Changes

=====1.2.2.2.  Statements, Questions, Commands=====

=====1.2.2.2.  Statements, Questions, Commands=====

When signs are created that can be placed in reliable association with the results of observations and the onsets of actions, these signs are said to denote or evoke the corresponding events and actions.  This is the beginning of ''declarative'', ''imperative'', and ''interrogative'' uses of symbolic expressions.

When signs are created that can be placed in reliable association with the  

results of observations and the onsets of actions, these signs are said to  

denote or evoke the corresponding events and actions.  This is the beginning of  

declarative, imperative, and interrogative uses of symbolic expressions.  The

with what actually happens on a recurring basis.

The imperative mode is associated with convergent possibilities of the states in

The ''interrogative'' mode is associated with residual properties of the state occupied by a system.  The ''question'' marks a difference between states denoted by declarative expressions, a divergence between expectation and actuality.  The ''inquisitive'' use of a sign notes a surprise to be explained, usually by adducing the signs of less obvious facts to the account.  A ''surprise'' incites the system to an effort whose end is to bring the system's habits of expectation in line with what actually happens on a recurring basis.

which a system may come to reside.  The command calls attention to a discrepancy

between actuality and intention, a difference between the states independently

declared to be observed and desired.  The injunctive use of a sign sets a  

problem to be resolved, usually by executing the actions enjoined by a series of  

signs.  A problem incites the system to an effort whose end is to bring what  

actually happens on a recurring basis in line with the system's hopeful

patterns of interaction.

In proceeding from surprise and problem states to arrive at explanations and  

plans of action that are suited to resolving these states, the system's aim is  

 

expedited by certain resources, all of which involve massive and complex systems  

In proceeding from surprise and problem states to arrive at explanations and plans of action that are suited to resolving these states, the system's aim is expedited by certain resources, all of which involve massive and complex systems of signs and symbolic expressions.  It helps to have a library, an access to the records of individual and collective past efforts and experiences.  To be used for clear and present indications this library must have a ready index of its contents, a form of afterthought that is not too thoughtless in design.  It helps to a have laboratory, a workshop or a study, any facility where imagination reigns for composing and testing improvised programs and theories, for prototyping on-the-spot inventions.  To be used for free and unbiased evaluation this factory of imagination must be a mechanism of forethought without malice, where symbolic expressions extempore are not confused with actions and do not exact the same price in energy spent and pain risked.

of signs and symbolic expressions.  It helps to have a library, an access to the  

 

records of individual and collective past efforts and experiences.  To be used  

But how can all this information and flexibility, constraint vying with freedom of interpretation, be accorded a place in the present state of a system?  Can Epimetheus and Prometheus find a way to "get along" in the current state of things?  Is the phase space of a system really big enough for both of them?

for clear and present indications this library must have a ready index of its  

 

contents, a form of afterthought that is not too thoughtless in design.  It  

If signs and symbols are to receive a place in systems theory it must be possible to construct them from materials available on that site.  But the only thing a system has to work with is its own present state.  How do states of a system come to serve the role of signs?  How can it make sense to say that system regards one of its own states as a sign of something else?  How do certain states of a system come to be taken by that system, as evidenced by its interpretive behavior, as signs of something else, some object or objective?  A good start toward answering these questions would be made by defining the words used in asking them.  In looking at the concepts that remain to be given system-theoretic definitions it appears that all of these questions boil down to one:  What character in the dynamics of a system would cause it to be called a sign-using system, one that acts as an interpreter in a non-trivial sense?

helps to a have laboratory, a workshop or a study, any facility where  

imagination reigns for composing and testing improvised programs and theories,  

for prototyping on-the-spot inventions.  To be used for free and unbiased  

evaluation this factory of imagination must be a mechanism of forethought  

without malice, where symbolic expressions extempore are not confused with  

actions and do not exact the same price in energy spent and pain risked.

But how can all this information and flexibility, constraint vying with freedom  

of interpretation, be accorded a place in the present state of a system?  Can  

Epimetheus and Prometheus find a way to "get along" in the current state of  

things?  Is the phase space of a system really big enough for both of them?

If signs and symbols are to receive a place in systems theory it must be  

possible to construct them from materials available on that site.  But the only  

thing a system has to work with is its own present state.  How do states of a  

system come to serve the role of signs?  How can it make sense to say that  

system regards one of its own states as a sign of something else?  How do  

certain states of a system come to be taken by that system, as evidenced by its  

interpretive behavior, as signs of something else, some object or objective?  A  

good start toward answering these questions would be made by defining the words  

used in asking them.  In looking at the concepts that remain to be given  

system-theoretic definitions it appears that all of these questions boil down to  

one:  What character in the dynamics of a system would cause it to be called a  

sign-using system, one that acts as an interpreter in a non-trivial sense?

=====1.2.2.3.  Pragmatic Theory of Signs=====

=====1.2.2.3.  Pragmatic Theory of Signs=====