Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa-I-94-102
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS XLIV - CII
- Question 94 The state of Adam's soul: His intellect
- Question 95 His righteousness
- Question 96 his will and the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over things (92
- Question 97 The state of Adam's body: Preservation of the individual.
- Question 98 Preservation of the species.
- Question 99 The state of the offspring's body.
- Question 100 Virtue.
- Question 101 Knowledge.
- Question 102 His home, which is paradise.
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IЄ q. 94 pr. Deinde considerandum est de statu vel conditione primi hominis. Et primo, quantum ad animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus. Circa primum consideranda sunt duo, primo, de conditione hominis quantum ad intellectum; secundo, de conditione hominis quantum ad voluntatem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum primus homo viderit Deum per essentiam. Secundo, utrum videre potuerit substantias separatas, idest Angelos. Tertio, utrum habuerit omnium scientiam. Quarto, utrum potuerit errare vel decipi. |
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| IЄ q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo per essentiam Deum viderit. Beatitudo enim hominis in visione divinae essentiae consistit. Sed primus homo, in Paradiso conversans, beatam et omnium divitem habuit vitam, ut Damascenus dicit in II libro. Et Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, si homines habebant affectus suos quales nunc habemus, quomodo erant beati in illo inenarrabilis beatitudinis loco, idest Paradiso? Ergo primus homo in Paradiso vidit Deum per essentiam. | Objection 1. It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the first man in paradise saw God through His Essence. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod primo homini non aberat quidquam quod bona voluntas adipisceretur. Sed nihil melius bona voluntas adipisci potest quam divinae essentiae visionem. Ergo homo per essentiam Deum videbat. | Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that "the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, visio Dei per essentiam est qua videtur Deus sine medio et sine aenigmate. Sed homo in statu innocentiae vidit Deum sine medio; ut Magister dicit in I distinctione IV libri Sent. Vidit etiam sine aenigmate, quia aenigma obscuritatem importat, ut Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin.; obscuritas autem introducta est per peccatum. Ergo homo in primo statu vidit Deum per essentiam. | Objection 3. Further, the vision of God is His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence "saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God through His Essence. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, quod non prius quod spirituale est, sed quod animale. Sed maxime spirituale est videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo primus homo, in primo statu animalis vitae, Deum per essentiam non vidit. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 15:46): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod primus homo Deum per essentiam non vidit, secundum communem statum illius vitae; nisi forte dicatur quod viderit eum in raptu, quando Deus immisit soporem in Adam, ut dicitur Gen. II. Et huius ratio est quia, cum divina essentia sit ipsa beatitudo, hoc modo se habet intellectus videntis divinam essentiam ad Deum, sicut se habet quilibet homo ad beatitudinem. Manifestum est autem quod nullus homo potest per voluntatem a beatitudine averti, naturaliter enim, et ex necessitate, homo vult beatitudinem, et fugit miseriam. Unde nullus videns Deum per essentiam, potest voluntate averti a Deo, quod est peccare. Et propter hoc, omnes videntes Deum per essentiam, sic in amore Dei stabiliuntur, quod in aeternum peccare non possunt. Cum ergo Adam peccaverit, manifestum est quod Deum per essentiam non videbat. Cognoscebat tamen Deum quadam altiori cognitione quam nos cognoscamus, et sic quodammodo eius cognitio media erat inter cognitionem praesentis status, et cognitionem patriae, qua Deus per essentiam videtur. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod visio Dei per essentiam dividitur contra visionem Dei per creaturam. Quanto autem aliqua creatura est altior et Deo similior, tanto per eam Deus clarius videtur, sicut homo perfectius videtur per speculum in quo expressius imago eius resultat. Et sic patet quod multo eminentius videtur Deus per intelligibiles effectus, quam per sensibiles et corporeos. A consideratione autem plena et lucida intelligibilium effectuum impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a sensibilibus, et circa ea occupatur. Sed, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, Deus fecit hominem rectum. Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderentur, et superiora ab inferioribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non impediebatur per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplatione intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita. Unde dicit Augustinus, in XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod fortassis Deus primis hominibus antea loquebatur, sicut cum Angelis loquitur, ipsa incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum; etsi non tanta participatione divinae essentiae, quantam capiunt Angeli. Sic igitur per huiusmodi intelligibiles effectus Dei, Deum clarius cognoscebat quam modo cognoscamus. | I answer that, The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam" (Genesis 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence. Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written (Ecclesiastes 7:30): "God made man right." And man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo in Paradiso beatus fuit, non illa perfecta beatitudine in quam transferendus erat, quae in divinae essentiae visione consistit, habebat tamen beatam vitam secundum quendam modum, ut Augustinus dicit XI super Gen. ad Litt., inquantum habebat integritatem et perfectionem quandam naturalem. | Reply to Objection 1. Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bona voluntas est ordinata voluntas. Non autem fuisset primi hominis ordinata voluntas, si in statu meriti habere voluisset quod ei promittebatur pro praemio. | Reply to Objection 2. A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est medium. Quoddam, in quo simul videtur quod per medium videri dicitur; sicut cum homo videtur per speculum, et simul videtur cum ipso speculo. Aliud medium est, per cuius notitiam in aliquid ignotum devenimus; sicut est medium demonstrationis. Et sine tali medio Deus videbatur, non tamen sine primo medio. Non enim oportebat primum hominem pervenire in Dei cognitionem per demonstrationem sumptam ab aliquo effectu, sicut nobis est necessarium; sed simul in effectibus, praecipue intelligibilibus, suo modo Deum cognoscebat. Similiter etiam est considerandum quod obscuritas quae importatur in nomine aenigmatis, dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo, secundum quod quaelibet creatura est quoddam obscurum, si comparetur ad immensitatem divinae claritatis, et sic Adam videbat Deum in aenigmate, quia videbat Deum per effectum creatum. Alio modo potest accipi obscuritas quae consecuta est ex peccato, prout scilicet impeditur homo a consideratione intelligibilium per sensibilium occupationem, et secundum hoc, non vidit Deum in aenigmate. | Reply to Objection 3. A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiae Angelos per essentiam viderit. Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog., in Paradiso quippe assueverat homo verbis Dei perfrui, beatorum Angelorum spiritibus cordis munditia et celsitudine visionis interesse. | Objection 1. It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): "In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels." |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima in statu praesenti impeditur a cognitione substantiarum separatarum, ex hoc quod est unita corpori corruptibili, quod aggravat animam, ut dicitur Sap. IX. Unde et anima separata substantias separatas videre potest, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima primi hominis non aggravabatur a corpore, cum non esset corruptibile. Ergo poterat videre substantias separatas. | Objection 2. Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which "is a load upon the soul," as is written Wisdom 9:15. Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained (89, 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to see separate substances. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, una substantia separata cognoscit aliam cognoscendo seipsam, ut dicitur in libro de causis. Sed anima primi hominis cognoscebat seipsam. Ergo cognoscebat substantias separatas. | Objection 3. Further, one separate substance knows another separate substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, anima Adae fuit eiusdem naturae cum animabus nostris. Sed animae nostrae non possunt nunc intelligere substantias separatas. Ergo nec anima primi hominis potuit. | On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither could Adam's soul. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod status animae hominis distingui potest dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum diversum modum naturalis esse, et hoc modo distinguitur status animae separatae, a statu animae coniunctae corpori. Alio modo distinguitur status animae secundum integritatem et corruptionem, servato eodem modo essendi secundum naturam, et sic status innocentiae distinguitur a statu hominis post peccatum. Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiae erat corpori perficiendo et gubernando accommodata, sicut et nunc, unde dicitur primus homo factus fuisse in animam viventem, idest corpori vitam dantem, scilicet animalem. Sed huius vitae integritatem habebat, inquantum corpus erat totaliter animae subditum, in nullo ipsam impediens, ut supra dictum est. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod ex hoc quod anima est accommodata ad corporis gubernationem et perfectionem secundum animalem vitam, competit animae nostrae talis modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. Unde et hic modus intelligendi etiam animae primi hominis competebat. Secundum autem hunc modum intelligendi, motus quidam invenitur in anima, ut Dionysius dicit IV cap. de Div. Nom., secundum tres gradus. Quorum primus est, secundum quod a rebus exterioribus congregatur anima ad seipsam; secundus autem est, prout anima ascendit ad hoc quod uniatur virtutibus superioribus unitis, scilicet Angelis; tertius autem gradus est, secundum quod ulterius manuducitur ad bonum quod est supra omnia, scilicet Deum. Secundum igitur primum processum animae, qui est a rebus exterioribus ad seipsam, perficitur animae cognitio. Quia scilicet intellectualis operatio animae naturalem ordinem habet ad ea quae sunt extra, ut supra dictum est, et ita per eorum cognitionem perfecte cognosci potest nostra intellectualis operatio, sicut actus per obiectum. Et per ipsam intellectualem operationem perfecte potest cognosci humanus intellectus, sicut potentia per proprium actum. Sed in secundo processu non invenitur perfecta cognitio. Quia, cum Angelus non intelligat per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed longe eminentiori modo, ut supra dictum est; praedictus modus cognoscendi, quo anima cognoscit seipsam, non sufficienter ducit in Angeli cognitionem. Multo autem minus tertius processus ad perfectam notitiam terminatur, quia etiam ipsi Angeli, per hoc quod cognoscunt seipsos, non possunt pertingere ad cognitionem divinae substantiae propter eius excessum. Sic igitur anima primi hominis non poterat videre Angelos per essentiam. Sed tamen excellentiorem modum cognitionis habebat de eis, quam nos habeamus, quia eius cognitio erat magis certa et fixa circa interiora intelligibilia, quam cognitio nostra. Et propter tantam eminentiam dicit Gregorius quod intererat Angelorum spiritibus. | I answer that, The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a "living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body--namely animal life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above (1). Now it is clear from what has been already said (84, 7; 85, 1; 89, 1) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also. Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to God. In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above (87, 3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (55, 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits." |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 2 ad 1 Unde patet solutio ad primum. | This makes clear the reply to the first objection. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravatione corporis; sed ex hoc quod obiectum ei connaturale erat deficiens ab excellentia substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem deficimus propter utrumque. | Reply to Objection 2. That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod anima primi hominis non poterat per cognitionem sui ipsius pertingere ad cognoscendas substantias separatas, ut supra dictum est, quia etiam unaquaeque substantia separata cognoscit aliam per modum sui ipsius. | Reply to Objection 3. The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non habuerit scientiam omnium. Aut enim habuit talem scientiam per species acquisitas, aut per species connaturales, aut per species infusas. Non autem per species acquisitas, huiusmodi enim cognitio ab experientia causatur, ut dicitur in I Metaphys.; ipse autem non tunc fuerat omnia expertus. Similiter etiam nec per species connaturales, quia erat eiusdem naturae nobiscum; anima autem nostra est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Si autem per species infusas, ergo scientia eius quam habebat de rebus, non erat eiusdem rationis cum scientia nostra, quam a rebus acquirimus. | Objection 1. It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, in omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei est idem modus consequendi perfectionem. Sed alii homines non statim in sui principio habent omnium scientiam, sed eam per temporis successionem acquirunt secundum suum modum. Ergo nec Adam, statim formatus, habuit omnium scientiam. | Objection 2. Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things when he was first created. