Changes

<p>We have then:</p>

<p>We have then:</p>

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<p>The principle of explicatory or deductive reasoning then is that:</p>

<p>The principle of explicatory or deductive reasoning then is that:</p>

<p>The highest terms are therefore broadest and the lowest terms the narrowest.  We can take a term so broad that it contains all other spheres under it.  Then it will have no content whatever.  There is but one such term — with its synonyms — it is ''Being''.  We can also take a term so low that it contains all other content within it.  Then it will have no sphere whatever.  There is but one such term — it is ''Nothing''.</p>

<p>The highest terms are therefore broadest and the lowest terms the narrowest.  We can take a term so broad that it contains all other spheres under it.  Then it will have no content whatever.  There is but one such term — with its synonyms — it is ''Being''.  We can also take a term so low that it contains all other content within it.  Then it will have no sphere whatever.  There is but one such term — it is ''Nothing''.</p>

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<p>We can conceive of terms so narrow that they are next to nothing, that is have an absolutely individual sphere.  Such terms would be innumerable in number.  We can also conceive of terms so high that they are next to ''being'', that is have an entirely simple content.  Such terms would also be innumerable.</p>

<p>We can conceive of terms so narrow that they are next to nothing, that is have an absolutely individual sphere.  Such terms would be innumerable in number.  We can also conceive of terms so high that they are next to ''being'', that is have an entirely simple content.  Such terms would also be innumerable.</p>

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<p>But such terms though conceivable in one sense — that is intelligible in their conditions — are yet impossible.  You never can narrow down to an individual.  Do you say Daniel Webster is an individual?  He is so in common parlance, but in logical strictness he is not.  We think of certain images in our memory — a platform and a noble form uttering convincing and patriotic words — a statue — certain printed matter — and we say that which that speaker and the man whom that statue was taken for and the writer of this speech — that which these are in common is Daniel Webster.  Thus, even the proper name of a man is a general term or the name of a class, for it names a class of sensations and thoughts.  The true individual term the absolutely singular ''this'' & ''that'' cannot be reached.  Whatever has comprehension must be general.</p>

<p>But such terms though conceivable in one sense — that is intelligible in their conditions — are yet impossible.  You never can narrow down to an individual.  Do you say Daniel Webster is an individual?  He is so in common parlance, but in logical strictness he is not.  We think of certain images in our memory — a platform and a noble form uttering convincing and patriotic words — a statue — certain printed matter — and we say that which that speaker and the man whom that statue was taken for and the writer of this speech — that which these are in common is Daniel Webster.  Thus, even the proper name of a man is a general term or the name of a class, for it names a class of sensations and thoughts.  The true individual term the absolutely singular ''this'' & ''that'' cannot be reached.  Whatever has comprehension must be general.</p>