Directory talk:Jon Awbrey/Papers/Inquiry Driven Systems : Part 5

3.2. Reflective Inquiry

3.2.1. Integrity and Unity of Inquiry

One of the very first questions that one encounters in the inquiry into inquiry is one that challenges both the integrity and the unity of inquiry, a question that asks: “Is inquiry one or many?” By this one means two things:

1. Concerning the integrity of inquiry: How are the components and the properties of inquiry, as identified by analysis, integrated into a whole that is singly and solely responsible for its results, and as it were, that answers for its answers in one voice? These qualities of unanimity and univocity are necessary in order to be able to speak of an inquiry as a coherent entity, whose nature it is to have and to hold the boundaries one finds in or gives to it, rather than being an artificial congeries of naturally unrelated elements and features. In other words, this is required in order to treat inquiry as a systematic function, that is, as the action, behavior, conduct, or operation of a system.
2. Concerning the unity of inquiry: Is the form of inquiry that is needed for reasoning about facts the same form of inquiry that is needed for reasoning about actions and goals, duties and goods, feelings and values, guesses and hopes, and so on, or does each sort of inquiry — aesthetic, ethical, practical, speculative, or whatever — demand and deserve a dedicated and distinctive form? Although it is clear that some degree of modulation is needed to carry out different modes of inquiry, is the adaptation so radical that one justly considers it to generate different forms, or is the changeover merely a matter of mildly tweaking the same old tunes and draping new materials on the same old forms?

If one reflects, shares the opinion, or takes the point of view on experimental grounds that inquiry begins with uncertainty, then each question about the integrity and the unity of inquiry can be given a sharper focus if it is re-posed as a question about the integrity and the unity of uncertainty, or of its positive counterpart, information.

Accordingly, one is led to wonder next: Is uncertainty one or many? Is information one or many? As before, each question raises two more: one that inquires into the internal composition of its subject, or the lack thereof, and one that inquires into the external diversity of its subject, or the lack thereof. This reflection, on the integrity and the unity, or else the multiplicity, of uncertainty and information, is the image of the earlier reflection, on the facts of sign use. Once more, what appears in this reflection is so inconclusive and so insubstantial that there is nothing else to do at this point but to back away again from the mirror.

To rephrase the question more concretely: Is uncertainty about what is true or what is the case the general form that subsumes every species of uncertainty, or is it possible that uncertainty about what to do, what to feel, what to hope, and so on constitute essentially different forms of inquiry among them? The answers to these questions have a practical bearing in determining how usefully the presently established or any conceivable theory of information can serve as a formal tool in different types of inquiry.

Another way to express these questions is in terms of a distinction between form and matter. The form is what all inquiries have in common, and the question is whether it is anything beyond the bare triviality that they all have to take place in some universe of inquiry or another. The matter is what concerns each particular inquiry, and the question is whether the matter warps the form to a shape all its own, one that is peculiar to this matter to such a degree that it is never interchangeable with the forms that are proper to other modes of inquiry.

3.2.2. Apparitions and Allegations

Next I consider the preparations for a phenomenology. This is not yet any style of phenomenology itself but an effort to grasp the very idea that something appears, and to grasp it in relation to the something that appears. I begin by looking at a sample of the language that one ordinarily uses to talk about appearances, with an eye to how this medium shapes one's thinking about what appears. A close inspection reveals that there are subtleties issuing from this topic that are partly disclosed and partly obscured by the language that is commonly used in this connection.

• An apparition, as I adopt the term and adapt its use to this context, is a property, a quality, or a respect of appearance. That is, it is an aspect or an attribute of a phenomenon of interest that appears to arise in a situation and to affect the character of the phenomenal situation. Apparitions shape themselves in general to any shade of apperception, assumption, imitation, intimation, perception, sensation, suspicion, or surmise that is apt or amenable to be apprehended by an animate agent.

• An allegation, in the same manner of speaking, is any description or depiction, any expression or emulation, in short, any verbal exhalation or visual emanation that appears to apprehend a characteristic trait or an illuminating trace of an apparition.

The terms apparition and allegation serve their purpose in allowing an observer to focus on the sheer appearance of the apparition itself, in assisting a listener or a reader to attend to the sheer assertion of the allegation itself. Their application enables an interpreter to accept at first glance or to acknowledge at first acquaintance the reality of each impression as a sign, without being forced to the point of assuming that there is anything in reality that the apparition is in fact an appearance of, that there is anything in reality that the allegation is in deed an adversion to, or, as people commonly say, that there is anything of substance "behind" it all.

Ordinarily, when one speaks of the appearance of an object, one tends to assume that there is in reality an object that has this appearance, but if one speaks about the apparition of an object, one leaves more room for a suspicion whether there is in reality any such object as there appears to be. In technical terms, however much it is simply a matter of their common acceptations, the term appearance is said to convey slightly more existential import than the term apparition. This dimension of existential import is one that enjoys a considerable development in the sequel.

If one asks what apparitions and allegations have in common, it seems to be that they share the character of signs. If one asks what character divides them, it is said to be that apparitions are more likely to be generated by an object in and of itself while allegations are more likely to be generated by an interpreter in reaction to an alleged or apparent object. Nevertheless, even if one agrees to countenance both apparitions and allegations as a pair of especially specious species of signs, whose generations are differentially attributed to objects and to interpreters, respectively, and whose variety runs through a spectrum of intermediate variations, there remains a number of subtleties still to be recognized.