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, status praesentis vitae homini conceditur ut in eo proficiat anima et quantum ad cognitionem, et quantum ad meritum; propter hoc enim anima corpori videtur esse unita. Sed homo in statu illo profecisset quantum ad meritum. Ergo etiam profecisset quantum ad cognitionem rerum. Non ergo habuit omnium rerum scientiam. | Objection 3. Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod ipse imposuit nomina animalibus, ut dicitur Gen. II. Nomina autem debent naturis rerum congruere. Ergo Adam scivit naturas omnium animalium, et pari ratione, habuit omnium aliorum scientiam. | On the contrary, Man named the animals (Genesis 2:20). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod naturali ordine perfectum praecedit imperfectum, sicut et actus potentiam, quia ea quae sunt in potentia, non reducuntur ad actum nisi per aliquod ens actu. Et quia res primitus a Deo institutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut essent aliorum principia; ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse principium alterius non solum per generationem corporalem, sed etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo, sicut primus homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare; ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et haec sunt omnia illa quae virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quaecumque scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt. Ad gubernationem autem vitae propriae et aliorum, non solum requiritur cognitio eorum quae naturaliter sciri possunt, sed etiam cognitio eorum quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt; eo quod vita hominis ordinatur ad quendam finem supernaturalem; sicut nobis, ad gubernationem vitae nostrae, necessarium est cognoscere quae fidei sunt. Unde et de his supernaturalibus tantam cognitionem primus homo accepit, quanta erat necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae secundum statum illum. Alia vero, quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli iaceant in flumine, et alia huiusmodi. | I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others. Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod primus homo habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo infusas. Nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra; sicut nec oculi quos caeco nato Christus dedit, fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit. | Reply to Objection 1. The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Adam debebat aliquid habere perfectionis, inquantum erat primus homo, quod ceteris hominibus non competit; ut ex dictis patet. | Reply to Objection 2. To Adam, as being the first man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above explained. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Adam in scientia naturalium scibilium non profecisset quantum ad numerum scitorum, sed quantum ad modum sciendi, quia quae sciebat intellectualiter, scivisset postmodum per experimentum. Quantum vero ad supernaturalia cognita, profecisset etiam quantum ad numerum, per novas revelationes; sicut et Angeli proficiunt per novas illuminationes. Nec tamen est simile de profectu meriti, et scientiae, quia unus homo non est alteri principium merendi, sicut est sciendi. | Reply to Objection 3. Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in primo statu decipi potuisset. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod mulier seducta in praevaricatione fuit. | Objection 1. It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Timothy 2:14) that "the woman being seduced was in the transgression." |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXI dist. II Sent., quod ideo mulier non horruit serpentem loquentem, quia officium loquendi eum accepisse a Deo putavit. Sed hoc falsum erat. Ergo mulier decepta fuit ante peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, naturale est quod quanto aliquid remotius videtur, tanto minus videtur. Sed natura oculi non est contracta per peccatum. Ergo hoc idem in statu innocentiae contigisset. Fuisset ergo homo deceptus circa quantitatem rei visae, sicut et modo. | Objection 3. Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod in somno adhaeret anima similitudini tanquam ipsi rei. Sed homo in statu innocentiae comedisset, et per consequens dormivisset et somniasset. Ergo deceptus fuisset, adhaerendo similitudinibus tanquam rebus. | Objection 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, primus homo nescivisset cogitationes hominum et futura contingentia, ut dictum est. Si igitur aliquis super his sibi falsum diceret, deceptus fuisset. | Objection 5. Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above (3). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, approbare vera pro falsis, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment of man condemned." |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod in nomine deceptionis duo possunt intelligi, scilicet qualiscumque existimatio levis, qua aliquis adhaeret falso tanquam vero, sine assensu credulitatis; et iterum firma credulitas. Quantum ergo ad ea quorum scientiam Adam habebat, neutro istorum modorum homo decipi poterat ante peccatum. Sed quantum ad ea quorum scientiam non habebat, decipi poterat, large accepta deceptione pro existimatione qualicumque sine assensu credulitatis. Quod ideo dicunt, quia existimare falsum in talibus, non est noxium homini; et ex quo temere assensus non adhibetur, non est culpabile. Sed haec positio non convenit integritati primi status, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civit. Dei, in illo statu erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente, nullum malum omnino esse poterat. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum eius, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat; ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi. Quod etiam ex ipsa rectitudine primi status apparet, secundum quam, quandiu anima maneret Deo subdita, tandiu in homine inferiora superioribus subderentur, nec superiora per inferiora impedirentur. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus est. Unde ex seipso nunquam decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo huiusmodi. Unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est ligatum, non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando ligatur, ut patet in dormientibus. Unde manifestum est quod rectitudo primi status non compatiebatur aliquam deceptionem circa intellectum. | I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without the assent of belief--or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed. Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion. This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded (85, 6), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod mulier verbis serpentis non crederet, nisi iam inesset menti eius amor propriae potestatis, et quaedam de se superba praesumptio. | Reply to Objection 1. Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit." |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod mulier putavit serpentem hoc accepisse loquendi officium, non per naturam, sed aliqua supernaturali operatione. Quamvis non sit necessarium auctoritatem Magistri sententiarum sequi in hac parte. | Reply to Objection 2. The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si aliquid repraesentatum fuisset sensui vel phantasiae primi hominis aliter quam sit in rerum natura, non tamen deciperetur, quia per rationem veritatem diiudicaret. | Reply to Objection 3. Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod id quod accidit in somno, non imputatur homini, quia non habet usum rationis, qui est proprius hominis actus. | Reply to Objection 4. A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper action. |
| IЄ q. 94 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod alicui dicenti falsum de contingentibus futuris vel cogitationibus cordium, homo in statu innocentiae non credidisset ita esse, sed credidisset quod hoc esset possibile, et hoc non esset existimare falsum. Vel potest dici quod divinitus ei subventum fuisset, ne deciperetur in his quorum scientiam non habebat. Nec est instantia, quam quidam afferunt, quod in tentatione non fuit ei subventum ne deciperetur, licet tunc maxime indigeret. Quia iam praecesserat peccatum in animo, et ad divinum auxilium recursum non habuit. | Reply to Objection 5. If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion. It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend. If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid. |
IЄ q. 95 pr. Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad voluntatem primi hominis. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt duo, primo quidem, de gratia et iustitia primi hominis; secundo, de usu iustitiae quantum ad dominium super alia. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum primus homo creatus fuerit in gratia. Secundo, utrum in statu innocentiae habuerit animae passiones. Tertio, utrum habuit virtutes omnes. Quarto, utrum opera eius fuissent aeque efficacia ad merendum, sicut modo sunt. |
Question 95. Things pertaining to the first man's will--namely, grace and righteousnessWas the first man created in grace? In the state of innocence, did he have passions of the soul? Did he have all virtues? Would what he did have been as meritorious as now? |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non fuerit creatus in gratia. Apostolus enim, I Cor. XV, distinguens Adam a Christo, dicit, factus est primus Adam in animam viventem; novissimus autem in spiritum vivificantem. Sed vivificatio spiritus est per gratiam. Ergo hoc est proprium Christi, quod fuerit factus in gratia. | Objection 1. It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Corinthians 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaestionibus veteris et novi testamenti, quod Adam non habuit spiritum sanctum. Sed quicumque habet gratiam, habet spiritum sanctum. Ergo Adam non fuit creatus in gratia. | Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, quod Deus sic ordinavit Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut prius in eis ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, iustitiaeque iudicium. Primo ergo condidit hominem et Angelum in sola naturali arbitrii libertate, et postmodum eis gratiam contulit. | Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, Magister dicit, in XXIV distinctione libri II Sent., quod homini in creatione datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat, sed non poterat proficere. Quicumque autem habet gratiam, potest proficere per meritum. Ergo primus homo non fuit creatus in gratia. | Objection 4. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte recipientis, cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale inter Deum et animam. Sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi prius existentis. Ergo homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti suae creationis. | Objection 5. Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 arg. 6 Praeterea, natura plus distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est aliud quam gratia consummata. Sed in homine gratia praecessit gloriam. Ergo multo magis natura praecessit gratiam. | Objection 6. Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummaed. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, homo et Angelus aequaliter ordinantur ad gratiam. Sed Angelus est creatus in gratia, dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, quod Deus simul erat in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam. Ergo et homo creatus fuit in gratia. | On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): "God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit quidem creatus in gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia fuit sibi collata antequam peccasset, plurimae enim sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem in statu innocentiae gratiam habuisse. Sed quod etiam fuerit conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. VII, Deus fecit hominem rectum. Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit. Manifestum est autem quod illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom. Unde manifestum est quod et illa prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae, non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae. Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur. | I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence. But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Ecclesiastes 7:30, "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus illa verba inducit ad ostendendum esse corpus spirituale, si est corpus animale, quia vita spiritualis corporis incoepit in Christo, qui est primogenitus ex mortuis, sicut vita corporis animalis incoepit in Adam. Non ergo ex verbis apostoli habetur quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam; sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus. | Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in eodem loco, non negatur quin aliquo modo fuerit in Adam spiritus sanctus, sicut et in aliis iustis, sed quod non sic fuerit in eo, sicut nunc est in fidelibus, qui admittuntur ad perceptionem haereditatis aeternae statim post mortem. | Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non habetur quod Angelus vel homo prius fuerit creatus in naturali libertate arbitrii, quam habuisset gratiam, sed quod prius ostendit quid in eis posset liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem, et quid postmodum consecuti sunt per auxilium gratiae confirmantis. | Reply to Objection 3. This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum qui posuerunt hominem non esse creatum in gratia, sed in naturalibus tantum. Vel potest dici quod, etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae. | Reply to Objection 4. The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse. | Reply to Objection 5. As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 1 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum naturae. Unde non est similis ratio. | Reply to Objection 6. We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in primo homine non fuerint animae passiones. Secundum enim passiones animae contingit quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed hoc non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erant animae passiones. | Objection 1. It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Galatians 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima Adae erat nobilior quam corpus. Sed corpus Adae fuit impassibile. Ergo nec in anima eius fuerunt passiones. | Objection 2. Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, per virtutem moralem comprimuntur animae passiones. Sed in Adam fuit virtus moralis perfecta. Ergo totaliter passiones excludebantur ab eo. | Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod erat in eis amor imperturbatus in Deum, et quaedam aliae animae passiones. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of the soul. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensuali, cuius obiectum est bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri boni ut suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae. Aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes. | I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per hoc quod passiones rationi repugnant, quod in statu innocentiae non erat. | Reply to Objection 1. The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus humanum in statu innocentiae erat impassibile quantum ad passiones quae removent dispositionem naturalem, ut infra dicetur. Et similiter anima fuit impassibilis quantum ad passiones quae impediunt rationem. | Reply to Objection 2. The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (97, 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit passiones, sed ordinat eas, temperati enim est concupiscere sicut oportet, et quae oportet, ut dicitur in III Ethic. | Reply to Objection 3. Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam non habuerit omnes virtutes. Quaedam enim virtutes ordinantur ad refraenandam immoderantiam passionum; sicut per temperantiam refraenatur immoderata concupiscentia, et per fortitudinem immoderatus timor. Sed immoderantia passionum non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo nec dictae virtutes. | Objection 1. It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaedam virtutes sunt circa passiones respicientes malum; ut mansuetudo circa iras, et fortitudo circa timores. Sed tales passiones non erant in statu innocentiae, ut dictum est. Ergo nec huiusmodi virtutes. | Objection 2. Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, poenitentia est quaedam virtus respiciens peccatum prius commissum. Misericordia etiam est quaedam virtus respiciens miseriam. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat peccatum nec miseria. Ergo neque huiusmodi virtutes. | Objection 3. Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, perseverantia est quaedam virtus. Sed hanc Adam non habuit; ut sequens peccatum ostendit. Ergo non habuit omnes virtutes. | Objection 4. Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, fides quaedam virtus est. Sed haec in statu innocentiae non fuit, importat enim aenigmaticam cognitionem, quae perfectioni primi status repugnare videtur. | Objection 5. Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in quadam homilia, princeps vitiorum devicit Adam de limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia armatum, temperantia compositum, claritate splendidum. | On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness." |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes. Et hoc ex dictis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra quod talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subiecta, inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, et inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis; ut magis patebit cum de virtutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet. Sed considerandum est quod virtutum quaedam sunt, quae de sui ratione nullam imperfectionem important, ut caritas et iustitia. Et huiusmodi virtutes fuerunt in statu innocentiae simpliciter, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quaedam vero sunt, quae de sui ratione imperfectionem important, vel ex parte actus vel ex parte materiae. Et si huiusmodi imperfectio non repugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus huiusmodi virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur, et spes, quae est eorum quae non habentur. Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Si vero imperfectio quae est de ratione virtutis alicuius, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat huiusmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, ut patet de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena; perfectioni enim primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro posse repelleret. Sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, contingit studioso solum sub conditione, est enim sic dispositus, quod verecundaretur si turpe aliquid committeret. | I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For it was shown above (1) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (I-II, 63, 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9). |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod accidit temperantiae et fortitudini quod superabundantiam passionum repellat, inquantum invenit passiones superabundantes in subiecto. Sed per se convenit huiusmodi virtutibus passiones moderari. | Reply to Objection 1. It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se' competent to moderate the passions. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illae passiones ad malum ordinatae, repugnant perfectioni primi status, quae habent respectum ad malum in ipso qui afficitur passione, ut timor et dolor. Sed passiones quae respiciunt malum in altero, non repugnant perfectioni primi status, poterat enim homo in primo statu habere odio malitiam Daemonum, sicut et diligere bonitatem Dei. Unde et virtutes quae circa tales passiones essent, possent esse in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quae vero sunt circa passiones respicientes malum in eodem subiecto, si circa huiusmodi solas passiones sunt, non poterant esse in primo statu secundum actum, sed solum secundum habitum; sicut de poenitentia et misericordia dictum est. Sed sunt quaedam virtutes quae non sunt circa has passiones solum, sed etiam circa alias; sicut temperantia, quae non solum est circa tristitias, sed etiam circa delectationes; et fortitudo, quae non solum est circa timores, sed etiam circa audaciam et spem. Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive spei; non autem secundum quod moderantur tristitiam et timorem. | Reply to Objection 2. Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt. | Reply to Objection 3. appears from what has been said above. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod perseverantia dupliciter sumitur. Uno modo, prout est quaedam virtus, et sic significat quendam habitum, quo quis eligit perseverare in bono. Et sic Adam perseverantiam habuit. Alio modo, prout est circumstantia virtutis, et sic significat continuationem quandam virtutis absque interruptione. Et hoc modo Adam perseverantiam non habuit. | Reply to Objection 4. Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. | Reply to Objection 5. appears from what has been said above. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod opera primi hominis fuerint minus efficacia ad merendum quam opera nostra. Gratia enim ex Dei misericordia datur, quae magis indigentibus subvenit magis. Sed nos indigemus magis gratia quam primus homo in statu innocentiae. Ergo copiosius infunditur nobis gratia. Quae cum sit radix meriti, opera nostra efficaciora ad merendum redduntur. | Objection 1. It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad meritum requiritur pugna quaedam et difficultas. Dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit. Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Sed nunc est maior pugna et difficultas. Ergo et maior efficacia ad merendum. | Objection 2. Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written (2 Timothy 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXIV distinctione II libri Sent., quod homo non meruisset, tentationi resistendo; nunc autem meretur qui tentationi resistit. Ergo efficaciora sunt opera nostra ad merendum quam in primo statu. | Objection 3. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quia secundum hoc, homo esset melioris conditionis post peccatum. | On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quantitas meriti ex duobus potest pensari. Uno modo, ex radice caritatis et gratiae. Et talis quantitas meriti respondet praemio essentiali, quod consistit in Dei fruitione, qui enim ex maiori caritate aliquid facit, perfectius Deo fruetur. Alio modo pensari potest quantitas meriti ex quantitate operis. Quae quidem est duplex, scilicet absoluta, et proportionalis. Vidua enim quae misit duo aera minuta in gazophylacium; minus opus fecit quantitate absoluta, quam illi qui magna munera posuerunt, sed quantitate proportionali vidua plus fecit, secundum sententiam domini, quia magis eius facultatem superabat. Utraque tamen quantitas meriti respondet praemio accidentali; quod est gaudium de bono creato. Sic igitur dicendum quod efficaciora fuissent hominis opera ad merendum in statu innocentiae quam post peccatum, si attendatur quantitas meriti ex parte gratiae; quae tunc copiosior fuisset, nullo obstaculo in natura humana invento. Similiter etiam, si consideretur absoluta quantitas operis, quia, cum homo esset maioris virtutis, maiora opera fecisset. Sed si consideretur quantitas proportionalis, maior invenitur ratio meriti post peccatum, propter hominis imbecillitatem, magis enim excedit parvum opus potestatem eius qui cum difficultate operatur illud, quam opus magnum potestatem eius qui sine difficultate operatur. | I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good. We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo post peccatum ad plura indiget gratia quam ante peccatum, sed non magis. Quia homo, etiam ante peccatum, indigebat gratia ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quae est principalis necessitas gratiae. Sed homo post peccatum, super hoc, indiget gratia etiam ad peccati remissionem, et infirmitatis sustentationem. | Reply to Objection 1. After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod difficultas et pugna pertinent ad quantitatem meriti, secundum quantitatem operis proportionalem, ut dictum est. Et est signum promptitudinis voluntatis, quae conatur ad id quod est sibi difficile, promptitudo autem voluntatis causatur ex magnitudine caritatis. Et tamen potest contingere quod aliquis ita prompta voluntate faciat opus aliquod facile, sicut alius difficile, quia paratus esset facere etiam quod sibi esset difficile. Difficultas tamen actualis, inquantum est poenalis, habet etiam quod sit satisfactoria pro peccato. | Reply to Objection 2. Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. |
| IЄ q. 95 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod resistere tentationi primo homini non fuisset meritorium, secundum opinionem ponentium quod gratiam non haberet; sicut nec modo est meritorium non habenti gratiam. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia in primo statu nihil erat interius impellens ad malum, sicut modo est, unde magis tunc poterat homo resistere tentationi sine gratia, quam modo. | Reply to Objection 3. The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace. |
IЄ q. 96 pr. Deinde considerandum est de dominio quod competebat homini in statu innocentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae animalibus dominaretur. Secundo, utrum dominaretur omni creaturae. Tertio, utrum in statu innocentiae omnes homines fuissent aequales. Quarto, utrum in illo statu homo hominibus dominaretur. |
Question 96. The mastership belonging to man in the state of innocenceWas man in the state of innocence master over the animals? Was he master over all creatures? In the state of innocence, were all men equal? Would man in that state have been master over men? |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiae animalibus non dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX super Gen. ad Litt., quod ministerio Angelorum animalia sunt adducta ad Adam, ut eis nomina imponeret. Non autem fuisset ibi necessarium Angelorum ministerium, si homo per seipsum animalibus dominabatur. Non ergo in statu innocentiae habuit dominium homo super alia animalia. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae ad invicem discordant, non recte sub uno dominio congregantur. Sed multa animalia naturaliter ad invicem discordant, sicut ovis et lupus. Ergo omnia animalia sub hominis dominio non continebantur. | Objection 2. Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod homini ante peccatum non indigenti, Deus animalium dominationem dedit, praesciebat enim hominem adminiculo animalium adiuvandum fore post lapsum. Ergo ad minus usus dominii super animalia non competebat homini ante peccatum. | Objection 3. Further, Jerome says [The words quoted are not in St. Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Genesis 1:26: "God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man." Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, proprium domini esse videtur praecipere. Sed praeceptum non recte fertur nisi ad habentem rationem. Ergo homo non habebat dominium super animalia irrationalia. | Objection 4. Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, praesit piscibus maris, et volatilibus caeli, et bestiis terrae. | On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:26): "Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth" [Vulg."and the whole earth"]. