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| − | | Things are equivocally named, when they have the name only in common,
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| − | | the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name
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| − | | being different. For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly
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| − | | both be called "animals" [Greek 'zõon' means 'living' or 'true to life'],
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| − | | these are equivocally named. For they have the name only in common,
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| − | | the definitions (or statements of essence) corresponding with the name
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| − | | being different. For if you are asked to define what the being an animal
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| − | | means in the case of the man and the portrait, you give in either case
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| − | | a definition appropriate to that case alone. ("Categories", p. 13).
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| − | | Aristotle, "The Categories", in 'Aristotle, Volume 1',
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| − | | Translated by H.P. Cooke & H. Tredennick, Loeb Classics,
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| − | | William Heinemann Ltd, London, UK, 1938.
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| | I would like to introduce a concept that I find to be of | | I would like to introduce a concept that I find to be of |
| | use in discussing the problems of hypostatic abstraction, | | use in discussing the problems of hypostatic abstraction, |