For instance, when one speaks of an appearance of a sign, then one is usually talking about a token of that type of sign, as it appears in a particular locus and as it occurs on a particular occasion, all of which further details can be specified if required. If this common usage is to be squared with calling apparitions a species of signs, then talk about an appearance of an apparition must have available to it a like order of interpretation. And thus what looks like a higher order apparition, in other words, an apparition of an apparition, is in fact an even more particular occurrence, specialized appearance, or special case of sign. At this point I have to let go of the subject for now, since the general topic of higher order signs, their variety and interpretation, is one that occupies a much broader discussion later on in this work.

Any action that an interpreter takes to detach the presumed actuality of the sign from the presumed actuality of its object, at least in so far as the sign appears to present itself as denoting, depicting, or describing a particular object, remains a viable undertaking and a valuable exercise to attempt, no matter what hidden agenda, ulterior motive, or intentional object is conceivably still invested in the apparition or the allegation. If there is an object, property, or situation in reality that is in fact denoted or represented by one of these forms of adversion and allusion, then one says that there is a basis for acting on them, a justification for believing in them, a motivation for taking them seriously, a reason for treating them as true, or a foundation that is capable of lending support to their prima facie evidence.

Once the dimension of existential import is recognized as a parameter of interpretation, for example, as it runs through the spectrum of meanings that the construals of apparitions and appearances are differentially scattered across, then there are several observations that ought to be made about the conceivable distributions of senses:

1. In principle, the same range of ambiguities and equivocalities affects both of the words apparition and appearance to the same degree, however much their conventional usage tilts their individual and respective senses one way or the other.
2. Deprived of its existential import, the applicational phrase appearance of an object (AOAO) means something more akin to the adjectival or analogous phrase object-like appearance (OLA). Can it be that the mere appearance of the preposition of in the application "P of Q" is somehow responsible for the tilt of its construal toward a more substantial interpretation, one with a fully existential import?
3. Interpreting any apparition, appearance, phenomenon, or sign as an appearance of an object is tantamount to the formation of an abductive hypothesis, that is, it entertains the postulation of an object in an effort to explain the particulars of an appearance.
4. The positing of objects to explain apparitions, appearances, phenomena, or signs, to be practical on a regular basis, requires the preparatory establishment of an interpretive framework (IF) and the concurrent facilitation of an objective framework (OF). Teamed up together, these two frameworks assist in organizing the data of signs and the impressions of ideas in connection with the hypotheses of objects, and thus they make it feasible to examine each object-like appearance and to convert each one that is suitable into an appearance of an object.

At this point it ought to be clear that the pragmatic theory of signs permits the whole of phenomenal reality (WOPR) to be taken as a sign, perhaps of itself as an object, and perhaps to itself as an interpretant. The articulation of the exact sign relation that exists is the business of inquiry into a particular universe, and this is a world whose existence, development, and completion are partially contingent on the character, direction, and end of that very inquiry.

The next step to take in preparing a style of phenomenology, that is, in acquiring a paradigm for addressing apparitions or in producing an apparatus for dealing with appearances, is to partition the space of conceivable phenomena in accord with several forms of classification, drawing whatever parallel and incidental lines appear suitable to the purpose of oganizing phenomena into a sensible array, in particular, separating out the kinds of appearances that one is prepared to pay attention to, and thus deciding the kinds of experiences that one is ready to partake in, while paring away the sorts of apparitions that one is prepared to ignore.

It may be thought that a phenomenology has no need of preparation or partition, that the idea is to remain openly indiscriminate and patently neutral to all that appears, that all of its classifications are purely descriptive, and that all of them put together are intended to cover the entire range of what can possibly show up in experience. But attention is a precious resource, bounded in scope and exhausted in detail, while the time and the trouble that are available to spend on the free and the unclouded observation of phenomena are much more limited still, at least, in so far as it concerns finite agents and mortal creatures, and thus even the most liberal phenomenology is forced to act on implicit guidelines or to put forward explicit recommendations of an evaluative, a normative, or a prescriptive character, saying in effect that if one acts in certain ways, in particular, that if one expends an undue quantity of attention on the "wrong" kinds of appearances, then one is bound to pay the price, in other words, to experience unpleasant experiences as a consequence or else to suffer other sorts of adverse results.

This observation draws attention to the general form of constraint that comes into play at this point. Let me then ask the following question: What is the most general form of preparation, partition, or reparation, of whatever sort of disposition or structure, that I can imagine as applying to the whole situation, that I can see as characterizing its experiential totality, and that I can grasp as contributing to its ultimate result? For my own part, in the present situation, the answer appears to be largely as follows.

As far as I know, all styles of phenomenology and all notions of science, whether general or special, either begin by adopting an implicit recipe for what makes an apparition worthy of note or else begin their advance by developing an explicit prescription for a "worthwhile" appearance, a rule that presumes to dictate what phenomena are worthy of attention. This recipe or prescription amounts to a critique of phenomena, a rule that has an evaluative or a normative force. As a piece of advice, it can be taken as a tentative rule of mental presentation (TROMP) for all that appears or shows itself, since it sets the bar for admitting phenomena to anything more than a passing regard, marks the threshold of abiding concern and the level of recurring interest, formulates a precedence ordering to be imposed on the spectra of apparitions and appearances, and is tantamount to a recommendation about what kinds of phenomena are worth paying attention to and what kinds of shows are not worth the ticket — in a manner of speaking saying that the latter do not repay the price of admission to consciousness and do not earn a continuing regard.