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, inobedientia ad hominem eorum quae ei debent esse subiecta, subsecuta est in poenam eius, eo quod ipse fuit inobediens Deo. Et ideo in statu innocentiae, ante inobedientiam praedictam, nihil ei repugnabat quod naturaliter deberet ei esse subiectum. Omnia autem animalia sunt homini naturaliter subiecta. Quod apparet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex ipso naturae processu. Sicut enim in generatione rerum intelligitur quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecto ad perfectum (nam materia est propter formam, et forma imperfectior propter perfectiorem), ita etiam est in usu rerum naturalium, nam imperfectiora cedunt in usum perfectorum; plantae enim utuntur terra ad sui nutrimentum, animalia vero plantis, et homines plantis et animalibus. Unde naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in I Politic., quod venatio sylvestrium animalium est iusta et naturalis, quia per eam homo vindicat sibi quod est naturaliter suum. Secundo apparet hoc ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae semper inferiora per superiora gubernat. Unde, cum homo sit supra cetera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter eius gubernationi alia animalia subduntur. Tertio apparet idem ex proprietate hominis, et aliorum animalium. In aliis enim animalibus invenitur, secundum aestimationem naturalem, quaedam participatio prudentiae ad aliquos particulares actus, in homine autem invenitur universalis prudentia, quae est ratio omnium agibilium. Omne autem quod est per participationem, subditur ei quod est per essentiam et universaliter. Unde patet quod naturalis est subiectio aliorum animalium ad hominem. | I answer that, As above stated (95, 1) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in subiectos multa potest facere superior potestas, quae non potest facere inferior. Angelus autem est naturaliter superior homine. Unde aliquis effectus poterat fieri circa animalia virtute angelica, qui non poterat fieri potestate humana; scilicet quod statim omnia animalia congregarentur. | Reply to Objection 1. A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod animalia quae nunc sunt ferocia et occidunt alia animalia, in statu illo fuissent mansueta non solum circa hominem, sed etiam circa alia animalia. Sed hoc est omnino irrationabile. Non enim per peccatum hominis natura animalium est mutata, ut quibus nunc naturale est comedere aliorum animalium carnes, tunc vixissent de herbis, sicut leones et falcones. Nec Glossa Bedae dicit, Gen. I, quod ligna et herbae datae sunt omnibus animalibus et avibus in cibum, sed quibusdam. Fuisset ergo naturalis discordia inter quaedam animalia. Nec tamen propter hoc subtraherentur dominio hominis; sicut nec nunc propter hoc subtrahuntur dominio Dei, cuius providentia hoc totum dispensatur. Et huius providentiae homo executor fuisset, ut etiam nunc apparet in animalibus domesticis, ministrantur enim falconibus domesticis per homines gallinae in cibum. | Reply to Objection 2. In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on Genesis 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod homines in statu innocentiae non indigebant animalibus ad necessitatem corporalem, neque ad tegumentum, quia nudi erant, et non erubescebant, nullo instante inordinatae concupiscentiae motu; neque ad cibum, quia lignis Paradisi vescebantur; neque ad vehiculum, propter corporis robur. Indigebant tamen eis ad experimentalem cognitionem sumendam de naturis eorum. Quod significatum est per hoc, quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, ut eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas designant. | Reply to Objection 3. In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals--neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence--nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise--nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod alia animalia habent quandam participationem prudentiae et rationis secundum aestimationem naturalem; ex qua contingit quod grues sequuntur ducem, et apes obediunt regi. Et sic tunc omnia animalia per seipsa homini obedivissent, sicut nunc quaedam domestica ei obediunt. | Reply to Objection 4. All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non habuisset dominium super omnes alias creaturas. Angelus enim naturaliter est maioris potestatis quam homo. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus III de Trin., materia corporalis non obedivisset ad nutum etiam sanctis Angelis. Ergo multo minus homini in statu innocentiae. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels." Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, in plantis non sunt de viribus animae nisi nutritiva et augmentativa et generativa. Hae autem non sunt natae obedire rationi; ut in uno et eodem homine apparet. Ergo, cum dominium competat homini secundum rationem, videtur quod plantis homo in statu innocentiae non dominaretur. | Objection 2. Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, quicumque dominatur alicui rei, potest illam rem mutare. Sed homo non potuisset mutare cursum caelestium corporum, hoc enim solius Dei est, ut Dionysius dicit in epistola ad Polycarpum. Ergo non dominabatur eis. | Objection 3. Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, praesit universae creaturae. | On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:26): "That he may have dominion over . . . every creature." |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia, et ideo secundum modum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei dominari aliis. Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum Angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis. Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis, et non subiecti dominio. Unde homo Angelis non dominabatur in primo statu, et quod dicitur omni creaturae, intelligitur quae non est ad imaginem Dei. Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut irascibili et concupiscibili, quae aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima imperando. Unde et in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per imperium dominabatur. Viribus autem naturalibus, et ipsi corpori, homo dominatur non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo in statu innocentiae dominabatur plantis et rebus inanimatis, non per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimento utendo eorum auxilio. | I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his "reason," which makes him like to the angels'; his "sensitive powers," whereby he is like the animals; his "natural forces," which liken him to the plants; and "the body itself," wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 2 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | The answers to the objections appear from the above. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines in statu innocentiae omnes fuissent aequales. Dicit enim Gregorius quod, ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares sumus. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat delictum. Ergo omnes erant pares. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, similitudo et aequalitas est ratio mutuae dilectionis; secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit sibi simile, sic et omnis homo proximum sibi. In illo autem statu inter homines abundabat dilectio, quae est vinculum pacis. Ergo omnes fuissent pares in statu innocentiae. | Objection 2. Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to Sirach 13:19, "Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, cessante causa, cessat effectus. Sed causa inaequalitatis inter homines videtur nunc esse, ex parte quidem Dei, quod quosdam pro meritis praemiat, quosdam vero punit, ex parte vero naturae, quia propter naturae defectum quidam nascuntur debiles et orbati, quidam autem fortes et perfecti. Quae in primo statu non fuissent. | Objection 3. Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Ordo autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. Ergo in primo statu, qui decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur. | On the contrary, It is written (Romans 13:1): "The things which are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of God"]. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place." Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu fuisse, ad minus quantum ad sexum, quia sine diversitate sexus, generatio non fuisset. Similiter etiam quantum ad aetatem, sic enim quidam ex aliis nascebantur; nec illi qui miscebantur, steriles erant. Sed et secundum animam diversitas fuisset, et quantum ad iustitiam et quantum ad scientiam. Non enim ex necessitate homo operabatur, sed per liberum arbitrium; ex quo homo habet quod possit magis et minus animum applicare ad aliquid faciendum vel volendum vel cognoscendum. Unde quidam magis profecissent in iustitia et scientia quam alii. Ex parte etiam corporis, poterat esse disparitas. Non enim erat exemptum corpus humanum totaliter a legibus naturae, quin ex exterioribus agentibus aliquod commodum aut auxilium reciperet magis et minus, cum etiam et cibis eorum vita sustentaretur. Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum diversam dispositionem aeris et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et maiores et pulchriores et melius complexionati. Ita tamen quod in illis qui excederentur, nullus esset defectus sive peccatum, sive circa animam sive circa corpus. | I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile. Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life. So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius per verba illa intendit excludere disparitatem quae est secundum differentiam iustitiae et peccati; ex qua contingit quod aliqui poenaliter sunt sub aliis coercendi. | Reply to Objection 1. By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aequalitas est causa quod dilectio mutua sit aequalis. Sed tamen inter inaequales potest esse maior dilectio quam inter aequales, licet non aequaliter utrinque respondeat. Pater enim plus diligit filium naturaliter, quam frater fratrem; licet filius non tantundem diligat patrem, sicut ab eo diligitur. | Reply to Objection 2. Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod causa disparitatis poterat esse et ex parte Dei, non quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam praemiaret; sed ut quosdam plus, quosdam minus sublimaret, ut pulchritudo ordinis magis in hominibus reluceret. Et etiam ex parte naturae poterat disparitas causari secundum praedictum modum, absque aliquo defectu naturae. | Reply to Objection 3. The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae homini non dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, hominem rationalem, ad imaginem suam factum, non voluit Deus nisi irrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over cattle." |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est introductum in poenam peccati, non fuisset in statu innocentiae. Sed hominem subesse homini, introductum est in poenam peccati, dictum est enim mulieri post peccatum, sub potestate viri eris, ut dicitur Gen. III. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erat homo homini subiectus. | Objection 2. Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Genesis 3:16): "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power." Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, subiectio libertati opponitur. Sed libertas est unum de praecipuis bonis, quod in statu innocentiae non defuisset, quando nihil aberat quod bona voluntas cupere posset, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo homo homini in statu innocentiae non dominabatur. | Objection 3. Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, conditio hominum in statu innocentiae non erat dignior quam conditio Angelorum. Sed inter Angelos quidam aliis dominantur, unde et unus ordo dominationum vocatur. Ergo non est contra dignitatem status innocentiae, quod homo homini dominaretur. | On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of "Dominations." Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another. |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod dominium accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod opponitur servituti, et sic dominus dicitur cui aliquis subditur ut servus. Alio modo accipitur dominium, secundum quod communiter refertur ad subiectum qualitercumque, et sic etiam ille qui habet officium gubernandi et dirigendi liberos, dominus dici potest. Primo ergo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiae homo homini non dominaretur, sed secundo modo accepto dominio, in statu innocentiae homo homini dominari potuisset. Cuius ratio est, quia servus in hoc differt a libero, quod liber est causa sui, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys.; servus autem ordinatur ad alium. Tunc ergo aliquis dominatur alicui ut servo, quando eum cui dominatur ad propriam utilitatem sui, scilicet dominantis, refert. Et quia unicuique est appetibile proprium bonum, et per consequens contristabile est unicuique quod illud bonum quod deberet esse suum, cedat alteri tantum; ideo tale dominium non potest esse sine poena subiectorum. Propter quod, in statu innocentiae non fuisset tale dominium hominis ad hominem. Tunc vero dominatur aliquis alteri ut libero, quando dirigit ipsum ad proprium bonum eius qui dirigitur, vel ad bonum commune. Et tale dominium hominis, ad hominem in statu innocentiae fuisset, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, unde homines in statu innocentiae socialiter vixissent. Socialis autem vita multorum esse non posset, nisi aliquis praesideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet, multi enim per se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad unum. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in principio Politic., quod quandocumque multa ordinantur ad unum, semper invenitur unum ut principale et dirigens. Secundo quia, si unus homo habuisset super alium supereminentiam scientiae et iustitiae, inconveniens fuisset nisi hoc exequeretur in utilitatem aliorum; secundum quod dicitur I Petr. IV, unusquisque gratiam quam accepit, in alterutrum illam administrantes. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, quod iusti non dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi, hoc naturalis ordo praescribit, ita Deus hominem condidit. | I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own--namely the master's use. And since every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man. But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Peter 4:10, "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another." Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man." |
| IЄ q. 96 a. 4 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia obiecta, quae procedunt de primo modo dominii. | From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership. |
IЄ q. 97 pr. Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad statum primi hominis secundum corpus. Et primo, quantum ad conservationem individui; secundo, quantum ad conservationem speciei. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae esset immortalis. Secundo, utrum esset impassibilis. Tertio, utrum indigeret cibis. Quarto, utrum per lignum vitae immortalitatem consequeretur. |
