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==Test Area==
 
==Test Area==
  
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Interpretation as Action: The Risk of Inquiry
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<p>A child hears it said that the stove is hot.  But it is not, he says;  and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold.  But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way.  Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a ''self'' in which this ignorance can inhere.  &hellip;</p>
  
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Jon Awbrey and Susan Awbrey
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<p>In short, ''error'' appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a ''self'' which is fallible.</p>
  
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"We hope you will find these thoughts of ours both interesting and useful." These are words spoken to express an intention, a bearing in
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<p>Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute ''ego'' of pure apperception.</p>
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the mind of a person toward an object which is yet to be achieved. The readiest moment of human life involves the interplay of signs,
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| align="right" | (Peirce, CP 5.233&ndash;235)
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ideas, and objects-more explicitly, the interrelation of signifying expressions, states and dispositions of the mind or person, and
 
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objects or objectives either actual or potential. Our work designing instruments to enhance the play of inquiry has attuned us to the
 
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themes of interpretation and intentionality which every inquiry seems to involve. We hear what sounds like familiar strains reaching us
 
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from the hermeneutic quarter. The purpose of this essay is to trace to their sources a few of these potentially common themes, to draw out
 
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one line of their historical development, and to gather what consequences they inspire for educational practice and continued inquiry.
 
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Introduction
 
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In order to study the nature of signification and communication, the theory of signs must involve itself with questions of interpretation
 
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and intention. The theory of inquiry studies the common pattern of all determination, all proceeding toward the settlement of unsettled
 
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situations. There is a key relationship between signs and inquiry. We will follow this relationship through three points of reference.
 
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Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias or On Interpretation introduces the relationship of signs, impressions in the mind, and objects. C.S. Peirce
 
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fully explores the triadic relation of signs, interpretants, and objects in its bearing upon his threestage process of inquiry. John Dewey
 
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elaborates these ideas in his view of the lived experience as the "existential matrix" of inquiry. Three major questions will be explored:
 
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How does the sign relation that underlies the nature of signification and communication compare within these works?
 
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We discuss the role of the interpreter in the activity of interpretation. Aristotle assumes that objects and impressions in the mind are
 
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constant across all interpreters. Confronting this assumption with the needs of hermeneutic and educational practice, we argue that a
 
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comparative and developmental understanding of interpreters is required. This in turn demands the more complete theory of signs envisioned
 
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by Peirce and Dewey, which continues to be developed in the semiotic and pragmatic traditions.
 
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What is inquiry and how is it related to the theory of signs?
 
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We examine the structure of inquiry as articulated by Peirce and Dewey. In this model, inquiry begins with a surprising phenomenon or
 
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problematic situation. Whether felt as pleasant wonderment or painful bewilderment, we feel driven to some activity that will return us to
 
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our prior equilibrium. This may issue in a search for explanation that reduces the surprise or for a plan of action that resolves the
 
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problem. The ensuing activities share a common form, the differentiation of a pattern. In our consternation, we recognize a variety of
 
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features, some of which can be varied as part of our capacity for free choice. The problem or surprise is present because of its
 
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difference from something. As a surprise, what happens is different from what we habitually expect. As a problem, what happens is
 
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different from what we hopefully intend. To change the systematic expectation against which background a surprising phenomenon originally
 
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figured, we must discover some freedom to change what generated that expectation, and so to modify our personal model of the world.
 
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What do these ideas suggest for the practice of education?
 
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A variety of implications will be explored. In this view, the teacher acts as a catalyst of inquiry, serving as a mediator to quicken the
 
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actualization of something already present in the potential of the student. Emphasis is placed on developing tools that extend the
 
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learner's capacity for inquiry. The authors' goal is to design computer software that will enhance the capacity for exploring complex,
 
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qualitative information and will support inquiry by serving as a bridge between teaching and research. By engaging in their own
 
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explorations and making assumptions explicit, learners will be invited to "think reflectively" about their interpretations.
 
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The Theory of Signs and the Role of the Interpreter
 
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We accept the tenet of pragmatism that all thought takes place in signs. Our interest in the enterprise of "training thought" (Dewey 1991)
 
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demands that we examine the role of the interpreter in all the activities that make use of or take place in signs.
 
