed while out of fighter escort range, and 62 planes out of 228 were destroyed. The ratio was now up over one-in-four, and each Fortress carried ten men. The Eighth Air Force, for the time, had to give up any more raids of this type.

The invasion of Normandy brought about a new bombing priority: the rail lines of western [[France]] were to be cut in order to hinder German reinforcements being sent to the area come D-day. Unfortunately these stretches of track often came very close to urban populations, and the lives of the French citizens were overruled by military necessity. In April 1944, British and American bombs killed "250 people at Juvisy, 200 at Toulon, 500 at Lille, 850 at Rouen, and 650 at Paris."<ref>Kennett, '''History''', p. 156.</ref>  The raids seemed to produce the desired effect, though, and the OVERLORD landing and COBRA breakout were made much easier. With the army's success on the ground, the Eighth returned to its bombing missions over Germany proper.

The invasion of Normandy brought about a new bombing priority: the rail lines of western France were to be cut in order to hinder German reinforcements being sent to the area come D-day. Unfortunately these stretches of track often came very close to urban populations, and the lives of the French citizens were overruled by military necessity. In April 1944, British and American bombs killed "250 people at Juvisy, 200 at Toulon, 500 at Lille, 850 at Rouen, and 650 at Paris."<ref>Kennett, '''History''', p. 156.</ref>  The raids seemed to produce the desired effect, though, and the OVERLORD landing and COBRA breakout were made much easier. With the army's success on the ground, the Eighth returned to its bombing missions over Germany proper.

   

   

====Transition from precision to area bombing====

===Transition from precision to area bombing===

But the return was not quite the same. The nature of American bombing policy definitely changed in a two-step process. The first phase was a result primarily of General Eisenhower's changing position. Eisenhower stated, "While I have always insisted that U.S. Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets, I am always prepared to take part in anything that gives real promise to ending the war quickly."<ref>Ronald Schaffer, '''Wings of Judgment''', (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 84.</ref> This opened the door for new methods of bombing to be tested and tried. President Roosevelt himself summarized in August 1944 a common belief among military circles:

But the return was not quite the same. The nature of American bombing policy definitely changed in a two-step process. The first phase was a result primarily of General Eisenhower's changing position. Eisenhower stated, "While I have always insisted that U.S. Strategic Air Forces be directed against precision targets, I am always prepared to take part in anything that gives real promise to ending the war quickly."<ref>Ronald Schaffer, '''Wings of Judgment''', (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 84.</ref> This opened the door for new methods of bombing to be tested and tried. President Roosevelt himself summarized in August 1944 a common belief among military circles:

The first aerial consequence of this policy statement was Operation CLARION. This plan was drafted in December 1944 and was intended to break civilian morale by sending a wide series of low-level attacks across Germany. The targets were ostensibly transportation ones, but the real objective was the psychological collapse of the German populace at large. Small towns were hit later in 1945 in a deliberate attempt to bring home to the German citizen the omnipresence of the Allied air forces. CLARION was the call to arms for those military leaders who wished to move from the precise to the indiscriminate in bombing.

The first aerial consequence of this policy statement was Operation CLARION. This plan was drafted in December 1944 and was intended to break civilian morale by sending a wide series of low-level attacks across Germany. The targets were ostensibly transportation ones, but the real objective was the psychological collapse of the German populace at large. Small towns were hit later in 1945 in a deliberate attempt to bring home to the German citizen the omnipresence of the Allied air forces. CLARION was the call to arms for those military leaders who wished to move from the precise to the indiscriminate in bombing.

The second phase of the new American doctrine was evidenced in Operation THUNDERCLAP. It was a plan enacted in January 1945 which made Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden acceptable, even preferred, targets. There was a two-fold reasoning behind THUNDERCLAP: one, that adding to the "existing pandemonium" would hasten the collapse and surrender of Germany and, two, that the Soviets would see for themselves the destructive power of the Anglo-American bomber forces.<ref>Schaffer, '''Wings of Judgment''', pp. 96.</ref> Berlin was attacked on February 3 by some 900 B-17s. Some military objectives were hit, but 25,000 civilians may have perished.<ref>Schaffer, '''Wings of Judgment''', pp. 97.</ref> Ten days later, historic Dresden was walloped by a two-day combined British and American raid which killed at least 30,000 civilians.<ref>Note: The casualties at Dresden were amplified by the large number of refugees seeking shelter from the advancing Red Army. The total death toll has never been undisputably established, and legitimate estimates range from 25,000 to about 100,000.  Lee Kennett has stated (p. 161) that an estimate of 500,000 exists, but most scholars agree that that many bodies could not have been counted, much less disposed of by the authorities there.</ref> The American bombing policy over Germany had drastically changed and probably would have continued in this direction had the European war not ended. The ruthless attacks that summer on numerous Japanese cities lends credence to this assumption.

