Changes

# Developments in other fields in the intervening times have caused the prevailing paradigms to shift a number of times.  For starters, the lately recognized inescapability of participatory observation, and the multitude of constraints on knowledgeable action that the necessity of this contingency implies, that ought to have always been clear in marking the horizons of anthropology, economics, politics, psychology, and sociology, and the phenomenological consequences of this unavoidability that have recently forced themselves to the status of physical principles and tardily made their appearance in the symbolic rites of the attendant formalities, against all the fields of reluctance that physics can generate, and in spite of the full recalcitrance that its occasional ancillary, mathematics, can bring to heel.  These cautions leave even the casual observer nowadays much more suspicious about declaring the self evident independence of diverse aspects and axes of experience, whether assuming the disentanglement of different features of experiential quality or presuming on the orthogonality of their coordinate dimensions of formal quantity, for instance, as represented by the aspects of particles versus waves, or the axes of space versus time.  Features and dimensions of experience that appear as relevant or arise into salience at one level of action, exchange, or observation can disappear from the scene of relevant regard at other stages of participation and weigh imponderably on other scales of transaction.  In relation to one another, aspects and axes of experience that appear unrelated just so long as they are considered at one level of interaction and perception may not preserve their appearance of indifference and independence if the scales of participation under consideration are radically shifted, whether up or down in their order of magnitude.  As a result, the sort of consideration that makes a line of experience conspicuous as it falls on one plane of existence is seldom enough to draw it through every plane of being.  In a related fashion, the brand of consideration whose bearing on an intermediate scale of treatment causes one to regard two features or dimensions of experience as ''moderately independent'' or as ''relatively orthogonal'' is rarely ever relevant to all levels of regard and is almost never enough to justify one's calling these aspects ''absolutely independent'' or to support one's calling these axes "perfectly orthogonal".

# Developments in other fields in the intervening times have caused the prevailing paradigms to shift a number of times.  For starters, the lately recognized inescapability of participatory observation, and the multitude of constraints on knowledgeable action that the necessity of this contingency implies, that ought to have always been clear in marking the horizons of anthropology, economics, politics, psychology, and sociology, and the phenomenological consequences of this unavoidability that have recently forced themselves to the status of physical principles and tardily made their appearance in the symbolic rites of the attendant formalities, against all the fields of reluctance that physics can generate, and in spite of the full recalcitrance that its occasional ancillary, mathematics, can bring to heel.  These cautions leave even the casual observer nowadays much more suspicious about declaring the self evident independence of diverse aspects and axes of experience, whether assuming the disentanglement of different features of experiential quality or presuming on the orthogonality of their coordinate dimensions of formal quantity, for instance, as represented by the aspects of particles versus waves, or the axes of space versus time.  Features and dimensions of experience that appear as relevant or arise into salience at one level of action, exchange, or observation can disappear from the scene of relevant regard at other stages of participation and weigh imponderably on other scales of transaction.  In relation to one another, aspects and axes of experience that appear unrelated just so long as they are considered at one level of interaction and perception may not preserve their appearance of indifference and independence if the scales of participation under consideration are radically shifted, whether up or down in their order of magnitude.  As a result, the sort of consideration that makes a line of experience conspicuous as it falls on one plane of existence is seldom enough to draw it through every plane of being.  In a related fashion, the brand of consideration whose bearing on an intermediate scale of treatment causes one to regard two features or dimensions of experience as ''moderately independent'' or as ''relatively orthogonal'' is rarely ever relevant to all levels of regard and is almost never enough to justify one's calling these aspects ''absolutely independent'' or to support one's calling these axes "perfectly orthogonal".

Next, I examine the more specific features of the pragmatic theory of sign relations, focusing on attributes that are augmented in the degrees of their development and that acquire a distinctive emphasis along with the extension and growth of this theory.  These features happen to be material in character, that is, they concern the contents of individual sign relations, affecting the aspects of relational structure and the orders of relational complexity that become especially conspicuous from the pragmatic point of view.  Two of these specific material features are taken up next.

Next, I examine the more specific features of the pragmatic theory of sign relations, focusing on attributes that are augmented in the degrees of their development and that acquire a distinctive emphasis along with the extension and growth of this theory.  These features happen to be material in character, that is, they concern the contents of individual sign relations, affecting the aspects of relational structure and the orders of relational complexity that become especially conspicuous from the pragmatic point of view.  Two of these specific material features are taken up next.

1. Direct relation between objects and signs.

# Direct relation between objects and signs.

# Irreducibly triadic sign relations.

2. Irreducibly triadic sign relations.

A few more things can now be said about the conditions that are usually taken for granted in the theoretical use of sign relations.  Although it is often the case that the structure of the object domain is marked for reconstruction, part for part, in the partition of the syntactic domain, as one says, in the ''divisions'' of its ''quotient structure'', or equally, in the structure of its ''semantic equivalence classes'' (SECs), which are also called its ''semantic orbits'', it is advisable not to imagine, except in the most abstractly artificial and purely formal cases, that an object is “nothing but” an orbit of signs.  In every situation of concrete or practical interest, the object domain is something that has a real existence, one that is independent of the syntactic domain to some degree, and to a degree of qualified independence that can be specified, for example, as ''absolutely'', ''moderately'', or ''relatively''.  That is, an object exists in a manner that is more or less independent of both the signs and the interpretants that are used to talk and to think about it, as one sooner or later discovers in any real case where one is tempted to ignore the implications of this fact.