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Aristotle On Interpretation
 
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Our first point of reference is Aristotle's introduction of the sign relation in his treatise On Interpretation.
 
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Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of
 
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words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words
 
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are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are
 
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representations or likenesses, images, copies (homoiomata). (Aristotle, De Interp. i. 16a4).
 
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This early text recognizes the three roles within the sign relation: signs, ideas, and objects. It also characterizes the relationships
 
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between these three roles. For Aristotle, the relation between signs (words) and ideas (affections and impressions) is that of a symbol to
 
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what it symbolizes. In origin, a symbol was a split coin used as a token of recognition. In concrete terms, the symbol is a particular
 
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kind of sign. As a fragment, it refers both to its other half and to the whole that they originally formed. The relation between ideas and
 
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objects is that of an impression to what it is a likeness of. Although Aristotle leaves it implicit, we can see that there is a
 
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relationship between signs and objects that is a compound of the first two relations. It is the indirect relation, a fragment of a
 
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likeness. There is irony here, that the sign relation is rooted in a type of iconoclasm.
 
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Figure 1 illustrates the sign relation as described by Aristotle. The arrows are drawn to indicate the direction of increasing
 
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symbolization, proceeding around the faces of the sign relation in an opposite sense from the process of adducing meaning which it is the
 
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job of interpretation to reconstruct. The interpreter, as agent and embodiment of all the various sign processes, does not have a
 
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particular role in the sign relation but is, in a sense, identified with the whole of it.
 
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Figure 1. The Sign Relation in Aristotle
 
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Aristotle's description contains two claims of constancy, that ideas and objects are the same for all interpreters. This view does not
 
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allow for the plurality and mutability of interpreters, two features that we must be concerned with in hermeneutics and education. John
 
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Dewey expresses this point well:
 
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Thinking is specific, in that different things suggest their own appropriate meanings, tell their own unique stories, and in that they do
 
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this in very different ways with different persons. (Dewey 1991, 39).
 
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However, this account of Aristotle's may be considered in part a reasonable approximation and in part a suggestive metaphor, suitable as a
 
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first approach to a complex subject.
 
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Some other features of this text will figure in our later discussions. Pragmata, the Greek word used for "objects," has shades of meaning
 
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ranging from physical objects to purposeful objectives to problematic objections. Derivatives of it can refer to troubles and treatises,
 
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all very much the business of inquiry. These objects became the "going concerns" of pragmatism. However, the attempt of pragmatists to
 
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convey these varied meanings in practice was often misconstrued as a reduction of intentions to physical operations. One last point of
 
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interest, the text suggests that Aristotle appreciated the tension between cultural and natural signs by employing words with both
 
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connotations (symbola vs. semeia).
 
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The Sign Relation According to Peirce
 
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In moving from Aristotle's account of the sign relation to Peirce's, it helps to identify some links between them. Words spoken or written
 
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are classed together as Signs. Ideas, affections and impressions, correspond to what Peirce calls Interpretants. For all practical
 
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purposes, interpretants are just another class of signs. They may even be just another role the same class of signs can play. If any
 
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distinction is intended between them, it is only that interpretants are more intimately involved in the mind or person of the Interpreter.
 
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Peirce gave the following definition of a sign in his 1902 Application to the Carnegie Institution:
 
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Logic is formal semiotic. A sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign, determined or created by it, into the
 
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same sort of correspondence (or a lower implied sort) with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. This definition
 
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no more involves any reference to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place within which a particle lies during a
 
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lapse of time. (Peirce, NE 4, 54).
 
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There are two important features to note in this portrayal of the role of signs in logic. First, Peirce's goal is to differentiate the
 
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formal and the material aspects of thought and inquiry. This attempt is motivated by his interest in a certain question: "What is the
 
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relation of matter and form in the actuality of the mind (entelechy) and is their synthesis a third something or not? This helps us
 
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understand how Peirce can be concerned with developing a formal characterization of signs and sign processes without being just another
 
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"formalist." His interest is partly due to the influence of Aristotle, whose dictum that "soul is form" is given in the following text:
 
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So the soul (psyche) must be substance (ousia) in the sense of being the form (eidos) of a natural body (soma), which potentially
 
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(dynamei) has life. And substance in this sense is actuality (entelecheia). (Aristotle, De Anima II.i. 412a20).
 