The issue of a TROMP ("tentative rule of mental presentation") can appear to be a wholly trivial commonplace or a totally unnecessary extravagance, but realizing that a choice of this order has to be made, that it has to be made at a point of development where no form of justification of any prior logical order can be adduced, and thus that the choice is always partly arbitrary and always partly based on aesthetic considerations, ethical constraints, and practical consequences — all of this says something important about the sort of meaning that the choice can have, and it opens up a degree of freedom that was obscured by thinking that a phenomenology has to exhaust all apparitions, or that a science has to be anchored wholly in bedrock.

If it appears to my reader that my notion of what makes a worthwhile appearance is tied up with what I can actually allege to appear, and is therefore constrained by the medium of my language and the limits of my lexicon, then I am making the intended impression. One of the reasons that I find for accepting these bounds is that I am decidedly less concerned with those aspects of experience that appear in one inconsistent and transient fashion after another, and I am steadily more interested in those aspects of experience that appear on abiding, insistent, periodic, recurring, and stable bases. Since I am trying to demonstrate how inquiry takes place in the context of a sign relation, the ultimate reasons for this restriction have to do with the nature of inquiry and the limited capacities of signs to convey information.

Inquiry into reality has to do with experiential phenomena that recur, with states that appear and that promise or threaten to appear again, and with the actions that agents can take to affect these recurrences. This is true for two reasons: First, a state that does not appear or does not recur cannot be regarded as constituting any sort of problem. Second, only states that appear and recur are subject to the tactics of learning and teaching, or become amenable to the methods of reasoning.

There is a catch, of course, to such a blithe statement, and it is this: How does an agent know whether a state is going to appear, is bound to recur, or not? To be sure, there are hypothetically conceivable states that constitute obvious problems for an agent, independently of whether an instance of them already appears in experience or not. This is the question that inaugurates the theoretical issue of signs in full force, raises the practical stakes that are associated with their actual notice, and constellates the aspect of a promise or a threat that appears above. Accordingly, the vital utility of signs is tied up with questions about persistent appearances, predictable phenomena, contingently recurrent states of systems, and ultimately patterned forms of real existence that are able to integrate activity with appearance.

In asking questions about integral patterns of activity and appearance, where the category of action and the category of affect are mixed up in a moderately complicated congeries with each other and stirred together in a complex brew, it is helpful on a first approximation to "fudge" the issue of the agent a bit, in other words, to "dodge", "fuzz", or "hedge" any questions about the precise nature of the agent that appears to be involved in the activities and to whom the appearances actually appear. This intention is served by using the word "agency" in a systematically ambiguous way, namely, to mean either an individual agent, a community of agents, or any of the actions thereof. In this vein, the following sorts of questions can be asked:

1. What appearances can be recognized by what agencies to occur on a recurring basis? In other words, what appearances can be noted by what agencies to fall under sets of rules that describe their ultimate patterns of activity and appearance?
2. What appearances can be shared among agents and communities that are distributed through dimensions of culture, language, space, and time?
3. What appearances can be brought under the active control of what agencies by observing additional and alternative appearances that are associated with them, that is, by acquiring and exploiting an acquaintance with the larger patterns of activity and appearance that apply?

There is a final question that I have to ask in this preparation for a phenomenology, though it, too, remains an ultimately recurring inquiry: What form of reparation is due for the undue distribution of attention to appearance? In other words, what form of reform is called on to repair an unjust disposition, to remedy an inadequate preparation, or to adjust a partition that is not up to par? Any attempt to answer this question has occasion to recur to its preliminary: What form of information does it take to convince agents that a reform of their dispositions is due?

As annoying as all of these apparitions and allegations are at first, it is clear that they arise from an ability to reflect on a scene of awareness, and thus, aside from the peculiar attitudes that they may betray from time to time, they advert to an aptitude that amounts to an inchoate agency of reflection, an incipient faculty of potential utility that the agent affected with its afflictions is well-advised to appreciate, develop, nurture, and train, in spite of how insipid its animadversions are alleged to appear at times. This marks the third time now that the subject of reflection has come to the fore. Paradoxically enough, no increment of charm appears to accrue to the occasion.

A good part of the work ahead is taken up with considering ways to formalize the process of reflection. This is necessary, not just in the interest of those apparitions that are able to animate reflection, or for the sake of those allegations that are able to survive reflection, but in order to devise a regular methodology for articulating, bringing into balance with each other, and reasoning on the grounds of the various kinds of reflections that naturally occur, the apparitions that arise in the incidental context of experience plus the allegations that get expressed in the informal context of discussion. Later discussions will advance a particular approach to reflection, bringing together the work already begun in previous discussions of interpretive frameworks (IFs) and objective frameworks (OFs), and constructing a compound order or a hybrid species of framework for arranging, organizing, and supporting reflection. These tandem structures will be referred to as reflective interpretive frameworks (RIFs).

Before the orders of complexity that are involved in the construction of a RIF can be entertained, however, it is best to obtain a rudimentary understanding of just how the issues associated with reflection can in fact arise in ordinary and unformalized experience. Proceeding by this path will allow us to gain, along with a useful array of moderately concrete intuitions, a relatively stable basis for comprehending the nature of reflection. For all of these reasons, the rest of this initial discussion will content itself with a sample of the more obvious and even superficial properties of reflection as they develop out of casual and even cursory contexts of discussion, and as they make themselves available for expression in the terms and in the structures of a natural language medium.

