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=====1.3.3.5.  A Formal Approach=====

=====1.3.3.5.  A Formal Approach=====

I plan to approach the issue of formalization from a slightly different angle, proceeding through an analysis of the medium of interpretation and developing an effective conception of ''interpretive frameworks'' or ''interpretive systems''.  This concept refers to any organized system of interpretive practice, ranging from those used in everyday speech, to the ones that inform technical discourse, to the kinds of completely formalized symbol systems that one can safely regard as mathematical objects.  Depending on the degree of objectification that it possesses from one's point of view, the same system of conduct can be variously described as an interpretive framework (IF), interpretive system (IS), interpretive object (IO), or object system (OS).  These terms are merely suggestive — no rigid form of classification is intended.

I plan to approach the issue of formalization from a slightly different angle, proceeding through an analysis of the medium of interpretation and developing an effective conception of ''interpretive frameworks'' or ''interpretive systems''.  This concept refers to any organized system of interpretive practice, ranging from those used in everyday speech, to the ones that inform technical discourse, to the kinds of completely formalized symbol systems that one can safely regard as mathematical objects.  Depending on the degree of objectification that it possesses from one's point of view, the same system of conduct can be variously described as an interpretive framework (IF), interpretive system (IS), interpretive object (IO), or object system (OS).  These terms are merely suggestive — no rigid form of classification is intended.

Many times, it is convenient to personify the interpretive organization as if it were embodied in the actions of a typical user of the framework or a substantive agent of the system.  I will call this agent the ''interpreter'' of the moment.  At other times, it may be necessary to analyze the action of interpretation more carefully.  At these times, it is important to remember that this form of personification is itself a figure of speech, one that has no meaning outside a fairly flexible interpretive framework.  Thus, the term ''interpreter'' can be a cipher analogous to the terms ''X'', ''unknown'', or ''to whom it may concern'' appearing in a system of potentially recursive constraints.  As such, it serves in the role of an indeterminate symbol, in the end to be solved for a fitting value, but in the mean time conveying an appearance of knowledge in a place where very little is known about the subject itself.

Many times, it is convenient to personify the interpretive organization as if it were embodied in the actions of a typical user of the framework or a substantive agent of the system.  I will call this agent the ''interpreter'' of the moment.  At other times, it may be necessary to analyze the action of interpretation more carefully.  At these times, it is important to remember that this form of personification is itself a figure of speech, one that has no meaning outside a fairly flexible interpretive framework.  Thus, the term ''interpreter'' can be a cipher analogous to the terms ''X'', ''unknown'', or ''to whom it may concern'' appearing in a system of potentially recursive constraints.  As such, it serves in the role of an indeterminate symbol, in the end to be solved for a fitting value, but in the mean time conveying an appearance of knowledge in a place where very little is known about the subject itself.

The supposition that there is a meaningful and well-defined distinction between object language and meta-language ordinarily goes unexamined.  This means that the assumption of a distinction between them is de facto a part of the meta-language and not even an object of discussion in the object language.  A slippery slope begins here.  A failure to build reflective capacities into an interpretive framework can let go unchallenged the spurious opinion that presumes there can be only one way to draw a distinction between object language and meta-language.

The supposition that there is a meaningful and well-defined distinction between object language and meta-language ordinarily goes unexamined.  This means that the assumption of a distinction between them is de facto a part of the meta-language and not even an object of discussion in the object language.  A slippery slope begins here.  A failure to build reflective capacities into an interpretive framework can let go unchallenged the spurious opinion that presumes there can be only one way to draw a distinction between object language and meta-language.

The next natural development is to iterate the supposed distinction.  This represents an attempt to formalize and thereby ''objectify'' parts of the meta-language, precipitating it like a new layer of pearl or crystal from the resident medium or ''mother liquor'', and thereby preparing the decantation of a still more pervasive and ethereal meta-meta-language.  The successive results of this process can have a positivistically intoxicating effect on the human intellect.  But a not so happy side-effect leads the not quite mindful cerebration up and down a blind alley, chasing the specious impression that just beyond the realm of objective nature there lies a unique fractionation of permeabilities and a permanent hierarchy of effabilities in language.

