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<th>Latin</th>
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<th>English</th>
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||     [CAP. 10. DE DIVISIONE NOMINUM IN MERE AESOLUTA ET CONNOTATIVA]
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              ||   C. 10. ON THE DIVISION OF NAMES INTO PURELY ABSOLUTE AND CONNOTATIVE
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||<b> C.12. DE PROPOSITIONIBUS IN QUIBUS PONUNTUR TERMINI NEGATIVI, PRIVATIVI ET INFINITI
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||     Postquam de nominibus concretis et abstractis est discussum, nunc de alia divisione nominum, quibus scholastici frequenter utuntur, est dicendum.
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||<b>Chapter 12. On propositions in which there occur negative, privative and infinite terms.
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Unde sciendum quod nominum quaedam sunt absoluta mere, quaedam sunt connotativa.
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Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud vel idem secundario, sed quidquid significatur per illud nomen, aeque primo significatur, sicut patet de hoc nomine 'animal' quod non significat nisi boves, asinos et homines, et sic de aliis animalibus, et non significat unum primo et aliud secundario, ita quod oporteat aliquid significari in recto et aliud in obliquo, nec in definitione exprimente quid nominis oportet ponere talia distincta in diversis casibus vel aliquod verbum adiectivum.  
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              ||   After concrete and abstract names have been discussed, now we have to speak about another division of names which scholastics frequently use.
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||Non solum autem propositiones in quibus ponuntur termini connotativi vel relativi sunt aequivalentes propositionibus hypotheticis, sed etiam propositiones in quibus ponuntur termini negativi, privativi et infiniti sunt aequivalentes propositionibus hypotheticis, quia etiam omnes tales termini sunt vere connotativi, eo quod in eorum definitionibus exprimentibus quid nominis debet poni aliquid in recto et aliquid in obliquo, vel in recto cum negatione praevia.
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Wherefore, you should know that certain names are 'purely absolute', certain are 'connotative'.
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||Now, not only propositions with connotative or relative terms are equivalent to hypothetical propositions, but also propositions with negative, privative and infinite terms are equivalent to hypothetical propositions, since all such terms also are truly connotative, seeing as in their nominal definitions should be put something in the nominative case and something in an oblique case (or in the nominative case with a previous negation).
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Purely absolute names are those which do not signify something principally and something else (or the same thing) secondarily, but rather, whatever is signified by that name, is equally signified primarily, thus the name 'animal' clearly does not signify anything but cattle, donkeys and men, and so for other animals, and does not signify one primarily and another secondarily in such a way that something has to be signified in the nominative case and another in an oblique case, and in the nominal definition it is not necessary to put such distinct terms in different cases, or to use some participle.
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||Sicut definitio huius nominis 'immateriale' est ista 'aliquid quod non habet materiam', et definitio istius termini 'caecum' est ista 'aliquid carens visu quod natum est habere visum', et definitio istius termini 'non-homo' est ista 'aliquid quod non est homo', et sic de aliis.
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||    Immo, proprie loquendo talia nomina non habent definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, quia proprie loquendo unius nominis habentis definitionem exprimentem quid nominis est una definitio explicans quid nominis, sic scilicet quod talis nominis non sunt diversae orationes exprimentes quid nominis habentes partes distinctas, quarum aliqua significat aliquid quod non eodem modo importatur per aliquam partem alterius orationis.  
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||(As for instance the definition of the name 'immaterial' is 'something which is not material', and the definition of 'blind' is 'something lacking sight which naturally is to have sight, and the definition of 'not a man' is 'something which is not a man', and so on).
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              ||   Indeed, properly speaking, such names do not have a nominal definition, since, properly speaking, there is one definition of a name that has a nominal definition, explicating the nominal essence, thus it is evident that of such a name there are not different nominal definitions having distinct parts, of which one signifies something that is not conveyed in the same way by some part of the other expression.  
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||Et ideo quilibet terminus talis est vere connotativus, quamvis non quilibet talis sit relativus, eo quod aliquando terminus talis potest de aliquo verificari, quamvis terminus obliquus sibi non possit vere et convenienter addi, sicut angelus est immaterialis, et tamen non oportet quod 'alicuius immaterialis' sit nec 'alicui immaterialis', et sic de aliis obliquis.