3.2.3. A Reflective Heuristic

In a first attempt to state explicitly the principles by which reflection operates, it helps to notice a few of the tasks that reflection performs. In the process of doing this it is useful to keep this figure of speech, where the anthropomorphic reflection is interpreted in the figure of its personification, in other words, as a hypostatic reference that personifies the reflective faculty of an agent.

One of the things that reflection does is to look for common patterns as they appear in diverse materials. Another thing that reflection does is to look for variations in familiar and recognized patterns. These ideas lead to the statement of two aesthetic guidelines or heuristic suggestions as to how the process of reflection can be duly carried out:

Try to reduce the number of primitive notions.

Try to vary what has been held to be constant.

These are a couple of aesthetic imperatives or founding principles that I first noticed as underlying motives in the work of C.S. Peirce, informing the style of thinking that is found throughout his endeavors (Awbrey & Awbrey, 1989). It ought to be recognized that this pair of imperatives operate in antagonism or work in conflict with each other, each recommending a course that strives against the aims of the other. The circumstances of this opposition appear to suggest a mythological derivation for the faculty of reflection that is being personified in this figure, as if it were possible to inquire into the background of reflection so deeply as to reach that original pair of sibling rivals: Epimetheus, Defender of the Same; Prometheus, Sponsor of the Different.

Aesthetic slogans and practical maxims do not have to be consistent in all of the exact and universal ways that are required of logical principles, since their applications to each particular matter can be adjusted in a differential and a discriminating manner, taking into account the points of their pertinence, the qualities of their relevance, and the times of their salience. Nevertheless, the use of these heuristic principles can have a bearing on the practice of logic, especially when it comes to the forms of logical expression and argumentation that are available for use in a particular language, specialized calculus, or other formal system. Although one's initial formulations of logical reasoning, in the shapes that are seized on by fallible and finite creatures, can be as arbitrary and as idiosyntactic as particular persons and parochial paradigms are likely to make them, a dedicated and persistent application of these two heuristic rudiments, whether in team, in tandem, or in tournament with each other, is capable of leading in time to forms that subtilize and universalize, at the same time, the forms initially taken by thought.

3.2.8. Priorisms of Normative Sciences

Let me start with some questions that continue to puzzle me,
in spite of having spent a considerable spell of time pursuing
their answers, and not for a lack of listening to the opinions
expressed on various sides.  I first present these questions as
independently of the current context as I possibly can, and then
I return to justify their relevance to the present inquiry.

The questions that concern me concern the relationships of identity, necessity,
or sufficiency that can be found to hold among three classes of properties or
qualities that can be attributed to or possessed by an agent, and conceivably
passed from one agent to another.  The relevant classes of properties or
possessions can be schematized as follows:

    T.  "Teachings", learnings, lessons, disciplines, doctrines, dogmas,
        or things that can be taught and learned, transmitted and received.

    U.  "Understandings", articles of knowledge, items of comprehension,
        bits of potential wisdom that form the possession of knowledge.

    V.  "Virtues", aspects of accomplished performance, attainments of
        demonstrated achievement, qualities of accomplishment, completion,
        excellence, mastery, maturity, or relative perfection, "grits" or
        integrities that form the exercise of art, justice, and wisdom.

The category of "teachings", as a whole, can be
analyzed and divided into two subcategories:

    1.  There are "disciplines", which involve elements of action, behavior,
        conduct, and instrumental practice in their realization, and thus take
        on a fully evaluative, normative, prescriptive, or procedural character.

    2.  There are "doctrines", which are properly restricted to realms of attitude,
        belief, conjecture, knowledge, and speculative theory, and thus take on
        a purely descriptive, factual, logical, or declarative character.

The category of "virtues" can be subjected to a parallel analysis, but here it is
not so much the domain as a whole that gets divided into two subcategories as that
each virtue gets viewed in two alternative lights:

    1.  With regard to its qualities of action, execution, and performance.

    2.  As it affects its properties of competence, knowledge, and selection.

The reason for this difference in the sense of the analysis that applies
to each is that it is one of the better parts of virtue to bring about
a synthesis between action and knowledge in the very actuality of
the virtue itself.

At this point one arrives at the general question:

    What is the logical relation of virtues to teachings?

In particular:

    a.  Does one category necesarily imply the other?

    b.  Are the categories mutually exclusive?

    c.  Do they form independent categories?

Are virtues the species and teachings the genus, or perhaps vice versa?
Or do virtues and teachings form domains that are essentially distinct?
Whether one is a species of the other or whether the two are essentially
different, what are the features that apparently distiguish the one from
the other?

Let me begin by assuming a situation that is plausibly general enough,
that some virtues can be taught, V & T, and that some cannot, V & ~T.
I am not trying to say yet whether both kinds of cases actually occur,
but merely wish to consider what follows from the likely alternatives.
Then the question as to what distinguishes virtues from teachings has
two senses:

    1.  Among virtues that are special cases of teachings, V & T,
        the features that distinguish virtues from teachings are
        known as "specific differences".  These qualities serve to
        mark out virtues for special consideration from amidst the
        common herd of teachings and tend to distinguish the more
        exemplary species of virtues from the more inclusive genus
        of teachings.

    2.  Among virtues that transcend the realm of teachings, V & ~T,
        the features that distinguish virtues from teachings are aptly
        called "exclusionary exemptions".  These properties place the
        reach of virtues beyond the grasp of what is attainable through
        any order of teachings and serve to remove the orbit of virtues
        a discrete pace from the general run of teachings.

