Changes

====1.2.3.  Architecture of Inquiry====

====1.2.3.  Architecture of Inquiry====

The outlines of one important landmark can already be seen from this station.  It is the architecture of inquiry, in the style traced out by C.S. Peirce and John Dewey on the foundations poured by Aristotle.  I envision being able to characterize the simplest drifts of its dynamics in terms of certain differential operators.

The outlines of one important landmark can already be seen from this station.   

It is the architecture of inquiry, in the style traced out by C.S. Peirce and  

John Dewey on the foundations poured by Aristotle.  I envision being able to  

characterize the simplest drifts of its dynamics in terms of certain  

differential operators.

It is important to remember that knowledge is a different sort of goal from the  

It is important to remember that knowledge is a different sort of goal from the run-of-the-mill setpoints that a system might have.  The typical goal is a state that a system has actually experienced many times before, like normal body temperature for a human being.  But a particular state of knowledge that an intelligent system moves toward may be a state it has never been through before.   

run-of-the-mill setpoints that a system might have.  The typical goal is a state  

The fundamental equivocation on this point expressed in Plato's Meno, whether learning is functionally equivalent to remembering, was discussed above.  In spite of this quibble, it still seems necessary to regard states of knowledge as a distinctive class.  The reasons for this may lie in the fact that a useful definition of inquiry for human beings necessarily involves a whole community of inquiry.

that a system has actually experienced many times before, like normal body  

temperature for a human being.  But a particular state of knowledge that an  

intelligent system moves toward may be a state it has never been through before.   

The fundamental equivocation on this point expressed in Plato's Meno, whether  

learning is functionally equivalent to remembering, was discussed above.  In  

spite of this quibble, it still seems necessary to regard states of knowledge as  

a distinctive class.  The reasons for this may lie in the fact that a useful  

definition of inquiry for human beings necessarily involves a whole community of  

inquiry.

On account of this social character of inquiry, even those states of knowledge  

On account of this social character of inquiry, even those states of knowledge which might be arrived at through accidental, gratuitous, idiosyncratic, transcendental, or otherwise inexplicable means are useless for most human purposes unless they can be communicated, that is, reliably reproduced in the social system as a whole.  In order to do this it seems necessary as a practical matter, whatever may have been the original process of construction, that such states of knowledge be obtainable through the option of a rational reconstruction.  Hence the familiar requirement of proof for mathematical results, no matter how inspired their first glimmerings.  Hence the discipline of programming that challenges workers in AI to represent intelligent processes in terms of computable functions, however differently intelligence may have evolved in the frame of biological time.

which might be arrived at through accidental, gratuitous, idiosyncratic,  

transcendental, or otherwise inexplicable means are useless for most human  

purposes unless they can be communicated, that is, reliably reproduced in the  

social system as a whole.  In order to do this it seems necessary as a practical  

matter, whatever may have been the original process of construction, that such  

states of knowledge be obtainable through the option of a rational  

reconstruction.  Hence the familiar requirement of proof for mathematical  

results, no matter how inspired their first glimmerings.  Hence the discipline  

of programming that challenges workers in AI to represent intelligent processes  

in terms of computable functions, however differently intelligence may have  

evolved in the frame of biological time.

Aristotle long ago pointed out that there can be no genuine science of the  

Aristotle long ago pointed out that there can be no genuine science of the purely idiosyncratic subject, no systematic knowledge of the totally isolated event.  Science does not have as its domain all experience but only that subset which is indefinitely repeatable.  Likewise on the negative branch, concerning the lack of knowledge that occasions a problem, a state that never recurs does not present a problem for a system.  This limitation of scientific problems and knowledge to recurrent phenomena yields an important clue.  The placement of intelligence and knowledge in analogy with system attributes like momentum and frequency may turn out to be based on deeply common principles.

purely idiosyncratic subject, no systematic knowledge of the totally isolated  

event.  Science does not have as its domain all experience but only that subset  

which is indefinitely repeatable.  Likewise on the negative branch, concerning  

the lack of knowledge that occasions a problem, a state that never recurs does  

not present a problem for a system.  This limitation of scientific problems and  

knowledge to recurrent phenomena yields an important clue.  The placement of  

intelligence and knowledge in analogy with system attributes like momentum and  

frequency may turn out to be based on deeply common principles.

=====1.2.3.1.  Inquiry Driven Systems=====

=====1.2.3.1.  Inquiry Driven Systems=====