Question 97. The preservation of the individual in the primitive stateWas man in the state of innocence immortal? Was he impassible? Did he stand in need of food? Would he have obtained immortality by the tree of life? |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non erat immortalis. Mortale enim ponitur in definitione hominis. Sed remota definitione, aufertur definitum. Ergo si homo erat, non poterat esse immortalis. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, corruptibile et incorruptibile genere differunt, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed eorum quae differunt genere, non est transmutatio in invicem. Si ergo primus homo fuit incorruptibilis, non posset homo in statu isto esse corruptibilis. | Objection 2. Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, si homo in statu innocentiae fuit immortalis, aut hoc habuit per naturam, aut per gratiam. Sed non per naturam, quia, cum natura eadem maneat secundum speciem, nunc quoque esset immortalis. Similiter nec per gratiam, quia primus homo gratiam per poenitentiam recuperavit, secundum illud Sap. X, eduxit illum a delicto suo; ergo immortalitatem recuperasset; quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo homo erat immortalis in statu innocentiae. | Objection 3. Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wisdom 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, immortalitas promittitur homini in praemium; secundum illud Apoc. XXI, mors ultra non erit. Sed homo non fuit conditus in statu praemii, sed ut praemium mereretur. Ergo homo in statu innocentiae non fuit immortalis. | Objection 4. Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to Apocalypse 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Rom. V, quod per peccatum intravit mors in mundum. Ergo ante peccatum homo erat immortalis. | On the contrary, It is written (Romans 5:12): "By sin death came into the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte materiae, eo scilicet quod vel non habet materiam, sicut Angelus; vel habet materiam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut corpus caeleste. Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam incorruptibile. Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte formae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur. Et hoc dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Dioscorum, tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis, idest incorruptionis vigor. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., Deus hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut ipse sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam aut ad mortem. Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est. Conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservare posset supra naturam corporalis materiae. | I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (76, 1), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo et secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de incorruptibili et immortali per naturam. | Reply to Objection 1 and 2 These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae. Et quamvis gratiam recuperaverit ad remissionem culpae et meritum gloriae, non tamen ad amissae immortalitatis effectum. Hoc enim reservabatur Christo, per quem naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat, ut infra dicetur. | Reply to Objection 3. This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (III, 14 , 4, ad 1). |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod differt immortalitas gloriae, quae promittitur in praemium, ab immortalitate quae fuit homini collata in statu innocentiae. | Reply to Objection 4. The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae fuisset passibilis. Sentire enim est pati quoddam. Sed homo in statu innocentiae fuisset sensibilis. Ergo fuisset passibilis. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, somnus passio quaedam est. Sed homo in statu innocentiae dormivisset; secundum illud Gen. II, immisit Deus soporem in Adam. Ergo fuisset passibilis. | Objection 2. Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to Genesis 2:21, "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ibidem subditur quod tulit unam de costis eius. Ergo fuisset passibilis etiam per abscissionem partis. | Objection 3. Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, corpus hominis molle fuit. Sed molle naturaliter passivum est a duro. Ergo si corpori primi hominis obvium fuisset aliquod corpus durum, ab eo passum fuisset. Et sic primus homo fuit passibilis. | Objection 4. Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quia, si fuit passibilis, fuit etiam corruptibilis, quia passio, magis facta, abiicit a substantia. | On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive suffering wastes the very substance." |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie, et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est effectus actionis, in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis, poterat enim passionem prohibere, sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset. | I answer that, "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima. Nam sentire et dormire non removent hominem a naturali dispositione, sed ad bonum naturae ordinantur. | Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, costa illa fuit in Adam, inquantum erat principium humani generis; sicut semen est in homine, inquantum est principium per generationem. Sicut igitur decisio seminis non est cum passione quae removeat hominem a naturali dispositione, ita etiam est dicendum de separatione illius costae. | Reply to Objection 3. As already explained (92, 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro, partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur. | Reply to Objection 4. Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non indigebat cibis. Cibus enim necessarius est homini ad restaurationem deperditi. Sed in corpore Adae, ut videtur, nulla fiebat deperditio, quia incorruptibile erat. Ergo non erat ei cibus necessarius. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, cibus est necessarius ad nutriendum. Sed nutritio non est sine passione. Cum ergo corpus hominis esset impassibile, non erat ei cibus necessarius, ut videtur. | Objection 2. Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does not appear how food could be needful to him. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, cibus dicitur esse nobis necessarius ad vitae conservationem. Sed Adam aliter vitam poterat conservare, quia si non peccaret, non moreretur. Ergo cibus non erat ei necessarius. | Objection 3. Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did not require food. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, ad sumptionem cibi sequitur emissio superfluitatum, quae habent quandam turpitudinem non convenientem dignitati primi status. Ergo videtur quod homo in primo statu cibis non uteretur. | Objection 4. Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso, comedetis. | On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 2:16): "Of every tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat." |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae habuit vitam animalem cibis indigentem; post resurrectionem vero habebit vitam spiritualem cibis non indigentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod anima rationalis et anima est et spiritus. Dicitur autem esse anima secundum illud quod est sibi commune et aliis animabus, quod est vitam corpori dare, unde dicitur Gen. II, factus est homo in animam viventem, idest vitam corpori dantem. Sed spiritus dicitur secundum illud quod est proprium sibi et non aliis animabus, quod scilicet habeat virtutem intellectivam immaterialem. In primo igitur statu anima rationalis communicabat corpori id quod competit ei inquantum est anima, et ideo corpus illud dicebatur animale, inquantum scilicet habebat vitam ab anima. Primum autem principium vitae in istis inferioribus, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est anima vegetabilis, cuius opera sunt alimento uti et generare et augeri. Et ideo haec opera homini in primo statu competebant. In ultimo vero statu post resurrectionem, anima communicabit quodammodo corpori ea quae sunt sibi propria inquantum est spiritus, immortalitatem quidem, quantum ad omnes; impassibilitatem vero et gloriam et virtutem, quantum ad bonos, quorum corpora spiritualia dicentur. Unde post resurrectionem homines cibis non indigebunt, sed in statu innocentiae eis indigebant. | I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Genesis 2:7): "Man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power. Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called "animal" [From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Corinthians 15:44 seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., quomodo immortale corpus habebat, quod cibo sustentabatur? Immortale enim non eget esca neque potu. Dictum est enim supra quod immortalitas primi status erat secundum vim quandam supernaturalem in anima residentem; non autem secundum aliquam dispositionem corpori inhaerentem. Unde per actionem caloris aliquid de humido illius corporis poterat deperdi; et ne totaliter consumeretur, necesse erat per assumptionem cibi homini subveniri. | Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine): "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For we have explained (1) that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in nutritione est quaedam passio et alteratio, scilicet ex parte alimenti, quod convertitur in substantiam eius quod alitur. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod corpus hominis fuerit passibile, sed quod cibus assumptus erat passibilis. Quamvis etiam talis passio esset ad perfectionem naturae. | Reply to Objection 2. A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si homo sibi non subveniret de cibo, peccaret; sicut peccavit sumendo vetitum cibum. Simul enim sibi praeceptum fuit ut a ligno scientiae boni et mali abstineret, et ut de omni alio ligno Paradisi vesceretur. | Reply to Objection 3. If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod homo in statu innocentiae non assumpsisset de cibo nisi quantum fuisset ei necessarium, unde non fuisset ibi superfluitatum emissio. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur, quod in cibo assumpto non esset aliqua faeculentia, quae non esset apta ut converteretur in hominis nutrimentum. Unde oportebat superfluitates emitti. Tamen fuisset divinitus provisum ut nulla ex hoc indecentia esset. | Reply to Objection 4. Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lignum vitae non poterat esse causa immortalitatis. Nihil enim potest agere ultra suam speciem, effectus enim non excedit causam. Sed lignum vitae erat corruptibile, alioquin non potuisset in nutrimentum assumi, quia alimentum convertitur in substantiam nutriti, ut dictum est. Ergo lignum vitae incorruptibilitatem seu immortalitatem conferre non poterat. | Objection 1. It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, effectus qui causantur a virtutibus plantarum et aliarum naturalium rerum, sunt naturales. Si ergo lignum vitae immortalitatem causasset, fuisset illa immortalitas naturalis. | Objection 2. Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, hoc videtur redire in fabulas antiquorum, qui dixerunt quod dii qui comedebant de quodam cibo, facti sunt immortales, quos irridet philosophus in III Metaphys. | Objection 3. Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4). |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 4 s. c. 1 /2Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. III, ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat de ligno vitae, et comedat et vivat in aeternum.Praeterea, Augustinus in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., dicit, gustus arboris vitae corruptionem corporis inhibebat, denique etiam post peccatum potuit insolubilis manere, si permissum esset illi edere de arbore vitae. | On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 3:22): "Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever." Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine): "A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life." |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod lignum vitae quodammodo immortalitatem causabat, non autem simpliciter. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod duo remedia ad conservationem vitae habebat homo in primo statu, contra duos defectus. Primus enim defectus est deperditio humidi per actionem caloris naturalis, qui est animae instrumentum. Et contra hunc defectum subveniebatur homini per esum aliorum lignorum Paradisi, sicut et nunc subvenitur nobis, per cibos quos sumimus. Secundus autem defectus est quia, ut philosophus dicit I de Generat., illud quod generatur ex aliquo extraneo, adiunctum ei quod prius erat humido praeexistenti, imminuit virtutem activam speciei, sicut aqua adiuncta vino, primo quidem convertitur in saporem vini, sed secundum quod magis et magis additur, diminuit vini fortitudinem, et tandem vinum fit aquosum. Sic igitur videmus quod in principio virtus activa speciei est adeo fortis, quod potest convertere de alimento non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam quod sufficit ad augmentum. Postmodum vero quod aggeneratur non sufficit ad augmentum, sed solum ad restaurationem deperditi. Tandem vero, in statu senectutis, nec ad hoc sufficit, unde sequitur decrementum, et finaliter naturalis dissolutio corporis. Et contra hunc defectum subveniebatur homini per lignum vitae, habebat enim virtutem fortificandi virtutem speciei contra debilitatem provenientem ex admixtione extranei. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod cibus aderat homini ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, et lignum vitae ne senectus eum dissolveret. Et in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., dicit quod vitae arbor medicinae modo corruptionem hominum prohibebat. Non tamen simpliciter immortalitatem causabat. Quia neque virtus quae inerat animae ad conservandum corpus, causabatur ex ligno vitae, neque etiam poterat immortalitatis dispositionem corpori praestare, ut nunquam dissolvi posset. Quod ex hoc patet, quia virtus cuiuscumque corporis est finita. Unde non poterat virtus ligni vitae ad hoc se extendere ut daret corpori virtutem Durandi tempore infinito, sed usque ad determinatum tempus. Manifestum est enim quod, quanto aliqua virtus est maior, tanto imprimit durabiliorem effectum. Unde cum virtus ligni vitae esset finita, semel sumptum praeservabat a corruptione usque ad determinatum tempus; quo finito, vel homo translatus fuisset ad spiritualem vitam, vel indiguisset iterum sumere de ligno vitae. | I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine) "The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption." Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life. |
