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SUMMA THEOLOGIAE – QUESTIONS LXV - LXIX

Index

Latin English
Iª q. 65 pr. Post considerationem spiritualis creaturae, considerandum est de creatura corporali. In cuius productione tria opera Scriptura commemorat, scilicet opus creationis, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, etc.; opus distinctionis, cum dicitur, divisit lucem a tenebris, et aquas quae sunt supra firmamentum, ab aquis quae sunt sub firmamento; et opus ornatus, cum dicitur, fiant luminaria in firmamento et cetera. Primo ergo considerandum est de opere creationis; secundo, de opere distinctionis; tertio, de opere ornatus. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creatura corporalis sit a Deo. Secundo, utrum sit facta propter bonitatem Dei. Tertio, utrum sit facta a Deo mediantibus Angelis. Quarto, utrum formae corporum sint ab Angelis, an immediate a Deo.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non sit a Deo. Dicitur enim Eccle. III, didici quod omnia quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum. Sed corpora visibilia non perseverant in aeternum, dicitur enim II Cor. IV, quae videntur temporalia sunt; quae autem non videntur, aeterna. Ergo Deus non fecit corpora visibilia.
 Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it is said (Ecclesiastes 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for it is said (2 Corinthians 4:18): "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore God did not make visible bodies.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gen. I, dicitur, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Sed creaturae corporales sunt malae, experimur enim eas in multis noxias, ut patet in multis serpentibus, in aestu solis, et huiusmodi; ideo autem aliquid dicitur malum, quia nocet. Creaturae igitur corporales non sunt a Deo. Objection 2. Further, it is said (Genesis 1:31): "God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod est a Deo, non retrahit a Deo, sed ducit in ipsum. Sed creaturae corporales retrahunt a Deo, unde apostolus dicit, II Cor. IV, non contemplantibus nobis quae videntur. Ergo creaturae corporales non sunt a Deo. Objection 3. Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle (2 Corinthians 4:18): "While we look not at the things which are seen." Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXLV, qui fecit caelum et terram, mare, et omnia quae in eis sunt. On the contrary, It is said (Psalm 145:6): "Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them."
Iª q. 65 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quorundam haereticorum positio est, quod visibilia ista non sunt creata a bono Deo, sed a malo principio. Et ad argumentum sui erroris assumunt quod apostolus dicit II, Cor. IV, Deus huius saeculi excaecavit mentes infidelium. Haec autem positio est omnino impossibilis. Si enim diversa in aliquo uniantur, necesse est huius unionis causam esse aliquam, non enim diversa secundum se uniuntur. Et inde est quod, quandocumque in diversis invenitur aliquid unum, oportet quod illa diversa illud unum ab aliqua una causa recipiant; sicut diversa corpora calida habent calorem ab igne. Hoc autem quod est esse, communiter invenitur in omnibus rebus, quantumcumque diversis. Necesse est ergo esse unum essendi principium, a quo esse habeant quaecumque sunt quocumque modo, sive sint invisibilia et spiritualia, sive sint visibilia et corporalia. Dicitur autem Diabolus esse Deus huius saeculi, non creatione, sed quia saeculariter viventes ei serviunt; eo modo loquendi quo apostolus loquitur, ad Philipp. III, quorum Deus venter est. I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 4:4), "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, "Whose god is their belly" (Philippians 3:19).
Iª q. 65 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes creaturae Dei secundum aliquid in aeternum perseverant, ad minus secundum materiam, quia creaturae nunquam in nihilum redigentur, etiam si sint corruptibiles. Sed quanto creaturae magis appropinquant ad Deum, qui est omnino immobilis, tanto magis sunt immobiles. Nam creaturae corruptibiles in perpetuum manent secundum materiam, sed mutantur secundum formam substantialem. Creaturae vero incorruptibiles permanent quidem secundum substantiam, sed sunt mutabiles secundum alia, puta secundum locum, ut corpora caelestia; vel secundum affectiones, ut creaturae spirituales. Quod autem apostolus dicit, quae videntur, temporalia sunt, etsi verum sit etiam quantum ad ipsas res in se consideratas, secundum quod omnis creatura visibilis subiacet tempori, vel secundum suum esse vel secundum suum motum; tamen apostolus intendit loqui de visibilibus secundum quod sunt hominis praemia. Nam praemia hominis quae sunt in istis rebus visibilibus, temporaliter transeunt, quae autem sunt in rebus invisibilibus, permanent in aeternum. Unde et supra praemiserat, aeternum gloriae pondus operatur in nobis. Reply to Objection 1. All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he said before (2 Corinthians 4:17): "It worketh for us . . . an eternal weight of glory."
Iª q. 65 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod creatura corporalis, secundum suam naturam, est bona, sed non est bonum universale, sed est quoddam bonum particulare et contractum, secundum quam particularitatem et contractionem sequitur in ea contrarietas, per quam unum contrariatur alteri, licet utrumque in se sit bonum. Quidam autem, aestimantes res non ex earum natura, sed ex suo proprio commodo, quaecumque sibi nociva sunt, simpliciter mala arbitrantur non considerantes quod id quod est uni nocivum quantum ad aliquid, vel alteri vel eidem quantum ad aliquid est proficuum. Quod nequaquam esset, si secundum se corpora essent mala et noxia. Reply to Objection 2. Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae, quantum est de se, non retrahunt a Deo, sed in ipsum ducunt, quia invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, ut dicitur Rom. I. Sed quod avertant a Deo, hoc est ex culpa eorum qui insipienter eis utuntur. Unde dicitur Sap. XIV, quod creaturae factae sunt in muscipulam pedibus insipientium. Et hoc ipsum quod sic a Deo abducunt, attestatur quod sunt a Deo. Non enim abducunt insipientes a Deo, nisi alliciendo secundum aliquid boni in eis existens, quod habent a Deo. Reply to Objection 3. Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1:20). If, then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wisdom 14:11): "Creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non sit facta propter Dei bonitatem. Dicitur enim Sap. I, creavit Deus ut essent omnia. Ergo omnia sunt creata propter suum proprium esse, et non propter Dei bonitatem.
 Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wisdom 1:14) that God "created all things that they might be." Therefore all things were created for their own being's sake, and not on account of God's goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo id quod est magis bonum in rebus, est finis minus boni. Creatura autem spiritualis comparatur ad corporalem, sicut maius bonum ad minus bonum. Ergo creatura corporalis est propter spiritualem, et non propter Dei bonitatem. Objection 2. Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, iustitia non dat inaequalia nisi inaequalibus. Sed Deus est iustus. Ergo ante omnem inaequalitatem a Deo creatam, est inaequalitas a Deo non creata. Sed inaequalitas a Deo non creata, non potest esse nisi quae est ex libero arbitrio. Ergo omnis inaequalitas sequitur ex diversis motibus liberi arbitrii. Creaturae autem corporales sunt inaequales spiritualibus. Ergo creaturae corporales sunt factae propter aliquos motus liberi arbitrii, et non propter Dei bonitatem. Objection 3. Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on account of God's goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVI, universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus. On the contrary, It is said (Proverbs 16:4): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself."
Iª q. 65 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit quod creatura corporalis non est facta ex prima Dei intentione, sed ad poenam creaturae spiritualis peccantis. Posuit enim quod Deus a principio creaturas spirituales solas fecit, et omnes aequales. Quarum, cum essent liberi arbitrii, quaedam conversae sunt in Deum, et secundum quantitatem conversionis sortitae sunt maiorem vel minorem gradum, in sua simplicitate remanentes. Quaedam vero, aversae a Deo, alligatae sunt corporibus diversis, secundum modum aversionis a Deo. Quae quidem positio erronea est. Primo quidem, quia contrariatur Scripturae, quae, enarrata productione cuiuslibet speciei creaturae corporalis subiungit, vidit Deus quia hoc esset bonum; quasi diceret quod unumquodque ideo factum est, quia bonum est ipsum esse. Secundum autem opinionem Origenis, creatura corporalis facta est, non quia bonum est eam esse, sed ut malum alterius puniretur. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod mundi corporalis dispositio quae nunc est, esset a casu. Si enim ideo corpus solis tale factum est, ut congrueret alicui peccato spiritualis creaturae puniendo; si plures creaturae spirituales similiter peccassent sicut illa propter cuius peccatum puniendum ponit solem creatum, sequeretur quod essent plures soles in mundo. Et idem esset de aliis. Haec autem sunt omnino inconvenientia. Unde haec positione remota tanquam erronea, considerandum est quod ex omnibus creaturis constituitur totum universum sicut totum ex partibus. Si autem alicuius totius et partium eius velimus finem assignare, inveniemus primo quidem, quod singulae partes sunt propter suos actus; sicut oculus ad videndum. Secundo vero, quod pars ignobilior est propter nobiliorem; sicut sensus propter intellectum, et pulmo propter cor. Tertio vero, omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter formam, partes enim sunt quasi materia totius. Ulterius autem, totus homo est propter aliquem finem extrinsecum, puta ut fruatur Deo. Sic igitur et in partibus universi, unaquaeque creatura est propter suum proprium actum et perfectionem. Secundo autem, creaturae ignobiliores sunt propter nobiliores sicut creaturae quae sunt infra hominem, sunt propter hominem. Ulterius autem, singulae creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. Ulterius autem, totum universum, cum singulis suis partibus, ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem, inquantum in eis per quandam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei, quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione, cognoscendo et amando. Et sic patet quod divina bonitas est finis omnium corporalium. I answer that, Origen laid down [Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Genesis 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts. Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly, that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in hoc ipso quod creatura aliqua habet esse, repraesentat divinum esse et bonitatem eius. Et ideo per hoc quod Deus creavit omnia ut essent, non excluditur quin creaverit omnia propter suam bonitatem. Reply to Objection 1. In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod finis proximus non excludit finem ultimum. Unde per hoc quod creatura corporalis facta est quodammodo propter spiritualem, non removetur quin sit facta propter Dei bonitatem. Reply to Objection 2. The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of God's goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aequalitas iustitiae locum habet in retribuendo, iustum enim est quod aequalibus aequalia retribuantur. Non autem habet locum in prima rerum institutione. Sicut enim artifex eiusdem generis lapides in diversis partibus aedificii ponit absque iniustitia, non propter aliquam diversitatem in lapidibus praecedentem, sed attendens ad perfectionem totius aedificii, quae non esset nisi lapides diversimode in aedificio collocarentur; sic et Deus a principio, ut esset perfectio in universo, diversas et inaequales creaturas instituit, secundum suam sapientiam, absque iniustitia, nulla tamen praesupposita meritorum diversitate. Reply to Objection 3. Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis sit producta a Deo mediantibus Angelis. Sicut enim res gubernantur per divinam sapientiam, ita omnia sunt per Dei sapientiam facta; secundum illud Psalmi CIII, omnia in sapientia fecisti. Sed ordinare est sapientis, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Unde in gubernatione rerum, inferiora per superiora reguntur quodam ordine, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Ergo et in rerum productione talis ordo fuit, quod creatura corporalis, tanquam inferior, per spiritualem, tanquam superiorem, est producta.
 Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24 "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to wisdom to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, diversitas effectuum demonstrat diversitatem causarum, quia idem semper facit idem. Si ergo omnes creaturae, tam spirituales quam corporales, sunt immediate a Deo productae, nulla esset inter creaturas diversitas, nec una magis distaret a Deo quam alia. Quod patet esse falsum, cum propter longe distare a Deo dicat philosophus quaedam corruptibilia esse. Objection 2. Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
Iª q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad producendum effectum finitum, non requiritur virtus infinita. Sed omne corpus finitum est. Ergo per finitam virtutem spiritualis creaturae produci potuit; et productum fuit, quia in talibus non differt esse et posse; praesertim quia nulla dignitas competens alicui secundum suam naturam, ei denegatur, nisi forte ob culpam. Objection 3. Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, per quae creatura corporalis intelligitur. Ergo creatura corporalis est immediate a Deo producta. On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt gradatim res a Deo processisse, ita scilicet quod ab eo immediate processit prima creatura, et illa produxit aliam; et sic inde usque ad creaturam corpoream. Sed haec positio est impossibilis. Quia prima corporalis creaturae productio est per creationem per quam etiam ipsa materia producitur, imperfectum enim est prius quam perfectum in fieri impossibile est autem aliquid creari nisi a solo Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit in causando. Semper autem id quod substernitur in rebus, invenitur communius quam id quod informat et restringit ipsum, sicut esse quam vivere, et vivere quam intelligere, et materia quam forma. Quanto ergo aliquid est magis substratum, tanto a superiori causa directe procedit. Id ergo quod est primo substratum in omnibus, proprie pertinet ad causalitatem supremae causae. Nulla igitur secunda causa potest aliquid producere, non praesupposito in re producta aliquo quod causatur a superiori causa. Creatio autem est productio alicuius rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praesupposito quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum. Unde relinquitur quod nihil potest aliquid creare nisi solus Deus, qui est prima causa. Et ideo ut Moyses ostenderet corpora omnia immediate a Deo creata, dixit, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone. In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
Iª q. 65 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in productione rerum est aliquis ordo, non quidem ut una creatura creetur ab alia (hoc enim impossibile est); sed ita quod ex divina sapientia diversi gradus in creaturis, constituuntur. Reply to Objection 1. In the production of things an order exists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ipse Deus unus, absque suae simplicitatis detrimento, diversorum cognoscitivus est, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo etiam est, secundum diversa cognita, diversorum productorum causa per suam sapientiam, sicut et artifex, apprehendendo diversas formas, producit diversa artificiata. Reply to Objection 2. God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above (15, 2); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas virtutis agentis non solum mensuratur secundum rem factam, sed etiam secundum modum faciendi, quia unum et idem aliter fit et a maiori, et a minori virtute. Producere autem aliquid finitum hoc modo ut nihil praesupponatur, est virtutis infinitae. Unde nulli creaturae competere potest. Reply to Objection 3. The amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no creature.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod formae corporum sint ab Angelis. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod a formis quae sunt sine materia, veniunt formae quae sunt in materia. Formae autem quae sunt sine materia, sunt substantiae spirituales, formae autem quae sunt in materia, sunt formae corporum. Ergo formae corporum sunt a spiritualibus substantiis.
