Changes

Over time, Peirce tried to express the basic idea contained in the ''pragmatic maxim'' (PM) in numerous different ways.  In the remainder of this work, the gist of the pragmatic maxim, the logical content that appropriates its general intention over a variety of particular contexts, the common denominator of all of its versionary approximations, can be referred to with maximal simplicity as “PM”.  Otherwise, subscripts can be used in contexts where it is necessary to mention a particular form, for instance, referring to the versions just given as “PM₁” and “PM₂”, respectively.

Over time, Peirce tried to express the basic idea contained in the ''pragmatic maxim'' (PM) in numerous different ways.  In the remainder of this work, the gist of the pragmatic maxim, the logical content that appropriates its general intention over a variety of particular contexts, the common denominator of all of its versionary approximations, can be referred to with maximal simplicity as “PM”.  Otherwise, subscripts can be used in contexts where it is necessary to mention a particular form, for instance, referring to the versions just given as “PM₁” and “PM₂”, respectively.

Considered side by side like this, any perceptible differences between PM₁ and PM₂ appear to be trivial and insignificant, lacking in every conceivable practical consequence, as indeed would be the case if both statements were properly understood.  One would like to say that both variants belong to the same ''pragmatic equivalence class'' (PEC), where all of the peculiarities of their individual expressions are absorbed into the effective synonymy of a single operational maxim of conduct. Unfortunately, no matter how well this represents the ideal, it does not describe the present state of understanding with respect to the pragmatic maxim, and this is the situation that my work is given to address.

Considered side by side like this, any perceptible differences between

PM_1 and PM_2 appear to be trivial and insignificant, lacking in every

conceivable practical consequence, as indeed would be the case if both

statements were properly understood.  One would like to say that both

variants belong to the same "pragmatic equivalence class" (PEC), where

all of the peculiarities of their individual expressions are absorbed

into the effective synonymy of a single operational maxim of conduct.

Unfortunately, no matter how well this represents the ideal, it does

not describe the present state of understanding with respect to the

pragmatic maxim, and this is the situation that my work is given

to address.

I am taking the trouble to recite both of these very close variants

I am taking the trouble to recite both of these very close variants of the pragmatic maxim because I want to examine how their subsequent interpretations have tended to diverge over time and to analyze why the traditions of interpretation that stem from them are likely to develop in such a way that they eventually come to be at cross-purposes to each other.

of the pragmatic maxim because I want to examine how their subsequent

interpretations have tended to diverge over time and to analyze why the

traditions of interpretation that stem from them are likely to develop in

such a way that they eventually come to be at cross-purposes to each other.

There is a version of the pragmatic maxim, more commonly cited,

There is a version of the pragmatic maxim, more commonly cited, that uses ''we'' and ''our'' instead of ''you'' and ''your''.  At first sight, this appears to confer a number of clear advantages on the expression of the maxim.  The second person is ambiguous with regard to number, and it can be read as both singular and plural, since the …

that uses "we" and "our" instead of "you" and "your".  At first

sight, this appears to confer a number of clear advantages on the

expression of the maxim.  The second person is ambiguous with regard

to number, and it can be read as both singular and plural, since the ...

Unfortunately, people have a tendency to translate "our concept of the object"

Unfortunately, people have a tendency to translate ''our concept of the object'' into ''the meaning of a concept''.  This displacement of the genuine article from ''the object'' to ''the meaning'' obliterates the contingently indefinite commonality of ''our'' manner of thinking and replaces it with the absolutely definite pretension to ''the'' unique truth of the matter // changing the emphasis from common conception to unique intention.  This apparently causes them to read ''the whole of our conception'' as ''the whole meaning of a conception'' … // from ''thee'' and ''thy'' to ''the'' and ''our'' //

into "the meaning of a concept".  This displacement of the genuine article from

"the object" to "the meaning" obliterates the contingently indefinite commonality

of "our" manner of thinking and replaces it with the absolutely definite pretension

to "the" unique truth of the matter // changing the emphasis from common conception

to unique intention.  This apparently causes them to read "the whole of our conception"

as "the whole meaning of a conception" ...  // from 'thee' and 'thy' to 'the' and 'our'//

