Changes

====1.1.3.  Reality and Representation====

====1.1.3.  Reality and Representation====

A sidelight that arose in the characterization of intelligence is recapitulated here.  Beginning with experience described in phenomenal terms, the possibility of objective knowledge appears to depend on a certain factorization or decomposition of the total manifold of experience into a pair of factors:  a fundamental, original, objective, or base factor and a representational, derivative, subjective, or free factor.  To anticipate language that will be settled on later, the total manifold of phenomenal experience is said to factor into a bundle of fibers.  The bundle structure corresponds to the base factor and the fiber structure corresponds to the free factor of the decomposition.  Fundamental definitions and theorems with respect to fiber bundles are given in (Auslander & MacKenzie, ch. 9).  Discussions of fiber bundles in physical settings are found in (Burke, p. 84-108) and (Schutz, 1980).  Concepts of differential geometry directed toward applications in control engineering are treated in (Doolin & Martin, ch. 8).  An ongoing project in AI that uses simple aspects of fiber methods to build cognitive models of physics comprehension is described in (Bundy & Byrd, 1983).

A sidelight that arose in the characterization of intelligence is recapitulated  

here.  Beginning with experience described in phenomenal terms, the possibility  

of objective knowledge appears to depend on a certain factorization or  

decomposition of the total manifold of experience into a pair of factors:  a  

fundamental, original, objective, or base factor and a representational,  

derivative, subjective, or free factor.  To anticipate language that will be  

settled on later, the total manifold of phenomenal experience is said to factor  

into a bundle of fibers.  The bundle structure corresponds to the base factor  

and the fiber structure corresponds to the free factor of the decomposition.   

Fundamental definitions and theorems with respect to fiber bundles are given in  

(Auslander & MacKenzie, ch. 9).  Discussions of fiber bundles in physical  

settings are found in (Burke, p. 84-108) and (Schutz, 1980).  Concepts of  

differential geometry directed toward applications in control engineering are  

treated in (Doolin & Martin, ch. 8).  An ongoing project in AI that uses simple  

aspects of fiber methods to build cognitive models of physics comprehension is  

described in (Bundy & Byrd, 1983).

An exorbitant number of words has just been wrapped around the seemingly obvious  

An exorbitant number of words has just been wrapped around the seemingly obvious and innocuous distinction between a reality and a representation.  Of course, whole books have been written on the subjects of reality and representation, though not necessarily in that order (Putnam, 1988).  The topic is especially debated in the philosophy of science, e.g. (Duhem, 1914), (Russell, 1956), (Van Fraassen, 1980), (Hacking, 1983), (Salmon, 1990), and various individual essays in (Quine, 1960, '69, '74, '76, '80, '81).  Much of what is said there about the relation of theories to realities has a bearing on the relation of simulation models and AI representations to their underlying realities (Halpern, 1986), (Ginsberg, 1987).  A useful historical perspective on the problem of scientific knowledge in relation to the world is supplied by (Losee, 1980).  The history of an alternative tradition is treated in (Prasad, 1958).

and innocuous distinction between a reality and a representation.  Of course,  

whole books have been written on the subjects of reality and representation,  

though not necessarily in that order (Putnam, 1988).  The topic is especially  

debated in the philosophy of science, e.g. (Duhem, 1914), (Russell, 1956),  

(Van Fraassen, 1980), (Hacking, 1983), (Salmon, 1990), and various individual  

essays in (Quine, 1960, '69, '74, '76, '80, '81).  Much of what is said there  

about the relation of theories to realities has a bearing on the relation of  

simulation models and AI representations to their underlying realities (Halpern,  

1986), (Ginsberg, 1987).  A useful historical perspective on the problem of  

scientific knowledge in relation to the world is supplied by (Losee, 1980).  The  

history of an alternative tradition is treated in (Prasad, 1958).