[[File:Fotothek df ps 0000010 Blick vom Rathausturm.jpg|thumb|220px|left|Dresden incinerated by Allied bombing]]The second phase of the new American doctrine was evidenced in Operation THUNDERCLAP. It was a plan enacted in January 1945 which made Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden acceptable, even preferred, targets. There was a two-fold reasoning behind THUNDERCLAP: one, that adding to the "existing pandemonium" would hasten the collapse and surrender of Germany and, two, that the Soviets would see for themselves the destructive power of the Anglo-American bomber forces.<ref>Schaffer, '''Wings of Judgment''', pp. 96.</ref> Berlin was attacked on February 3 by some 900 B-17s. Some military objectives were hit, but 25,000 civilians may have perished.<ref>Schaffer, '''Wings of Judgment''', pp. 97.</ref> Ten days later, historic Dresden was walloped by a two-day combined British and American raid which killed at least 30,000 civilians.<ref>Note: The casualties at Dresden were amplified by the large number of refugees seeking shelter from the advancing Red Army. The total death toll has never been undisputably established, and legitimate estimates range from 25,000 to about 100,000.  Lee Kennett has stated (p. 161) that an estimate of 500,000 exists, but most scholars agree that that many bodies could not have been counted, much less disposed of by the authorities there.</ref> The American bombing policy over Germany had drastically changed and probably would have continued in this direction had the European war not ended. The ruthless attacks that summer on numerous Japanese cities lends credence to this assumption.

===Outcomes of the campaigns===

==Outcomes of the campaigns==

After about three years in Europe, American strategic air forces had developed into a gigantic operational group. At its maximum in August 1944, the U.S. Army Air Forces had over 619,000 combat personnel. These men dropped 1,461,864 tons of bombs on Germany.<ref>Saundby, "The Uses", p. 225.</ref>  Together with RAF Bomber Command's substantial efforts, 3,600,000 German dwelling units (20% of the total) were destroyed or heavily damaged. The homeless totaled between seven and eight million. Estimates suggest that 780,000 were wounded in bombing attacks and that 305,000 civilians were killed.<ref>"Air Victory in Europe," excerpt from the '''Summary Report (European War)''' by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, September 30, 1945. (From Eugene M. Emme, ed., The Impact of Air Power (Princeton, N J: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1959), p. 269.)</ref> These are minimum figures, though.  It has been proposed that more than 600,000 people in Germany were killed by "terror bombing".<ref>Ken Brown, "The Last Just War: How Just Was It?", '''The Progressive''', August 1982, p. 19.</ref> The accompanying graphic, derived from United States Strategic Bombing Survey statistics, helps to illustrate the enormous increase in the American air infrastructure.

After about three years in Europe, American strategic air forces had developed into a gigantic operational group. At its maximum in August 1944, the U.S. Army Air Forces had over 619,000 combat personnel. These men dropped 1,461,864 tons of

bombs on Germany.<ref>Saundby, "The Uses", p. 225.</ref>  Together with RAF Bomber Command's substantial efforts, 3,600,000 German dwelling units (20% of the total) were destroyed or heavily damaged. The homeless totaled between seven and eight million. Estimates suggest that 780,000 were wounded in bombing attacks and that 305,000 civilians were killed.<ref>"Air Victory in Europe," excerpt from the '''Summary Report (European War)''' by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, September 30, 1945. (From Eugene M. Emme, ed., The Impact of Air Power (Princeton, N J: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1959), p. 269.)

</ref> These are minimum figures, though.  It has been proposed that more than 600,000 people in Germany were killed by "terror bombing".<ref>Ken Brown, "The Last Just War: How Just Was It?", '''The Progressive''', August 1982, p. 19.</ref> The accompanying graphic, derived from United States Strategic Bombing Survey statistics, helps to illustrate the enormous increase in the American air infrastructure.