A few more things can now be said about the conditions that are usually taken for granted in the theoretical use of sign relations. Although it is often the case that the structure of the object domain is marked for reconstruction, part for part, in the partition of the syntactic domain, as one says, in the "divisions" of its "quotient structure", or equally, in the structure of its "semantic equivalence classes" (SEC's), which are also called its "semantic orbits" (SO's), it is advisable not to imagine, except in the most abstractly artifical and the most purely formal cases, that an object is "nothing but" an orbit of signs.  In every situation of concrete or practical interest, the object domain is something that has a real existence, one that is "independent of" the syntactic domain to some degree, and to a degree of qualified independence that can be specified, for example, as "absolutely", "moderately, or "relatively".  That is, an object exists in a manner that is more or less "independent of" both the signs and the interpretants that are used to talk and to think about it, as one sooner or later discovers in any real case where one is tempted to ignore the implications of this fact.

But this explanation of the status intended for objects only serves to elevate into prominence the subordinate question: What is meant by the relation ''independent of''?  Outside the realm of mathematics, where the necessity has long been recognized of declaring one's independence in the form of an explicit and public definition, one that makes clear the sense of the term that one plans to uphold, this is an issue that still manages to incite an uproarious confusion of obvious claims and often just as obvious counter claims, each of which is just as insistent in what it attributes to the terms of its relation as the actual basis for what it considers evident is kept implicit.

One thing does appear certain, at least, once the issue is addressed:  Whatever it means, and however it is qualified, the relation of being ''independent of'' does not mean a relation of being ''not in relation to''.  After all, did I not just call this, with all due justice, a relation?  Indeed, independently of all questions of independence, the very notion of there being a relation ''not in relation to'' is a self cancelling nullity.  Perhaps the closest that one can approach to conceiving of relations like ''not related to'' or ''not a relative of'', in short, perhaps the simplest analogues or approximations to such a relation that one can devise are:  ''considered as not in relation to'' or ''treated as not in relation to'', prompting the questions: ''considered by whom?'' and ''treated by whom?'', all of which goes to make it manifest that a triadic relation is the minimal support needed for any such brand of speculative relation.

 

One thing does appear certain, at least, once the issue is addressed:  Whatever it means, and however it is qualified, the relation of being "independent of" does not mean a relation of being "not in relation to".  After all, did I not just call this, with all due justice, a relation?  Indeed, independently of all questions of independence, the very notion of there being a relation "not in relation to" is a self cancelling nullity.  Perhaps the closest that one can approach to conceiving of relations like "not related to" or "not a relative of", in short, perhaps the simplest analogues or approximations to such a relation that one can devise are:  "considered as not in relation to" or "treated as not in relation to", prompting the questions: "considered by who?" and "treated by who?", all of which goes to make it manifest that a triadic relation is the minimal support needed for any such brand of speculative relation.

In trying to reach a form of relation that is minimal in a certain regard, the analysis comes to a point where it is forced to reverse its direction and to synthesize a complex relation, one that possesses a higher arity than might be expected of a structure intended as a primitive rudiment.  What is ultimately suggested is a triadic relation that formulates the idea of a "consideration", a "regard", or a "treatment".  This involves an agent that acts as the overseer of the consideration, the regard, or the treatment in question along with a couple of other entities that fall in a dyadic relation to each other under this consideration, this regard, or this treatment.  The way to treat this triadic relation as sparingly as possible, in regard to the level of consideration that is assigned to it, is to let the agency of this oversight ignore as much as it possibly can about all the relations that conceivably exist between the overseen pair, the couple of agents, entities, or objects that fall within its purview.  Thus, the least that the overseer can manage to do is to mark a relation between the other two parties, without codifying, conveying, recording, or retaining any information about the particular kind of relation it is.  At any rate, this is the best interpretation that I find myself able to contrive at present for "X regards Y as not in relation to Z".

In trying to reach a form of relation that is minimal in a certain regard, the analysis comes to a point where it is forced to reverse its direction and to synthesize a complex relation, one that possesses a higher arity than might be expected of a structure intended as a primitive rudiment.  What is ultimately suggested is a triadic relation that formulates the idea of a "consideration", a "regard", or a "treatment".  This involves an agent that acts as the overseer of the consideration, the regard, or the treatment in question along with a couple of other entities that fall in a dyadic relation to each other under this consideration, this regard, or this treatment.  The way to treat this triadic relation as sparingly as possible, in regard to the level of consideration that is assigned to it, is to let the agency of this oversight ignore as much as it possibly can about all the relations that conceivably exist between the overseen pair, the couple of agents, entities, or objects that fall within its purview.  Thus, the least that the overseer can manage to do is to mark a relation between the other two parties, without codifying, conveying, recording, or retaining any information about the particular kind of relation it is.  At any rate, this is the best interpretation that I find myself able to contrive at present for "X regards Y as not in relation to Z".