| IЄ q. 97 a. 4 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ab obiecta. Nam primae rationes concludunt quod non causabat incorruptibilitatem simpliciter. Aliae vero concludunt quod causabat incorruptibilitatem impediendo corruptionem, secundum modum praedictum. | From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality; while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the explanation above given. |
IЄ q. 98 pr. Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad conservationem speciei. Et primo, de ipsa generatione; secundo, de conditione prolis genitae. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio. Secundo, utrum fuisset generatio per coitum. |
Question 98. The preservation of the speciesIn the state of innocence, would there have been generation? Would generation have been through coition? |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio. Generationi enim corruptio est contraria, ut dicitur in V Physic. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. In statu autem innocentiae non fuisset corruptio. Ergo neque generatio. | Objection 1. It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, "corruption is contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, generatio ordinatur ad hoc quod conservetur in specie quod secundum individuum conservari non potest, unde et in illis individuis quae in perpetuum durant, generatio non invenitur. Sed in statu innocentiae homo in perpetuum absque morte vixisset. Ergo in statu innocentiae generatio, non fuisset. | Objection 2. Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, per generationem homines multiplicantur. Sed multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri possessionum divisionem, ad evitandam confusionem dominii. Ergo, cum homo sit institutus dominus animalium, facta multiplicatione humani generis per generationem, secuta fuisset divisio dominii. Quod videtur esse contrarium iuri naturali, secundum quod omnia sunt communia, ut Isidorus dicit. Non ergo fuisset generatio in statu innocentiae. | Objection 3. Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, crescite et multiplicamini, et replete terram. Huiusmodi autem multiplicatio absque nova generatione fieri non potuisset, cum duo tantum fuerint primitus instituti. Ergo in primo statu generatio fuisset. | On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 1:28): "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem humani generis, alioquin peccatum hominis fuisset valde necessarium, ex quo tantum bonum consecutum est. Est ergo considerandum quod homo, secundum suam naturam, est constitutus quasi medium quoddam inter creaturas corruptibiles et incorruptibiles, nam anima eius est naturaliter incorruptibilis, corpus vero naturaliter corruptibile. Est autem considerandum quod alio modo intentio naturae fertur ad corruptibiles, et incorruptibiles creaturas. Id enim per se videtur esse de intentione naturae, quod est semper et perpetuum. Quod autem est solum secundum aliquod tempus, non videtur esse principaliter de intentione naturae, sed quasi ad aliud ordinatum, alioquin, eo corrupto, naturae intentio cassaretur. Quia igitur in rebus corruptibilibus nihil est perpetuum et semper manens nisi species, bonum speciei est de principali intentione naturae, ad cuius conservationem naturalis generatio ordinatur. Substantiae vero incorruptibiles manent semper non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individua, et ideo etiam ipsa individua sunt de principali intentione naturae. Sic igitur homini ex parte corporis, quod corruptibile est secundum naturam suam, competit generatio. Ex parte vero animae, quae incorruptibilis est, competit ei quod multitudo individuorum sit per se intenta a natura, vel potius a naturae auctore, qui solus est humanarum animarum creator. Et ideo, ad multiplicationem humani generis, generationem in humano genere statuit, etiam in statu innocentiae. | I answer that, In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become void. Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature. Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per animam. Et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur corruptibilibus rebus. | Reply to Objection 1. In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio in statu innocentiae, etsi non fuisset propter conservationem speciei, fuisset tamen propter multiplicationem individuorum. | Reply to Objection 2. Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros observetur. | Reply to Objection 3. In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed even now among many good men. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Quia, ut Damascenus dicit, primus homo erat in Paradiso terrestri sicut Angelus quidam. Sed in futuro resurrectionis statu, quando erunt homines Angelis similes, neque nubent neque nubentur, ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Ergo neque in Paradiso fuisset generatio per coitum. | Objection 1. It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was "like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as is written Matthew 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, primi homines in perfecta aetate conditi fuerunt. Si igitur in eis ante peccatum generatio fuisset per coitum, fuissent etiam in Paradiso carnaliter coniuncti. Quod patet esse falsum, secundum Scripturam. | Objection 2. Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture (Genesis 4:1). |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, in coniunctione carnali maxime efficitur homo similis bestiis, propter vehementiam delectationis, unde etiam continentia laudatur, per quam homines ab huiusmodi delectationibus abstinent. Sed bestiis homo comparatur propter peccatum, secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis. Ergo ante peccatum non fuisset maris et feminae carnalis coniunctio. | Objection 3. Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according to Psalm 48:13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them." Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset corruptio. Sed per coitum corrumpitur integritas virginalis. Ergo coitus in statu innocentiae non fuisset. | Objection 4. Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 1 /2Sed contra est quod Deus ante peccatum masculum et feminam fecit, ut dicitur Gen. I et II. Nihil autem est frustra in operibus Dei. Ergo etiam si homo non peccasset, fuisset coitus, ad quem distinctio sexuum ordinatur.Praeterea, Gen. II, dicitur mulier esse facta in adiutorium viri. Sed non ad aliud nisi ad generationem quae fit per coitum, quia ad quodlibet aliud opus, convenientius adiuvari posset vir per virum quam per feminam. Ergo etiam in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio per coitum. | On the contrary, God made man and woman before sin (Genesis 1-2). But nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man (Genesis 2:18-20). But she is not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation also in the state of innocence. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam antiquorum doctorum, considerantes concupiscentiae foeditatem quae invenitur in coitu in isto statu, posuerunt quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit in libro quem fecit de homine, quod in Paradiso aliter fuisset multiplicatum genus humanum, sicut multiplicati sunt Angeli, absque concubitu, per operationem divinae virtutis. Et dicit quod Deus ante peccatum fecit masculum et feminam, respiciens ad modum generationis qui futurus erat post peccatum, cuius Deus praescius erat. Sed hoc non dicitur rationabiliter. Ea enim quae sunt naturalia homini, neque subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod homini, secundum animalem vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, ut supra dictum est, naturale est generare per coitum, sicut et ceteris animalibus perfectis. Et hoc declarant naturalia membra ad hunc usum deputata. Et ideo non est dicendum quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non fuisset ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum. Sunt igitur in coitu duo consideranda, secundum praesentem statum. Unum quod naturae est, scilicet coniunctio maris et feminae ad generandum. In omni enim generatione requiritur virtus activa et passiva. Unde, cum in omnibus in quibus est distinctio sexuum, virtus activa sit in mare, virtus vero passiva in femina; naturae ordo exigit ut ad generandum conveniant per coitum mas et femina. Aliud autem quod considerari potest, est quaedam deformitas immoderatae concupiscentiae. Quae in statu innocentiae non fuisset quando inferiores vires omnino rationi subdebantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis. | I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained (97, 3), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin. Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body." |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Unde non est similis ratio. | Reply to Objection 1. In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., ideo primi parentes in Paradiso non coierunt, quia, formata muliere, post modicum propter peccatum de Paradiso eiecti sunt, vel quia expectabatur divina auctoritas ad determinatum tempus commixtionis, a qua acceperunt universale mandatum. | Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest. Sed in statu innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt (fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non immoderate delectationi inhaereat; et dico immoderate, praeter mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit. Et hoc sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine. | Reply to Objection 3. Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust. |
| IЄ q. 98 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, in illo statu nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Ita enim potuit utero coniugis, salva integritate feminei genitalis, virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest, eadem integritate salva, ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris emitti. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret; sic ad concipiendum non libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque coniungeret. | Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state "intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action." |
IЄ q. 99 pr. Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis generandae. Et primo, quantum ad corpus; secundo, quantum ad iustitiam; tertio, quantum ad scientiam. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae pueri mox geniti habuissent perfectam virtutem corpoream. Secundo, utrum omnes fuissent nati in sexu masculino. |
Question 99. The condition of the offspring as to the bodyWould children in the state of innocence have had full powers of the body immediately after birth? Would all infants have been of the male sex? |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae, mox nati, virtutem perfectam habuissent ad motum membrorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Bapt. Parvul., quod infirmitati mentis congruit haec infirmitas corporis, quae scilicet in pueris apparet. Sed in statu innocentiae nulla fuisset infirmitas mentis. Ergo neque talis infirmitas corporis fuisset in parvulis. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind." But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaedam animalia statim cum nascuntur, habent virtutem sufficientem ad usum membrorum. Sed homo est nobilior aliis animalibus. Ergo multo magis est naturale homini quod statim natus virtutem habeat ad usum membrorum. Et ita videtur esse poena ex peccato consequens. | Objection 2. Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, non posse consequi delectabile propositum, afflictionem inducit. Sed si pueri non habuissent virtutem ad movendum membra, frequenter accidisset quod non possent consequi aliquod delectabile eis propositum. Ergo fuisset in eis afflictio; quae non poterat esse ante peccatum. Non ergo in statu innocentiae defuisset pueris virtus ad movendum membra. | Objection 3. Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, defectus senectutis videtur correspondere defectui pueritiae. Sed in statu innocentiae non fuisset defectus senectutis. Ergo neque etiam defectus pueritiae. | Objection 4. Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod omne generatum prius est imperfectum quam perficiatur. Sed pueri in statu innocentiae fuissent per generationem producti. Ergo a principio imperfecti fuissent et quantitate et virtute corporis. | On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus; quod autem credimus, auctoritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi debemus naturam rerum, praeter ea quae auctoritate divina traduntur, quae sunt supra naturam. Manifestum est autem naturale hoc esse, utpote et principiis humanae naturae competens, quod pueri mox nati non habeant sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra. Quia homo naturaliter habet cerebrum maius in quantitate, secundum proportionem sui corporis, quam cetera animalia. Unde naturale est quod, propter maximam humiditatem cerebri in pueris, nervi, qui sunt instrumenta motus, non sunt idonei ad movendum membra. Ex alia vero parte nulli Catholico dubium est quin divina virtute fieri possit, ut pueri mox nati perfectam virtutem habeant ad motum membrorum. Constat autem per auctoritatem Scripturae, quod Deus fecit hominem rectum, et haec rectitudo consistit, ut Augustinus dicit, in perfecta subiectione corporis ad animam. Sicut ergo in primo statu non poterat esse in membris hominis aliquid quod repugnaret ordinatae hominis voluntati, ita membra hominis deficere non poterant humanae voluntati. Voluntas autem hominis ordinata est quae tendit in actus sibi convenientes. Non sunt autem iidem actus convenientes homini secundum quamlibet aetatem. Dicendum est ergo quod pueri mox nati non habuissent sufficientem virtutem ad movendum membra ad quoslibet actus; sed ad actus pueritiae convenientes, puta ad sugendum ubera, et ad alia huiusmodi. | I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth. Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that "God made man right" (Ecclesiastes 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de ista infirmitate quae nunc in pueris apparet etiam quantum ad actus eorum pueritiae convenientes; ut patet per ea quae praemittit, quod iuxta se iacentibus mammis, magis possunt esurientes flere quam sugere. | Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle." |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod quaedam animalia statim nata habent usum membrorum, non est ex eorum nobilitate, cum quaedam animalia perfectiora hoc non habeant, sed hoc eis contingit ex siccitate cerebri, et quia actus proprii talium animalium sunt imperfecti, ad quos etiam parva virtus sufficere potest. | Reply to Objection 2. The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a small amount of strength suffices them. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium patet solutio per ea quae dicta sunt in corpore. Vel potest dici quod nihil appetivissent, nisi ordinata voluntate convenisset res secundum statum suum. | Reply to Objection 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and only what was befitting to their state of life. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae generatus fuisset, sed non fuisset corruptus. Et ideo in statu illo potuissent esse aliqui defectus pueriles, qui consequuntur generationem; non autem defectus seniles, qui ordinantur ad corruptionem. | Reply to Objection 4. In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in primo statu feminae natae non fuissent. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro II de Generat. Animal., quod femina est mas occasionatus, quasi praeter intentionem naturae proveniens. Sed in statu illo nihil evenisset innaturale in hominis generatione. Ergo feminae natae non fuissent. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne agens generat sibi simile, nisi impediatur vel propter defectum virtutis, vel propter indispositionem materiae, sicut parvus ignis non potest comburere ligna viridia. In generatione autem vis activa est in mare. Cum igitur in statu innocentiae nullus fuisset defectus virtutis ex parte maris, nec indispositio materiae ex parte feminae, videtur quod semper masculi nati fuissent. | Objection 2. Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always have been born. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, in statu innocentiae generatio ad multiplicationem hominum ordinabatur. Sed sufficienter homines multiplicari potuissent per primum hominem et per primam feminam, ex quo in perpetuum victuri erant. Ergo non fuit necessarium quod in statu innocentiae feminae nascerentur. | Objection 3. Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod sic natura processisset in generando, sicut eam Deus instituit. Sed Deus instituit marem et feminam in natura humana, ut dicitur Gen. I et II. Ergo etiam in statu illo fuissent mares et feminae generati. | On the contrary, Nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Genesis 1-2). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil eorum quae ad complementum humanae naturae pertinent, in statu innocentiae defuisset. Sicut autem ad perfectionem universi pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita etiam diversitas sexus est ad perfectionem humanae naturae. Et ideo in statu innocentiae uterque sexus per generationem productus fuisset. | I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod femina dicitur mas occasionatus, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem naturae universalis, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (92, 1, ad 2). |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod generatio feminae non solum contingit ex defectu virtutis activae vel indispositione materiae, ut obiectio tangit. Sed quandoque quidem ex aliquo accidenti extrinseco; sicut philosophus dicit, in libro de animalibus, quod ventus Septentrionalis coadiuvat ad generationem masculorum, Australis vero ad generationem feminarum. Quandoque etiam ex conceptione animae, ad quam de facili immutatur corpus. Et praecipue in statu innocentiae hoc esse poterat, quando corpus magis erat animae subiectum; ut scilicet secundum voluntatem generantis, distingueretur sexus in prole. | Reply to Objection 2. The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified. |
| IЄ q. 99 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod proles fuisset genita vivens vita animali, ad quam sicut pertinet alimento uti, sic etiam generare. Unde conveniebat quod omnes generarent, et non solum primi parentes. Ad quod consequens videtur quod tot fuissent generatae feminae, quot et mares. | Reply to Objection 3. The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number. |
IЄ q. 100 pr. Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis generandae quantum ad iustitiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum homines fuissent nati cum iustitia. Secundo, utrum nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. |
Question 100. The condition of the offspring as regards righteousnessWould men have been born in a state of righteousness? Would they have been born confirmed in righteousness? |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines non fuissent cum iustitia nati. Dicit enim Hugo de sancto Victore quod primus homo ante peccatum generaret quidem filios sine peccato, sed non paternae iustitiae haeredes. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness." |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, iustitia est per gratiam, ut apostolus dicit ad Rom. V. Sed gratia non transfunditur, quia sic esset naturalis; sed a solo Deo infunditur. Ergo pueri cum iustitia nati non fuissent. | Objection 2. Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says (Romans 5:16-21). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, iustitia in anima est. Sed anima non est ex traduce. Ergo nec iustitia traducta fuisset a parentibus in filios. | Objection 3. Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents, to the children. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu Virg., quod simul cum rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si non peccaret. | On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul." |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Unde quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset. In accidentibus autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti naturae. Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros. Et propter hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad originalem iustitiam. | I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Hugonis est intelligendum non quantum ad habitum iustitiae, sed quantum ad executionem actus. | Reply to Objection 1. These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia originali. Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus. Non tamen fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est dispositum infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex traduce. | Reply to Objection 2. Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (95, 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (95, 1). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 1 ad 3 Unde patet solutio ad tertium. | From this the reply to the third objection is clear. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae nati fuissent in iustitia confirmati. Dicit enim Gregorius, IV Moralium, super illud, somno meo requiescerem etc., si parentem primum nulla putredo peccati corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios Gehennae generaret; sed hi qui nunc per redemptorem salvandi sunt, soli ab illo electi nascerentur. Ergo nascerentur omnes in iustitia confirmati. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: "For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten "children of hell"; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer." Therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro cur Deus homo, quod si primi parentes sic vixissent ut tentati non peccassent, ita confirmarentur cum omni propagine sua, ut ultra peccare non possent. Ergo pueri nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. | Objection 2. Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, bonum est potentius quam malum. Sed propter peccatum primi hominis consecuta est necessitas peccandi in his qui nascuntur ex eo. Ergo si primus homo in iustitia perstitisset, derivaretur ad posteros necessitas observandi iustitiam. | Objection 3. Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, Angelus adhaerens Deo aliis peccantibus, statim est in iustitia confirmatus, ut ulterius peccare non posset. Ergo similiter et homo, si tentationi restitisset, confirmatus fuisset. Sed qualis ipse fuit, tales alios generasset. Ergo et eius filii confirmati in iustitia nascerentur. | Objection 4. Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, tam felix universa esset humana societas si nec illi, scilicet primi parentes, malum quod in posteros traiicerent, nec quisquam ex stirpe eorum iniquitatem committeret, quae damnationem reciperet. Ex quo datur intelligi quod, etiam si primi homines non peccassent, aliqui ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere. Non ergo nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod non videtur possibile quod pueri in statu innocentiae nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. Manifestum est enim quod pueri in sua nativitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum parentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quandiu generassent, non fuissent confirmati in iustitia. Ex hoc enim creatura rationalis in iustitia confirmatur, quod efficitur beata per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non potest non inhaerere, cum ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, a qua nullus potest averti, cum nihil desideretur et ametur nisi sub ratione boni. Et hoc dico secundum legem communem, quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali secus accidere potest, sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei. Quam cito autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem pervenisset quod Deum per essentiam videret, efficeretur spiritualis et mente et corpore, et animalis vita cessaret, in qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde manifestum est quod parvuli non nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. | I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si Adam non peccasset, non generaret ex se filios Gehennae, ita scilicet quod ab ipso peccatum contraherent, quod est causa Gehennae. Possent tamen fieri filii Gehennae per liberum arbitrium peccando. Vel, si filii Gehennae non fierent per peccatum, hoc non esset propter hoc, quia essent in iustitia confirmati; sed propter divinam providentiam, per quam a peccato conservarentur immunes. | Reply to Objection 1. If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Anselmus hoc non dicit asserendo, sed opinando. Quod patet ex ipso modo loquendi, cum dicit, videtur quod, si vixissent et cetera. | Reply to Objection 2. Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: "It seems that if they had lived, etc." |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio ista non est efficax, quamvis per eam Anselmus motus fuisse videatur, ut ex eius verbis apparet. Non enim sic per peccatum primi parentis eius posteri necessitatem peccandi incurrunt, ut ad iustitiam redire non possint, quod est tantum in damnatis. Unde nec ita necessitatem non peccandi transmisisset ad posteros, quod omnino peccare non possent, quod est tantum in beatis. | Reply to Objection 3. This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed. |
| IЄ q. 100 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod non est simile de homine et Angelo. Nam homo habet liberum arbitrium vertibile et ante electionem et post, non autem Angelus, sicut supra dictum est, cum de Angelis ageretur. | Reply to Objection 4. There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels (64, 2). |
IЄ q. 101 pr. Deinde considerandum est de conditione prolis generandae quantum ad scientiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum pueri nascerentur in scientia perfecti. Secundo, utrum statim post nativitatem habuissent perfectum usum rationis. |
Question 101. The condition of the offspring as regards knowledgeWould children in the state of innocence have been born with perfect knowledge? Would they have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth? |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae pueri nati fuissent in scientia perfecti. Qualis enim fuit Adam, tales filios generasset. Sed Adam fuit in scientia perfectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo filii nascerentur ab eo in scientia perfecti. | Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (94, 3). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ignorantia ex peccato causatur, ut Beda dicit. Sed ignorantia est privatio scientiae. Ergo ante peccatum pueri mox nati omnem scientiam habuissent. | Objection 2. Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. I-II, 85, 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, pueri mox nati iustitiam habuissent. Sed ad iustitiam requiritur scientia, quae dirigit in agendis. Ergo etiam scientiam habuissent. | Objection 3. Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod anima nostra per naturam est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed eadem animae natura est modo, quae tunc fuisset. Ergo animae puerorum in principio scientia caruissent. | On the contrary, The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, et ideo anima unitur corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est quod pueri in statu innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia; sed eam in processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo vel addiscendo. | I answer that, As above stated (99, 1), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained (55, 2; 84, 6); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non generabat filios similes sibi; sed solum quantum ad accidentia naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae. | Reply to Objection 1. The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ignorantia est privatio scientiae quae debet haberi pro tempore illo. Quod in pueris mox natis non fuisset, habuissent enim scientiam quae eis competebat secundum tempus illud. Unde ignorantia in eis non fuisset, sed nescientia respectu aliquorum. Quam etiam Dionysius ponit in Angelis sanctis, in VII Cael. Hier. | Reply to Objection 2. Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium principiorum. | Reply to Objection 3. Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae mox nati habuissent perfectum usum rationis. Nunc enim pueri perfectum usum rationis non habent propter hoc, quod anima per corpus aggravatur. Hoc autem tunc non erat, quia, ut dicitur Sap. IX, corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam. Ergo ante peccatum et corruptionem a peccato subsecutam, pueri mox nati perfectum usum rationis habuissent. | Objection 1. It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wisdom 9:15). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaedam alia animalia mox nata habent naturalis industriae usum, sicut agnus statim fugit lupum. Multo ergo magis homines in statu innocentiae mox nati habuissent usum perfectum rationis. | Objection 2. Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus generatis. Ergo pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum usum rationis. | On the contrary, In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, usus rationis dependet quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Vires autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus. In pueris autem est impedimentum harum virium, propter nimiam humiditatem cerebri. Et ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate. Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum superius est dictum. | I answer that, As above stated (84, 7), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (99, 1). |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem. | Reply to Objection 1. The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages. |
