Changes

<p>In short, my philosophical working hypothesis is concrete reflection, i.e., the ''cogito'' as mediated by the whole universe of signs.</p>

<p>In short, my philosophical working hypothesis is concrete reflection, i.e., the ''cogito'' as mediated by the whole universe of signs.</p>

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| align="right" | Ricoeur, ''The Conflict of Interpretations'', [Ric, 166, 170]

| align="right" | Paul Ricoeur, ''The Conflict of Interpretations'', [Ric, 166, 170]

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This understanding of the task of phenomenology bears on three features of the approach to consciousness that I am charting here.

This understanding of the task of phenomenology bears on three features of the approach to consciousness that I am charting here.

1. It is under the heading of "description", especially as qualified by the adjective "effective", that the rationale of using mathematical models and the strategy of seeking computational implementations of these models can be found to successively fall.

# It is under the heading of ''description'', especially as qualified by the adjective ''effective'', that the rationale of using mathematical models and the strategy of seeking computational implementations of these models can be found to successively fall.

 

# As a rule, I find it helps to avoid hypostatizing consciousness or self-awareness as statically constituted entities, but to use the systematic notions of dynamic agency and developing organization.  However, in order to make connections with other approaches to phenomenology I need occasionally to mention concepts and even to make use of language that I would otherwise prefer to avoid.

2. As a rule, I find it helps to avoid hypostatizing consciousness or self awareness as statically constituted entities, but to use the systematic notions of dynamic agency and developing organization.  However, in order to make connections with other approaches to phenomenology I need occasionally to mention concepts and even to make use of language that I would otherwise prefer to avoid.

# Finally, it is under the cumulative aims of effective description and systematic dynamics that the utility of sign relations is key.  Sign relations are the minimal forms of models that are capable of compassing all that goes on in thinking along with whatever it is that thinking relates to in all the domains that it orients toward.  The use of sign relations as models, as mathematical descriptions, and as computational simulations of what appears in reflecting on conduct is especially well suited to including in these models a description of what transpires in the conduct of reflection itself.

 

3. Finally, it is under the cumulative aims of effective description and systematic dynamics that the utility of sign relations is key.  Sign relations are the minimal forms of models that are capable of compassing all that goes on in thinking along with whatever it is that thinking relates to in all the domains that it orients toward.  The use of sign relations as models, as mathematical descriptions, and as computational simulations of what appears in reflecting on conduct is especially well suited to including in these models a description of what transpires in the conduct of reflection itself.

The type of phenomenology that is being envisioned here depends on no assured power of introspection but only on a modest power to reflect on conduct and thereby to give it a description.  These descriptions, all the better if they are inscribed in external media, can be examined with increasing degrees of detachment and have their consequences projected by deductive means.  In time, the mass of descriptions that accumulates with continuing experience and persistent reflection on conduct begins to constitute a de facto "model of behavior" (MOB).  In common regard this "prescribed code" or "catalog of procedure" (COP) can range from an empirical standard of comparison, through a provisional regulation, to a tentative ideal for future conduct.  However, the status that a COP or a MOB has when it starts out is not as important as its ability to test its prescriptions, along with their deductive and pragmatic implications, against the corpus of continuing observation, reflection, and description.

The type of phenomenology that is being envisioned here depends on no assured power of introspection but only on a modest power to reflect on conduct and thereby to give it a description.  These descriptions, all the better if they are inscribed in external media, can be examined with increasing degrees of detachment and have their consequences projected by deductive means.  In time, the mass of descriptions that accumulates with continuing experience and persistent reflection on conduct begins to constitute a de facto "model of behavior" (MOB).  In common regard this "prescribed code" or "catalog of procedure" (COP) can range from an empirical standard of comparison, through a provisional regulation, to a tentative ideal for future conduct.  However, the status that a COP or a MOB has when it starts out is not as important as its ability to test its prescriptions, along with their deductive and pragmatic implications, against the corpus of continuing observation, reflection, and description.