Line 30: |
Line 30: |
| <p>For this purpose, I must call your attention to the differences there are in the manner in which different representations stand for their objects.</p> | | <p>For this purpose, I must call your attention to the differences there are in the manner in which different representations stand for their objects.</p> |
| | | |
− | <p>In the first place there are likenesses or copies — such as ''statues'', ''pictures'', ''emblems'', ''hieroglyphics'', and the like. Such representations stand for their objects only so far as they have an actual resemblance to them — that is agree with them in some characters. The peculiarity of such representations is that they do not determine their objects — they stand for anything more or less; for they stand for whatever they resemble and they resemble everything more or less.</p> | + | <p>In the first place there are likenesses or copies — such as ''statues'', ''pictures'', ''emblems'', ''hieroglyphics'', and the like. Such representations stand for their objects only so far as they have an actual resemblance to them — that is agree with them in some characters. The peculiarity of such representations is that they do not determine their objects — they stand for anything more or less; for they stand for whatever they resemble and they resemble everything more or less.</p> |
| | | |
| <p>The second kind of representations are such as are set up by a convention of men or a decree of God. Such are ''tallies'', ''proper names'', &c. The peculiarity of these ''conventional signs'' is that they represent no character of their objects. Likenesses denote nothing in particular; ''conventional signs'' connote nothing in particular.</p> | | <p>The second kind of representations are such as are set up by a convention of men or a decree of God. Such are ''tallies'', ''proper names'', &c. The peculiarity of these ''conventional signs'' is that they represent no character of their objects. Likenesses denote nothing in particular; ''conventional signs'' connote nothing in particular.</p> |
| | | |
− | <p>The third and last kind of representations are ''symbols'' or general representations. They connote attributes and so connote them as to determine what they denote. To this class belong all ''words'' and all ''conceptions''. Most combinations of words are also symbols. A proposition, an argument, even a whole book may be, and should be, a single symbol. (Peirce 1866, "Lowell Lecture 7", CE 1, 467–468).</p> | + | <p>The third and last kind of representations are ''symbols'' or general representations. They connote attributes and so connote them as to determine what they denote. To this class belong all ''words'' and all ''conceptions''. Most combinations of words are also symbols. A proposition, an argument, even a whole book may be, and should be, a single symbol.</p> |
| + | |
| + | <p>(Peirce 1866, Lowell Lecture 7, CE 1, 467–468).</p> |
| |} | | |} |
| | | |