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||     Sed talia quantum ad quid nominis possunt aliquo modo pluribus orationibus non easdem res secundum suas partes significantibus explicari, et ideo nulla earum est proprie definitio exprimens quid nominis.
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||And for that reason any such term is truly connotative, although not every such term is relative, seeing as sometimes such a term can be truly predicated of something, although an oblique term cannot be added to it truly and consistently, just as an angel is immaterial and yet is not necessary that it is 'immaterial of something' nor 'immaterial to something' and so for other oblique cases.
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              ||   But, as far as their nominal definition is concerned, such names can be explained in some way by several expressions that do not signify the same things by their parts. And on that account none of them is properly a nominal definition.
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||Quaelibet autem propositio talis in qua ponitur terminus talis, duas ad minus habet exponentes, et aliquando habet plures; quod faciliter videri potest videndo definitionem exprimentem quid nominis ipsius termini.
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||     Verbi gratia 'angelus' est nomen mere absolutum, saltem si non sit nomen officii sed tantum substantiae.  
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||But any such proposition in which such a term is put has at least two exponents, and sometimes more; which can easily be seen by looking at the nominal definition of the term itself.
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Et istius nominis non est aliqua una definitio exprimens quid nominis, nam unus explicat quid hoc nomen significat, sic dicendo 'intelligo per angelum substantiam abstractam a materia'; alius sic 'angelus est substantia intellectualis et incorruptibilis'; alius sic 'angelus est substantia simplex, non componens cum alio'.  
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              ||    For example, 'angel' is a purely absolute name (at least if it is not the name of a function, but of a substance only).  
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And there is not one nominal definition of this name, for one person explains what the name means by saying 'I understand by an angel a substance abstracted from matter', another saying 'an angel is an intellectual and incorruptible substance', and another 'an angel is a simple substance that does not join with any other'.
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||Unde quaelibet propositio in qua ponitur terminus infinitus habet duas exponentes: unam affirmativam, in qua iste terminus 'aliquid' in singulari vel in plurali, vel aliquis alius terminus aequipollens tali, subicitur vel praedicatur.
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||Wherefore any proposition containing an infinite term has two exponents: one affirmative, in which the term 'something' in the singular or the plural, or some other term equivalent to it, is subject or predicate.
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||Unde ista 'asinus est non-homo' aequivalet isti 'asinus est aliquid et asinus non est homo'.
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||Wherefore 'a donkey is a non man' is equivalent to 'a donkey is something and it is not the case that a donkey is a man'.
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||     Et ita bene explicat unus quid significat hoc nomen sicut alius. Et tamen aliquis terminus positus in una oratione significat aliquid quod non significatur eodem modo per terminum alterius orationis, et ideo nulla earum est proprie definitio exprimens quid nominis.
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              ||   And so one explains what the name means just as well as the other. And yet some term put in one expression signifies something that is not signified in the same way by some term in the other expression, and for that reason none of them is properly a nominal definition.
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||Similiter ista 'angelus est immaterialis' aequivalet isti 'angelus est aliquid et angelus non habet materiam'.
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||Similarly, 'an angel is immaterial' is equivalent to 'an angel is something and an angel has no material'
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||     Et ita est de nominibus mere absolutis quod stricte loquendo nullum eorum habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis. Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi 'homo', 'animal', 'capra', 'Iapis', 'arbor', 'ignis', 'terra, 'aqua', 'caelum', 'albedo', 'nigredo', 'calor', 'dulcedo', 'odor', 'sapor' et huiusmodi.  
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              ||   And so it is for purely absolute names that (strictly speaking) none of them has a nominal definition.  Now such names are as follows: 'man', 'animal', 'goat', 'stone', 'tree', 'fire', 'earth', 'water', 'heaven', 'whiteness', 'blackness', 'heat', 'sweetness', 'smell', 'taste', and the like.  