 Objection 1. It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne quod est per participationem, reducitur ad id quod est per essentiam. Sed spirituales substantiae per suam essentiam sunt formae, creaturae autem corporales participant formas. Ergo formae corporalium rerum sunt a spiritualibus substantiis derivatae. Objection 2. Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, spirituales substantiae magis habent virtutem causandi quam corpora caelestia. Sed corpora caelestia causant formas in istis inferioribus, unde dicuntur esse generationis et corruptionis causa. Ergo multo magis a spiritualibus substantiis formae quae sunt in materia, derivantur. Objection 3. Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual substances.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod non est putandum Angelis ad nutum servire hanc corporalem materiam, sed potius Deo. Illi autem ad nutum dicitur servire corporalis materia, a quo speciem recipit. Non ergo formae corporales sunt ab Angelis, sed a Deo. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys God thus." But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from the angels, but from God.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod opinio fuit quorundam quod omnes formae corporales deriventur a substantiis spiritualibus quas Angelos dicimus. Et hoc quidem dupliciter aliqui posuerunt. Plato enim posuit formas quae sunt in materia corporali, derivari et formari a formis sine materia subsistentibus, per modum participationis cuiusdam. Ponebat enim hominem quendam immaterialiter subsistentem, et similiter equum, et sic de aliis, ex quibus constituuntur haec singularia sensibilia, secundum quod in materia corporali remanet quaedam impressio ab illis formis separatis, per modum assimilationis cuiusdam, quam participationem vocabat. Et secundum ordinem formarum ponebant Platonici ordinem substantiarum separatarum, puta quod una substantia separata est quae est equus, quae est causa omnium equorum; supra quam est quaedam vita separata, quam dicebant per se vitam et causam omnis vitae; et ulterius quandam quam nominabant ipsum esse, et causam omnis esse. Avicenna vero et quidam alii non posuerunt formas rerum corporalium in materia per se subsistere, sed solum in intellectu. A formis ergo in intellectu creaturarum spiritualium existentibus (quas quidem ipsi intelligentias, nos autem Angelos dicimus), dicebant procedere omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, sicut a formis quae sunt in mente artificis, procedunt formae artificiatorum. Et in idem videtur redire quod quidam moderni haeretici ponunt, dicentes quidem Deum creatorem omnium, sed materiam corporalem a Diabolo formatam et per varias species distinctam. Omnes autem hae opiniones ex una radice processisse videntur. Quaerebant enim causam formarum, ac si ipsae formae fierent secundum seipsas. Sed sicut probat Aristoteles in VII Metaphys., id quod proprie fit, est compositum, formae autem corruptibilium rerum habent ut aliquando sint, aliquando non sint, absque hoc quod ipsae generentur aut corrumpantur, sed compositis generatis aut corruptis, quia etiam formae non habent esse, sed composita habent esse per eas, sic enim alicui competit fieri, sicut et esse. Et ideo, cum simile fiat a suo simili, non est quaerenda causa formarum corporalium aliqua forma immaterialis; sed aliquod compositum, secundum quod hic ignis generatur ab hoc igne. Sic igitur formae corporales causantur, non quasi influxae ab aliqua immateriali forma, sed quasi materia reducta de potentia in actum ab aliquo agente composito. Sed quia agens compositum, quod est corpus, movetur a substantia spirituali creata, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin.; sequitur ulterius quod etiam formae corporales a substantiis spiritualibus deriventur, non tanquam influentibus formas, sed tanquam moventibus ad formas. Ulterius autem reducuntur in Deum, sicut in primam causam, etiam species angelici intellectus, quae sunt quaedam seminales rationes corporalium formarum. In prima autem corporalis creaturae productione non consideratur aliqua transmutatio de potentia in actum. Et ideo formae corporales quas in prima productione corpora habuerunt, sunt immediate a Deo productae, cui soli ad nutum obedit materia, tanquam propriae causae. Unde ad hoc significandum, Moyses singulis operibus praemittit, dixit Deus fiat hoc vel illud; in quo significatur formatio rerum per verbum Dei facta, a quo, secundum Augustinum, est omnis forma et compago et concordia partium. I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species. But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite." Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; since even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine [Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4, is "all form and fitness and concord of parts."
Iª q. 65 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Boetius intelligit per formas quae sunt sine materia, rationes rerum quae sunt in mente divina, sicut etiam apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, fide credimus aptata esse saecula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Si tamen per formas quae sunt sine materia, intelligit Angelos, dicendum est quod ab eis veniunt formae quae sunt in materia, non per influxum, sed per motum. Reply to Objection 1. By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:3): "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made." But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod formae participatae in materia reducuntur, non ad formas aliquas per se subsistentes rationis eiusdem, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed ad formas intelligibiles vel intellectus angelici, a quibus per motum procedunt; vel ulterius ad rationes intellectus divini, a quibus etiam formarum semina sunt rebus creatis indita, ut per motum in actum educi possint. Reply to Objection 2. Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod corpora caelestia causant formas in istis inferioribus, non influendo, sed movendo. Reply to Objection 3. The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation.
Iª q. 66 pr. Deinde considerandum est de opere distinctionis. Et primo considerandum est de ordine creationis ad distinctionem; secundo, de ipsa distinctione secundum se. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum informitas materiae creatae praecesserit tempore distinctionem ipsius. Secundo, utrum sit una materia omnium corporalium. Tertio, utrum caelum Empyreum sit concreatum materiae informi. Quarto, utrum tempus sit eidem concreatum.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem ipsius. Dicitur enim Gen. 1, terra erat inanis et vacua, sive invisibilis et incomposita, secundum aliam litteram; per quod designatur informitas materiae, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo materia fuit aliquando informis, antequam formaretur.
 Objection 1. It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Genesis 1:2): "The earth was void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version [Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it received its form.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, natura in sua operatione Dei operationem imitatur; sicut causa secunda imitatur causam primam. Sed in operatione naturae informitas tempore praecedit formationem. Ergo et in operatione Dei. Objection 2. Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, materia potior est accidente, quia materia est pars substantiae. Sed Deus potest facere quod accidens sit sine subiecto; ut patet in sacramento altaris. Ergo potuit facere quod materia esset sine forma. Objection 3. Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without form.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 s. c. 1 Sed contra, imperfectio effectus attestatur imperfectioni agentis. Sed Deus est agens perfectissimum, unde de eo dicitur, Deut. XXXII, Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ergo opus ab eo creatum nunquam fuit informe. On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him (Deuteronomy 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." Therefore the work of His creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal creation.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 s. c. 2 Praeterea, creaturae corporalis formatio facta fuit per opus distinctionis. Distinctioni autem opponitur confusio, sicut et formationi informitas. Si ergo informitas praecessit tempore formationem materiae, sequitur a principio fuisse confusionem corporalis creaturae, quam antiqui vocaverunt chaos.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones sanctorum. Augustinus enim vult quod informitas materiae corporalis non praecesserit tempore formationem ipsius, sed solum origine vel ordine naturae. Alii vero, ut Basilius, Ambrosius et Chrysostomus, volunt quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit formationem. Et quamvis hae opiniones videantur esse contrariae, tamen parum ab invicem differunt, aliter enim accipit informitatem materiae Augustinus quam alii. Augustinus enim accipit informitatem materiae pro carentia omnis formae. Et sic impossibile est dicere quod informitas materiae tempore praecesserit vel formationem ipsius, vel distinctionem. Et de formatione quidem manifestum est. Si enim materia informis praecessit duratione, haec erat iam in actu, hoc enim duratio importat, creationis enim terminus est ens actu. Ipsum autem quod est actus, est forma. Dicere igitur materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem. Nec etiam potest dici quod habuit aliquam formam communem et postmodum supervenerunt ei formae diversae, quibus sit distincta. Quia hoc esset idem cum opinione antiquorum naturalium, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse aliquod corpus in actu, puta ignem, aerem aut aquam, aut aliquod medium. Ex quo sequebatur quod fieri non esset nisi alterari. Quia cum illa forma praecedens daret esse in actu in genere substantiae, et faceret esse hoc aliquid; sequebatur quod superveniens forma non faceret simpliciter ens actu, sed ens actu hoc, quod est proprium formae accidentalis; et sic sequentes formae essent accidentia, secundum quae non attenditur generatio, sed alteratio. Unde oportet dicere quod materia prima neque fuit creata omnino sine forma, neque sub forma una communi, sed sub formis distinctis. Et ita, si informitas materiae referatur ad conditionem primae materiae, quae secundum se non habet aliquam formam, informitas materiae non praecessit formationem seu distinctionem ipsius tempore, ut Augustinus dicit, sed origine seu natura tantum, eo modo quo potentia est prior actu, et pars toto. Alii vero sancti accipiunt informitatem, non secundum quod excludit omnem formam, sed secundum quod excludit istam formositatem et decorem qui nunc apparet in corporea creatura. Et secundum hoc dicunt quod informitas materiae corporalis duratione praecessit formationem eiusdem. Et sic secundum hoc, quantum ad aliquid cum eis Augustinus concordat, et quantum aliquid discordat, ut infra patebit. Et quantum ex littera Genesis I, accipi potest, triplex formositas deerat, propter quod dicebatur creatura corporalis informis. Deerat enim a toto corpore diaphano, quod dicitur caelum, pulchritudo lucis, unde dicitur quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Deerat autem terrae duplex pulchritudo. Una, quam habet ex hoc quod est aquis discooperta, et quantum ad hoc dicitur quod terra erat inanis, sive invisibilis, quia corporali aspectui patere non poterat, propter aquas undique eam cooperientes. Alia vero, quam habet ex hoc quod est ornata herbis et plantis, et ideo dicitur quod erat vacua, vel incomposita, idest non ornata, secundum aliam litteram. Et sic, cum praemisisset duas naturas creatas, scilicet caelum et terram, informitatem caeli expressit per hoc quod dixit, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi, secundum quod sub caelo etiam aer includitur, informitatem vero terrae, per hoc quod dixit, terra erat inanis et vacua. I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For it formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be shown later (69, 1; 74, 2). As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that "darkness was upon the fact of the deep." And the earth lacked beauty in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or "invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view; secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants, for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading [Septuagint], "shapeless"--that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty."
Iª q. 66 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod terra aliter accipitur in loco isto ab Augustino, et ab aliis sanctis. Augustinus enim vult quod nomine terrae et aquae significetur in hoc loco ipsa materia prima. Non enim poterat Moyses rudi populo primam materiam exprimere, nisi sub similitudine rerum eis notarum. Unde et sub multiplici similitudine eam exprimit, non vocans eam tantum aquam vel tantum terram, ne videatur secundum rei veritatem materia prima esse vel terra vel aqua. Habet tamen similitudinem cum terra, inquantum subsidet formis; et cum aqua, inquantum est apta formari diversis formis. Secundum hoc ergo, dicitur terra inanis et vacua, vel invisibilis et incomposita, quia materia per formam cognoscitur (unde in se considerata dicitur invisibilis vel inanis), et eius potentia per formam repletur (unde et Plato materiam dicit esse locum). Alii vero sancti per terram intelligunt ipsum elementum, quae qualiter, secundum eos, erat informis, dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. The word earth is taken differently in this passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said (1) how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod natura producit effectum in actu de ente in potentia, et ideo oportet ut in eius operatione potentia tempore praecedat actum, et informitas formationem. Sed Deus producit ens actu ex nihilo, et ideo statim potest producere rem perfectam, secundum magnitudinem suae virtutis. Reply to Objection 2. Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod accidens, cum sit forma, est actus quidam, materia autem secundum id quod est, est ens in potentia. Unde magis repugnat esse in actu materiae sine forma, quam accidenti sine subiecto. Reply to Objection 3. Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than for accident to be without subject.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 ad 4 Ad primum vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum est quod si, secundum alios sanctos, informitas tempore praecessit formationem materiae, non fuit hoc ex impotentia Dei; sed ex eius sapientia, ut ordo servaretur in rerum conditione, dum ex imperfecto ad perfectum adducerentur. In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part, but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.