The pragmatic maxim, taking the form of an injunctive prescription, a piece

The pragmatic maxim, taking the form of an injunctive prescription, a piece of advice, or a practical recommendation, provides an operational description of a certain philosophical outlook or ''frame of reference''.  This is the general POV that is called ''pragmatism'', or ''pragmaticism'', as Peirce later renamed it when he wanted more pointedly to emphasize the principles that distinguish his own particular POV from the general run of its appropriations, interpretations, and common misconstruals.  Thus the pragmatic maxim, in a way that is deliberately consistent with the principles of the POV to which it leads, enunciates a practical idea and provides a truly pragmatic definition of that very same POV.

of advice, or a practical recommendation, provides an operational description

of a certain philosophical outlook or "frame of reference".  This is the general

POV that is called "pragmatism", or "pragmaticism", as Peirce later renamed it

when he wanted more pointedly to emphasize the principles that distingush his

own particular POV from the general run of its appropriations, interpretations,

and common misconstruals.  Thus the pragmatic maxim, in a way that is deliberately

consistent with the principles of the POV to which it leads, enunciates a practical

idea and provides a truly pragmatic definition of that very same POV.

I am quoting a version of the pragmatic maxim whose form of address to

I am quoting a version of the pragmatic maxim whose form of address to the reader exemplifies a second person POV on the part of the writer. In spite of the fact that this particular variation does not appear in print until a later date, my own sense of the matter leads me to think that it actually recaptures the original form of the pragmatic insight. My reasons for believing this are connected with Peirce's early notion of ''tuity'', the second person character of the mind's dialogue with nature and with other minds, and a topic to be addressed in detail at a later point in this discussion.

the reader exemplifies a "second person" POV on the part of the writer.

In spite of the fact that this particular variation does not appear in

print until a later date, my own sense of the matter leads me to think

that it actually reacaptures the original form of the pragmatic insight.

My reasons for believing this are connected with Peirce's early notion

of "tuity", the second person character of the mind's dialogue with

nature and with other minds, and a topic to be addressed in detail

at a later point in this discussion.

By way of a piece of evidence for this impression, one that is internal

By way of a piece of evidence for this impression, one that is internal to the texts, both versions begin with the second person POV that is implied by their imperative mood.

to the texts, both versions begin with the second person POV that is

implied by their imperative mood.

Just as the sign in a sign relation addresses the interpretant intended

Just as the sign in a sign relation addresses the interpretant intended

in the mind of its interpreter, PM_2 is addressed to an interpretant or

in the mind of its interpreter, PM₂ is addressed to an interpretant or effect intended in the mind of its reader.

effect intended in the mind of its reader.

The third excerpt puts a gloss on the meaning of a "practical bearing"

The third excerpt puts a gloss on the meaning of a ''practical bearing'' and provides an alternative statement of the pragmatic maxim (PM₃).

and provides an alternative statement of the pragmatic maxim (PM_3).

| Such reasonings and all reasonings turn upon the idea that if one exerts

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| is called a "practical consideration".  Hence is justified the maxim,

|

|

|(Peirce, CP 5.9, 1905).

<p>Such reasonings and all reasonings turn upon the idea that if one exerts certain kinds of volition, one will undergo in return certain compulsory perceptions. Now this sort of consideration, namely, that certain lines of conduct will entail certain kinds of inevitable experiences is what is called a "practical consideration". Hence is justified the maxim, belief in which constitutes pragmatism;  namely,</p>

The fourth excerpt illustrates one of Peirce's many attempts to get the sense

The fourth excerpt illustrates one of Peirce's many attempts to get the sense

of the pragmatic POV across by rephrasing the pragmatic maxim in an alternative

of the pragmatic POV across by rephrasing the pragmatic maxim in an alternative