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Second, Peirce's claim that his definition of a sign involves no reference to human thought means no necessary reference. The adjective
 
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"nonpsychological" that he often attaches to this conception of signs and logic is not intended to be exclusive of human thought but to
 
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expand the scope of the concepts beyond it (Peirce, NE 4, 21). The prefix "non" is better read as an acronym for "not of necessity," and
 
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is commonly used in mathematical discourse in just this way. It extends the use of a concept into wider domains than the paradigm cases
 
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upon which our original intuitions were formed.
 
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A definition of signs and their processes which is not limited by prior restriction to human psychology can be used to investigate human
 
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thought as a species of natural process. There is considerable power in this naturalistic viewpoint. It allows us to put human thought in
 
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a context of other sign processes, to ask what might be the specific differences that distinguish it, and to consider its evolution
 
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through different orders of complexity.
 
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Two other features of the sign relation, as portrayed by Peirce, are especially crucial. First, the designations sign, interpretant, and
 
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object are pragmatic roles and not attributes of real essence or permanent nature. Second, a sign relation in the generic case can be
 
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irreducibly triadic, and as such cannot be wholly understood from any compound of its dyadic fractions.
 
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Pragmatic Roles vs. Exclusive Attributes
 
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The assignments of entities to the roles of sign, interpretant, and object do not mark any distinctions of essence or substantial
 
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differences among these entities. The same entity may function in any role. For example, Queen Elizabeth may be a symbol of her realm to
 
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her subjects; but as a person, she is an interpreter of the English language. Of course, some things may be found more suitable than
 
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others for a given role, but this is a pragmatic factor and discovered after the fact. These attributions are exactly that, roles
 
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attributed to an entity from a certain point of view, and correctly attributed only in relation to its moment by moment functioning in a
 
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currently relevant sign process.
 
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Sign Relations are Irreducibly Triadic
 
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What does it mean that a sign relation is irreducibly triadic? In simplest terms it means that there are facts about a sign relation which
 
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cannot be pieced together from separate investigations of the pairwise relations. Thus, studies which limit themselves to syntax
 
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(relations internal to the sign domain) or semantics (relations between signs and objects) or semiotics (relations between signs and
 
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interpretants), all necessary to the topic, are not sufficient to capture the full dimensionality of the subject. Pragmatics is the name
 
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we use for the full theory of signs, one that provides for the consideration of plurality and progress in the analysis of interpreters.
 
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Why is it important that a sign relation is irreducibly triadic? In our general effort to understand complex phenomena using the simpler
 
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things we already understand as guides, the irreducibly triadic nature of signs brings both good news and bad news. The bad news we have
 
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already seen. There is no hope of fully understanding the sign relation in terms of anything simpler. The good news is this. If we do
 
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become accustomed to things as complex as the sign relation, then many other interesting phenomena can be clarified by using it. Indeed,
 
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it is our impression that at least some of the tensions in the issue of intentionality can be resolved by relating them to similar
 
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tensions in the sign relation.
 
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Signs and Inquiry, Information and Doubt
 
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When we call attention to the fact that signs and expressions are human artifacts, it forces us to recognize that signs are objects in
 
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their own right, with all the contingency and facticity that this entails. It is only natural that in pointing out the status of a sign as
 
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sign, we are reminded of its fallibility, the chance that it can fail to mean anything either present or forthcoming, the risk that it may
 
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lead or mislead by degrees in its aim. The sign may be broken in numerous ways, failing to connect by not denoting or not connoting,
 
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losing its relation to objects in the world or ideas in the mind. All the ways that it can succeed are ways that it can fail to signify.
 
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What is frequently appreciated in many so-called symbols is exactly their vagueness, their openness, their fruitful ineffectiveness in
 
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expressing a "final" meaning, so that with symbols and by symbols one indicates what is always beyond one's reach. (Eco 1986, 153).
 
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The fallibility of signs is shared with the human activities of interpretation and inquiry, and bears a relation to the situated character
 
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of all dynamic processes of determination.
 