Iª q. 66 a. 1 ad 5 Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam antiquorum naturalium posuerunt confusionem excludentem omnem distinctionem; praeter hoc quod Anaxagoras posuit solum intellectum distinctum et immixtum. Sed ante opus distinctionis Scriptura sacra ponit multiplicem distinctionem. Primo quidem, caeli et terrae (in quo ostenditur distinctio etiam secundum materiam, ut infra patebit), et hoc cum dicit, in principio Deus creavit caelum et terram. Secundo, distinctionem elementorum quantum ad formas suas, per hoc quod nominat terram et aquam. Aerem autem et ignem non nominat, quia non est ita manifestum rudibus, quibus Moyses loquebatur, huiusmodi esse corpora, sicut manifestum est de terra et aqua. Quamvis Plato aerem intellexerit significari per hoc quod dicitur spiritus domini (quia etiam aer spiritus dicitur), ignem vero intellexerit significari per caelum (quod igneae naturae esse dixit), ut Augustinus refert in VIII libro de Civ. Dei. Sed Rabbi Moyses, in aliis cum Platone concordans, dicit ignem significari per tenebras, quia, ut dicit, in propria sphaera ignis non lucet. Sed magis videtur esse conveniens quod prius dictum est, quia spiritus domini in Scriptura non nisi pro spiritu sancto consuevit poni. Qui aquis superferri dicitur, non corporaliter, sed sicut voluntas artificis superfertur materiae quam vult formare. Tertia distinctio significatur secundum situm. Quia terra erat sub aquis, quibus invisibilis reddebatur, aer vero, qui est subiectum tenebrarum, significatur fuisse super aquas, per hoc quod dicitur, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Quid autem distinguendum remaneret, ex sequentibus apparebit. In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction; except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later (3; 68, 1). This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words, "Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God" Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters," not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep." The remaining distinctions will appear from what follows (71).
Iª q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una sit materia informis omnium corporalium. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Confess., duo reperio quae fecisti, unum quod erat formatum, alterum quod erat informe; et hoc dicit esse terram invisibilem et incompositam, per quam dicit significari materiam rerum corporalium. Ergo una est materia omnium corporalium.
 Objection 1. It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod illa quae sunt unum in genere, sunt unum in materia. Sed omnia corporalia conveniunt in genere corporis. Ergo omnium corporalium est una materia. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): "Things that are one in genus are one in matter." But all corporeal things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, diversus actus fit in diversa potentia, et unus in una. Sed omnium corporum est una forma, scilicet corporeitas. Ergo omnium corporalium est materia una. Objection 3. Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, materia in se considerata, est solum in potentia. Sed distinctio est per formas. Ergo materia in se considerata, est una tantum omnium corporalium. Objection 4. Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, quaecumque conveniunt in materia, sunt transmutabilia ad invicem, et agunt et patiuntur ab invicem, ut dicitur in I de Gen. Sed corpora caelestia et inferiora non sic se habent ad invicem. Ergo eorum materia non est una. On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt diversae opiniones philosophorum. Plato enim, et omnes philosophi ante Aristotelem, posuerunt omnia corpora esse de natura quatuor elementorum. Unde cum quatuor elementa communicent in una materia, ut mutua generatio et corruptio in eis ostendit; per consequens sequebatur quod omnium corporum sit materia una. Quod autem quaedam corpora sint incorruptibilia, Plato adscribebat non conditioni materiae, sed voluntati artificis, scilicet Dei, quem introducit corporibus caelestibus dicentem, natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia, quia voluntas mea maior est nexu vestro. Hanc autem positionem Aristoteles reprobat, per motus naturales corporum. Cum enim corpus caeleste habeat naturalem motum diversum a naturali motu elementorum, sequitur quod eius natura sit alia a natura quatuor elementorum. Et sicut motus circularis, qui est proprius corporis caelestis, caret contrarietate, motus autem elementorum sunt invicem contrarii, ut qui est sursum ei qui est deorsum, ita corpus caeleste est absque contrarietate, corpora vero elementaria sunt cum contrarietate. Et quia corruptio et generatio sunt ex contrariis, sequitur quod secundum suam naturam corpus caeleste sit incorruptibile, elementa vero sunt corruptibilia. Sed non obstante hac differentia corruptibilitatis et incorruptibilitatis naturalis, Avicebron posuit unam materiam omnium corporum, attendens ad unitatem formae corporalis. Sed si forma corporeitatis esset una forma per se, cui supervenirent aliae formae, quibus corpora distinguuntur, haberet necessitatem quod dicitur. Quia illa forma immutabiliter materiae inhaereret, et quantum ad illam esset omne corpus incorruptibile, sed corruptio accideret per remotionem sequentium formarum, quae non esset corruptio simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia privationi substerneretur aliquod ens actu. Sicut etiam accidebat antiquis naturalibus, qui ponebant subiectum corporum aliquod ens actu, puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi. Supposito autem quod nulla forma quae sit in corpore corruptibili remaneat ut substrata generationi et corruptioni, sequitur de necessitate quod non sit eadem materia corporum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium. Materia enim, secundum id quod est, est in potentia ad formam. Oportet ergo quod materia, secundum se considerata, sit in potentia ad formam omnium illorum quorum est materia communis. Per unam autem formam non fit in actu nisi quantum ad illam formam. Remanet ergo in potentia quantum ad omnes alias formas. Nec hoc excluditur, si una illarum formarum sit perfectior et continens in se virtute alias. Quia potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum, unde sicut quando est sub forma imperfecta, est in potentia ad formam perfectam, ita e converso. Sic ergo materia, secundum quod est sub forma incorruptibilis corporis, erit adhuc in potentia ad formam corruptibilis corporis. Et cum non habeat eam in actu, erit simul sub forma et privatione, quia carentia formae in eo quod est in potentia ad formam, est privatio. Haec autem dispositio est corruptibilis corporis. Impossibile ergo est quod corporis corruptibilis et incorruptibilis per naturam, sit una materia. Nec tamen dicendum est, ut Averroes fingit, quod ipsum corpus caeleste sit materia caeli, ens in potentia ad ubi et non ad esse; et forma eius est substantia separata quae unitur ei ut motor. Quia impossibile est ponere aliquod ens actu, quin vel ipsum totum sit actus et forma, vel habeat actum seu formam. Remota ergo per intellectum substantia separata quae ponitur motor, si corpus caeleste non est habens formam, quod est componi ex forma et subiecto formae, sequitur quod sit totum forma et actus. Omne autem tale est intellectum in actu; quod de corpore caelesti dici non potest, cum sit sensibile. Relinquitur ergo quod materia corporis caelestis, secundum se considerata, non est in potentia nisi ad formam quam habet. Nec refert ad propositum quaecumque sit illa, sive anima, sive aliquid aliud. Unde illa forma sic perficit illam materiam, quod nullo modo in ea remanet potentia ad esse, sed ad ubi tantum, ut Aristoteles dicit. Et sic non est eadem materia corporis caelestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae. I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that binds you together." But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms--that is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form. Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and "vice versa." Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter. Neither can we say, as Averroes [De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines, that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven--beings in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside, then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form--that is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form--it follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle [De Coelo i, text. 20 says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the character of potentiality.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus sequitur in hoc opinionem Platonis, non ponentis quintam essentiam. Vel dicendum quod materia informis est una unitate ordinis, sicut omnia corpora sunt unum in ordine creaturae corporeae. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod si genus consideretur physice, corruptibilia et incorruptibilia non sunt in eodem genere, propter diversum modum potentiae in eis, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Secundum autem logicam considerationem, est unum genus omnium corporum, propter unam rationem corporeitatis. Reply to Objection 2. If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod forma corporeitatis non est una in omnibus corporibus, cum non sit alia a formis quibus corpora distinguuntur, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated above.
Iª q. 66 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum potentia dicatur ad actum, ens in potentia est diversum ex hoc ipso quod ordinatur ad diversum actum; sicut visus ad colorem, et auditus ad sonum. Unde ex hoc ipso materia caelestis corporis est alia a materia elementi, quia non est in potentia ad formam elementi. Reply to Objection 4. As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caelum Empyreum non sit concreatum materiae informi. Caelum enim Empyreum, si est aliquid, oportet quod sit corpus sensibile. Omne autem corpus sensibile est mobile. Caelum autem Empyreum non est mobile, quia motus eius deprehenderetur per motum alicuius corporis apparentis; quod minime apparet. Non ergo caelum Empyreum est aliquid materiae informi concreatum.
 Objection 1. It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with formless matter.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quod inferiora corpora per superiora quodam ordine reguntur. Si ergo caelum Empyreum est quoddam supremum corpus, oportet quod habeat aliquam influentiam in haec inferiora corpora. Sed hoc non videtur, praesertim si ponatur immobile, cum nullum corpus moveat nisi motum. Non est ergo caelum Empyreum materiae informi concreatum. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order." If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3 Si dicatur quod caelum Empyreum est locus contemplationis, non ordinatum ad naturales effectus, contra, Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., quod nos, secundum quod mente aliquid aeternum capimus, non in hoc mundo sumus; ex quo patet quod contemplatio mentem supra corporalia elevat. Non ergo contemplationi locus corporeus deputatur. Objection 3. Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world"; from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, inter corpora caelestia invenitur aliquod corpus partim diaphanum et partim lucidum, scilicet caelum sidereum. Invenitur etiam aliquod caelum totum diaphanum, quod aliqui nominant caelum aqueum vel crystallinum. Si ergo est aliud superius caelum, oportet quod sit totum lucidum. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia sic continue aer illuminaretur, nec unquam nox esset. Non ergo caelum Empyreum materiae informi est concreatum. Objection 4. Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Strabus dicit, quod cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, caelum dicit non visibile firmamentum, sed Empyreum, idest igneum. On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum non invenitur positum nisi per auctoritates Strabi et Bedae, et iterum per auctoritatem Basilii. In cuius positione quantum ad aliquid conveniunt, scilicet quantum ad hoc quod sit locus beatorum. Dicit enim Strabus, et etiam Beda, quod statim factum Angelis est repletum. Basilius etiam dicit, in II Hexaem., sicut damnati in tenebras ultimas abiguntur ita remuneratio pro dignis operibus restauratur in ea luce quae est extra mundum, ubi beati quietis domicilium sortientur. Differunt tamen quantum ad rationem ponendi. Nam Strabus et Beda ponunt caelum Empyreum ea ratione, quia firmamentum, per quod caelum sidereum intelligunt, non in principio sed secunda die dicitur factum. Basilius vero ea ratione ponit, ne videatur simpliciter Deus opus suum a tenebris inchoasse; quod Manichaei calumniantur, Deum veteris testamenti Deum tenebrarum nominantes. Hae autem rationes non sunt multum cogentes. Nam quaestio de firmamento quod legitur factum in secunda die, aliter solvitur, ab Augustino et ab aliis sanctis. Quaestio autem de tenebris solvitur, secundum Augustinum, per hoc quod informitas (quae per tenebras significatur) non praecessit duratione formationem, sed origine. Secundum alios vero, cum tenebrae non sint creatura aliqua, sed privatio lucis, divinam sapientiam attestatur, ut ea quae produxit ex nihilo, primo in statu imperfectionis institueret, et postmodum ea perduceret ad perfectum. Potest autem convenientior ratio sumi ex ipsa conditione gloriae. Expectatur enim in futura remuneratione duplex gloria, scilicet spiritualis, et corporalis, non solum in corporibus humanis glorificandis, sed etiam in toto mundo innovando. Inchoata est autem spiritualis gloria ab ipso mundi principio in beatitudine Angelorum, quorum aequalitas sanctis promittitur. Unde conveniens fuit ut etiam a principio corporalis gloria inchoaretur in aliquo corpore, quod etiam a principio fuerit absque servitute corruptionis et mutabilitatis, et totaliter lucidum; sicut tota creatura corporalis expectatur post resurrectionem futura. Et ideo illud caelum dicitur Empyreum, idest igneum, non ab ardore, sed a splendore. Sciendum est autem quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, dicit quod Porphyrius discernebat a Daemonibus Angelos, ut aerea loca esse Daemonum, aetherea vero vel Empyrea diceret Angelorum. Sed Porphyrius, tanquam Platonicus, caelum istud sidereum igneum esse existimabat, et ideo Empyreum nominabat; vel aethereum, secundum quod nomen aetheris sumitur ab inflammatione, et non secundum quod sumitur a velocitate motus, ut Aristoteles dicit. Quod pro tanto dictum sit, ne aliquis opinetur Augustinum caelum Empyreum posuisse sicut nunc ponitur a modernis. I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest." But they differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [Gen. ad lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpora sensibilia sunt mobilia secundum ipsum statum mundi, quia per motum creaturae corporalis procuratur electorum multiplicatio. Sed in ultima consummatione gloriae cessabit corporum motus. Et talem oportuit esse a principio dispositionem caeli Empyrei. Reply to Objection 1. Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally consummaed, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod satis probabile est quod caelum Empyreum, secundum quosdam, cum sit ordinatum ad statum gloriae, non habet influentiam in inferiora corpora, quae sunt sub alio ordine, utpote ordinata ad naturalem rerum decursum. Probabilius tamen videtur dicendum quod, sicut supremi Angeli, qui assistunt, habent influentiam super medios et ultimos, qui mittuntur, quamvis ipsi non mittantur, secundum Dionysium; ita caelum Empyreum habet influentiam super corpora quae moventur, licet ipsum non moveatur. Et propter hoc potest dici quod influit in primum caelum quod movetur, non aliquid transiens et adveniens per motum, sed aliquid fixum et stabile; puta virtutem continendi et causandi, vel aliquid huiusmodi ad dignitatem pertinens. Reply to Objection 2. It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior bodies of another order--those, namely, that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [Infra, 112, 3], influence those of lower degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity.
