Changes

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

====Note 9.====

====Note 9. Peirce (CE 1, 280&ndash;281)====

<pre>

<blockquote>

| But these three principles must have this in common that they refer to 'symbolization'

<p>But these three principles must have this in common that they refer to ''symbolization'' for they are principles of inference which is symbolization.  As grounds of the possibility of inference they must refer to the possibility of symbolization or symbolizability.  And as logical principles they must relate to the reference of symbols to objects;  for logic has been defined as the science of the general conditions of the relations of symbols to objects.  But as three different principles they must state three different relations of symbols to objects.  Now we already found that a symbol has three different relations to objects;  namely, connotation, denotation, and information, which are its relations to the object considered as a thing, a form, and an equivalent representation.  Hence, it is obvious that these three principles must relate to the symbolizability of things, of forms, and of symbols.</p>

| for they are principles of inference which is symbolization.  As grounds of the

| possibility of inference they must refer to the possibility of symbolization or

| symbolizability.  And as logical principles they must relate to the reference

| of symbols to objects;  for logic has been defined as the science of the

| general conditions of the relations of symbols to objects.  But as three

| different principles they must state three different relations of

| symbols to objects.  Now we already found that a symbol has three

| different relations to objects;  namely, connotation, denotation,

| and information, which are its relations to the object considered

| as a thing, a form, and an equivalent representation.  Hence,

| it is obvious that these three principles must relate to

| the symbolizability of things, of forms, and of symbols.

</pre>

====Note 10.====

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 280&ndash;281</p>

<pre>

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&ndash;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| Our next business is to find out which is which.

| For this purpose we must consider that each principle

 

| is to be proved by the kind of inference which it supports.

 

| The ground of deductive inference then must be established deductively;

| that is by reasoning from determinant to determinate, or in other words

<p>Our next business is to find out which is which. For this purpose we must consider that each principle is to be proved by the kind of inference which it supports.</p>

| by reasoning from definition.  But this kind of reasoning can only be

 

| applied to an object whose character depends upon its definition.

<p>The ground of deductive inference then must be established deductively; that is by reasoning from determinant to determinate, or in other words by reasoning from definition.  But this kind of reasoning can only be applied to an object whose character depends upon its definition. Now of most objects it is the definition which depends upon the character;  and so the definition must therefore itself rest on induction or hypothesis.  But the principle of deduction must rest on nothing but deduction, and therefore it must relate to something whose character depends upon its definition. Now the only objects of which this is true are symbols; they indeed are created by their definition;  while neither forms nor things are.  Hence, the principle of deduction must relate to the symbolizability of symbols.</p>

| Now of most objects it is the definition which depends upon the

 

| character;  and so the definition must therefore itself rest on

<p>The principle of hypothetic inference must be established hypothetically, that is by reasoning from determinate to determinant.  Now it is clear that this kind of reasoning is applicable only to that which is determined by what it determines;  or that which is only subject to truth and falsehood so far as its determinate is, and is thus of itself pure ''zero''.  Now this is the case with nothing whatever except the pure forms;  they indeed are what they are only in so far as they determine some symbol or object.  Hence the principle of hypothetic inference must relate to the symbolizability of forms.</p>

| induction or hypothesis.  But the principle of deduction must

 

| rest on nothing but deduction, and therefore it must relate

<p>The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively, that is by reasoning from parts to whole.  This kind of reasoning can apply only to those objects whose parts collectively are their whole. Now of symbols this is not true.  If I write ''man'' here and ''dog'' here that does not constitute the symbol of ''man and dog'', for symbols have to be reduced to the unity of symbolization which Kant calls the unity of apperception and unless this be indicated by some special mark they do not constitute a whole.  In the same way forms have to determine the same matter before they are added;  if the curtains are green and the wainscot yellow that does not make a ''yellow-green''.  But with things it is altogether different;  wrench the blade and handle of a knife apart and the form of the knife has disappeared but they are the same thing &mdash; the same matter &mdash; that they were before.  Hence, the principle of induction must relate to the symbolizability of things.</p>

| to something whose character depends upon its definition.

 

| Now the only objects of which this is true are symbols;

<p>All these principles must as principles be universal. Hence they are as follows: &mdash;</p>

| they indeed are created by their definition;  while

 

| neither forms nor things are.  Hence, the principle

<p>All things, forms, symbols are symbolizable.</p>

| of deduction must relate to the symbolizability of

 

| symbols.

<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 281&ndash;282</p>

 

| The principle of hypothetic inference must be established hypothetically,

<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857&ndash;1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>

| that is by reasoning from determinate to determinant.  Now it is clear that

</blockquote>

| this kind of reasoning is applicable only to that which is determined by what

| it determines;  or that which is only subject to truth and falsehood so far as

| its determinate is, and is thus of itself pure 'zero'.  Now this is the case with

| nothing whatever except the pure forms;  they indeed are what they are only in so

| far as they determine some symbol or object.  Hence the principle of hypothetic

| inference must relate to the symbolizability of forms.

| The principle of inductive inference must be established inductively,

| that is by reasoning from parts to whole.  This kind of reasoning can

| apply only to those objects whose parts collectively are their whole.

| Now of symbols this is not true.  If I write 'man' here and 'dog' here

| that does not constitute the symbol of 'man and dog', for symbols have

| to be reduced to the unity of symbolization which Kant calls the unity

| of apperception and unless this be indicated by some special mark they

| do not constitute a whole.  In the same way forms have to determine the

| same matter before they are added;  if the curtains are green and the

| wainscot yellow that does not make a 'yellow-green'.  But with things

| it is altogether different;  wrench the blade and handle of a knife

| apart and the form of the knife has dissappeared but they are the

| same thing -- the same matter -- that they were before.  Hence,

| the principle of induction must relate to the symbolizability

| of things.

| All these principles must as principles be universal.

| Hence they are as follows: --

| All things, forms, symbols are symbolizable.

| C.S. Peirce, 'Chronological Edition', CE 1, pp. 281-282.

| Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures 'On the Logic of Science'", (1865),

|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857-1866',

| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.

</pre>

==Locations Cited==

==Locations Cited==

# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002238.html

# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002238.html

# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002239.html

# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-December/002239.html