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<p>§1. This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it. (CP 1.545)</p>
<p>§1. This paper is based upon the theory already established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity, and that the validity of a conception consists in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it. (CP 1.545)</p>
<p>§2. This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on. (CP 1.546)</p>
<p>§2. This theory gives rise to a conception of gradation among those conceptions which are universal. For one such conception may unite the manifold of sense and yet another may be required to unite the conception and the manifold to which it is applied; and so on. (CP 1.546)</p>
<p>C.S. Peirce, “On a New List of Categories”</p>
<p>C.S. Peirce, “On a New List of Categories”</p>
===Selection 2===
===Selection 2===
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<p>I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have explained as predicates of predicates.</p>
<p>I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have explained as predicates of predicates.</p>
<p>That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create <i>entia rationis</i> that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think <i>through</i>, into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign.</p>
<p>That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create ''entia rationis'' that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think ''through'', into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign.</p>
<p>Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions. Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. What then are the characters of its different members?</p>
<p>Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions. Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. What then are the characters of its different members?</p>
<p>My thoughts on this subject are not yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but that the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny).</p>
<p>My thoughts on this subject are not yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but that the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny).</p>
<p>On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into <i>Realms</i> for the different Predicaments.</p>
<p>On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into ''Realms'' for the different Predicaments.</p>
<p>Peirce, CP 4.549, "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism", <i>The Monist</i> 16, 492–546 (1906), CP 4.530–572.</p>
<p>Peirce, CP 4.549, “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism”, ''The Monist'' 16, 492–546 (1906), CP 4.530–572.</p>
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The first thing to extract from this passage is the fact that Peirce's Categories, or "Predicaments", are predicates of predicates. Considerations like these tend to generate hierarchies of subject matters, extending through what is traditionally called the _logic of second intentions_, or what is handled very roughly by _second order logic_ in contemporary parlance, and continuing onward through higher intentions, or higher order logic and type theory.
The first thing to extract from this passage is the fact that Peirce's Categories, or “Predicaments”, are predicates of predicates. Considerations like these tend to generate hierarchies of subject matters, extending through what is traditionally called the ''logic of second intentions'', or what is handled very roughly by ''second order logic'' in contemporary parlance, and continuing onward through higher intentions, or higher order logic and type theory.
Peirce arrived at his own system of three categories after a thoroughgoing study of his predecessors, with special reference to the categories of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. The names that he used for his own categories varied with context and occasion, but ranged from moderately intuitive terms like _quality_, _reaction_, and _symbolization_ to maximally abstract terms like _firstness_, _secondness_, and _thirdness_, respectively. Taken in full generality, $k$-ness may be understood as referring to those properties that all $k$-adic relations have in common. Peirce's distinctive claim is that a type hierarchy of three levels is generative of all that we need in logic.
Peirce arrived at his own system of three categories after a thoroughgoing study of his predecessors, with special reference to the categories of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. The names that he used for his own categories varied with context and occasion, but ranged from moderately intuitive terms like ''quality'', ''reaction'', and ''symbolization'' to maximally abstract terms like ''firstness'', ''secondness'', and ''thirdness'', respectively. Taken in full generality, <math>k</math>-ness may be understood as referring to those properties that all <math>k</math>-adic relations have in common. Peirce's distinctive claim is that a type hierarchy of three levels is generative of all that we need in logic.
Part of the justification for Peirce's claim that three categories are both necessary and sufficient appears to arise from mathematical facts about the reducibility of $k$-adic relations. With regard to necessity, triadic relations cannot be completely analyzed in terms or monadic and dyadic predicates. With regard to sufficiency, all higher arity $k$-adic relations can be analyzed in terms of triadic and lower arity relations.
Part of the justification for Peirce's claim that three categories are both necessary and sufficient appears to arise from mathematical facts about the reducibility of <math>k</math>-adic relations. With regard to necessity, triadic relations cannot be completely analyzed in terms or monadic and dyadic predicates. With regard to sufficiency, all higher arity <math>k</math>-adic relations can be analyzed in terms of triadic and lower arity relations.
==Hilbert==
==Hilbert==