Iª q. 66 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod locus corporeus deputatur contemplationi non propter necessitatem, sed propter congruitatem, ut exterior claritas interiori conveniat. Unde Basilius dicit quod ministrator spiritus non poterat degere in tenebris; sed in luce et laetitia decentem sibi habitum possidebat. Reply to Objection 3. Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: "The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual dwelling in light and joy."
Iª q. 66 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Basilius dicit in II Hexaem., constat factum esse caelum rotunditate conclusum, habens corpus spissum et adeo validum, ut possit ea quae extrinsecus habentur, ab interioribus separare. Ob hoc necessario post se regionem relictam carentem luce constituit, utpote fulgore qui superradiabat excluso. Sed quia corpus firmamenti, etsi sit solidum, est tamen diaphanum, quod lumen non impedit (ut patet per hoc, quod lumen stellarum videmus non obstantibus mediis caelis); potest aliter dici quod habet lucem caelum Empyreum non condensatam, ut radios emittat, sicut corpus solis, sed magis subtilem. Vel habet claritatem gloriae, quae non est conformis cum claritate naturali. Reply to Objection 4. As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): "It is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. "But since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tempus non sit concreatum materiae informi. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Confess., ad Deum loquens, duo reperio quae fecisti carentia temporibus, scilicet materiam primam corporalem, et naturam angelicam. Non ergo tempus est concreatum materiae informi.
 Objection 1. It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature." Therefore time was not created with formless matter.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, tempus dividitur per diem et noctem. Sed a principio nec nox nec dies erat, sed postmodum, cum divisit Deus lucem a tenebris. Ergo a principio non erat tempus. Objection 2. Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God divided the light from the darkness." Therefore in the beginning time was not.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, tempus est numerus motus firmamenti, quod legitur factum secundo die. Ergo non a principio erat tempus. Objection 3. Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning time was not.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, motus est prior tempore. Magis igitur deberet numerari inter primo creata motus, quam tempus. Objection 4. Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, sicut tempus est mensura extrinseca, ita et locus. Non ergo magis debet computari inter primo creata tempus, quam locus. Objection 5. Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod spiritualis et corporalis creatura est creata in principio temporis. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time."
Iª q. 66 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod communiter dicitur quatuor esse primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam, caelum Empyreum, materiam corporalem informem, et tempus. Sed attendendum est quod hoc dictum non procedit secundum Augustini opinionem. Augustinus enim ponit duo primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam et materiam corporalem, nulla mentione facta de caelo Empyreo. Haec autem duo, scilicet natura angelica et materia informis, praecedunt formationem non duratione, sed natura. Et sicut natura praecedunt formationem, ita etiam et motum et tempus. Unde tempus non potest eis connumerari. Procedit autem praedicta connumeratio secundum opinionem aliorum sanctorum, ponentium quod informitas materiae duratione praecessit formationem, et tunc pro illa duratione necesse est ponere tempus aliquod; aliter enim mensura durationis accipi non posset. I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were these four--the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as first created--the angelic nature and corporeal matter--making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus hoc dicit ea ratione qua natura angelica et materia informis praecedunt origine, seu natura, tempus. Reply to Objection 1. The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut, secundum alios sanctos, materia erat quodammodo informis, et postea fuit formata; ita tempus quodammodo fuit informe, et postmodum formatum, et distinctum per diem et noctem. Reply to Objection 2. As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si motus firmamenti non statim a principio incoepit, tunc tempus quod praecessit, non erat numerus motus firmamenti, sed cuiuscumque primi motus. Accidit enim tempori quod sit numerus motus firmamenti, inquantum hic motus est primus motuum, si autem esset alius motus primus, illius motus esset tempus mensura, quia omnia mensurantur primo sui generis. Oportet autem dicere statim a principio fuisse aliquem motum, ad minus secundum successionem conceptionum et affectionum in mente angelica. Motum autem non est intelligere sine tempore, cum nihil aliud sit tempus quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu. Reply to Objection 3. If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession in movement."
Iª q. 66 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod inter primo creata computantur ea quae habent generalem habitudinem ad res. Et ideo computari debuit tempus, quod habet rationem communis mensurae, non autem motus, qui comparatur solum ad subiectum mobile. Reply to Objection 4. Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable subject.
Iª q. 66 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod locus intelligitur in caelo Empyreo omnia continente. Et quia locus est de permanentibus, concreatus est totus simul. Tempus autem, quod non est permanens, concreatum est in suo principio, sicut etiam modo nihil est accipere in actu de tempore nisi nunc. Reply to Objection 5. Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now."
Iª q. 67 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de opere distinctionis secundum se et primo, de opere primae diei; secundo, de opere secundae diei; tertio, de opere tertiae. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum lux proprie in spiritualibus dici possit. Secundo, utrum lux corporalis sit corpus. Tertio, utrum sit qualitas. Quarto, utrum conveniens fuit prima die fieri lucem.
Iª q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lux proprie in spiritualibus dicatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad Litt., quod in spiritualibus melior et certior lux est, et quod Christus non sic dicitur lux quo modo lapis, sed illud proprie, hoc figurative.
 Objection 1. It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that "in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically."
Iª q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ponit lumen inter nomina intelligibilia Dei. Nomina autem intelligibilia proprie dicuntur in spiritualibus. Ergo lux proprie dicitur in spiritualibus. Objection 2. Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiritual matters.
Iª q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, omne quod manifestatur, lumen est. Sed manifestatio magis proprie est in spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Ergo et lux. Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (Ephesians 5:13): "All that is made manifest is light." But to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.
Iª q. 67 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius, in libro de fide, ponit splendorem inter ea quae de Deo metaphorice dicuntur. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that "Splendor" is among those things which are said of God metaphorically.
Iª q. 67 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. Sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum (dicimus enim, vide quomodo sapit, vel quomodo redolet, vel quomodo est calidum); et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus, secundum illud Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et similiter dicendum est de nomine lucis. Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in sensu visus, postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod facit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem. Si ergo accipiatur nomen luminis secundum suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur, ut Ambrosius dicit. Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur. I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways--that is to say, either in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, "Seeing how it tastes," or "smells," or "burns. "Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God" (Matthew 5:8). And thus it is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.
Iª q. 67 a. 1 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been said.
Iª q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lux sit corpus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Lib. Arbit., quod lux in corporibus primum tenet locum. Ergo lux est corpus.
 Objection 1. It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among bodies."Therefore light is a body.
Iª q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit quod lumen est species ignis. Sed ignis est corpus. Ergo lumen est corpus. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is a species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.
Iª q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ferri, intersecari, et reflecti est proprie corporum, haec autem omnia attribuuntur lumini vel radio. Coniunguntur etiam diversi radii et separantur, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod etiam videtur non nisi corporibus convenire posse. Ergo lumen est corpus. Objection 3. Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they are bodies. Therefore light is a body.
Iª q. 67 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, duo corpora non possunt simul esse in eodem loco. Sed lumen est simul cum aere. Ergo lumen non est corpus. On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same place simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore light is not a body.
Iª q. 67 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est lumen esse corpus. Quod quidem apparet tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte loci. Nam locus cuiuslibet corporis est alius a loco alterius corporis, nec est possibile, secundum naturam, duo corpora esse simul in eodem loco, qualiacumque corpora sint; quia contiguum requirit distinctionem in situ. Secundo, apparet idem ex ratione motus. Si enim lumen esset corpus, illuminatio esset motus localis corporis. Nullus autem motus localis corporis potest esse in instanti, quia omne quod movetur localiter, necesse est quod prius perveniat ad medium magnitudinis quam ad extremum. Illuminatio autem fit in instanti. Nec potest dici quod fiat in tempore imperceptibili. Quia in parvo spatio posset tempus latere, in magno autem spatio, puta ab oriente in occidentem, tempus latere non posset, statim enim cum sol est in puncto orientis, illuminatur totum hemisphaerium usque ad punctum oppositum. Est etiam aliud considerandum ex parte motus. Quia omne corpus habet motum naturalem determinatum, motus autem illuminationis est ad omnem partem, nec magis secundum circulum quam secundum rectitudinem. Unde manifestum est quod illuminatio non est motus localis alicuius corporis. Tertio, apparet idem ex parte generationis et corruptionis. Si enim lumen esset corpus, quando aer obtenebrescit per absentiam luminaris, sequeretur quod corpus luminis corrumperetur, et quod materia eius acciperet aliam formam. Quod non apparet, nisi aliquis dicat etiam tenebras esse corpus. Nec etiam apparet ex qua materia tantum corpus, quod replet medium hemisphaerium, quotidie generetur. Ridiculum est etiam dicere quod ad solam absentiam luminaris, tantum corpus corrumpatur. Si quis etiam dicat quod non corrumpitur, sed simul cum sole accedit et circumfertur, quid dici poterit de hoc, quod ad interpositionem alicuius corporis circa candelam, tota domus obscuratur? Nec videtur quod lumen congregetur circa candelam, quia non apparet ibi maior claritas post quam ante. Quia ergo omnia haec non solum rationi, sed sensui etiam repugnant, dicendum est quod impossibile est lumen esse corpus. I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons. First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires distinction of place. The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movement, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local movement of a body. The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before. Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.
Iª q. 67 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus accipit lucem pro corpore lucido in actu, scilicet pro igne, quod inter quatuor elementa nobilissimum est. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act--in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.
Iª q. 67 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Aristoteles lumen nominat ignem in propria materia, sicut ignis in materia aerea dicitur flamma, et in materia terrea dicitur carbo. Non tamen est multum curandum de eis exemplis quae Aristoteles inducit in libris logicalibus, quia inducit ea ut probabilia secundum opinionem aliorum. Reply to Objection 2. Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in earthly matter is "burning coal." Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers.
Iª q. 67 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa attribuuntur lumini metaphorice, sicut etiam possent attribui calori. Quia enim motus localis est naturaliter primus motuum, ut probatur in VIII Physic., utimur nominibus pertinentibus ad motum localem, in alteratione et in omnibus motibus, sicut etiam nomen distantiae derivatum est a loco ad omnia contraria, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Reply to Objection 3. All these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.
Iª q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod lux non sit qualitas. Omnis enim qualitas permanet in subiecto etiam postquam agens discesserit; sicut calor in aqua postquam removetur ab igne. Sed lumen non remanet in aere recedente luminari. Ergo lumen non est qualitas.
 Objection 1. It would seem that light is not a quality. For every quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality.
Iª q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis qualitas sensibilis habet contrarium; sicut calido contrariatur frigidum, et albo nigrum. Sed lumini nihil est contrarium, tenebra enim est privatio luminis. Ergo lumen non est qualitas sensibilis. Objection 2. Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light therefore is not a sensible quality.
Iª q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, causa est potior effectu. Sed lux caelestium corporum causat formas substantiales in istis inferioribus. Dat etiam esse spirituale coloribus, quia facit eos visibiles actu. Ergo lux non est aliqua qualitas sensibilis, sed magis substantialis forma, aut spiritualis. Objection 3. Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a substantial or spiritual form.
Iª q. 67 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in libro I, quod lux est quaedam qualitas. On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a species of quality.