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If doubt and indeterminateness were wholly within the mind-whatever that may signify - purely mental processes ought to get rid of them.
 
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But experimental procedure signifies that actual alteration of an external situation is necessary to effect the conversion. A situation
 
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undergoes, through operations directed by thought, transition from problematic to settled, from internal discontinuity to coherency and
 
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organization. (Dewey 1988, 185).
 
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Signs are enabled to have significance only within a proper setting. A whole system of signs is required to constitute what we variously
 
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call a medium, a channel, a formal or natural language. In such a context, information becomes a property that we attribute to signs. A
 
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sign given in this kind of situation has the ability to reduce the uncertainty that an interpreter has with regard to an object domain. It
 
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is in virtue of this ability that a sign is said to possess and convey information.
 
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This power of reducing uncertainty, of mediating between the less and the more determinate situation, is just the virtue that inquiry
 
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seeks to have. Our established systems of signs are the typical results of wellcompleted inquiries, while inquiries in the present tense
 
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have no guarantee of yielding such stable and reusable products.
 
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The Pattern and Stages of Inquiry
 
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Up until now we proceeded synthetically, attempting to reconstruct the nature of inquiry from the shape and flow of its chief
 
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constituents, signs in action. We now move inquiry into the foreground, examining the functions and stages which support it. In doing
 
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this, it is natural to reverse the order of presentation and to work from our current perspective on signs toward the functional and
 
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historical precursors which round out our view of inquiry.
 
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To illustrate the place of the sign relation in inquiry we begin with Dewey's elegant and simple example of reflective thinking in
 
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everyday life:
 
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A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he observed it; but presently he notes, while occupied primarily with
 
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other things, that the air is cooler. It occurs to him that it is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between him and
 
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the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything, in such a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the
 
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noting of the cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity; looking and noting are other modes of activity. The likelihood that
 
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it will rain is, however, something suggested. The pedestrian feels the cold; he thinks of clouds and a coming shower. (Dewey 1991, 6-7).
 
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In this narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation as follows: coolness is a Sign of the Object rain, and the
 
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Interpretant is the thought of the rain's likelihood. In his 1910 description of reflective thinking Dewey distinguishes two phases, "a
 
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state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt" and "an act of search or investigation" (Dewey 1991, 9), comprehensive stages which are further
 
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refined in his later model of inquiry. In this example, reflection is the act of the interpreter which establishes a fund of connections
 
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between the sensory shock of coolness and the objective danger of rain, by way of his impression that rain is likely. But reflection is
 
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more than irresponsible speculation. In reflection the interpreter acts to charge or defuse the thought of rain (the probability of rain
 
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in thought) by seeking other signs which this thought implies and evaluating the thought according to the results of this search.
 
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Figure 2 illustrates Dewey's "Rain" example, tracing the structure and function of the sign relation as it informs the activity of
 
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inquiry, including both the movements of surprise explanation and intentional action. The dyadic faces of the sign relation are labeled
 
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with just a few of the loosest terms that apply, indicating the "significance" of signs for eventual occurrences and the "correspondence"
 
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of ideas with external orientations. Nothing essential is meant by these dyadic role distinctions, since it is only in special or
 
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degenerate cases that their shadowy projections can maintain enough information to determine the original sign relation.
 
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Figure 2. Signs and Inquiry in Dewey
 
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If we follow this example far enough to consider the import of thought for action, we realize that the subsequent conduct of the
 
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interpreter, progressing up through the natural conclusion of the episode-the quickening steps, seeking shelter in time to escape the
 
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rain-all of these acts form a series of further interpretants, contingent on the active causes of the individual, for the originally
 
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recognized signs of rain and for the first impressions of the actual case. Just as critical reflection develops the associated and
 
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alternative signs which gather about an idea, pragmatic interpretation explores the consequential and contrasting actions which give
 
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effective and testable meaning to a person's belief in it.
 
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Dewey's Definition of Inquiry
 
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By 1938 Dewey had developed a definition of inquiry which summarized his mature views:
 
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Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent
 
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distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole. (Dewey 1986, 108).
 