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||Et hoc est intelligendum quando terminus talis negativus nihil significat negative nisi quod terminus oppositus significat affirmative.
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||And this is to be understood when such a negative term signifies nothing negatively unless the opposite term signifies affirmatively.
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||    Nomen autem connotativum est illud quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario. Et tale nomen proprie habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, et frequenter oportet ponere unum illius definitionis in recto et aliud in obliquo.  
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Sicut est de hoc nomine 'album, nam 'album' habet definitionem exprimentem quid nominis, in qua una dictio ponitur in recto et alia in obliquo.
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||Quod dico ad excludendum istam instantiam: ista enim copu- lativa 'essentia divina est aliquid et non est genita' non aequivalet isti 'essentia divina est ingenita'.
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              ||    But a connotative name is one that signifies something primarily and something secondarily. And such a name does properly have a nominal definition, and often it is necessary to put one part of that definition in the nominative case and another in an oblique case.
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||Which I say in order to exclude this instance: for the conjunction 'the divine essence is something and it is not begotten' is not equivalent to 'the divine essence is unbegotten'.
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So it is for the name 'white', for 'white' has a nominal definition, in which one word is put in the nominative and another one in an oblique case.
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||Ex isto patet quod de virtute sermonis ista est neganda 'chimaera est non-homo', quia habet unam exponentem falsam, scilicet istam 'chimaera est aliquid'.
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||    Unde si quaeras, quid significat hoc nomen 'album', dices quod illud idem quod ista oratio tota 'aliquid informatum albedine' vel 'aliquid habens albedinem'. Et patet quod una pars orationis istius ponitur in recto et alia in obliquo.
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||And from this is is clear that 'a chimera is a non-man' is literally false, because it has one false exponent, namely 'a chimera is something'.
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              ||   Wherefore, if you ask what the name 'a white thing' signifies, you will say: that name signifies the same as the entire expression 'something informed by whiteness' or 'something having whiteness'. And it is clear that one part of the expression is put in the nominative and another part in an oblique case.
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||Similiter si nullus homo sit albus, haec est neganda de virtute sermonis 'homo albus est non-homo', quia ista exponens est falsa 'homo albus est aliquid'.
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||     Potest etiam aliquando aliquod verbum cadere in definitione exprimente quid nominis, sicut si quaeras, quid significat hoc nomen 'causa', potest dici quod idem quod haec oratio 'aliquid ad cuius esse sequitur aliud' vel 'aliquid potens producere aliud', vel aliquid huiusmodi.  
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||Similarly if no man is white, 'a white man is something', taken literally, is to be denied, because 'a white man is something' is false.
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              ||   Sometimes too a verb can occur in the nominal definition, so, for instance, if you ask what the name 'cause' signifies, it can be said, the same as 'something on whose existence something else is a consequence' or 'something that can produce another thing', or something of that sort.
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||Et si dicatur quod, secundum Aristotelem, alterum contradictoriorum dicitur de quolibet;
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||     Huiusmodi autem nomina connotativa sunt omnia nomina concreta primo modo dicta, de quibus dictum est in quinto capitulo. Et hoc quia talia concreta significant unum in recto et aliud in obliquo; hoc est dictu, in definitione exprimente quid nominis debet poni unus rectus, significans unam rem, et alius obliquus, significans aliam rem, sicut patet de omnibus talibus 'iustus', 'albus', 'animatus', 'humanum', et sic de aliis.  
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si igitur chimaera non sit non-homo, igitur chimaera est homo:
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              ||   Now such connotative names include all concrete names of the first sort (which were mentioned in c. 5). And this is because such concrete names signify one thing in the nominative and another in an oblique case; that is to say, in the nominal definition there ought to be put one nominative term, signifying one thing, and another oblique term, signifying another thing, as is clear for all such names as 'just', 'white', 'animate', 'human', and so on.  
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Dicendum est, secundum intentionem Aristotelis,  
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quod non de quolibet termino significative sumpto dicitur alterum contradictoriorum incomplexorum,  
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sicut de hoc nomine 'chimaera' significative sumpto nec dicitur 'homo' nec 'non-homo'.