The next natural development is to iterate the supposed distinction.  This represents an attempt to formalize and thereby ''objectify'' parts of the meta-language, precipitating it like a new layer of pearl or crystal from the resident medium, and thereby preparing the decantation of a still more pervasive and ethereal meta-meta-language.  The successive results of this process can have a positivistically intoxicating effect on the human intellect.  But a not so happy side-effect leads the not quite mindful cerebration up and down a blind alley, chasing the specious impression that just beyond the realm of objective nature there lies a unique fractionation of permeabilities and a permanent hierarchy of effabilities in language.

The grounds of discussion I am raking over here constellate a rather striking scene, especially for something intended as a neutral backdrop.  Unlike other concerns, the points I am making seem obvious to all reasonable people at the outset of discussion, and yet the difficulties that follow as inquiry develops get muddier and more grating the more one probes and stirs them up.  A large measure of the blame, I think, can be charged to a misleading directive that people derive from the epithet ''meta'', leading them to search for higher and higher levels of meaning and truth, on beyond language, on beyond any conceivable system of signs, and on beyond sense.  Prolonged use of the prefix ''meta'' leads people to act as if a meta-language were step outside of ordinary language, or an artificial platform constructed above and beyond natural language, and then they forget that formal models are developments internal to the informal context.  For this reason among others, I suggest replacing talk about rigidly stratified object languages and meta-languages with talk about contingent interpretive frameworks.

The grounds of discussion I am raking over here constellate a rather striking scene, especially for something intended as a neutral backdrop.  Unlike other concerns, the points I am making seem obvious to all reasonable people at the outset of discussion, and yet the difficulties that follow as inquiry develops get muddier and more grating the more one probes and stirs them up.  A large measure of the blame, I think, can be charged to a misleading directive that people derive from the epithet ''meta'', leading them to search for higher and higher levels of meaning and truth, on beyond language, on beyond any conceivable system of signs, and on beyond sense.  Prolonged use of the prefix ''meta'' leads people to act as if a meta-language were step outside of ordinary language, or an artificial platform constructed above and beyond natural language, and then they forget that formal models are developments internal to the informal context.  For this reason among others, I suggest replacing talk about rigidly stratified object languages and meta-languages with talk about contingent interpretive frameworks.

To avoid the types of cul-de-sac (cultist act) encountered above, I am taking some pains to ensure a reflective capacity for the interpretive frameworks I develop in this project.  This is a capacity that natural languages always assume for themselves, instituting specialized discourses as developments that take place within their frame and not as constructs that lie beyond their scope.  Any time the levels of recursive discussion become too involved to manage successfully, one needs to keep available the resource of ''instant wisdom'', the modest but indispensable quantum of ready understanding, that restores itself on each return to the ordinary universe (OU).

To avoid the types of cul-de-sac (cultist act) encountered above, I am taking some pains to ensure a reflective capacity for the interpretive frameworks I develop in this project.  This is a capacity that natural languages always assume for themselves, instituting specialized discourses as developments that take place within their frame and not as constructs that lie beyond their scope.  Any time the levels of recursive discussion become too involved to manage successfully, one needs to keep available the resource of ''instant wisdom'', the modest but indispensable quantum of ready understanding, that restores itself on each return to the ordinary universe.

From this angle of approach, let us try to view afresh the manner of drawing distinctions between various levels of formalization in language.  Once again, I begin in the context of ordinary discussion, and if there is any distinction to be drawn between objective and instrumental languages then it must be possible to describe it within the frame of this informally discursive universe.

From this angle of approach, let us try to view afresh the manner of drawing distinctions between various levels of formalization in language.  Once again, I begin in the context of ordinary discussion, and if there is any distinction to be drawn between objective and instrumental languages then it must be possible to describe it within the frame of this informally discursive universe.