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In view of the apparently inextricable relationship our previous discussions have detected between interpretation and inquiry, it would
 
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seem natural that a definition of inquiry should have some bearing on interpretation. Given Dewey's definition of inquiry, this forces the
 
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question: Can both interpretation and inquiry be seen as special types of determination?
 
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Prior to our discussion of the sign relation, an affirmative answer to this question might have seemed surprising, because these two
 
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things seem so different. Interpretation and inquiry are not usually identified with each other in everyday thought. Interpretation gives
 
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meanings to signs. Inquiry seeks to end perplexity. Interpretation of everyday speech is not reflected upon as problematic, whereas
 
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inquiry is the very model of problem-solving activity.
 
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But now the idea that interpretation is every bit as risky as inquiry should be familiar. There is no infallible reflex which gives
 
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meanings to signs, expressions, and texts. Conversely, inquiry, "thinking" in its best sense, "is a term denoting the various ways in
 
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which things acquire significance" (Dewey 1991, 38). So, there is no longer an obstacle to viewing these two processes as forms of
 
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determination.
 
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Architecture of Inquiry
 
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Peirce and Dewey gave similar accounts of the architecture of inquiry, its typical pattern and generic stages. Both Peirce and Dewey agree
 
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that inquiry is "a response by human beings to some break or interruption in their previously untroubled behavior." In Dewey's later
 
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thought, the stages of inquiry involve: (1) "the problem implicit in such an interruption is located, formulated, and developed"; (2)
 
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"hypotheses (or suggestions) for solving the problem are introduced and are examined, with a view to determining by reasoning just what is
 
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implied by them"; (3) "a hypothesis is tested by appropriate experiments which either verify or disconfirm such logical consequences of
 
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the hypothesis"; and (4) "a judgment as to whether a proposed hypothesis does (or does not) resolve the problem that initiated the
 
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inquiry." (All quotes in this paragraph are from Nagel, in Dewey 1986, xv-xvi).
 
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Peirce's most elegant and detailed account of inquiry is given in the context of his 1908 article "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of
 
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God" (CP 6.468-476). According to Peirce, inquiry begins with "some surprising phenomenon, some experience which either disappoints an
 
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expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of expectation of the inquisiturus."
 
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The first functional stage of inquiry is abduction, which involves "pondering these phenomena in all their aspects," allowing a conjecture
 
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to arise "that furnishes a possible Explanation," regarding the conjecture with "favor" and holding it to be "Plausible." Abduction is the
 
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"whole series of mental performances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the acceptance of the hypothesis." It is:
 
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the dark laboring, the bursting out of the startling conjecture, the remarking of its smooth fitting to the anomaly, as it is turned back
 
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and forth like a key in a lock, and the final estimation of its Plausibility, … Its characteristic formula of reasoning I term
 
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Retroduction [abduction], i.e. reasoning from consequent to antecedent. (Peirce, CP 6.469).
 
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Peirce's second stage of inquiry, deduction, is the testing of the hypothesis.
 
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This testing, to be logically valid, must honestly start, not as Retroduction starts, with scrutiny of the phenomena, but with examination
 
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of the hypothesis, and a muster of all sorts of conditional experiential consequences which would follow from its truth.
 
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(Peirce, CP 6.470).
 
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Finally, in the third stage, induction, the inquirer ascertains "how far those consequents accord with Experience, and of judging
 
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accordingly whether the hypothesis is sensibly correct."
 
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(Peirce, CP 6.472).
 
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Peirce divides the stages of inquiry at different points than Dewey, relating them to three modes of inference that he calls abductive,
 
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deductive, and inductive reasoning. (Abduction suffers a flight of fanciful names from hypothesis, through presumption and suggestion, to
 
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retroduction.) These forms of inference were drawn from Aristotle's three figures of syllogism and passed through a series of
 
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metamorphoses in Peirce's refractory. Though they follow one another in the typical progress of inquiry, these elements of inference may
 
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also be combined in other ways, for example, to yield mixed forms of reasoning such as analogy (Peirce 1982, 180).
 