In either case it can always be said, though without contributing anything of
substance to the understanding of the problem, that it is their very property
of "virtuosity" or their very quality of "excellence" that distinguishes the
virtues from the teachings, whether this character appears to do nothing but
add specificity to what can be actualized through learning alone, or solely
through teaching, or whether it requires a nature that transcends the level
of what can be achieved through any learning or teaching at all.  But this
sort of answer only begs the question.  The real question is whether this
mark is apparent or real, and how it ought to be analyzed and construed.

Assuming a tentative understanding of the categories that I indicated
in the above terms, the questions that I am worried about are these:

    1.  Did Socrates assert or believe that virtue can be taught, or not?
        In symbols, did he assert or believe that V => T, or not?

    2.  Did he think that:

        a.  knowledge is virtue, in the sense that U  => V ?

        b.  virtue is knowledge, in the sense that U <=  V ?

        c.  knowledge is virtue, in the sense that U <=> V ?

    3.  Did he teach or try to teach that knowledge can be taught?
        In symbols, did he teach or try to teach that U => T ?

My current understanding of the record that is given to us
in Plato's Socratic Dialogues can be summarized as follows:

At one point Socrates seems to assume the rule that
knowledge can be taught (U => T), but simply in order
to pursue the case that virtue is knowledge (V => U)
toward the provisional conclusion that virtue can be
taught (V => T).  This seems straightforward enough,
if it were not for the good chance that all of this
reasoning is taking place under the logical aegis
of an indirect argument, a reduction to absurdity,
designed to show just the opposite of what it has
assumed for the sake of initiating the argument.
The issue is further clouded by the circumstance
that the full context of the argument most likely
extends over several Dialogues, not all of which
survive, and the intended order of which remains
in question.

At other points Socrates appears to claim that knowledge and virtue are
neither learned nor taught, in the strictest senses of these words, but
can only be "divined", "recollected", or "remembered", that is, recalled,
recognized, or reconstituted from the original acquaintance that a soul,
being immortal, already has with the real idea or the essential form of
each thing in itself.  Still, this leaves open the possibility that one
person can help another to guess a truth or to recall what both of them
already share in knowing, as if locked away in one or another partially
obscured or temporarily forgotten part of their inmost being.  And it is
just this freer interpretation of "learning" and "teaching", whereby one
agent catalyzes not catechizes another, that a liberal imagination would
yet come to call "education".  Therefore, the real issue at stake, both
with regard to the aim and as it comes down to the end of this inquiry,
is not so much whether knowledge and virtue can be learned and taught
as what kind of education is apt to achieve their actualization in the
individual and is fit to maintain their realization in the community.

How are these riddles from the origins of intellectual history, whether
one finds them far or near and whether one views it as bright or dim,
relevant to the present inquiry?  There are a number of reasons why
I am paying such close attention to these ancient and apparently
distant concerns.  The classical question as to what virtues are
teachable is resurrected in the modern question, material to the
present inquiry, as to what functions are computable, indeed,
most strikingly in regard to the formal structures that each
question engenders.  Along with a related question about the
nature of the true philosopher, as one hopes to distinguish
it from the most sophisticated imitations, all of which is
echoed on the present scene in the guise of Turing's test
for a humane intelligence, this body of riddles inspires
the corpus of most work in AI, if not the cognitive and
the computer sciences at large.

| Reason alone teaches us to know good and bad.
| Conscience, which makes us love the former and
| hate the latter, although independent of reason,
| cannot therefore be developed without it.  Before
| the age of reason we do good and bad without knowing
| it, and there is no morality in our actions, although
| there sometimes is in the sentiment of other's actions
| which have a relation to us.
|
| Rousseau, 'Emile', or 'On Education', [Rou_1, 67].

Aesthetics, ethics, and logic are categorized as "normative sciences"
because they pursue knowledge about the ways that things ought to be,
their objects being beauty, justice, and truth, respectively.  It is
generally appreciated that there are intricate patterns of deep and
subtle interrelationships that exist among these subjects, and among
their objects, but different people seem to intuit different patterns,
perhaps at different times.  At least, it seems that they must be seeing
different patterns of interrelation from the different ways that they find
to enact their insights and intuitions in customs, methods, and practices.
In particular, one's conception of science, indeed, one's whole approach
to life, is determined by the "priorism" or the "precedence ordering"
that one senses among these normative subjects and employs to order
their normative objects.  This Section considers a sample of the
choices that people typically make in building up a personal or
a cultural "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS).

For example, on the modern scene, among people trained to sport
all of the modern fashions of scientific reasoning, it is almost
a reflex of their modern identities to echo in their doctrines,
if not always to follow in their disciplines, those ancients who
taught that "knowledge is virtue".  This means that to know the
truth about anything is to know how to act rightly in regard to
it, but more yet, to be compelled to act that way.  It is usually
understood that this maxim posits a relation between the otherwise
independent realms of knowledge and action, where knowledge resides
in domains of signs and ideas, and where action presides over domains
of objects, states of being, and their changes through time.  However,
it is not so frequently remembered that this connection cuts both ways,
causing the evidence of virtue as exercised in practice to reflect on
the presumption of knowledge as possessed in theory, where each defect
of virtue necessarily reflects a defect of knowledge.