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||     Huiusmodi etiam nomina sunt omnia nomina relativa, quia semper in sua definitione ponuntur diversa idem diversis modis, vel distincta, significantia, sicut patet de hoc nomine 'simile'.
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||It may be said, according to Aristotle, that one or the other of contradictories is said of anything;
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              ||   Such names also include all relative names, since in their definition there are always put different terms signifying the same thing in different ways or distinct things, such as is is clear for the name 'similar'.
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  if therefore a chimaera is not a non-man, therefore a chimaera is a man.
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  The reply is that, according to the intention of Aristotle,  
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  it is not true of any term whatsoever, taken significatively, that one or the other of contradictory terms is said of it;
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||     Si enim definiatur simile, debet dici sic 'simile est aliquid habens qualitatem talem qualem habet aliud', vel aliquo modo consimili debet definiri. Unde de exemplis non est magna cura.
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  for example, neither man or non-man is said of the name 'chimaera', taken significatively.
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              ||   For if 'similar' is defined, it should be said thus: 'the similar is something having a quality such as another thing has', or it ought to be defined in some similar way. Wherefore there is no great importance attached to these examples.
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||Tamen de omni termino supponente significative, non includente aequivalenter aliquod  syncategorema vel aliam determinationem, de quo praedicatur vere 'ens' vel 'aliquid', dicitur alterum contradictoriorum.
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||     Ex quo patet quod hoc commune 'nomen en connotativum' est superius ad hoc commune 'nomen relativum', et hoc accipiendo hoc commune 'nomen connotativum' largissime.  
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||Yet of every term denoting significatively not including some syncategoremata or other determinate term, of which is truly predicated 'being' or 'something', is said one or the other of contradictories.
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              ||   From which it is clear that the common term 'connotative name' is of a higher genus than the common term 'relative name', taking here the common term 'connotative name' in the broadest sense.
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||Unde si haec esset vera 'chimaera est aliquid', altera istarum esset vera 'chimaera est homo', 'chimaera est non-homo'.
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||     Talia etiam nomina sunt omnia nomina pertinentia ad genus quantitatis, secundum illos qui ponunt quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate, sicut 'corpus', secundum eos, debet poni nomen connotativum.  
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||Wherefore if 'a chimaera is something' were true, one or the other of 'a chimaera is a man' or 'a chimaera is a non-man' would be true.
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              ||   Such names also include all names pertaining to the genus of quantity, according to those who propose that quantity is not another thing from substance and quality, so that 'body', according to them, should be held to be a connotative name.
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||Et ideo concedendum est quod non de quolibet significative sumpto dicitur alterum contradictoriorum, tamen hoc non obstante de quolibet tali quidlibet vere affirmatur vel vere negatur.
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||     Unde secundum eos debet dici quod corpus non est aliud nisi aliqua res habens partem distantem a parte secundum longum, latum et profundum; et quantitas continua et permanens non est nisi res habens partem distantem a parte, ita quod ista est definitio exprimens quid nominis ipsius.
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||And for that reason it is to be granted that not of any [term] taken significatively is said one or the other of contradictories, yet this does not prevent anything being truly affirmed or truly denied of any such term.
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              ||   Wherefore, according to them, it ought to be said that a body is nothing but some thing having part distant from part in respect of length, breadth and depth; and continuous and permanent quantity is nothing but  some thing having part distant from part', so that this is a nominal definition.
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||Et hoc intendit Aristoteles quando dicit : "De quolibet affirmatio vel negatio", et de nullo eorum ambo.
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||     Tales etiam consequenter habent ponere quod 'figura', 'curvitas', 'rectitudo', 'longitudo', 'latitudo' et huiusmodi sunt nomina connotativa.
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||And this is what Aristotle intends when he says 'Of anything either affirmation or negation', and of none of them both.
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Immo, qui ponunt quod quaelibet res est substantia vel qualitas, habent ponere quod omnia contenta in aliis praedicamentis a substantia et qualitate sunt nomina connotativa; et etiam quaedam de genere qualitatis sunt connotativa, sicut ostendetur inferius.  