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Implications for Educational Practice
 
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According to John Dewey, it is because of the human quest for perfect certainty that philosophy has inherited three problematic
 
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viewpoints:
 
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the first, that certainty, security, can be found only in the fixed and unchanging;
 
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the second, that knowledge is the only road to that which is intrinsically stable and certain; the third, that practical activity is an
 
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inferior sort of thing, necessary simply because of man's animal nature and the necessity for winning subsistence from the environment.
 
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(Dewey, 1988, 41).
 
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These predispositions of philosophy toward antecedent, fixed universals have led to what Peirce and Dewey call a spectator theory of
 
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knowledge which "excludes any element of practical activity that enters into the construction of the object known" (Dewey 1988, xi). Still
 
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it is not the uncertainty itself for which Dewey believes we lack tolerance but the risk that it entails. In contrast with invariants the
 
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results of action, even action painstakingly planned and conceived, can never be certain. Its outcomes are only probable. What then can
 
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inquiry offer that the spectator theory of knowledge cannot? Instead of the pursuit of invariant objects as the foundation of certainty,
 
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inquiry affords a feeling of control based on discovering the "relations among changes in place of definition of objects immutable beyond
 
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the possibility of alteration" (Dewey 1988, 82). No longer are we passive receptacles of facts but actively involved explorers, constantly
 
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interpreting our experiences.
 
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Teacher as Catalyst
 
−
 
 
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In this view the teacher acts as a catalyst of student inquiry, serving as a mediator or sign to quicken the actualization of something
 
−
 
 
−
already present in the potential of the student. The student's impulse is the 'moving spring' of inquiry, but impulse does not direct
 
−
 
 
−
intelligent inquiry. It is purpose that shapes reflective inquiry - "A purpose differs from an original impulse and desire through its
 
−
 
 
−
translation into a plan and method of action based upon foresight of the consequences of acting under given observed conditions in a
 
−
 
 
−
certain way" (Dewey 1963, 69). Such purposes are formed through observation, experience (both first hand and as information obtained from
 
−
 
 
−
those who have wider experience), and judgment which puts observation and experience together to determine what is "signified" (Dewey
 
−
 
 
−
1963, 69). To nurture this process teachers can create environments where blind action (impulse) is not an end in itself but where
 
−
 
 
−
experiences build the habits of reflective inquiry. Reflective thinking, "active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or
 
−
 
 
−
supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends" (Dewey 1991, 6) is
 
−
 
 
−
indeed the process of inquiry.
 
−
 
 
−
Suspending Conclusions and Questioning Assumptions
 
−
 
 
−
The inquiry process demands that we suspend our conclusions and tolerate the lack of mental ease created by uncertainty until alternatives
 
−
 
 
−
have been examined. We must overcome the tendency to jump at the first suggestion that presents itself. Habermas has said that it is not
 
−
 
 
−
entirely our judgments but also our prejudices that determine our being since they are "the conditions whereby we experience something-
 
−
 
 
−
whereby what we encounter says something to us" (Bernstein 1971, 97). Reflective thinking is then also critical thinking, "calling into
 
−
 
 
−
question the assumptions underlying our customary, habitual ways of thinking and acting and then being ready to think and act differently
 
−
 
 
−
on the basis of this critical questioning" (Brookfield 1991, 1).
 
−
 
 
−
This reflective operation as we've seen can be triggered by a surprise or a perplexity that we seek to bring to a more settled state.
 
−
 
 
−
Today, there is no shortage of such events. "As people try to make sense of these externally imposed changes, they are frequently at
 
−
 
 
−
teachable moments as far as the process of becoming critical thinkers is concerned" (Brookfield 1991, 10). Teachers who desire to develop
 
−
 
 
−
the habits of inquiry in their students might do well to consider the characteristics of critical teachers described by Freire which
 
−
 
 
−
include competence in communicating the possibility of alternative interpretations, the courage to challenge assumptions, willingness to
 
−
 
 
−
risk being fully engaged in the educational exchange, humility, and the political clarity to recognize distorting perspectives (Brookfield
 
−
 
 
−
1991, 82). However, it must also be noted that teachers, as human beings, have values and prejudices of their own. Recognition of these
 
−
 
 
−
assumptions and beliefs to ourselves and to our students is an important part of teaching reflective thinking. It involves the willingness
 
−
 
 
−
to examine our biases in the light of student perspectives.
 