In other words, converting the rule through its contrapositive yields
the equivalent proposition "evil is ignorance", making every fault of
conduct traceable to a fault of knowledge.  Everyone knows the typical
objection to this claim, saying that one often knows better than to do
a certain thing while going ahead and doing it anyway, but the axiom is
meant to be taken as a new definition of knowledge, ruling overall that
if one really, really knows better, then one simply does not do it, by
virtue of the definition.  This sort of reasoning issues in the setting
of priorities, putting knowledge before virtue, theory before practice,
beauty and justice after truth, or reason itself before rhyme and right.

It is not that reason sees any reason to disparage the just deserts that
it places after or intends to diminish the gratifications that it defers.
Indeed, it aims to give these latter values a place of honor by placing
them more in the direction of its aims, and it thinks that it can take
them up in this order without risking a consequential loss of geniality.
According to this rationale, it is the first order of business to know
what is true, while purely an afterthought to do what is good.

It is not too surprising that reason assigns a priority to itself in its
own lists of aims, goods, values, and virtues, but this only renders its
bias, its favor, its preference, and its prejudice all the more evident.
And since the patent favoritism that reason displays is itself a reason
of the most aesthetic kind, it thus knocks itself out of its first place
ranking, the ranking that reason assumes for itself in the first place,
by dint of the prerogative that it exercises and in view of the category
of excuse that it uses, from then on deferring to beauty, to happiness,
or to pleasure, and all that is admirable in and of itself, or desired
for its own sake.  This self-demotion of reason is one of the unintended
consequences of its own argumentation, that leads it down the garden path
to a self-deprecation.  It is an immediate corollary of reason trying to
distinguish itself from the other goods, granting to itself an initially
arbitrary distinction, and then reflecting on the unjustified presumption
of this self-devotion.  This condition, that reason suffers and that reason
endures, is one that continues through all of the rest of its argumentations,
that is, unless it can find a better reason than the one it gives itself to
begin, or until such time as it can show that all good reasons are one and
the same.

So the maxim "knowlege is virtue", in its modern interpretation,
at least, leads to the following results.  It makes just action,
right behavior, and virtuous conduct not merely one among many
practical tests but the only available criterion of knowledge,
reason, and truth.  Sufficient criterion?  If a conceptual rule
is the only available test of some property, then it must be an
essential criterion of that property.  This conceives the essence
of knowledge to lie in a conception of action.   This maxim can
be taken, by way of its contrapositive, as a pragmatic principle,
positing a rule to the effect that any defect of virtue reflects
a defect of knowledge.  This makes truth the "sine qua non" of
justice, right action, or virtuous conduct, that is, it makes
reason the "without which not" of morality.  Since virtuous
conduct is distinguished as that action which leads to what
we call "beauty", "beatitude", or "happiness", by any other
name just that which is admirable in and of itself, desired
for its own sake, or sought as an end in itself, whether it
is only in the conduct itself or in a distinct product that
the beauty is held to abide, this makes logic the sublimest
art.  (Why be logical?  Becuase it pleases me to be logical.)

| It depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is.
|
| President William Jefferson Clinton, August ?, 1998

Of course, there is much that is open to interpretation about the maxim
"knowledge is virtue".  In particular, does the copula "is" represent a
necessary implication ("=>"), a sufficient reduction ("is only", "<="),
or a necessary and sufficient identification ("<=>")?

3.2.9. Principle of Rational Action

| Knowledge systems are just another level within this same hierarchy,
| another way to describe a system.  ...  The knowledge level abstracts
| completely from the internal processing and the internal representation.
| Thus, all that is left is the content of the representations and the goals
| toward which that content will be used.  As a level, it has a medium, namely,
| knowledge.  It has a law of behavior, namely, if the system wants to attain
| goal G and knows that to do act A will lead to attaining G, then it will do A.
| This law is a simple form of rationality -- that an agent will operate in its
| own best interests according to what it knows.
|
| Allen Newell, 'Unified Theories of Cognition', [New, 48-49].

How does this ancient issue, concerning the relation of reason, to action,
to the good that is overall desired or intended, transform itself through
the medium of intellectual history onto the modern scene?  In particular,
what bearing does it have on the subjects of artificial intelligence and
systems theory, and on the object of the present inquiry?  As it turns out,
in classical cybernetics and in systems theory, and especially in the parts
of AI and cognitive science that have to do with heuristic reasoning, the
transformations of the problem have tarried so long in the vicinity of
a singular triviality that the original form of the question is nearly
unmistakable in every modern version.  The transposition of the theme
<Reason, Action, Good> into the mode of <Intelligence, Operation, Goal>
can make for an interesting variation, but it does not alter the given
state of accord or discord among its elements and does nothing to turn
the lock into its key.

How do these questions bear on the present inquiry?  Suppose that
one is trying to understand something like an agency of life, a
capacity for inquiry, a faculty of intelligence, or a power of
learning and reasoning.  For starters, "something like" is a
little vague, so let me suggest calling the target class of
agencies, capacities, faculties, or powers that most hold
my interest here by the name of "virtues", thereby invoking
as an offstage direction the classical concepts of "anima"
and "arete" that seem to prompt them all.  What all of these
virtues have in common is their appearance, whether it strikes
one on first impression or only develops in one's appreciation
through a continuing acquaintance over time, of transcending or
rising infinitely far beyond all of one's attempts to construct
them from or reduce them to the sorts of instrumentalities that
are much more basic, familiar, mundane, ordinary, simpler, in
short, the kinds of abilities that one already understands well
enough and is granted to have well under one's command or control.
For convenience, I dub this class of abilities, that a particular
agent has a thorough understanding of and a complete competency in,
as the "resources" of that agent.