<center>[[File:Kohs_-_Strategic_Bombing_statistics.jpg|550px]]</center>

<center>[[File:Kohs_-_Strategic_Bombing_statistics.jpg|550px]]</center>

Ziff's comparison of German civilians to fish seems to disregard any moral question whatsoever. He concludes this article by reminding the American citizen that just as aerial bombardment is "the only road open to us for attack on Germany, it is also the only road open to Hitler for attacking America".<ref>Ziff, "Wanted...", p. 41.</ref> Ziff's belief that the Fuhrer could utilize this avenue of attack "tomorrow"<ref>Ziff, "Wanted...", p. 42.</ref> belies any knowledge of air warfare at all. An air attack on the United States would have been suicidal, if not absolutely impossible, from any location in German-occupied territory. Yet, the American public was misguided into thinking that the U.S. must strike before the Nazis did.

Ziff's comparison of German civilians to fish seems to disregard any moral question whatsoever. He concludes this article by reminding the American citizen that just as aerial bombardment is "the only road open to us for attack on Germany, it is also the only road open to Hitler for attacking America".<ref>Ziff, "Wanted...", p. 41.</ref> Ziff's belief that the Fuhrer could utilize this avenue of attack "tomorrow"<ref>Ziff, "Wanted...", p. 42.</ref> belies any knowledge of air warfare at all. An air attack on the United States would have been suicidal, if not absolutely impossible, from any location in German-occupied territory. Yet, the American public was misguided into thinking that the U.S. must strike before the Nazis did.

The '''Reader's Digest''' next printed an article by Francis Vivian Drake titled "Why Don't We Really <u>Try</u> to Bomb Germany Out of the War?"  This May 1943 article labeling Drake an "aviation expert for 30 years" takes a rather statistical look at how to bomb. Drake vouches that the air plan he presents is not the work of an "armchair strategist" but is in concordance with ranking air officers and military "professionals who... analyze photographs after every raid, study Intelligence reports, assess actual destruction".<ref>Francis Vivian Drake, "Why Don't We Really <u>Try</u> to Bomb Germany Out of the War?", '''Reader's Digest''', May 1943, p. 35.</ref> Note the businesslike attitude conveyed. Drake quotes Major General Ira C. Eaker, commander of the Eighth Air Force as saying, "There is nothing that can be destroyed by gunfire that cannot be destroyed by bombs."<ref>Drake, "Why Don't We...", p. 36.</ref>  Assuming this would include innocent German civilians, it must be asked, "Does the ability to destroy someone justify that destruction?" On a more practical note, Drake comments, "With the tremendous armament carried by our Fortresses and Liberators, a force of several hundred could probably take care of itself."<ref>Drake, "Why Don't We...", p. 37.</ref> Later that year in August and October, American generals would make the same incorrect assumption in operations over Schweinfurt, thereby sending 122 Fortresses to the ground. Drake concludes that there is a sound alternative to the heartaches of great land offensives.<ref>Drake, "Why Don't We...", p. 39.</ref> Given the fallibility of his article up to that point, it is difficult to trust Drake. But the American public did not know about Schweinfurt in May.