These questions go back to the beginnings of philosophy.  Plato's dialogue The  

These questions go back to the beginnings of philosophy.  Plato's dialogue ''The Sophist'' is one early inquiry that has a special relevance, in its substance and method, for the current context.  There is a certain type of recursive and paradigmatic character to the strategy of its analysis.  In its quest after the nature of the true philosopher it proceeds in manner that strikingly foreshadows modern debates about the Turing test.  What spirit can winnow the grain from the chaff, what screen can sift the fine from the coarse, what threshold can keep the spirit in the letter?  These may indeed have been our kind's earliest decision problems.  Modern commentary on this dialogue and the context of its times may be found in (Plato/Benardete, 1986), (Kerferd, 1981), (Rosen, 1983), and (Lanigan, 1986).

Sophist is one early inquiry that has a special relevance, in its substance and  

method, for the current context.  There is a certain type of recursive and  

paradigmatic character to the strategy of its analysis.  In its quest after the  

nature of the true philosopher it proceeds in manner that strikingly foreshadows  

modern debates about the Turing test.  What spirit can winnow the grain from the  

chaff, what screen can sift the fine from the coarse, what threshold can keep  

the spirit in the letter?  These may indeed have been our kind's earliest  

decision problems.  Modern commentary on this dialogue and the context of its  

times may be found in (Plato/Benardete, 1986), (Kerferd, 1981), (Rosen, 1983),  

and (Lanigan, 1986).

There is a reason for the seeming excess of labels and packaging invested around  

There is a reason for the seeming excess of labels and packaging invested around this distinction between reality and representation.  The razor that would function as advertised and earn its patent to separate sharp realities from fuzzy impressions is not a toy to be wielded lightly.  Until it is certain just  

this distinction between reality and representation.  The razor that would  

where to cut, other means may be required to manage, organize, store, and control the fringes of a systematic imagination.  It is my hope to turn this measure of redundancy to an informative purpose later on when the distinction begins to seem both more elusive and more vital.  An uncertainty in this dimension can become positively noisy in its interference with the observation and communication of static situations and potentially noxious in its undermining of a system's capacity for dynamic control.  The difficulty to be faced is this:  There can be genuine questions about what actually forms the best factorization of the total manifold into a base space and a remainder.

function as advertised and earn its patent to separate sharp realities from  

 

fuzzy impressions is not a toy to be wielded lightly.  Until it is certain just  

The most fitting factorization is not necessarily given in advance, though any number of possibilities may be tried out initially.  The most suitable distinction between phenomenal reality and epiphenomenal representation can be a matter determined by empirical or pragmatic factors.  Of course, with any empirical investigation there can be logical and mathematical features that place strong constraints on what is conceivably possible, but the risk remains that the proper articulation may have to be discovered through empirical inquiry carried on by a systematic agent delving into its own world of states without absolutely dependable lines as guides.  The appropriate factorization, ideally the first item of description, may indeed be the chief thing to find out about a system and the principal thing to know about the total space of phenomena it manifests, and yet persist in being the last fact to be fully settled.

where to cut, other means may be required to manage, organize, store, and  

control the fringes of a systematic imagination.  It is my hope to turn this  

measure of redundancy to an informative purpose later on when the distinction  

begins to seem both more elusive and more vital.  An uncertainty in this  

dimension can become positively noisy in its interference with the observation  

and communication of static situations and potentially noxious in its  

undermining of a system's capacity for dynamic control.  The difficulty to be  

faced is this:  There can be genuine questions about what actually forms the  

best factorization of the total manifold into a base space and a remainder.

The most fitting factorization is not necessarily given in advance, though any  

number of possibilities may be tried out initially.  The most suitable  

distinction between phenomenal reality and epiphenomenal representation can be a  

matter determined by empirical or pragmatic factors.  Of course, with any  

empirical investigation there can be logical and mathematical features that  

place strong constraints on what is conceivably possible, but the risk remains  

that the proper articulation may have to be discovered through empirical inquiry  

carried on by a systematic agent delving into its own world of states without  

absolutely dependable lines as guides.  The appropriate factorization, ideally  

the first item of description, may indeed be the chief thing to find out about a  

system and the principal thing to know about the total space of phenomena it  

manifests, and yet persist in being the last fact to be fully settled.

=====1.1.3.1.  Levels of Analysis=====

=====1.1.3.1.  Levels of Analysis=====