Iª q. 67 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod lumen in aere non habet esse naturale, sicut color in pariete; sed esse intentionale, sicut similitudo coloris in aere. Sed hoc non potest esse, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia lumen denominat aerem, fit enim aer luminosus in actu. Color vero non denominat ipsum, non enim dicitur aer coloratus. Secundo, quia lumen habet effectum in natura, quia per radios solis calefiunt corpora. Intentiones autem non causant transmutationes naturales. Alii vero dixerunt quod lux est forma substantialis solis. Sed hoc etiam apparet impossibile, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis est per se sensibilis, quia quod quid est est obiectum intellectus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Lux autem est secundum se visibilis. Secundo, quia impossibile est ut id quod est forma substantialis in uno, sit forma accidentalis in alio, quia formae substantiali per se convenit constituere in specie; unde semper et in omnibus adest ei. Lux autem non est forma substantialis aeris, alioquin, ea recedente, corrumperetur. Unde non potest esse forma substantialis solis. Dicendum est ergo quod, sicut calor est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem ignis, ita lux est qualitas activa consequens formam substantialem solis, vel cuiuscumque alterius corporis a se lucentis, si aliquod aliud tale est. Cuius signum est, quod radii diversarum stellarum habent diversos effectus, secundum diversas naturas corporum. I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly, because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions. Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form, but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun. We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies.
Iª q. 67 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum qualitas consequatur formam substantialem, diversimode se habet subiectum ad receptionem qualitatis, sicut se habet ad receptionem formae. Cum enim materia perfecte recipit formam, firmiter stabilitur etiam qualitas consequens formam; sicut si aqua convertatur in ignem. Cum vero forma substantialis recipitur imperfecte, secundum inchoationem quandam, qualitas consequens manet quidem aliquandiu, sed non semper; sicut patet in aqua calefacta, quae redit ad suam naturam. Sed illuminatio non fit per aliquam transmutationem materiae ad susceptionem formae substantialis, ut fiat quasi inchoatio aliqua formae. Et ideo lumen non remanet nisi ad praesentiam agentis. Reply to Objection 1. Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than fully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its active cause.
Iª q. 67 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod accidit luci quod non habeat contrarium, inquantum est qualitas naturalis primi corporis alterantis, quod est a contrarietate elongatum. Reply to Objection 2. It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of change, which is itself removed from contrariety.
Iª q. 67 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut calor agit ad formam ignis quasi instrumentaliter in virtute formae substantialis, ita lumen agit quasi instrumentaliter in virtute corporum caelestium ad producendas formas substantiales, et ad hoc quod faciat colores visibiles actu, inquantum est qualitas primi corporis sensibilis. Reply to Objection 3. As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lucis productio in prima die ponatur. Est enim lux qualitas quaedam, ut dictum est. Qualitas autem, cum sit accidens, non habet rationem primi, sed magis rationem postremi. Non ergo prima die debet poni productio lucis.
 Objection 1. It would seem that the production of light is not fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above (3), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, per lucem distinguitur nox a die. Hoc autem fit per solem, qui ponitur factus die quarta. Ergo non debuit poni productio lucis prima die. Objection 2. Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been on the first day.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, nox et dies fit per circularem motum corporis lucidi. Sed circularis motus est proprius firmamenti, quod legitur factum die secunda. Ergo non debuit poni in prima die productio lucis distinguentis noctem et diem. Objection 3. Further, night and day are brought about by the circular movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought not to be assigned to the first day.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 arg. 4 Si dicatur quod intelligitur de luce spirituali, contra, lux quae legitur facta prima die, facit distinctionem a tenebris. Sed non erant in principio spirituales tenebrae, quia etiam Daemones fuerunt a principio boni, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo prima die debuit poni productio lucis. Objection 4. Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown (63, 5). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the first day.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, id sine quo non potest esse dies, oportuit fieri in prima die. Sed sine luce non potest esse dies. Ergo oportuit lucem fieri prima die. On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light. Therefore light must have been made on the first day.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de productione lucis est duplex opinio. Augustino enim videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Moysen praetermisisse spiritualis creaturae productionem. Et ideo dicit quod, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, per caelum intelligitur spiritualis natura adhuc informis, per terram autem intelligitur materia informis corporalis creaturae. Et quia natura spiritualis dignior est quam corporalis, fuit prius formanda. Formatio igitur spiritualis naturae significatur in productione lucis, ut intelligatur de luce spirituali formatio enim naturae spiritualis est per hoc quod illuminatur ut adhaereat verbo Dei. Aliis autem videtur quod sit praetermissa a Moyse productio spiritualis creaturae. Sed huius rationem diversimode assignant. Basilius enim dicit quod Moyses principium narrationis suae fecit a principio quod ad tempus pertinet sensibilium rerum; sed spiritualis natura, idest angelica, praetermittitur, quia fuit ante creata. Chrysostomus autem assignat aliam rationem. Quia Moyses loquebatur rudi populo, qui nihil nisi corporalia poterat capere; quem etiam ab idololatria revocare volebat. Assumpsissent autem idololatriae occasionem, si propositae fuissent eis aliquae substantiae supra omnes corporeas creaturas, eas enim reputassent deos, cum etiam proni essent ad hoc quod solem et lunam et stellas colerent tanquam deos; quod eis inhibetur Deut. IV. Praemissa autem fuerat Gen. I, circa creaturam corporalem multiplex informitas, una quidem in hoc quod dicebatur, terra erat inanis et vacua; alia vero in hoc quod dicebatur, tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Necessarium autem fuit ut informitas tenebrarum primo removeretur per lucis productionem, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia lux, ut dictum est, est qualitas primi corporis, unde secundum eam primo fuit mundus formandus. Secundo, propter communitatem lucis, communicant enim in ea inferiora corpora cum superioribus. Sicut autem in cognitione proceditur a communioribus, ita etiam in operatione, nam prius generatur vivum quam animal, et animal quam homo, ut dicitur in libro de Gener. Animal. Sic ergo oportuit ordinem divinae sapientiae manifestari, ut primo inter opera distinctionis produceretur lux, tanquam primi corporis forma, et tanquam communior. Basilius autem ponit tertiam rationem, quia per lucem omnia alia manifestantur. Potest et quarta ratio addi, quae in obiiciendo est tacta, quia dies non potest esse sine luce; unde oportuit in prima die fieri lucem. I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light. Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and therefore when we read, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word "heaven," and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the word "earth." And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of higher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God. Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [Hom. i in Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand. Chrysostom [Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission that Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship, since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars, which was forbidden them (Dt. 4). But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the corporeal creature. One is where we read that "the earth was void and empty," and another where it is said that "darkness was upon the face of the deep." Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of the first body, as was stated (3), and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The second reason is because light is a common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before the man, as is shown in De Gener. Anim. ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is more common quality. Basil [Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth, already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first day.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum opinionem quae ponit informitatem materiae duratione praecedere formationem, oportet dicere quod materia a principio fuerit creata sub formis substantialibus; postmodum vero fuerit formata secundum aliquas conditiones accidentales, inter quas primum locum obtinet lux. Reply to Objection 1. According to the opinion of those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light holds the first place.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt lucem illam fuisse quandam nubem lucidam, quae postmodum, facto sole, in materiam praeiacentem rediit. Sed istud non est conveniens. Quia Scriptura in principio Genesis commemorat institutionem naturae, quae postmodum perseverat, unde non debet dici quod aliquid tunc factum fuerit, quod postmodum esse desierit. Et ideo alii dicunt quod illa nubes lucida adhuc remanet, et est coniuncta soli, ut ab eo discerni non possit. Sed secundum hoc, illa nubes superflua remaneret, nihil autem est vanum in operibus Dei. Et ideo alii dicunt quod ex illa nube formatum est corpus solis. Sed hoc etiam dici non potest, si ponatur corpus solis non esse de natura quatuor elementorum, sed esse incorruptibile per naturam quia secundum hoc, materia eius non potest esse sub alia forma. Et ideo est dicendum, ut Dionysius dicit IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod illa lux fuit lux solis, sed adhuc informis, quantum ad hoc, quod iam erat substantia solis, et habebat virtutem illuminativam in communi; sed postmodum data est ei specialis et determinata virtus ad particulares effectus. Et secundum hoc, in productione huius lucis distincta est lux a tenebris, quantum ad tria. Primo quidem, quantum ad causam, secundum quod in substantia solis erat causa luminis, in opacitate autem terrae causa tenebrarum. Secundo, quantum ad locum, quia in uno hemisphaerio erat lumen, in alio tenebrae. Tertio, quantum ad tempus, quia in eodem hemisphaerio secundum unam partem temporis erat lumen, secundum aliam tenebrae. Et hoc est quod dicitur, lucem vocavit diem, et tenebras noctem. Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this returned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot well be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time afterwards ceased to exist. Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is superfluous, whereas none of God's works have been made in vain. On this account it is held by some that the sun's body was made out of this nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and naturally incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on another form. I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the sun's light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was afterwards added the special and determinative power required to produce determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple distinction was made between light and darkness. First, as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we have the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there was light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there was light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere; and this is signified by the words, "He called the light day, and the darkness night."
Iª q. 67 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Basilius dicit lucem et tenebras tunc fuisse per emissionem et contractionem luminis, et non per motum. Sed contra hoc obiicit Augustinus quod nulla ratio esset huius vicissitudinis emittendi et retrahendi luminis; cum homines et animalia non essent, quorum usibus hoc deserviret. Et praeterea hoc non habet natura corporis lucidi, ut retrahat lumen in sui praesentia, sed miraculose potest hoc fieri, in prima autem institutione naturae non quaeritur miraculum, sed quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit. Et ideo dicendum est quod duplex est motus in caelo. Unus communis toti caelo, qui facit diem et noctem, et iste videtur institutus primo die. Alius autem est, qui diversificatur per diversa corpora; secundum quos motus fit diversitas dierum ad invicem, et mensium et annorum. Et ideo in prima die fit mentio de sola distinctione noctis et diei, quae fit per motum communem. In quarta autem die fit mentio de diversitate dierum et temporum et annorum, cum dicitur, ut sint in tempora et dies et annos; quae quidem diversitas fit per motus proprios. Reply to Objection 3. Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and night were then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by movement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for whose service this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is actually present; though this might be effected by a miracle. As to this, however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the first founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but for what is in accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the movement of the heavens is twofold. Of these movements, one is common to the entire heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in proportion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is the cause of the succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that in the account of the first day the distinction between day and night alone is mentioned; this distinction being brought about by the common movement of the heavens. The further distinction into successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth day, in the words, "let them be for seasons, and for days, and years" is due to proper movements.
Iª q. 67 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, informitas non praecedit formationem duratione. Unde oportet dicere quod per lucis productionem intelligatur formatio spiritualis creaturae non quae est per gloriam perfecta, cum qua creata non fuit; sed quae est per gratiam perfecta, cum qua creata fuit, ut dictum est. Per hanc ergo lucem facta est divisio a tenebris, idest ab informitate alterius creaturae non formatae. Vel, si tota creatura simul formata fuit, facta est distinctio a tenebris spiritualibus, non quae tunc essent (quia Diabolus non fuit creatus malus); sed quas Deus futuras praevidit. Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,15), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must understand the production of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in which they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which they possessed from their creation as said above (62, 3). Thus the division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form. But if all created things received their form at the same time, the darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw would exist.
Iª q. 68 pr. Deinde considerandum est de opere secundae diei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum firmamentum sit factum secunda die. Secundo, utrum aliquae aquae sint supra firmamentum. Tertio, utrum firmamentum dividat aquas ab aquis. Quarto, utrum sit unum caelum tantum, vel plures.
Iª q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod firmamentum non sit factum secunda die. Dicitur enim Gen. I, vocavit Deus firmamentum caelum. Sed caelum factum est ante omnem diem, ut patet cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Ergo firmamentum non est factum secunda die.
 Objection 1. It would seem that the firmament was not made on the second day. For it is said (Genesis 1:8): "God called the firmament heaven." But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.
Iª q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, opera sex dierum ordinantur secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae. Non conveniret autem divinae sapientiae, ut posterius faceret quod est naturaliter prius. Firmamentum autem est naturaliter prius aqua et terra, de quibus tamen fit mentio ante formationem lucis, quae fuit prima die. Non ergo firmamentum factum est secunda die. Objection 2. Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to the order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine wisdom to make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are mentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.
Iª q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne quod est factum per sex dies, formatum est ex materia prius creata ante omnem diem. Sed firmamentum non potuit formari ex materia praeexistente, quia sic esset generabile et corruptibile. Ergo firmamentum non est factum secunda die. Objection 3. Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.
Iª q. 68 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, dixit Deus, fiat firmamentum. Et postea sequitur, et factum est vespere et mane dies secundus. On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:6): "God said: let there be a firmament," and further on (verse 8); "And the evening and morning were the second day."
