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<p>If a definition is to be understood as introducing the definitum, so that it means “Let so and so — the definitum — mean so and so — the definition”, then it is a proposition in the imperative mood, and consequently, not a proposition; for a proposition is equivalent to a sentence in the indicative mood.</p>
<p>If a definition is to be understood as introducing the definitum, so that it means “Let so and so — the definitum — mean so and so — the definition”, then it is a proposition in the imperative mood, and consequently, not a proposition; for a proposition is equivalent to a sentence in the indicative mood.</p>
<p>The definition is thus only a proposition if the definitum be already known to the interpreter. But in that case it clearly conveys information as to the character of this definitum, which is a matter of fact.</p>
<p>The definition is thus only a proposition if the definitum be already known to the interpreter. But in that case it clearly conveys information as to the character of this definitum, which is a matter of fact.</p>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, “Syllabus” (''c.'' 1902).<br>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, “Syllabus” (c. 1902)<br>
''Collected Papers'' (CP 2.309–331).</p>
''Collected Papers'' (CP 2.309–331)</p>
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<p>But take an “analytical”, ''i.e.'', an explicative proposition; and to begin with, take the formula “A is A”. If this be intended to state anything about real things, it is quite unintelligible. It must be understood to mean something about symbols; no doubt, that the substantive verb “is“ expresses one of those relations that everything bears to itself, like “loves whatever may be loved by”. So understood, it conveys information about a symbol. A symbol is not an individual, it is true. But any information about a symbol is information about every replica of it; and a replica is strictly an individual. What information, then, does the proposition “A is A” furnish concerning this replica?</p>
<p>But take an “analytical”, ''i.e.'', an explicative proposition; and to begin with, take the formula “A is A”. If this be intended to state anything about real things, it is quite unintelligible. It must be understood to mean something about symbols; no doubt, that the substantive verb “is“ expresses one of those relations that everything bears to itself, like “loves whatever may be loved by”. So understood, it conveys information about a symbol. A symbol is not an individual, it is true. But any information about a symbol is information about every replica of it; and a replica is strictly an individual. What information, then, does the proposition “A is A” furnish concerning this replica?</p>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, “Syllabus” (''c.'' 1902).<br>
<p>The information is that if the replica be modified so as to bring the same name before it and after it, then the result will be a replica of a proposition which will never be in conflict with any fact. To say that something ''never'' will be is not to state any real fact, and until some experience occurs — whether outward experience, or experience of fancies — which might be an occasion for a conflict with the proposition in question, it does not, to our knowledge, represent any actual Secondness. But as soon as such an occasion does arise, the proposition relates to the single replica that then occurs and to the single expeerience, and describes the relation between them. Similar remarks apply to every explicative proposition.</p>
''Collected Papers'' (CP 2.309–331).</p>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, “Syllabus” (c. 1902)<br>
''Collected Papers'' (CP 2.309–331)</p>
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<p>Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for ''semiotic'' (Greek ''semeiotike''), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary”, or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what ''must be'' the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. As to that process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation.</p>
<p>Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for ''semiotic'' (σημειωτική), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary”, or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what ''must be'' the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. As to that process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation.</p>
<p>The faculty which I call abstractive observation is one which ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for which the theories of philosophers sometimes hardly leave room. It is a familiar experience to every human being to wish for something quite beyond his present means, and to follow that wish by the question, “Should I wish for that thing just the same, if I had ample means to gratify it?” To answer that question, he searches his heart, and in doing so makes what I term an abstractive observation. He makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is, ''observes'' what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to be discerned. By such a process, which is at bottom very much like mathematical reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to what ''would be'' true of signs in all cases, so long as the intelligence using them was scientific.</p>
<p>The faculty which I call abstractive observation is one which ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for which the theories of philosophers sometimes hardly leave room. It is a familiar experience to every human being to wish for something quite beyond his present means, and to follow that wish by the question, “Should I wish for that thing just the same, if I had ample means to gratify it?” To answer that question, he searches his heart, and in doing so makes what I term an abstractive observation. He makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is, ''observes'' what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to be discerned. By such a process, which is at bottom very much like mathematical reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to what ''would be'' true of signs in all cases, so long as the intelligence using them was scientific.</p>
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[[Category:Charles Sanders Peirce]]
[[Category:Charles Sanders Peirce]]
