Changes

The introduction of explicit names for systems of interpretation, as well as for their interpretive moments, models of interpretation, objective concerns, points of development, and situations of use, is intended to flesh out the lifeless idiom or insipid brand of ''assignment statements'' that are currently found in CL settings, which are typically rendered so abstractly as to constitute a entire style of ''anonymous'', ''passive'', or ''unattributed'' excuses for fully executable commands.

The introduction of explicit names for systems of interpretation, as well as for their interpretive moments, models of interpretation, objective concerns, points of development, and situations of use, is intended to flesh out the lifeless idiom or insipid brand of ''assignment statements'' that are currently found in CL settings, which are typically rendered so abstractly as to constitute a entire style of ''anonymous'', ''passive'', or ''unattributed'' excuses for fully executable commands.

<pre>

<pre>

"x := y", read as "x is set equal to y",

"x := y", read as "x is set equal to y",

converting it into the corresponding "attributive" or "active" form of assignment statement:

converting it into the corresponding ''attributive'' or ''active'' form of assignment statement:

"j : x = y", read as "j sets x equal to y".

"j : x = y", read as "j sets x equal to y".

Returning to the present application, the "categorical" project leads one to seek something in the object itself, some factor that divides up its dynamic and symbolic aspects, some plane of cleavage that explains the natural divisions between different types of object system, while the "methodeutic" outlook leads one to wonder whether the specialized mode of being that is beheld in the object is not in fact due to something in the style and direction of approach, some artifact of method that is being cast on the object system from the eye of the beholder.

Returning to the present application, the ''categorical'' project leads one to seek something in the object itself, some factor that divides up its dynamic and symbolic aspects, some plane of cleavage that explains the natural divisions between different types of object system, while the ''methodeutic'' outlook leads one to wonder whether the specialized mode of being that is beheld in the object is not in fact due to something in the style and direction of approach, some artifact of method that is being cast on the object system from the eye of the beholder.

I would like to articulate a systematic hypothesis that prevails over the scene of this work, tacitly imposing the deliberately hopeful assumption that there is always some sort of hypostatic unity to be found beneath the manifold diversity of phenomena.  It is not just my own presumption or personal preference to say this.  I find it to be a likely and common assumption, constantly being used to address all sorts of interesting phenomena and almost every process of note, whether or not it is ever expressly enunciated.

I would like to articulate a systematic hypothesis that prevails over the scene of this work, tacitly imposing the deliberately hopeful assumption that there is always some sort of hypostatic unity to be found beneath the manifold diversity of phenomena.  It is not just my own presumption or personal preference to say this.  I find it to be a likely and common assumption, constantly being used to address all sorts of interesting phenomena and almost every process of note, whether or not it is ever expressly enunciated.

This hypothesis is probably implicit in the very idea of a "system", that is to say, in the notion of "things standing together", and it is central to the very conception of a systematic universe or a universal system.  Nevertheless, I will have to take responsibility for the particular way that this premiss is expressed and developed in this text.  Because it amounts to the underlying hope that there is always a unified system, some one thing that subsists beneath every form of phenomenal process and that remains available to substantiate and explain whatever manner of diversity in appearances is encountered, something or other that is always ready to be explicated but seldom necessary to declare, I call this assumption the "hypostatically unified system hypothesis" (HUSH).

This hypothesis is probably implicit in the very idea of a ''system'', that is to say, in the notion of ''things standing together'', and it is central to the very conception of a systematic universe or a universal system.  Nevertheless, I will have to take responsibility for the particular way that this premiss is expressed and developed in this text.  Because it amounts to the underlying hope that there is always a unified system, some one thing that subsists beneath every form of phenomenal process and that remains available to substantiate and explain whatever manner of diversity in appearances is encountered, something or other that is always ready to be explicated but seldom necessary to declare, I call this assumption the ''hypostatically unified system hypothesis'' (HUSH).

In accord with this tacit assumption, that rules the entire realm of systems theory, it can be presumed that there is an integral system, prior in its real status to the manifold of observable appearances, that is somehow able to manifest itself in the severally projected roles of a dynamic process and a symbolic purpose.  But to harvest any practical consequences from the employment of this inchoative precept, the twin yoke of questions, categorical and methodeutic, must now be taken up:

In accord with this tacit assumption, that rules the entire realm of systems theory, it can be presumed that there is an integral system, prior in its real status to the manifold of observable appearances, that is somehow able to manifest itself in the severally projected roles of a dynamic process and a symbolic purpose.  But to harvest any practical consequences from the employment of this inchoative precept, the twin yoke of questions, categorical and methodeutic, must now be taken up:

1. What constitutes the differences between the dynamic and symbolic aspects of the hypothetically unified intelligent system?

# What constitutes the differences between the dynamic and symbolic aspects of the hypothetically unified intelligent system?

# What features divide the two perspectives that find these aspects respectively salient?

The integration of symbolic and dynamic approaches to systems thinking requires a significant level of reconstructive effort, one that is capable of extending its energies in both the analytic and synthetic directions.  It may be nothing more than a metaphor to describe it this way, but there is something like a dynamic economy of energy exchanges that goes on in facilitating the required &ldquo;metaboly of symbols&rdquo; (Peirce).

 

The integration of symbolic and dynamic approaches to systems thinking requires a significant level of reconstructive effort, one that is capable of extending its energies in both the analytic and synthetic directions.  It may be nothing more than a metaphor to describe it this way, but there is something like a dynamic economy of energy exchanges that goes on in facilitating the required "metaboly of symbols" (Peirce).

In this vein, there seem to be laws analogous to conservation principles that govern the transactions between subordinate processes, determining the interactions that are most likely to occur between the breaking down of old conceptual bonds and the creation of new configurations of ideas at higher and lower levels of conceptual equilibrium.  Brought to bear on the present task, the specific manifestations of "mental energy" that are called on to accomplish the current work of integration have a potential for raising questions about the relation of "logic" to "time", and thus revive an issue that goes back to the very birth of thought.

In this vein, there seem to be laws analogous to conservation principles that govern the transactions between subordinate processes, determining the interactions that are most likely to occur between the breaking down of old conceptual bonds and the creation of new configurations of ideas at higher and lower levels of conceptual equilibrium.  Brought to bear on the present task, the specific manifestations of "mental energy" that are called on to accomplish the current work of integration have a potential for raising questions about the relation of "logic" to "time", and thus revive an issue that goes back to the very birth of thought.