The language of "virtues" and "resources" gives me a way to express the
main problem of this inquiry, indeed, the overriding challenge that is
engaged in every round of effective analysis and functional modeling.
I emphasized the "apparent transcendence" of virtues because the hope
is often precisely that this appearance will turn out to be false, not
that the virtue is false in any of the properties that it seems to have,
but that the awesome aspect of its unapproachability can be diminished,
and that a way opens up to acquire this virtue by means of the kinds of
gradual steps that are available to a fallible and a finite agent.

If I had my own choice in the matter I would proceed by using the words
"knowledge" and "understanding" as synonyms, deploying them in ways that
make them refer to one and the same resource, roughly corresponding the
Greek "episteme", and thus guaranteeing that the faculty they denote is
teachable.  But others use these terms in ways that make one or the other
of them suggest a transcendental aptitude more akin to "wisdom", and thus
amounting to a virtue extending in the intellectual direction whose very
teachability is open to question.  Keeping this variety of senses and
understandings in mind, it is advisable to be flexible in one's usage.

Virtue involves, not just knowing what is the case and knowing what can be done
in each case, but knowing how to do each thing that can be done, knowing which
is the best to do in a given case, and finally, having the willingness to do it.

What are the features that are really at stake in the examination of these
admittedly paradigmatic and even parabolic examples?  There are two ways
that virtues appear to transcend the limitations of effectively finite
and empirically rational resources and thus appear to distinguish
themselves from teachings and understandings, that is, from the
orders of disciplined conduct and doctrinal knowledge that bind
themselves too severely to the merely mechanical ritual and the
purely rote recitation.

1.  In their qualitative aspect, virtues appear to combine characters of act and
    will that appear to be lacking in the simple imputations of knowledge alone.
    In particular, virtues appear to display qualities of persistent action,
    efficient volition, the will to actually do the right thing, and the
    willingness to keep on doing the right thing on each occasion that
    arises.  Thus, virtues appear to possess a live performance value
    that is not guaranteed by simply knowing the right thing to do and
    to say, indeed, they appear to have a unique and irreproducible mix
    of qualities that goes beyond the facts circumscribed by any name and
    thus that goes missing from the ordinary interpretation of its meaning.

2.  In their quantitative aspect, virtues appear to be infinitely far
    beyond the grasp of discrete, finite, and even rational resources.

3.2.10. The Pragmatic Cosmos

This Section outlines the general idea of a "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS)
and it presents the particular PONS that I will refer to as the "pragmatic cosmos".
This is the precedence ordering for the normative sciences that best accords with
the pragmatic approach to inquiry, incidentally framing and introducing the order
of normative sciences that I plan to deploy throughout the rest of this work.
From this point on, whenever I mention a PONS without further qualification,
it will always be one or another version of a pragmatic PONS that I mean to
invoke, all the while taking into consideration the circumstance that its
underlying theme still leaves a lot of room for variation in the carrying
out of its live interpretation.

Roughly speaking, in regard to the forms of human aspiration that are
exercised in normative practices and studied in the normative sciences,
the study of states or things that satisfy agents is called "aesthetics",
the study of actions that lead agents toward these goals or these goods
is called "ethics", and the study of signs that indicate these actions
is called "logic".  Understood this way, logic involves the enumeration
and the analysis of signs with regard to their "truth", a property that
only makes sense in the light of the actions that are indicated and the
objects that are desired.  In other words, logic evaluates signs with
regard to the trustworthiness of the actions that they indicate, and
this means with respect to the utility that these indications exhibit
in a mediate relationship to their objects.  As an appreciative study,
logic prizes the properties of signs that allow them to collect the
scattered actions of agents into coherent forms of conduct and that
permit them to indicate the general courses of conduct that are most
likely to lead agents toward their objects.

From this "pragmatic" point of view, logic is a special case of ethics,
one that is concerned with the conduct of signs, and ethics is a special
case of aesthetics, one that is interested in the good of actual conduct.
Another way to approach this perspective is to start with the "good" of
anything and to work back through the maze of actions and indications
that lead to it.  An action that leads to the good is a good action,
and this puts the questions of ethics among the questions of aesthetics,
as the ones that contemplate the goods of actions.  A sign that indicates
a good action, that shows a good way to act, is a good sign, and this puts
the domain of logic squarely within the domain of aesthetics.  Moreover,
thinking is a sign process that moves from signs to interpretant signs,
and this makes thinking a special kind of action.  In sum, the questions
that logic takes up in its critique of good signs and good thinking are
properly seen as special cases of aesthetic and ethical considerations.

The circumstance that the domain of logic is set within the domain of ethics,
which is further set within the domain of aesthetics, does not keep each realm
from rising to such a height in another dimension that each keeps a watch over
all of the domains that it is set within.  In sum, the image is that of three
cylinders standing on their concentric bases, telescopically extending to a
succession of heights, with the narrowest the highest and the broadest the
lowest, rising to the contemplation of the point that virtually completes
their perspective, just as if wholly sheltered by the envelope of the cone
that they jointly support, no matter what its ultimate case may be, whether
imaginary or real, rational or transcendental.