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              ||   Such persons also have to maintain that 'figure', 'curvedness', 'rightness', 'length', 'breadth' and the like are connotative names.  
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Indeed, those who propose that every thing is either a substance or a quality have to suppose that all the contents in categories other than substance and quality are connotative names; and even certain names in the category of quality are connotative, as will be shown below.  
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||Unde quamvis nec 'homo' nec 'non-homo' dicatur de chimaera, tamen homo vere affirmatur vel negatur de chimaera, unde altera istarum est vera '‚chimaera est homo', 'chimaera non est homo'.
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||Wherefore although neither 'man' or 'non man' is said of the chimaera, yet 'man' is truly affirmed or denied of the chimaera, wherefore one or the other of 'a chimaera is a man' or 'it is not the case that a chimaera is a man' is true.
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||    Sub istis etiam nominibus comprehenduntur omnia talia 'verum', 'bonum', 'unum', 'potentia', 'actus', 'intellectus', 'intelligibile', 'voluntas', 'volibile' et huiusmodi.  
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Unde de intellectu est sciendum quod habet quid nominis istud 'intellectus est anima potens intelligere', ita quod anima significatur per rectum et actus intelligendi per aliam partem.  
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||Similiter altera istarum est vera 'chimaera est non-homo', 'chimaera non est non-homo'.
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||Similarly one or the other of 'a chimaera is a non-man' or 'it is not the case that a chimaera is a non-man' is true.
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              ||    Under these names are also comprehended all such as 'true', 'good', 'one', 'power', 'act', 'intellect', 'intelligible', 'will', 'willible'and the like.  
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Wherefore, concerning intellect you should know that it has this nominal essence: 'Intellect is soul able to understand.', so that the soul is signified by the nominative, and the act of understanding by the other part.  
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||Et sic de istis 'homo albus est homo', 'homo albus non est homo', 'homo albus est non-homo', 'homo albus non est non-homo'.
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||And so for 'a white man is a man' and 'it is not the case that a white man is a man', 'a white man is a non-man' and 'it is not the case that a white man is a non-man'
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||     Hoc autem nomen 'intelligibile' est nomen connotativum, et significat intellectum tam in recto quam in obliquo, quia definitio sua est ista 'intelligibile est aliquid apprehensibile ab intellectu'.  
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Ibi intellectus significatur per hoc nomen 'aliquid', et per istum obliquum 'intellectu' significatur etiam intellectus.
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||Quod autem neutra istarum sit vera 'homo albus est homo', 'homo albus est non-homo', posito quod nullus homo sit albus, potest ostendi: nam si haec sit vera 'homo albus est non-homo', cum sit affirmativa oportet quod subiectum supponat pro aliquo.
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              ||   But the name 'intelligible' is a connotative name, and signifies the intellect in the nominative just as in an oblique case, because its definition is 'the intelligible thing is something that can be apprehended by the intellect.'
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||However, it can be shown that neither 'a white man is a man' or 'a white man is a non-man' is true, having posited that no man is white: for if 'a white man is a non-man' is true, it must denote something, since it is affirmative.
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Here the intellect is signified by the name 'something', and the intellect is also signified by the oblique 'by an intellect'.
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||Quo dato quaero: pro quo supponit? Non pro voce nec pro conceptu, cum supponat significative et non materialiter neque simpliciter; igitur supponit pro aliquo alio.
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||     Et eodem modo dicendum est de 'vero' et 'bono', quia 'verum', quod ponitur convertibile cum 'ente', significat idem quod 'intelligibile'. 'Bonum' etiam, quod est convertibiIe cum 'ente', significat idem quod haec oratio 'aliquid secundum rectam rationem volibile vel diligibile'.
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||If so, I ask, what does it denote?  Not a sound or a concept, since it denotes significatively and not materially or simply, therefore it denotes something else.
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              ||    And we should say the same of 'true' and 'good', since 'true', which is supposed convertible with 'being', signifies the same as 'intelligible'.  'Good' too, which is convertible with 'being',signifies the same as the expression 'something willable or lovable according to right reason'.  