The '''Reader's Digest''' next printed an article by Francis Vivian Drake<ref>Note: Francis Vivian Drake was born in London around 1895. While a student there, he left the classrooms in 1914 to join the British cavalry. Soon afterward he transferred in 1915 to the Royal Flying Corps and later was sent to Canada to help form the Royal Canadian Air Force. A writer on military subjects and an early educator in aviation fighting techniques, he joined the '''Reader's Digest''' staff as a roving editor in 1943. One of his books, ''Above the Battle'', was an autobiography of his WWI experiences. During WWII, he was a consultant to the US Army Air Corps.  He died 4 July 1971 at Stonington, Connecticut at the age of 76 years.  Source: ''Cross & Cockade'', Winter 1971.</ref> titled "Why Don't We Really <u>Try</u> to Bomb Germany Out of the War?"  This May 1943 article labeling Drake an "aviation expert for 30 years" takes a rather statistical look at how to bomb. Drake vouches that the air plan he presents is not the work of an "armchair strategist" but is in concordance with ranking air officers and military "professionals who... analyze photographs after every raid, study Intelligence reports, assess actual destruction".<ref>Francis Vivian Drake, "Why Don't We Really <u>Try</u> to Bomb Germany Out of the War?", '''Reader's Digest''', May 1943, p. 35.</ref> Note the businesslike attitude conveyed. Drake quotes Major General Ira C. Eaker, commander of the Eighth Air Force as saying, "There is nothing that can be destroyed by gunfire that cannot be destroyed by bombs."<ref>Drake, "Why Don't We...", p. 36.</ref>  Assuming this would include innocent German civilians, it must be asked, "Does the ability to destroy someone justify that destruction?" On a more practical note, Drake comments, "With the tremendous armament carried by our Fortresses and Liberators, a force of several hundred could probably take care of itself."<ref>Drake, "Why Don't We...", p. 37.</ref> Later that year in August and October, American generals would make the same incorrect assumption in operations over Schweinfurt, thereby sending 122 Fortresses to the ground. Drake concludes that there is a sound alternative to the heartaches of great land offensives.<ref>Drake, "Why Don't We...", p. 39.</ref> Given the fallibility of his article up to that point, it is difficult to trust Drake. But the American public did not know about Schweinfurt in May.

The fourth article, "Bomb Germany--and Save a Million American Lives" was also penned by Drake. The '''Digest''' notes that his previous article "attracted nationwide attention," therefore presumably, it would be smart to examine carefully Drake's words. The horrors of World War One are reemphasized to bolster the position of air power as a clean, inexpensive (in terms of combat lives) way to wage war. Drake notifies the reader of the Cologne raid, "which exacted 25,000 enemy lives in exchange for 257 Allied airmen."<ref>Francis Vivian Drake, "Bomb Germany--and Save a Million American Lives," '''Reader's Digest''', July 1943, p. 89.</ref> The vast majority of those 25,000 human beings were civilians, and Drake now classifies them as "enemy." Also, the word "exchange" suggests some sort of transaction in which the better party is determined by a death toll. Was killing becoming "an end in itself, ...connected in American minds to victory," as Michael Sherry theorizes? Drake goes on to extol the Air Plan's "promise of quicker victory and its proved lower cost." This is pure speculation being passed off as fact. Drake continues:

The fourth article, "Bomb Germany--and Save a Million American Lives" was also penned by Drake. The '''Digest''' notes that his previous article "attracted nationwide attention," therefore presumably, it would be smart to examine carefully Drake's words. The horrors of World War One are reemphasized to bolster the position of air power as a clean, inexpensive (in terms of combat lives) way to wage war. Drake notifies the reader of the Cologne raid, "which exacted 25,000 enemy lives in exchange for 257 Allied airmen."<ref>Francis Vivian Drake, "Bomb Germany--and Save a Million American Lives," '''Reader's Digest''', July 1943, p. 89.</ref> The vast majority of those 25,000 human beings were civilians, and Drake now classifies them as "enemy." Also, the word "exchange" suggests some sort of transaction in which the better party is determined by a death toll. Was killing becoming "an end in itself, ...connected in American minds to victory," as Michael Sherry theorizes? Drake goes on to extol the Air Plan's "promise of quicker victory and its proved lower cost." This is pure speculation being passed off as fact. Drake continues:

After the war in Europe was over, Allan Michie returned to the pages of Reader's Digest with his "Germany Was Bombed to Defeat."<ref>Allan A. Michie, "Germany Was Bombed to Defeat," '''Reader's Digest''', August 1945, p. 77.</ref>  Michie compiles a vast array of statistics indicating the tremendous effect Allied bombs had on Germany. Within his analysis he describes how "Millions of Germans are living a troglodyte existence in cellars. Thousands of bodies still lie under piles of brick and stone."  These shameful facts are melded with his other data as reasons to interpret the bombing as a success.

After the war in Europe was over, Allan Michie returned to the pages of Reader's Digest with his "Germany Was Bombed to Defeat."<ref>Allan A. Michie, "Germany Was Bombed to Defeat," '''Reader's Digest''', August 1945, p. 77.</ref>  Michie compiles a vast array of statistics indicating the tremendous effect Allied bombs had on Germany. Within his analysis he describes how "Millions of Germans are living a troglodyte existence in cellars. Thousands of bodies still lie under piles of brick and stone."  These shameful facts are melded with his other data as reasons to interpret the bombing as a success.