| IЄ q. 101 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis generibus animalium inveniuntur. Et tamen in homine est speciale impedimentum propter abundantiam humiditatis cerebri, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2. Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (99, 1). |
IЄ q. 102 pr. Deinde considerandum est de loco hominis, qui est Paradisus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Paradisus sit locus corporeus. Secundo, utrum sit conveniens locus habitationis humanae. Tertio, ad quid homo in Paradiso positus fuit. Quarto, utrum in Paradiso debuit fieri. |
Question 102. Man's abode, which is paradiseIs paradise a corporeal place? Is it a place apt for human habitation? for what purpose was man placed in paradise? Should he have been created in paradise? |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non sit locus corporeus. Dicit enim Beda quod Paradisus pertingit usque ad lunarem circulum. Sed nullus locus terrenus talis esse potest, tum quia contra naturam terrae esset quod tantum elevaretur; tum etiam quia sub globo lunari est regio ignis, qui terram consumeret. Non est ergo Paradisus locus corporeus. | Objection 1. It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede [Strabus, Gloss on Genesis 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Scriptura commemorat quatuor flumina in Paradiso oriri, ut patet Gen. II. Illa autem flumina quae ibi nominantur, alibi habent manifestas origines; ut patet etiam per philosophum in libro Meteor. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus. | Objection 2. Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Genesis 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, aliqui diligentissime inquisierunt omnia loca terrae habitabilis, qui tamen nullam mentionem faciunt de loco Paradisi. Ergo non videtur esse locus corporeus. | Objection 3. Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, in Paradiso describitur lignum vitae esse. Sed lignum vitae est aliquid spirituale, dicitur enim Prov. III, de sapientia, quod est lignum vitae his qui apprehendunt eam. Ergo et Paradisus non est locus corporeus, sed spiritualis. | Objection 4. Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" (Proverbs 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, si Paradisus est locus corporalis, oportet quod et ligna Paradisi sint corporalia. Sed hoc non videtur, cum corporalia ligna sint producta tertio die; de plantatione autem lignorum Paradisi legitur Gen. II, post opera sex dierum. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus. | Objection 5. Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., tres sunt de Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual." |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, quae commode dici possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur. Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones fabricandae. Est ergo Paradisus, ut Isidorus dicit in libro Etymol., locus in orientis partibus constitutus, cuius vocabulum a Graeco in Latinum vertitur hortus. Convenienter autem in parte Orientali dicitur situs. Quia credendum est quod in nobilissimo loco totius terrae sit constitutus. Cum autem oriens sit dextera caeli, ut patet per philosophum in II de caelo; dextera autem est nobilior quam sinistra; conveniens fuit ut in Orientali parte Paradisus terrenus institueretur a Deo. | I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Bedae verbum non est verum, si secundum sensum manifestum intelligatur. Potest tamen exponi quod usque ad locum lunaris globi ascendit, non secundum situs eminentiam, sed secundum similitudinem, quia est ibi perpetua aeris temperies, ut Isidorus dicit, et in hoc assimilatur corporibus caelestibus, quae sunt absque contrarietate. Magis tamen fit mentio de lunari globo quam de aliis sphaeris, quia lunaris globus est terminus caelestium corporum versus nos; et luna etiam est magis terrae affinis inter omnia corpora caelestia; unde et quasdam tenebras nebulosas habet, quasi accedens ad opacitatem. Quidam autem dicunt quod Paradisus pertingebat usque ad lunarem globum, idest usque ad medium aeris interstitium, in quo generantur pluviae et venti et huiusmodi, quia dominium super huiusmodi evaporationes maxime attribuitur lunae. Sed secundum hoc, locus ille non esset conveniens habitationi humanae, tum quia ibi est maxima intemperies; tum quia non est contemperatus complexioni humanae, sicut aer inferior magis terrae vicinus. | Reply to Objection 1. Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon--that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., credendum est, quoniam locus Paradisi a cognitione hominum est remotissimus, flumina, quorum fontes noti esse dicuntur, alicubi isse sub terras, et post tractus prolixarum regionum, locis aliis erupisse. Nam hoc solere nonnullas aquas facere, quis ignorat? | Reply to Objection 2. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams?" |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt. | Reply to Objection 3. The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra dictum est. Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt. | Reply to Objection 4. The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (97 , 4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam aliae in actu. Secundum alios vero sanctos, oportet dicere quod omnes plantae productae sunt in actu tertio die, et etiam ligna Paradisi, sed quod dicitur de plantatione lignorum Paradisi post opera sex dierum, intelligitur per recapitulationem esse dictum. Unde littera nostra habet, plantaverat dominus Deus Paradisum voluptatis a principio. | Reply to Objection 5. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning" (Genesis 2:8). |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non fuerit locus conveniens habitationi humanae. Homo enim et Angelus similiter ad beatitudinem ordinantur. Sed Angelus statim a principio factus est habitator loci beatorum, scilicet caeli Empyrei. Ergo etiam ibi debuit institui habitatio hominis. | Objection 1. It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, si locus aliquis debetur homini, aut debetur ei ratione animae, aut ratione corporis. Si ratione animae, debetur ei pro loco caelum, qui videtur esse locus naturalis animae, cum omnibus insitus sit appetitus caeli. Ratione autem corporis, non debetur ei alius locus quam aliis animalibus. Ergo Paradisus nullo modo fuit locus conveniens habitationi humanae. | Objection 2. Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, frustra est locus in quo nullum locatum continetur. Sed post peccatum Paradisus non est locus habitationis humanae. Ergo, si est locus habitationi humanae congruus, in vanum videtur a Deo institutus fuisse. | Objection 3. Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, homini, cum sit temperatae complexionis congruus est locus temperatus. Sed locus Paradisi non est locus temperatus, dicitur enim esse sub aequinoctiali circulo, qui locus videtur esse calidissimus, cum bis in anno sol pertranseat super summitatem capitum eorum qui ibi habitant. Ergo Paradisus non est locus congruus habitationi humanae. | Objection 4. Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator--a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit de Paradiso, quod est divina regio, et digna eius qui secundum imaginem Dei erat, conversatio. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image." |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris. In Paradiso autem utrumque invenitur, quia, ut Damascenus dicit, est locus temperato et tenuissimo et purissimo aere circumfulgens, plantis semper floridis comatus. Unde manifestum est quod Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, secundum primae immortalitatis statum. | I answer that, As above stated (97, 1), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained (97, 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., Deus regit creaturam corporalem per spiritualem; unde conveniens est quod spiritualis natura sit supra omnem corporalem constituta, sicut ei praesidens. Quantum autem ad secundum, convenit statui beatitudinis, qui est firmatus in summa stabilitate. Sic igitur locus beatitudinis congruit Angelo secundum naturam suam, unde ibi creatus est. Non autem congruit homini secundum suam naturam, cum non praesideat toti corporali creaturae per modum gubernationis, sed competit ei solum ratione beatitudinis. Unde non est positus a principio in caelo Empyreo; sed illuc transferendus erat in statu finalis beatitudinis. | Reply to Objection 1. The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat, licet ex quadam dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli. | Reply to Objection 2. It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat. Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in illo Paradiso habitent. | Reply to Objection 3. Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod illi qui dicunt Paradisum esse sub circulo aequinoctiali, opinantur sub circulo illo esse locum temperatissimum, propter aequalitatem dierum et noctium omni tempore; et quia sol nunquam multum ab eis elongatur, ut sit apud eos superabundantia frigoris; nec iterum est apud eos, ut dicunt, superabundantia caloris, quia etsi sol pertranseat super eorum capita, non tamen diu moratur ibi in hac dispositione. Aristoteles tamen, in libro Meteor., expresse dicit quod regio illa est inhabitabilis propter aestum. Quod videtur probabilius, quia terrae per quas nunquam sol pertransit in directum capitis, sunt intemperatae in calore propter solam vicinitatem solis. Quidquid autem de hoc sit, credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi. | Reply to Objection 4. Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum. Quod enim introductum est in poenam peccati, non fuisset in Paradiso in statu innocentiae. Sed agricultura introducta est in poenam peccati, ut dicitur Gen. III. Ergo homo non fuit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur ipsum. | Objection 1. It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Genesis 3:17). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, custodia non est necessaria, ubi non timetur violentus invasor. Sed in Paradiso nullus timebatur violentus invasor. Ergo non erat necessarium ut Paradisum custodiret. | Objection 2. Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si homo positus est in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret ipsum, videtur sequi quod homo factus sit propter Paradisum, et non e converso, quod videtur esse falsum. Ergo homo non est positus in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum. | Objection 3. Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret illum. | On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 2:15): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it." |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., verbum istud Genesis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo sic, quod Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem, operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo. Alio modo potest intelligi, ut homo operaretur et custodiret Paradisum. Nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis naturae. Custodia etiam illa non esset contra invasores, sed esset ad hoc quod homo sibi Paradisum custodiret, ne ipsum peccando amitteret. Et hoc totum in bonum hominis cedebat, et sic Paradisus ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso. | I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo factus fuerit in Paradiso. Angelus enim in loco suae habitationis creatus fuit, scilicet in caelo Empyreo. Sed Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae ante peccatum. Ergo videtur quod in Paradiso homo debuit fieri. | Objection 1. It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place--namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, alia animalia conservantur in loco suae generationis; sicut pisces in aquis, et animalia gressibilia in terra, unde producta sunt. Homo autem conservatus fuisset in Paradiso, ut dictum est. Ergo in Paradiso fieri debuit. | Objection 2. Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created (97, 4). Therefore he was created in paradise. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, mulier in Paradiso facta fuit. Sed vir dignior est muliere. Ergo multo magis vir debuit fieri in Paradiso. | Objection 3. Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in Paradiso. | On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 2:15): "God took man and placed him in paradise." |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad incorruptionem primi status. Incorruptio autem illa non erat hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono. Ut ergo hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae, Deus hominem extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum. | I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est locus congruus Angelis etiam quantum ad eorum naturam, et ideo ibi sunt creati. | Reply to Objection 1. The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 4 ad 2 Et similiter dicendum ad secundum. Loca enim illa congruunt animalibus secundum suam naturam. | In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature. |
| IЄ q. 102 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in quo parentes iam erant positi. | Reply to Objection 3. Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.
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