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Directory talk:Jon Awbrey/Projects/Notes And Queries (view source)
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, 14:40, 7 November 2008→DET. Determination
===DET. Determination===
===DET. Determination===
====DET. Note 1====
<pre>
<pre>
| Now that I have proved sufficiently that everything
| Now that I have proved sufficiently that everything
| comes to pass according to determinate reasons, there
| comes to pass according to determinate reasons, there
| 1875-1890. Routledge 1951. Open Court 1985.
| 1875-1890. Routledge 1951. Open Court 1985.
| Paragraph 360, page 341.
| Paragraph 360, page 341.
</pre>
====DET. Note 2====
DET. Note 2
<pre>
| Earlier this century in 'The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism',
| Earlier this century in 'The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism',
| Karl Popper wrote, "Common sense inclines, on the one hand, to assert that
| Karl Popper wrote, "Common sense inclines, on the one hand, to assert that
| The Free Press, New York, NY, 1997, p. 1. Originally published as:
| The Free Press, New York, NY, 1997, p. 1. Originally published as:
|'La Fin des Certitudes', Éditions Odile Jacob, 1996.
|'La Fin des Certitudes', Éditions Odile Jacob, 1996.
</pre>
====DET. Note 3====
DET. Note 3
<pre>
| Of triadic Being the multitude of forms
| Of triadic Being the multitude of forms
| is so terrific that I have usually shrunk
| is so terrific that I have usually shrunk
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 6.347
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 6.347
</pre>
====DET. Note 4====
DET. Note 4
<pre>
| That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned
| That whatever action is brute, unintelligent, and unconcerned
| with the result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable
| with the result of it is purely dyadic is either demonstrable
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 6.332
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 6.332
</pre>
====DET. Note 5====
DET. Note 5
<pre>
| Accurate writers have apparently made a distinction
| Accurate writers have apparently made a distinction
| between the 'definite' and the 'determinate'. A subject
| between the 'definite' and the 'determinate'. A subject
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.447
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.447
</pre>
====DET. Note 6====
DET. Note 6
<pre>
| Perhaps a more scientific pair of definitions would be
| Perhaps a more scientific pair of definitions would be
| that anything is 'general' in so far as the principle of
| that anything is 'general' in so far as the principle of
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448
</pre>
====DET. Note 7====
DET. Note 7
<pre>
| These remarks require supplementation. Determination, in general, is not
| These remarks require supplementation. Determination, in general, is not
| defined at all; and the attempt at defining the determination of a subject
| defined at all; and the attempt at defining the determination of a subject
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
</pre>
====DET. Note 8====
DET. Note 8
<pre>
| Another advantage of this definition is that it saves us
| Another advantage of this definition is that it saves us
| from the blunder of thinking that a sign is indeterminate
| from the blunder of thinking that a sign is indeterminate
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
</pre>
====DET. Note 9====
DET. Note 9
<pre>
| At the same time, it is tolerably evident that the definition,
| At the same time, it is tolerably evident that the definition,
| as it stands, is not sufficiently explicit, and further, that
| as it stands, is not sufficiently explicit, and further, that
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
</pre>
====DET. Note 10====
DET. Note 10
<pre>
| The October remarks [i.e. those in the above paper] made the
| The October remarks [i.e. those in the above paper] made the
| proper distinction between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.:
| proper distinction between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.:
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 5.448, note 1
</pre>
====DET. Note 11====
DET. Note 11
<pre>
| Concepts, or terms, are, in logic, conceived to have
| Concepts, or terms, are, in logic, conceived to have
| 'subjective parts', being the narrower terms into which
| 'subjective parts', being the narrower terms into which
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 2.364
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 2.364
</pre>
====DET. Note 12====
DET. Note 12
<pre>
| Determine.
| Determine.
|
|
| Joseph T. Shipley, 'Dictionary of Word Origins',
| Joseph T. Shipley, 'Dictionary of Word Origins',
| Rowman & Allanheld, Totowa, NJ, 1967, 1985.
| Rowman & Allanheld, Totowa, NJ, 1967, 1985.
</pre>
====DET. Note 13====
DET. Note 13
<pre>
| To determine means to make a circumstance different from what
| To determine means to make a circumstance different from what
| it might have been otherwise. For example, a drop of rain
| it might have been otherwise. For example, a drop of rain
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 14====
DET. Note 14
<pre>
| Taking it for granted, then, that the inner and outer worlds are
| Taking it for granted, then, that the inner and outer worlds are
| superposed throughout, without possibility of separation, let us
| superposed throughout, without possibility of separation, let us
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 15====
DET. Note 15
<pre>
| But not to follow this subject too far, we have
| But not to follow this subject too far, we have
| now established three species of representations:
| now established three species of representations:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 16====
DET. Note 16
<pre>
| The consideration of this imperfect datum leads us to make
| The consideration of this imperfect datum leads us to make
| a fundamental observation; namely, that the problem how we
| a fundamental observation; namely, that the problem how we
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 17====
DET. Note 17
<pre>
| There is a large class of reasonings which are neither deductive nor inductive.
| There is a large class of reasonings which are neither deductive nor inductive.
| I mean the inference of a cause from its effect or reasoning to a physical hypothesis.
| I mean the inference of a cause from its effect or reasoning to a physical hypothesis.
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 18====
DET. Note 18
<pre>
| We come now to the question, what is the 'rationale' of these three kinds
| We come now to the question, what is the 'rationale' of these three kinds
| of reasoning. And first let us understand precisely what we intend by this.
| of reasoning. And first let us understand precisely what we intend by this.
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 19====
DET. Note 19
<pre>
| Now all symbolization is of three objects, at once; the first is a possible thing,
| Now all symbolization is of three objects, at once; the first is a possible thing,
| the second is a possible form, the third is a possible symbol. It will be objected
| the second is a possible form, the third is a possible symbol. It will be objected
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 20====
DET. Note 20
<pre>
| Is there any knowledge 'à priori'? All our thought begins with
| Is there any knowledge 'à priori'? All our thought begins with
| experience, the mind furnishes no material for thought whatever.
| experience, the mind furnishes no material for thought whatever.
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 21====
DET. Note 21
<pre>
| The terms 'à priori' and 'à posteriori' in their ancient sense
| The terms 'à priori' and 'à posteriori' in their ancient sense
| denote respectively reasoning from an antecedent to a consequent
| denote respectively reasoning from an antecedent to a consequent
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
====DET. Note 22====
DET. Note 22
<pre>
| Though I talk of forms as something independent of the mind,
| Though I talk of forms as something independent of the mind,
| I only mean that the mind so conceives them and that that
| I only mean that the mind so conceives them and that that
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
</pre>
</pre>