−
 
 
−
Building Tools for Inquiry
 
−
 
 
−
However, such attitudes are not enough. Emphasis is further placed on developing tools that extend the learner's capacity for inquiry and
 
−
 
 
−
reflective thinking. "The important thing in the history of modern knowing is the reinforcement of these active doings by means of
 
−
 
 
−
instruments … devised for the purposes of disclosing relations not otherwise apparent" (Dewey 1988, 70). Thinking reflectively about our
 
−
 
 
−
own practice, the education of children and adults and the development and use of computer technology, has led the authors to a belief in
 
−
 
 
−
the value of guided inquiry as educational method and to the use of the computer as a tool for active learning.
 
−
 
 
−
Because of its capacities for interaction, modeling and feedback, the computer has the potential to open new educational horizons. The
 
−
 
 
−
authors' goal is to develop computer software that will enhance the ability of learners to experience and explore their own worlds-to form
 
−
 
 
−
more settled interpretations of the relationships observed, and to examine and reinterpret the assumptions forming their world models.
 
−
 
 
−
Because the complexity of qualitative information often makes the process of observation overwhelming, such new tools are needed to
 
−
 
 
−
explore the depths of qualitative information, to recognize its patterns, and to interpret its significance. The second goal of this
 
−
 
 
−
software is to reduce the gap between teaching and research by empowering learners to work more directly on information gathered for
 
−
 
 
−
research. Finally, the third goal is to model the flow of each learner's inquiry and to highlight the individual student's implicit
 
−
 
 
−
assumptions. By engaging in personal explorations and making assumptions explicit, individual learners will be invited to "think
 
−
 
 
−
reflectively" about their distinctive and shared interpretations.
 
−
 
 
−
References
 
−
 
 
−
Aristotle, (1983). Prior analytics. In G.P Goold (Ed.) & H. Tredennick (Trans.), Aristotle (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
 
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Press.
 
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_____. (1986). On the soul. In G.P Goold (Ed.) & W.S. Hett (Trans.), Aristotle (Vol. 8). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 
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Bernstein, R.J. (1971). Praxis and action: Contemporary philosophies of human activity. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
 
−
 
 
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Press.
 
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_____. (1986). Philosophical profiles. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
 
−
 
 
−
Brookfield, S.D. (1991). Developing critical thinkers: Challenging adults to explore alternative ways of thinking and acting. San
 
−
 
 
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Francisco, CA: JosseyBass Publishers.
 
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Dewey, J. (1963). Experience and education. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company. Originally published 1938.
 
−
 
 
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_____. (1986). Logic: The theory of inquiry. In J.A. Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey: The later works, 1925-1953. (Vol 12: 1938). Carbondale,
 
−
 
 
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IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
 
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_____. (1988). The quest for certainty. In J.A. Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey: The later works, 1925-1953. (Vol 4: 1929). Carbondale, IL:
 
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Southern Illinois University Press.
 
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_____. (1991). How we think. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Originally published 1910.
 
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Eco, U. (1986). On symbols. In J. Deely, B. Williams, & F.E. Kruse (Eds.), Frontiers in semiotics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
 
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Press.
 
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Peirce, C.S. (1960). A neglected argument for the reality of God. In C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers of Charles Sanders
 
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Peirce, (Vol. 6: Scientific metaphysics). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Originally published 1908.
 
−
 
 
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_____. (1976). Parts of Carnegie application. In C. Eisele (Ed.), The new elements of mathematics (Vol. 4). The Hague, Mouton Publishers.
 
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Original letter dated 1902.
 
−
 
 
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_____. (1982). On the logic of science. In Peirce Edition Project (Eds.), Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A chronological edition. (Vol. 1:
 
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1857-1866). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Original lecture dated 1865.
 
−
 
 
−
An earlier version of this paper was presented at The Eleventh International Human Science Research Conference, June 1992, Rochester,
 
−
 
 
−
Michigan.</pre>
 

Latest revision as of 13:28, 22 February 2012

Test Area

A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. …

In short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is fallible.

Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute ego of pure apperception.

(Peirce, CP 5.233–235)