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||Et per consequens iste terminus 'homo albus' significative sumptus praedicaretur de pronomine demonstrante illud pro quo supponit, et per consequens haec esset vera 'hoc est homo albus'; quod est manifeste falsum.
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||And in consequence the term 'a white man' taken significatively would be predicated of a pronoun referring to what it denotes, and in consequence 'this is a white man' would be true, which is manifestly false.
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||Quia si sit vera, aut demonstratur ens aut non-ens.
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||Because if it is true, it refers to either a being or a non-being.
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||Si ens, ergo aliquod ens esset homo albus, quod est contra positum; si non-ens, igitur aliquod non-ens esset homo albus, et per consequens esset album, quod est manifeste falsum.
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||If a being - therefore some being – were a white man, that is contrary to what was supposed; if a non-being, then some non-being would be a white man, and in consequence would be white, which is manifestly false.
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||Et ita patet quod haec est falsa 'homo albus est non-homo', si nullus homo sit albus.
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||And so it is clear that 'a white man is a non-man' is false, if no man is white.
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||Et per eandem rationem possunt consimiles probari esse falsae.
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||And by the same reason, similar things can be shown to be false.
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||CAP.14. DE PROPOSITIONIBUS IN QUIBUS PONUNTUR FIGMENTA QUIBUS NIHIL CORRESPONDET EX PARTE REI: QUOMODO DEBENT EXPONI?
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||C. 14 ON PROPOSITIONS IN WHICH OCCUR FIGMENTS TO WHICH NOTHING CORRESPONDS IN REALITY:
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WHAT SHOULD BE GIVEN AS THEIR EXPONENTS?
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||Sicut propositiones in quibus ponuntur termini negativi et privativi habent plures exponentes, ita propositiones in quibus ponuntur figmenta, hoc est in quibus ponuntur termini ficti quibus nihil correspondet a parte rei tale quale finguntur significare, plures habent exponentes.
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||Just as propositions with negative and privative terms have more than one exponent, so propositions in which figmenta are posited (that is, propositions in which invented terms are posited, to which nothing corresponds in the world of things such as they are made up to signify) have more than one exponent.
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||Tales enim termini vere sunt connotativi, nec aliquid imaginabile per eos significatur nisi vera res quae est in actu vel esse potest vel saltem potuit fuisse vel fuit in actu.
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||For such terms are really 'connotative', and it is false that something imaginable is signified by them except a real thing which is actual or could be actual or at least could have been or was actual.
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||Unde sicut termini negativi et privativi nihil significant nisi quod significatur per terminos positivos, quamvis illud idem quod significatur per terminum affirmativum positive et construendo vel affirmative, significetur per terminum negativum vel privativum non construendo sed destruendo vel negando, secundum modum loquendi Anselmi, ita per tales terminos fictos, cuiusmodi sunt 'chimaera', 'tragelaphus', 'vacuum', 'infinitum' et huiusmodi, nihil significatur nisi quod significatur per terminos alios, sicut patet ex definitionibus exprimentibus quid nominis eorum.
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||Wherefore just as negative and privative terms signify nothing except what is signified by positive terms, even though that same thing which is signified positively by an affirmative term and by constructing or affirmatively, is signified by a negative or privative term that is not by constructing, but by destroying or negating, according to Anselm's way of speaking.  Thus by such made up terms, like 'chimera', 'tragelaphus', 'vacuum', 'infinitum' and the like, nothing is signified but what is signified by other terms, such as is clear from their nominal definitions.
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||Tamen non eodem modo significantur res per istos terminos et alios, sed sic significantur per alios quod pro illis rebus alii termini supponere possunt, isti autem termini non possunt pro eis supponere, sicut nec definitiones exprimentes quid nominis eorum.
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||Yet things are not signified in the same way by these and other terms, rather, they are signified by other terms in such a way that the other terms can denote those things, but those terms cannot denote them, insofar as they are not their nominal definitions.
