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| | <pre> | | <pre> |
| − | | Things are equivocally named, when they have the name only in common,
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| − | | the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name
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| − | | being different. For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly
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| − | | both be called "animals" [Greek 'zõon' means 'living' or 'true to life'],
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| − | | these are equivocally named. For they have the name only in common,
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| − | | the definitions (or statements of essence) corresponding with the name
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| − | | being different. For if you are asked to define what the being an animal
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| − | | means in the case of the man and the portrait, you give in either case
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| − | | a definition appropriate to that case alone. ("Categories", p. 13).
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| − | |
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| − | | Aristotle, "The Categories", in 'Aristotle, Volume 1',
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| − | | Translated by H.P. Cooke & H. Tredennick, Loeb Classics,
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| − | | William Heinemann Ltd, London, UK, 1938.
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| − |
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| | I would like to introduce a concept that I find to be of | | I would like to introduce a concept that I find to be of |
| | use in discussing the problems of hypostatic abstraction, | | use in discussing the problems of hypostatic abstraction, |
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| | So, in general, it can happen that a use of the string of char "Cat" | | So, in general, it can happen that a use of the string of char "Cat" |
| | may denote a particular cat, a category of cats, or a catitudiosity. | | may denote a particular cat, a category of cats, or a catitudiosity. |
| − | </pre>
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| − |
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| − | ==Work Area==
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| − |
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| − | <pre>
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| − | The word "intension" has recently come to be stressed in our discussions.
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| − | As I first learned this word from my reading of Leibniz, I shall take it
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| − | to be nothing more than a synonym for "property" or "quality", and shall
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| − | probably always associate it with the primes factorization of integers,
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| − | the analogy between having a factor and having a property being one of
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| − | the most striking, at least to my neo-pythagorean compleated mystical
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| − | sensitivities, that Leibniz ever posed, and of which certain facets
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| − | of Peirce's work can be taken as a further polishing up, if one is
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| − | of a mind to do so.
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| − |
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| − | As I dare not presume this to constitute the common acceptation
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| − | of the term "intension", not without checking it out, at least,
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| − | I will need to try and understand how others here understand
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| − | the term and all of its various derivatives, thereby hoping
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| − | to anticipate, that is to say, to evade or to intercept,
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| − | a few of the brands of late-breaking misunderstandings
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| − | that are so easy to find ourselves being surprised by,
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| − | if one shies away from asking silly questions at the
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| − | very first introduction of one of these parvenu words.
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| − | I have been advised that it will probably be fruitless
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| − | to ask direct questions of my informants in such a regard,
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| − | but I do not see how else to catalyze the process of exposing
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| − | the presumption that "it's just understood" when in fact it may
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| − | be far from being so, and thus to clear the way for whatever real
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| − | clarification might possibly be forthcoming, in the goodness of time.
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| − | Just to be open, and patent, and completely above the metonymous board,
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| − | I will lay out the paradigm that I myself bear in mind when I think about
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| − | how I might place the locus and the sense of this term "intension", because
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| − | I see the matter of where to lodge it in our logical logistic as being quite
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| − | analogous to the issue of where to place those other i-words, namely, "idea",
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| − | capitalized or not, "impresssion", "intelligible concept", and "interpretant".
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| | </pre> | | </pre> |