Iª q. 68 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus docet, in huiusmodi quaestionibus duo sunt observanda. Primo quidem, ut veritas Scripturae inconcusse teneatur. Secundo, cum Scriptura divina multipliciter exponi possit, quod nulli expositioni aliquis ita praecise inhaereat quod, si certa ratione constiterit hoc esse falsum, quod aliquis sensum Scripturae esse asserere praesumat, ne Scriptura ex hoc ab infidelibus derideatur, et ne eis via credendi praecludatur. Sciendum est ergo quod hoc quod legitur firmamentum secunda die factum, dupliciter intelligi potest. Uno modo, de firmamento in quo sunt sidera. Et secundum hoc, oportet nos diversimode exponere secundum diversas opiniones hominum de firmamento. Quidam enim dixerunt firmamentum illud esse ex elementis compositum. Et haec fuit opinio Empedoclis; qui tamen dixit ideo illud corpus indissolubile esse, quia in eius compositione lis non erat sed amicitia tantum. Alii vero dixerunt firmamentum esse de natura quatuor elementorum non quasi ex elementis compositum, sed quasi elementum simplex. Et haec opinio fuit Platonis, qui posuit corpus caeleste esse elementum ignis. Alii vero dixerunt caelum non esse de natura quatuor elementorum, sed esse quintum corpus, praeter quatuor elementa. Et haec est opinio Aristotelis. Secundum igitur primam opinionem, absolute posset concedi quod firmamentum factum fuerit secunda die, etiam secundum suam substantiam. Nam ad opus creationis pertinet producere ipsam elementorum substantiam, ad opus autem distinctionis et ornatus pertinet formare aliqua ex praeexistentibus elementis. Secundum vero opinionem Platonis, non est conveniens quod firmamentum credatur secundum suam substantiam esse factum secunda die. Nam facere firmamentum, secundum hoc, est producere elementum ignis. Productio autem elementorum pertinet ad opus creationis, secundum eos qui ponunt informitatem materiae tempore praecedere formationem, quia formae elementorum sunt quae primo adveniunt materiae. Multo autem minus secundum opinionem Aristotelis poni potest quod firmamentum secundum suam substantiam sit secunda die productum, secundum quod per istos dies successio temporis designatur. Quia caelum, cum sit secundum suam naturam incorruptibile, habet materiam quae non potest subesse alteri formae, unde impossibile est quod firmamentum sit factum ex materia prius tempore existente. Unde productio substantiae firmamenti ad opus creationis pertinet. Sed aliqua formatio eius, secundum has duas opiniones, pertinet ad opus secundae diei, sicut etiam Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod lumen solis fuit informe in primo triduo, et postea fuit in quarta die formatum. Si autem per istos dies non designetur temporis successio, sed solum ordo naturae, ut Augustinus vult; nihil prohibebit dicere, secundum quamcumque harum opinionum formationem secundum substantiam firmamenti ad secundam diem pertinere. Potest autem et alio modo intelligi, ut per firmamentum quod legitur secunda die factum, non intelligatur firmamentum illud in quo fixae sunt stellae, sed illa pars aeris in qua condensantur nubes. Et dicitur firmamentum propter spissitudinem aeris in parte illa, nam quod est spissum et solidum, dicitur esse corpus firmum, ad differentiam corporis mathematici, ut dicit Basilius. Et secundum hanc expositionem, nihil repugnans sequitur cuicumque opinioni. Unde Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., hanc expositionem commendans, dicit, hanc considerationem laude dignissimam iudico; quod enim dixit, neque est contra fidem, et in promptu, posito documento, credi potest. I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing. We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32). According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist. But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation, since the first form received by matter is the elemental. Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing antecedently in time. Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form. If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day. Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air. "For a body is called firm," that is dense and solid, "thereby differing from a mathematical body" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: "I consider this view of the question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed."
Iª q. 68 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Chrysostomum, primo Moyses summarie dixit quid Deus fecit, praemittens, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, postea per partes explicavit. Sicut si quis dicat, hic artifex fecit domum istam, et postea subdat, primo fecit fundamenta, et postea erexit parietes, tertio superposuit tectum. Et sic non oportet nos aliud caelum intelligere, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram; et cum dicitur quod secunda die factum est firmamentum. Potest etiam dici aliud esse caelum quod legitur in principio creatum, et quod legitur secunda die factum. Et hoc diversimode. Nam secundum Augustinum, caelum quod legitur primo die factum, est natura spiritualis informis, caelum autem quod legitur secunda die factum, est caelum corporeum. Secundum vero Bedam et Strabum, caelum quod legitur primo die factum, est caelum Empyreum, firmamentum vero quod legitur secunda die factum, est caelum sidereum. Secundum vero Damascenum, caelum quod legitur prima die factum, est quoddam caelum sphaericum sine stellis, de quo philosophi loquuntur, dicentes ipsum esse nonam sphaeram et mobile primum, quod movetur motu diurno, per firmamentum vero factum secunda die, intelligitur caelum sidereum. Secundum autem aliam expositionem, quam Augustinus tangit, caelum prima die factum, est etiam ipsum caelum sidereum, per firmamentum vero secunda die factum, intelligitur spatium aeris in quo nubes condensantur, quod etiam caelum aequivoce dicitur. Et ideo, ad aequivocationem designandam, signanter dicitur, vocavit Deus firmamentum caelum; sicut et supra dixerat, vocavit lucem diem (quia dies etiam pro spatio vigintiquatuor horarum ponitur). Et idem est in aliis observandum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit. Reply to Objection 1. According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and then proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as one might say: "This house was constructed by that builder," and then add: " First, he laid the foundations, then built the walls, and thirdly, put on the roof." In accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and when we read that the firmament was made on the second day. We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning is not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several senses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9) that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corporeal heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made on the second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) that of the first day was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal movement: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by Augustine [Gen. ad lit. ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that "God called the firmament heaven"; just as in a preceding verse it said that "God called the light day" (since the word "day" is also used to denote a space of twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed out by Rabbi Moses.
Iª q. 68 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum et tertium patet solutio ex supra dictis. The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has been already said.
Iª q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aquae non sunt supra firmamentum. Aqua enim est naturaliter gravis. Locus autem proprius gravis non est esse sursum, sed solum deorsum. Ergo aquae non sunt supra firmamentum.
 Objection 1. It would seem that there are not waters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.
Iª q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, naturaliter aqua est fluida. Sed quod est fluidum, non potest consistere super corpus rotundum, ut experimento patet. Ergo, cum firmamentum sit corpus rotundum, aqua non potest esse supra firmamentum. Objection 2. Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a sphere, there cannot be water above it.
Iª q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, aqua, cum sit elementum, ordinatur ad generationem corporis mixti; sicut imperfectum ordinatur ad perfectum. Sed supra firmamentum non est locus mixtionis, sed supra terram. Ergo frustra aqua esset supra firmamentum. Nihil autem in operibus Dei est frustra. Ergo aquae non sunt supra firmamentum. Objection 3. Further, water is an element, and appointed to the generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which imperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that water would be useless there. But none of God's works are useless. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.
Iª q. 68 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, quod divisit aquas quae erant supra firmamentum, ab his quae erant sub firmamento. On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:7): "(God) divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament."
Iª q. 68 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, II super Gen. ad Litt., maior est Scripturae huius auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii capacitas. Unde quomodo et quales aquae ibi sint, eas tamen ibi esse, minime dubitamus. Quales autem sint illae aquae, non eodem modo ab omnibus assignatur. Origenes enim dicit quod aquae illae quae super caelos sunt, sunt spirituales substantiae, unde in Psalmo CXLVIII, dicitur, aquae quae super caelos sunt, laudent nomen domini; et Dan. III, benedicite, aquae omnes quae super caelos sunt, domino. Sed ad hoc respondet Basilius, in III Hexaem., quod hoc non dicitur eo quod aquae sint rationales creaturae; sed quia consideratio earum, prudenter a sensum habentibus contemplata, glorificationem perficit creatoris. Unde ibidem dicitur idem de igne et grandine et huiusmodi, de quibus constat quod non sunt rationales creaturae. Dicendum est ergo quod sunt aquae corporales. Sed quales aquae sint, oportet diversimode definire, secundum diversam de firmamento sententiam. Si enim per firmamentum intelligitur caelum sidereum quod ponitur esse de natura quatuor elementorum, pari ratione et aquae quae super caelos sunt, eiusdem naturae poterunt credi cum elementaribus aquis. Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur caelum sidereum quod non sit de natura quatuor elementorum, tunc et aquae illae quae sunt supra firmamentum, non erunt de natura elementarium aquarum, sed sicut, secundum Strabum, dicitur caelum Empyreum, idest igneum, propter solum splendorem; ita dicetur aliud caelum aqueum propter solam diaphaneitatem, quod est supra caelum sidereum. Posito etiam quod firmamentum sit alterius naturae praeter quatuor elementa, adhuc potest dici quod aquas dividit, si per aquam non elementum aquae, sed materiam informem corporum intelligamus, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. contra Manich., quia secundum hoc, quidquid est inter corpora, dividit aquas ab aquis. Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur pars aeris in qua nubes condensantur, sic aquae quae supra firmamentum sunt, sunt aquae quae, vaporabiliter resolutae, supra aliquam partem aeris elevantur ex quibus pluviae generantur. Dicere enim quod aquae vaporabiliter resolutae eleventur supra caelum sidereum, ut quidam dixerunt, quorum opinionem Augustinus tangit in II super Gen. ad Litt. est omnino impossibile. Tum propter soliditatem caeli. Tum propter regionem ignis mediam, quae huiusmodi vapores consumeret. Tum quia locus quo feruntur levia et rara, est infra concavum orbis lunae. Tum etiam quia sensibiliter apparet vapores non elevari usque ad cacumina quorundam montium. Quod etiam dicunt de rarefactione corporis in infinitum, propter hoc quod corpus est in infinitum divisibile, vanum est. Non enim corpus naturale in infinitum dividitur aut rarefit, sed usque ad certum terminum. I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there." As to the nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in Gen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are "spiritual substances." Wherefore it is written (Psalm 148:4): "Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord," and (Daniel 3:60): "Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the Lord."To this Basil answers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these waters are rational creatures, but that "the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the Creator." Hence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same way, though no one would attribute reason to these. We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact nature will be differently defined according as opinions on the firmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters. If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the intervening region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to show the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain point only.
Iª q. 68 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quibusdam videtur ratio illa solvenda per hoc, quod aquae, quamvis sint naturaliter graves, virtute tamen divina super caelos continentur. Sed hanc solutionem Augustinus excludit, II Lib. super Gen. ad Litt., dicens quod nunc quemadmodum Deus instituit naturas rerum convenit quaerere; non quid in eis ad miraculum suae potentiae velit operari. Unde aliter dicendum est quod, secundum duas ultimas opiniones de aquis et firmamento, patet solutio ex praemissis. Secundum autem primam opinionem, oportet ponere alium ordinem in elementis quam Aristoteles ponat; ut quaedam aquae spissae sint circa terram, quaedam vero tenues circa caelum; ut sic se habeant illae ad caelum, sicut istae ad terram. Vel quod per aquam intelligatur materia corporum, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in its place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1), however will not admit this solution, but says "It is our business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way of miracle." We leave this view, then, and answer that according to the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears from what has been said. According to the first opinion, an order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven. Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to be signified.
Iª q. 68 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum etiam patet solutio ex praemissis, secundum duas ultimas opiniones. Secundum vero primam, respondet Basilius dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non est necessarium ut omne quod in concavo apparet rotundum, sit etiam supra rotundum secundum convexum. Secundo, quia aquae quae sunt supra caelos, non sunt fluidae; sed quasi glaciali soliditate circa caelum firmatae. Unde et a quibusdam dicuntur caelum crystallinum. Reply to Objection 2. The solution is clear from what has been said, according to the last two opinions. But according to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.
Iª q. 68 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum tertiam opinionem, aquae sunt supra firmamentum vaporabiliter elevatae propter utilitatem pluviarum. Secundum vero secundam opinionem, aquae sunt supra firmamentum, idest caelum totum diaphanum absque stellis. Quod quidam ponunt primum mobile, quod revolvit totum caelum motu diurno, ut operetur per motum diurnum continuitatem generationis, sicut caelum in quo sunt sidera, per motum qui est secundum zodiacum, operatur diversitatem generationis et corruptionis, per accessum et recessum, et per diversas virtutes stellarum. Secundum vero primam opinionem, aquae sunt ibi, ut Basilius dicit, ad contemperandum calorem caelestium corporum. Cuius signum acceperunt aliqui, ut Augustinus dicit, quod stella Saturni, propter vicinitatem aquarum superiorum, est frigidissima. Reply to Objection 3. According to the third opinion given, the waters above the firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve to give rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences. But according to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved by the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that are above the firmament.