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||Unde non est imaginandum quod sicut sunt quaedam entia significata per tales terminos 'homo', 'animal', 'album', 'calidum', 'longum', 'breve' et huiusmodi, ita sunt quaedam non-entia et impossibilia, distincta totaliter ab entibus, significata per tales terminos 'chimaera', 'hircoceruus' et huiusmodi, quasi esset unus mundus ex impossibilibus sicut est unus mundus ex entibus.
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||Wherefore it should not be imagined that just as there are certain entities signified by such terms as 'man', 'animal', 'hot', 'long', 'short' and suchlike, so there are certain non-entities and impossible things, entirely distinct from beings, signified by terms such as 'chimera', 'hircocercus' and suchlike, as if there were one world of impossible things just as there is a world of things.
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||Sed quidquid imaginabile significatur per hoc nomen 'chimaera' significatur per aliquem terminum de quo in propositione de inesse vel de possibili praedicatur esse; tamen hoc nomen 'chimaera' pro illo non potest supponere. Propter quod quaelibet propositio affirmativa, in qua subicitur hoc nomen 'chimaera' significative sumptum vel praedicatur, vel aliquid consimile, est falsa de virtute sermonis, quia habet aliquam exponentem falsam. Ista enim est falsa de virtute sermonis 'chimaera est non-ens' et quaelibet consimilis, quia quaelibet talis habet istas exponentes 'chimaera est aliquid' et 'illud est non-ens' quarum prima falsa est.
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||But whatever imaginable is signified by the name 'chimera' is signified by some term concerning which an indicative or possible proposition is predicated; yet the name 'chimera' cannot denote that.  On account of which any affirmative proposition, in which the name 'chimera' is subject taken significatively or predicated, or something similar, is literally false, because it has some false exponent.  For 'a chimera is a non-being' is literally false, and so is anything similar, because whatever of that sort has the exponents 'a chimera is something' and 'that thing is a non-entity', of which the first is false.
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||Et si dicatur: numquid ista est vera 'chimaera est chimaera'? Videtur quod sic, eo quod praedicatur idein de se, et Boethius dicit quod nulla propositio est verior illa in qua idem de se praedicatur.
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||And if it is objected: whether the proposition "the chimaera is the chimaera" is true? 
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It seems so, seeing as it is predicated of itself, and Boethius says that no proposition is more true [than] that in which the same thing is predicated of itself.
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||Dicendum est quod de virtute vocis ista est falsa 'chimaera est chimaera' si termini supponant significative, eo quod falsum implicatur.
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||In  reply, the proposition "the chimaera is the chimaera" is literally false if the terms
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denote significatively, in that something false is implied by it.
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||Et ad Boethium dicendum quod Boethius intendit quod nulla propositio in qua aliquid praedicatur de aliquo est verior illa in qua idem praedicatur de se.
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||And concerning the point about Boethius, it should be said that he meant that no proposition in which something is predicated of something is more true than that in which the same thing is predicated of itself.
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||Quia tamen ista est negativa, cum ista stat quod nulla sit vera: nec illa in qua idem praedicatur de se nec illa in qua praedicatur aliud.
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||For nevertheless that point is a negative one, since it is consistent with neither proposition being true - neither that in which the same thing is predicated of itself, nor that in which another thing is predicated of that thing.
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||Si tamen illa esset vera in qua de aliquo praedicatur aliquid, illa esset vera in qua praedicatur idem de se. Sicut si haec esset vera 'chimaera est aliquid', haec esset vera 'chimaera est chimaera'.
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||Still, if it were true where something is predicated of something, it would be true in which the same thing is predicated of itself (for example if "the chimaera is something" is true, "the chimaera is the chimaera" is true).
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||Et ita nulla propositio in qua praedicatur aliquid de hoc nomine 'chimaera',
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significative sumpto, potest esse verior illa in qua hoc nomen 'chimaera' praedicatur de se ipso.
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Cum hoc tamen stat quod nec illa nec ista sit vera.
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||And in this way no proposition in which is predicated something with the name "chimaera",
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taken significatively, can be more true [than] that in which "chimaera" is predicated of itself. 
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But still, this is consistent with neither one nor the other being true.
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Ockham
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