During the Korean war, Francis Drake contributed again to the '''Digest'''. After a short defense of the American bombing campaign,<ref>Note: Drake argues a familiar excuse, that the Air Plan didn't finish off the Reich in short order because "it was never tried until late in 1944." This inexplicably ignores the ball-bearing raids of late 1943 and the Big Week of February 1944 where German fighter production was targeted. The Air Plan, I would argue, was in effect at least one year before Drake would like to think.</ref> his "The Facts About Strategic Bombing"<ref>Francis Vivian Drake, "The Facts About Strategic Bombing," '''Reader's Digest''',

During the Korean war, Francis Drake contributed again to the '''Digest'''. After a short defense of the American bombing campaign,<ref>Note: Drake argues a familiar excuse, that the Air Plan didn't finish off the Reich in short order because "it was never tried until late in 1944." This inexplicably ignores the ball-bearing raids of late 1943 and the Big Week of February 1944 where German fighter production was targeted. The Air Plan, I would argue, was in effect at least one year before Drake would like to think.</ref> his "The Facts About Strategic Bombing"<ref>Francis Vivian Drake, "The Facts About Strategic Bombing," '''Reader's Digest''', July 1951, p. 55.</ref> discusses the importance of World War Two's lessons on the nuclear age. Drake says,

July 1951, p. 55.</ref> discusses the importance of World War Two's lessons on the nuclear age. Drake says,

<blockquote>''The atom bomb is so destructive that one bomb on an industrial target is enough.  ...strategic bombers can overleap the Red Army and, if used under our own Air Plan, can destroy its sources of power. Though the Soviet leaders are careless of lives, they may not be eager to incur the annihilation of productive facilities it has taken 30 years to build.''</blockquote>

<blockquote>''The atom bomb is so destructive that one bomb on an industrial target is enough.  ...strategic bombers can overleap the Red Army and, if used under our own Air Plan, can destroy its sources of power. Though the Soviet leaders are careless of lives, they may not be eager to incur the annihilation of productive facilities it has taken 30 years to build.''</blockquote>

Suggesting that an atom bomb be used to destroy an "industrial target" (a ball-bearing plant? an aircraft factory?) shows a disturbing carelessness of lives. Does this mode of thinking reflect a similar careless association with conventional bombing in Europe six or seven years previous? Unfortunately, it probably does. If Drake is unburdened by the collateral civilian deaths a nuclear blast promises, then how could he possibly be troubled by the deaths caused by the high explosive and incendiary bombs dropped by B-17s and B-24s?

Suggesting that an atom bomb be used to destroy an "industrial target" (a ball-bearing plant? an aircraft factory?) shows a disturbing carelessness of lives. Does this mode of thinking reflect a similar careless association with conventional bombing in Europe six or seven years previous? Unfortunately, it probably does. If Drake is unburdened by the collateral civilian deaths a nuclear blast promises, then how could he possibly be troubled by the deaths caused by the high explosive and incendiary bombs dropped by B-17s and B-24s?

To summarize, the '''Reader's Digest''' presented to the American public the very straightforward opinions of Michie, Ziff, and Drake. By choosing these authors' works and not providing a disclaimer of any sort, the Digest itself was in effect promoting their views. The authors' words reflect not only the Digest's intent to inform average middle class America about American strategic bombing policy but also its intent to shape and direct that policy into a more indiscriminate method. This impression coupled with the fact that the '''Reader's Digest''' was the leading information journal--that it was read by perhaps fifty million Americans--sends a very discouraging ethical warning.

To summarize, the '''Reader's Digest''' presented to the American public the very straightforward opinions of Michie, Ziff, and Drake. By choosing these authors' works and not providing a disclaimer of any sort, the Digest itself was in effect promoting their views. The authors' words reflect not only the Digest's intent to inform average middle class America about American strategic bombing policy but also its intent to shape and direct that policy into a more indiscriminate method. This impression coupled with the fact that the '''Reader's Digest''' was the leading information journal -- that it was read by perhaps fifty million Americans -- sends a very discouraging ethical warning.

 

 

 

==References==

==References==

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