Iª q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod firmamentum non dividat aquas ab aquis. Unius enim corporis secundum speciem, est unus locus naturalis. Sed omnis aqua omni aquae est eadem specie, ut dicit philosophus. Non ergo aquae ab aquis sunt distinguendae secundum locum.
 Objection 1. It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i, 6): "All water is the same species." Water therefore cannot be distinct from water by place.
Iª q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2 Si dicatur quod aquae illae quae sunt supra firmamentum, sunt alterius speciei ab aquis quae sunt sub firmamento, contra, ea quae sunt secundum speciem diversa, non indigent aliquo alio distinguente. Si ergo aquae superiores et inferiores specie differunt, firmamentum eas ab invicem non distinguit. Objection 2. Further, should it be said that the waters above the firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be argued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing else to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it is not the firmament that distinguishes them.
Iª q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud videtur aquas ab aquis distinguere, quod ex utraque parte ab aquis contingitur; sicut si aliquis paries fabricetur in medio fluminis. Manifestum est autem quod aquae inferiores non pertingunt usque ad firmamentum. Ergo non dividit firmamentum aquas ab aquis. Objection 3. Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from waters must be something which is in contact with them on either side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.
Iª q. 68 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, fiat firmamentum in medio aquarum, et dividat aquas ab aquis. On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:6): "Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from the waters."
Iª q. 68 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis, considerando superficie tenus litteram Genesis, posset talem imaginationem concipere, secundum quorundam antiquorum philosophorum positionem. Posuerunt enim quidam aquam esse quoddam infinitum corpus, et omnium aliorum corporum principium. Quam quidem immensitatem aquarum accipere posset in nomine abyssi, cum dicitur quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi. Ponebant etiam quod istud caelum sensibile quod videmus, non continet infra se omnia corporalia; sed est infinitum aquarum corpus supra caelum. Et ita posset aliquis dicere quod firmamentum caeli dividit aquas exteriores ab aquis interioribus, idest ab omnibus corporibus quae infra caelum continentur, quorum principium aquam ponebant. Sed quia ista positio per veras rationes falsa deprehenditur, non est dicendum hunc esse intellectum Scripturae. Sed considerandum est quod Moyses rudi populo loquebatur, quorum imbecillitati condescendens, illa solum eis proposuit, quae manifeste sensui apparent. Omnes autem, quantumcumque rudes, terram et aquam esse corpora sensu deprehendunt. Aer autem non percipitur ab omnibus esse corpus, intantum quod etiam quidam philosophi aerem dixerunt nihil esse, plenum aere vacuum nominantes. Et ideo Moyses de aqua et terra mentionem facit expressam, aerem autem non expresse nominat, ne rudibus quoddam ignotum proponeret. Ut tamen capacibus veritatem exprimeret, dat locum intelligendi aerem, significans ipsum quasi aquae annexum, cum dicit quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi; per quod datur intelligi super faciem aquae esse aliquod corpus diaphanum quod est subiectum lucis et tenebrarum. Sic igitur sive per firmamentum intelligamus caelum in quo sunt sidera, sive spatium aeris nubilosum, convenienter dicitur quod firmamentum dividit aquas ab aquis, secundum quod per aquam materia informis significatur; vel secundum quod omnia corpora diaphana sub nomine aquarum intelliguntur. Nam caelum sidereum distinguit corpora inferiora diaphana a superioribus. Aer vero nubilosus distinguit superiorem aeris partem, in qua generantur pluviae et huiusmodi impressiones, ab inferiori parte aeris, quae aquae connectitur, et sub nomine aquarum intelligitur. I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain philosophers of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite in dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the word "deep" might be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not all corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above that heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the waters without from those within--that is to say, from all bodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the principle of them all. As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum. Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the existence of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air. Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water and included under that name.
Iª q. 68 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si per firmamentum intelligatur caelum sidereum, aquae superiores non sunt eiusdem speciei cum inferioribus. Si autem per firmamentum intelligatur nubilosus aer, tunc utraeque aquae sunt eiusdem speciei. Et deputantur tunc duo loca aquis non eadem ratione; sed locus superior est locus generationis aquarum, locus autem inferior est locus quietis earum. Reply to Objection 1. If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven, the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned to them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose.
Iª q. 68 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si accipiantur aquae diversae secundum speciem, firmamentum dicitur dividere aquas ab aquis, non sicut causa faciens divisionem; sed sicut terminus utrarumque aquarum. Reply to Objection 2. If the waters are held to differ in species, the firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of their destruction, but only as the boundary of each.
Iª q. 68 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Moyses, propter invisibilitatem aeris et similium corporum, omnia huiusmodi corpora sub aquae nomine comprehendit. Et sic manifestum est quod ex utraque parte firmamenti, qualitercumque accepti, sunt aquae. Reply to Objection 3. On account of the air and other similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water, and thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the firmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used.
Iª q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit unum caelum tantum. Caelum enim contra terram dividitur, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Sed terra est una tantum. Ergo et caelum est unum tantum.
 Objection 1. It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only one heaven.
Iª q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne quod constat ex tota sua materia est unum tantum. Sed caelum est huiusmodi, ut probat philosophus in I de caelo. Ergo caelum est unum tantum. Objection 2. Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher proves (De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven.
Iª q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, quidquid dicitur de pluribus univoce, dicitur de eis secundum unam rationem communem. Sed si sunt plures caeli, caelum dicitur univoce de pluribus, quia si aequivoce, non proprie dicerentur plures caeli. Oportet ergo, si dicuntur plures caeli, quod sit aliqua ratio communis, secundum quam caeli dicantur. Hanc autem non est assignare. Non est ergo dicendum quod sint plures caeli. Objection 3. Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then, they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which each is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven.
Iª q. 68 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXLVIII, laudate eum, caeli caelorum. On the contrary, It is said (Psalm 148:4): "Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens."
Iª q. 68 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc videtur esse quaedam diversitas inter Basilium et Chrysostomum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus non esse nisi unum caelum; et quod pluraliter dicitur, caeli caelorum, hoc est propter proprietatem linguae Hebraeae, in qua consuetum est ut caelum solum pluraliter significetur; sicut sunt etiam multa nomina in Latino quae singulari carent. Basilius autem, et Damascenus sequens eum, dicunt plures esse caelos. Sed haec diversitas magis est in voce quam in re. Nam Chrysostomus unum caelum nominat totum corpus quod est supra terram et aquam, nam etiam aves, quae volant in aere, dicuntur propter hoc volucres caeli. Sed quia in isto corpore sunt multae distinctiones, propter hoc Basilius posuit plures caelos. Ad distinctionem ergo caelorum sciendam, considerandum est quod caelum tripliciter dicitur in Scripturis. Quandoque enim dicitur proprie et naturaliter. Et sic dicitur caelum corpus aliquod sublime, et luminosum actu vel potentia, et incorruptibile per naturam. Et secundum hoc, ponuntur tres caeli. Primum totaliter lucidum, quod vocant Empyreum. Secundum totaliter diaphanum, quod vocant caelum aqueum vel crystallinum. Tertium partim diaphanum et partim lucidum actu, quod vocant caelum sidereum, et dividitur in octo sphaeras, scilicet in sphaeram stellarum fixarum, et septem sphaeras planetarum; quae possunt dici octo caeli. Secundo dicitur caelum per participationem alicuius proprietatis caelestis corporis, scilicet sublimitatis et luminositatis actu vel potentia. Et sic totum illud spatium quod est ab aquis usque ad orbem lunae, Damascenus ponit unum caelum, nominans illud aereum. Et sic, secundum eum, sunt tres caeli, aereum, sidereum, et aliud superius, de quo intelligit quod apostolus legitur raptus usque ad tertium caelum. Sed quia istud spatium continet duo elementa, scilicet ignis et aeris, et in utroque eorum vocatur superior et inferior regio; ideo istud caelum Rabanus distinguit in quatuor, supremam regionem ignis nominans caelum igneum; inferiorem vero regionem, caelum Olympium, ab altitudine cuiusdam montis qui vocatur Olympus; supremam vero regionem aeris vocavit caelum aethereum, propter inflammationem; inferiorem vero regionem, caelum aereum. Et sic, cum isti quatuor caeli tribus superioribus connumerantur, fiunt in universo, secundum Rabanum, septem caeli corporei. Tertio dicitur caelum metaphorice. Et sic quandoque ipsa sancta Trinitas dicitur caelum, propter eius spiritualem sublimitatem et lucem. De quo caelo exponitur Diabolum dixisse, ascendam in caelum, idest ad aequalitatem Dei. Quandoque etiam spiritualia bona in quibus est sanctorum remuneratio, propter eorum eminentiam caeli nominantur; ubi dicitur, merces vestra multa est in caelis, ut Augustinus exponit. Quandoque vero tria genera supernaturalium visionum, scilicet corporalis, imaginariae et intellectualis tres caeli nominantur. De quibus Augustinus exponit quod Paulus est raptus usque ad tertium caelum. I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words 'heavens of heavens' are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven [Ps. 8:9. But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one. In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the spheres of the planets. In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was "rapt to the third heaven." But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus. Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, "I will ascend into heaven"; whereby the evil spirit is represented as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the words, "Your reward is very great in heaven" (Matthew 5:12). Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to which Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul's rapture "to the third heaven."
Iª q. 68 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod terra se habet ad caelum, ut centrum ad circumferentiam. Circa unum autem centrum possunt esse multae circumferentiae. Unde una terra existente, multi caeli ponuntur. Reply to Objection 1. The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heavens.
Iª q. 68 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de caelo, secundum quod importat universitatem creaturarum corporalium. Sic enim est unum caelum tantum. Reply to Objection 2. The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it is one.
Iª q. 68 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in omnibus caelis invenitur communiter sublimitas et aliqua luminositas, ut ex dictis patet. Reply to Objection 3. All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.
Iª q. 69 pr. Deinde considerandum est de opere tertiae diei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, de congregatione aquarum. Secundo, de productione plantarum.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aquarum congregatio non convenienter dicatur facta tertia die. Ea enim quae facta sunt prima et secunda die, verbo factionis exprimuntur, dicitur enim, dixit Deus fiat lux, et, fiat firmamentum. Sed tertia dies condividitur duabus primis. Ergo opus tertiae diei debuit exprimi verbo factionis, et non solum verbo congregationis.
 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been "made" in the words, "God said: Be light made," and "Let there be a firmament made."But the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third day should have been described as a making not as a gathering together.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, terra prius undique erat aquis cooperta, propter hoc enim invisibilis dicebatur. Non erat ergo aliquis locus super terram, in quo aquae congregari possent. Objection 2. Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described as "invisible" [66, 1, Objection 1]. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, quae non sunt continuata ad invicem, non habent unum locum. Sed non omnes aquae habent ad invicem continuitatem. Ergo non sunt omnes aquae congregatae in unum locum. Objection 3. Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, and therefore all were not gathered together into one place.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, congregatio ad motum localem pertinet. Sed aquae naturaliter videntur fluentes, et ad mare currentes. Non ergo fuit necessarium ad hoc divinum praeceptum adhiberi. Objection 4. Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement. But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea. In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, terra etiam in principio suae creationis nominatur, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur tertia die nomen terrae impositum. Objection 5. Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 s. c. Sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hic oportet aliter dicere secundum expositionem Augustini, et aliorum sanctorum. Augustinus enim in omnibus his operibus non ponit durationis ordinem, sed solum originis et naturae. Dicit enim primo creatam naturam spiritualem informem, et naturam corporalem absque omni forma (quam dicit primo significari nomine terrae et aquae), non quia haec informitas formationem praecesserit tempore, sed origine tantum. Neque una formatio, secundum eum, praecessit aliam duratione; sed solum naturae ordine. Secundum quem ordinem necesse fuit ut primo poneretur formatio supremae naturae, scilicet spiritualis, per hoc quod legitur prima die lux facta. Sicut autem spiritualis natura praeeminet corporali, ita superiora corpora praeeminent inferioribus. Unde secundo loco tangitur formatio superiorum corporum, cum dicitur, fiat firmamentum; per quod intelligitur impressio formae caelestis in materiam informem, non prius existentem tempore, sed origine tantum. Tertio vero loco ponitur impressio formarum elementarium in materiam informem, non tempore, sed origine praecedentem. Unde per hoc quod dicitur, congregentur aquae, et appareat arida, intelligitur quod materiae corporali impressa est forma substantialis aquae, per quam competit sibi talis motus; et forma substantialis terrae, per quam competit sibi sic videri. Sed secundum alios sanctos, in his operibus etiam ordo durationis attenditur, ponunt enim quod, informitas materiae tempore praecessit formationem, et una formatio aliam. Sed informitas materiae, secundum eos, non intelligitur carentia omnis formae quia iam erat caelum et aqua et terra (quae tria nominantur tanquam manifeste sensu perceptibilia), sed intelligitur informitas materiae carentia debitae distinctionis, et consummatae cuiusdam pulchritudinis. Et secundum haec tria nomina, posuit Scriptura tres informitates. Ad caelum enim, quod est superius, pertinet informitas tenebrarum, quia ex eo est origo luminis. Informitas vero aquae, quae est media, significatur nomine abyssi, quia hoc nomen significat quandam immensitatem inordinatam aquarum, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum. Informitas vero terrae tangitur in hoc quod dicitur, quod terra erat invisibilis vel inanis, per hoc quod erat aquis cooperta. Sic igitur formatio supremi corporis facta est prima die. Et quia tempus sequitur motum caeli, tempus autem est numerus motus supremi corporis; per huiusmodi formationem facta est distinctio temporis, noctis scilicet et diei. Secundo vero die formatum est medium corpus, scilicet aqua, per firmamentum accipiens quandam distinctionem et ordinem (ita quod sub nomine aquae etiam alia comprehenduntur, ut supra dictum est). Tertio vero die formatum est ultimum corpus, scilicet terra, per hoc quod discooperta est aquis; et facta est distinctio in infimo, quae dicitur terrae et maris. Unde satis congrue, sicut informitatem terrae expresserat dicens quod terra erat invisibilis vel inanis, ita eius formationem exprimit per hoc quod dicit, et appareat arida. I answer that, It is necessary to reply differently to this question according to the different interpretations given by Augustine and other holy writers. In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated by the words "earth" and "water." Not that this formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, "Let there be made a firmament," by which is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only. But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Therefore the words, "Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land appear," mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance. According, however, to other holy writers [66, 1] an order of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form another, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies the total absence of form, since heaven, earth, and water already existed, since these three are named as already clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty, and in respect of these three Scripture mentions three kinds of formlessness. Heaven, the highest of them, was without form so long as "darkness" filled it, because it was the source of light. The formlessness of water, which holds the middle place, is called the "deep," because, as Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this word signifies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the formless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said to be "void" or "invisible," because it was covered by the waters. Thus, then, the formation of the highest body took place on the first day. And since time results from the movement of the heaven, and is the numerical measure of the movement of the highest body, from this formation, resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night and day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was formed, receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and order (so that water be understood as including certain other things, as explained above (68, 3)). On the third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted the distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence Scripture, having clearly expresses the manner in which it received its form by the equally suitable words, "Let the dry land appear."
Iª q. 69 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, ideo in opere tertiae diei non utitur Scriptura verbo factionis, sicut in praecedentibus operibus, ut ostendatur quod superiores formae, scilicet spirituales Angelorum, et caelestium corporum, sunt perfectae in esse et stabiles; formae vero inferiorum corporum sunt imperfectae et mobiles. Et ideo per congregationem aquarum et apparentiam aridae, impressio talium formarum designatur, aqua enim est labiliter fluxa, terra stabiliter fixa, ut ipse dicit in II super Gen. ad Litt. Secundum vero alios, dicendum est quod opus tertiae diei est perfectum secundum solum motum localem. Et ideo non oportuit quod Scriptura uteretur verbo factionis. Reply to Objection 1. According to Augustine [Gen. ad lit. ii, 7,8; iii, 20], Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For "water," to use Augustine's words, "glides and flows away, the earth abides" (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that the work of the third day was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to place, and that for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of it as made.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum patet solutio secundum Augustinum, quia non oportet dicere quod terra primo esset cooperta aquis, et postmodum sint aquae congregatae; sed quod in tali congregatione fuerunt productae. Secundum vero alios, tripliciter respondetur, ut Augustinus dicit, I super Gen. ad Litt. Uno modo, ut aquae in maiorem altitudinem sint elevatae in loco ubi sunt congregatae. Nam mare esse altius terra experimento compertum est in mari rubro, ut Basilius dicit. Secundo, ut dicatur quod rarior aqua velut nebula, terras tegebat, quae congregatione densata est. Tertio modo, ut dicatur quod terra potuit aliquas partes praebere concavas, quibus confluentes aquae reciperentur. Inter quas prima videtur probabilior. Reply to Objection 2. This argument is easily solved, according to Augustine's opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that these were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced in this very gathering together. But according to the other writers there are three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen. ad lit. i, 12). The first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the land, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous, which was afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together. The third suggests the existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most probable.
Iª q. 69 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes aquae unum terminum habent, scilicet mare, in quod confluunt vel manifestis vel occultis meatibus. Et propter hoc dicuntur aquae congregari in unum locum. Vel dicit unum locum, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad locum terrae siccae; ut sit sensus, congregentur aquae in unum locum, idest, seorsum a terra sicca. Nam ad designandam pluralitatem locorum aquae, subdit quod congregationes aquarum appellavit maria. Reply to Objection 3. All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, "one place" is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, "Let the waters be gathered together in one place," that is, apart from the dry land. That the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by the words that follow, "The gathering together of the waters He called Seas."
Iª q. 69 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod iussio Dei naturalem motum corporibus praebet. Unde dicitur quod suis naturalibus motibus faciunt verbum eius. Vel potest dici quod naturale esset quod aqua undique esset circa terram, sicut aer undique est circa aquam et terram; sed propter necessitatem finis, ut scilicet animalia et plantae essent super terram, oportuit quod aliqua pars terrae esset discooperta aquis. Quod quidem aliqui philosophi attribuunt actioni solis, per elevationem vaporum desiccantis terram. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit hoc potestati divinae, non solum in Genesi, sed etiam in Iob XXXVIII, ubi ex persona domini dicitur, circumdedi mare terminis meis; et Ierem. V, me ergo non timebitis, ait dominus, qui posui arenam terminum mari? Reply to Objection 4. The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement and by these natural movements they are said to "fulfill His word." Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that plants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers attribute this uncovering of the earth's surface to the action of the sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture, however, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person of the Lord it is said, "I set My bounds around the sea," and Jer. 5:22, where it is written: "Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the sea?"
Iª q. 69 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, per terram de qua primo fiebat mentio, intelligitur materia prima, nunc autem intelligitur ipsum elementum terrae. Vel potest dici, secundum Basilium, quod primo nominabatur terra secundum naturam suam, nunc autem nominatur ex sua principali proprietate, quae est siccitas. Unde dicitur quod vocavit aridam, terram. Vel potest dici, secundum Rabbi Moysen, quod ubicumque dicitur vocavit, significatur aequivocatio nominis. Unde prius dictum est quod vocavit lucem, diem, propter hoc quod etiam dies vocatur spatium vigintiquatuor horarum, secundum quod ibidem dicitur, factum est vespere et mane dies unus. Similiter dicitur quod firmamentum, idest aerem, vocavit caelum, quia etiam caelum dicitur quod est primo creatum. Similiter etiam dicitur hic quod aridam, idest illam partem quae est discooperta aquis, vocavit terram, prout distinguitur contra mare, quamvis communi nomine terra vocetur, sive sit aquis cooperta, sive discooperta. Intelligitur autem ubique per hoc quod dicitur vocavit, idest, dedit naturam vel proprietatem ut possit sic vocari. Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned, but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself. Again it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here in respect of its principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it is written: "He called the dry land, Earth." It may also be said with Rabbi Moses, that the expression, "He called," denotes throughout an equivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that "He called the light Day": for the reason that later on a period of twenty-four hours is also called day, where it is said that "there was evening and morning, one day." In like manner it is said that "the firmament," that is, the air, "He called heaven": for that which was first created was also called "heaven." And here, again, it is said that "the dry land," that is, the part from which the waters had withdrawn, "He called, Earth," as distinct from the sea; although the name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or not. So by the expression "He called" we are to understand throughout that the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He gave.
Iª q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod plantarum productio inconvenienter tertia die facta legatur. Plantae enim habent vitam sicut et animalia. Sed productio animalium non ponitur inter opera distinctionis, sed pertinet ad opus ornatus. Ergo nec productio plantarum commemorari debuit in tertia die, quae pertinet ad opus distinctionis.
 Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of distinction.
Iª q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod pertinet ad maledictionem terrae, non debuit commemorari cum formatione terrae. Sed productio quarundam plantarum pertinet ad maledictionem terrae; secundum illud Gen. III, maledicta terra in opere tuo, spinas et tribulos germinabit tibi. Ergo productio plantarum universaliter non debuit commemorari in tertia die, quae pertinet ad formationem terrae. Objection 2. Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But the words of Gn. 3:17, "Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee," show that by the production of certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day, which is concerned with the work of formation.
Iª q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut plantae adhaerent terrae, ita etiam lapides et metalla; et tamen non fit mentio de eis in terrae formatione. Ergo nec plantae fieri debuerunt tertia die. Objection 3. Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the third day.
Iª q. 69 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, protulit terra herbam virentem; et postea sequitur, factum est vespere et mane dies tertius. On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:12): "The earth brought forth the green herb," after which there follows, "The evening and the morning were the third day."
Iª q. 69 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in tertia die informitas terrae removetur. Duplex autem informitas circa terram describebatur, una, quod erat invisibilis vel inanis, quia erat aquis cooperta; alia, quod erat incomposita sive vacua, idest non habens debitum decorem, qui acquiritur terrae ex plantis eam quodammodo vestientibus. Et ideo utraque informitas in hac tertia die removetur, prima quidem, per hoc quod aquae congregatae sunt in unum locum, et apparuit arida; secunda vero, per hoc quod protulit terra herbam virentem. Sed tamen circa productionem plantarum, aliter opinatur Augustinus ab aliis. Alii enim expositores dicunt quod plantae productae sunt actu in suis speciebus in hac tertia die, secundum quod superficies litterae sonat. Augustinus autem, V Sup. Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod causaliter tunc dictum est produxisse terram herbam et lignum, idest producendi accepisse virtutem. Et hoc quidem confirmat auctoritate Scripturae. Dicitur enim Gen. II, istae sunt generationes caeli et terrae, quando creata sunt, in die quo Deus fecit caelum et terram, et omne virgultum agri, antequam oriretur in terra, omnemque herbam regionis, priusquam germinaret. Ante ergo quam orirentur super terram, factae sunt causaliter in terra. Confirmat autem hoc etiam ratione. Quia in illis primis diebus condidit Deus creaturam originaliter vel causaliter, a quo opere postmodum requievit, qui tamen postmodum, secundum administrationem rerum conditarum per opus propagationis, usque modo operatur. Producere autem plantas ex terra, ad opus propagationis pertinet. Non ergo in tertia die productae sunt plantae in actu, sed causaliter tantum. Quamvis, secundum alios, dici possit quod prima institutio specierum ad opera sex dierum pertinet, sed quod ex speciebus primo institutis generatio similium in specie procedat, hoc iam pertinet ad rerum administrationem. Et hoc est quod Scriptura dicit, antequam oriretur super terram, vel antequam germinaret; idest, antequam ex similibus similia producerentur, sicut nunc naturaliter fieri videmus secundum viam seminationis. Unde signanter Scriptura dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem et facientem semen, quia scilicet sunt productae perfectae species plantarum, ex quibus semina aliarum orirentur. Nec refert ubicumque habeant vim seminativam, utrum scilicet in radice, vel in stipite, vel in fructu. I answer that, On the third day, as said (1), the formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was "invisible" or "void," being covered by the waters; on the other hand, it was "shapeless" or "empty," that is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect this formless state ends on the third day: first, when "the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared"; secondly, when "the earth brought forth the green herb." But concerning the production of plants, Augustine's opinion differs from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (Genesis 2:4,5): "These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that . . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew." Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, "He worketh until now."Now the production of plants from out the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only. However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days, but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government of the universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words, "before it sprung up in the earth," and "before it grew," that is, before like was produced from like; just as now happens in the natural course by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly (Genesis 1:11): "Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed," as indicating the production of perfection of perfect species, from which the seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument.
Iª q. 69 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita in plantis est occulta, quia carent motu locali et sensu, quibus animatum ab inanimato maxime distinguitur. Et ideo, quia immobiliter terrae inhaerent, earum productio ponitur quasi quaedam terrae formatio. Reply to Objection 1. Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation.
Iª q. 69 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam ante illam maledictionem, spinae et tribuli producti erant vel virtute vel actu. Sed non erant producti homini in poenam; ut scilicet terra quam propter cibum coleret, infructuosa quaedam et noxia germinaret. Unde dictum est, germinabit tibi. Reply to Objection 2. Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is said: "Shall it bring forth TO THEE."
Iª q. 69 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Moyses ea tantum proposuit quae in manifesto apparent, sicut iam dictum est. Corpora autem mineralia habent generationem occultam in visceribus terrae. Et iterum, non habent manifestam distinctionem a terra, sed quaedam terrae species videntur. Et ideo de eis mentionem non fecit. Reply to Objection 3. Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said (67, 4; 68, 3). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no mention of them.
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