Logic has a monitory function with respect to ethics and aesthetics,
while ethics has a monitory function solely with respect to aesthetics.
By way of definition, a "monitory function" is a duty, a role, or a task
that one discipline has to watch over the practice of another discipline,
checking the feasibility of its intentions and its proposed operations,
evaluating the conformity of its performed operations to its intentions,
and, when called for, reforming the faith, the feasance, or the fidelity
of its acts in accord with its aims.  A definite attitude and particular
perspective are prerequisites for an agent to exercise a monitory role
with any hope or measure of success.  The necessary station arises from
the observation that not all things are possible, at least, not at once,
and especially that not all ends are achievable by a fallible creature
within a finite creation.  Accordingly, the agent of a monitory faculty
needs to help the agency that is involved in the effort or the endeavor
it monitors to observe the due limits of its proper arena, the higher
considerations, and the inherent constraints that force a fallible and
finite agent to choose among the available truths, acts, and aims.

To recapitulate the pragmatic "priorism of normative sciences" (PONS):

Logic, ethics, and aesthetics, in that order, cannot succeed in any of
their aims, whether they turn to contemplating the natures of the true,
the just, and the beautiful, respectively, for their own sakes, whether
they turn to speculating on the certificates, the semblances, or the more
species tokens of these goods, as they might be utilized toward a divergent
conception of their values, or whether they convert from the one forum to the
other market, and back again, in an endless series of exchanges, that is, unless
their prospective agents possess the initial capital that can only be supplied by
competencies at the corresponding intellectual virtues, and until they are willing
to risk the stakes of adequately generous overhead investments, on orders that are
demanded to fund the performance of the associated practical disciplines, namely,
those that are appropriate to the good of signs, the good of acts, and the good
of aims in themselves.  In sum, the domains and the disciplines of logic, ethics,
and aesthetics, in that order, are placed so aptly in regard to one another that
each one waits on the order of its watch and each one maintains its own proper
monitory function with respect to all of the ones that follow on after it.

Why do things have to be this way?  Why is it necessary to impose
a PONS, much less a pragmatic PONS, on the array of goods and quests?
If everyone who reflects on the issue for a sufficient spell of time
seems to agree that the Beautiful, the Just, and the True are one and
the same in the End, then why is any PONS necessary?  Its necessity is
apparently relative to a certain contigency affecting the typical agent,
namely, the contingency of being a fallible and finite creature.  Perhaps
from a "God's Eye View" (GEV), Beauty, Justice, and Truth all amount to
a single Good, the only Good there is.  But the imperfect creature is
not given this view as its realized actuality and cannot contain its
vision within the "point of view" (POV) that is proper to it.  Even
if it sees the possibility of this unity, it cannot actualize what
it sees at once, at best being driven to work toward its realization
measure by measure, and that is only if the agent is capable of reason
and reflection at all.

The imperfect agent lives in a world of seeming beauty, seeming justice,
and seeming truth.  Fortunately, the symmetry of this seeming insipidity
can break up in relation to itself, and with the loss of the objective
world's equipoise and indifference goes all the equanimity and most of
the insouciance of the agent in question.  It happens like this:  Among
the number of apparent goods and amid the manifold of good appearances,
one soon discovers that not all seeming goods are alike.  Seeming beauty
is the most seemly and the least deceptive, since it does not vitiate its
own intention in merely seeming to achieve it, and does not destroy what
it reaches for in merely seeming to grasp it.

Monitory functions, as a rule, tend to shade off in extreme directions,
on the one hand becoming a bit too prescriptive before the act, whether
the hopeful effects are hortatory or prohibitory, and on the other hand
becoming much too reactionary after the fact, whether the tardy effects
are exculpatory or recriminatory.  In the midst of these extremes, that
is, within the scheme of monitory functions at large, it is possible to
distinguish subtler variations in the nuances of their action that work
toward the accomplishment the same general purpose, but that achieve it
with a form of such gentle urging all throughout the continuing process
of gaining a good, that affect a promise of such laudatory rewards, and
that afford an array of incidental senses of such ongoing satisfaction,
even before, while, and after the aimed for good is effected, that this
class of moderate measures is aptly known as "advisory functions" (AF's).

In the process of noticing what is necessary and what is impossible,
and in distinguishing itself from the general run of monitory functions,
an AF is able to adapt itself to get a better grip on what is possible,
to the point that it is eventually able to make constructive suggestions
to the agent that it monitors, and thus to give advice that is both apt
and applicable, positive and practical, or usable and useful.  If this
is beginning to sound familiar, then it is not entirely an accident.
As I see it, it is from these very grounds that the facility for
"abductive simile" or the faculty of "abductive synthesis" (AS)
first arises, to wit, just on the horizon of monitory observation
and just on the advent of advisory contemplation that an agent of
inquiry, learning, and reasoning first acquires the "quasi" ability
to regard one thing just as if it were construed to be another and
to consider each thing just inasmuch as it haps to be like another.

In the abode of the monitor I thus discover the first clues I can grasp
as to how the "abductive bearing" (AB) of hypothetical reasoning can be
bound together from the primitive elements of the most uncertain states
that the mind can ever know.  To my way of thinking, this derivation of
AB's from the general conduct of monitory duties and the specific ethos
of advisory roles, all as pursuant to the PONS, seems to strike a chord
with the heart of wonder beating at the core of every agent of inquiry,
and accordingly to fashion an answer to the central query, in the words
of Wm. Shakespeare:  "Where is fancy bred?"  Beyond the responsibility
to continue driving the cycle of inquiry and to keep on circulating the
fresh communication of provisional answers, this form of speculation on
the origin of the AB points out at least one way whence these faculties
of guessing widely but guessing well can lead me from the conditions of
amazement, bewilderment, and consternation that the start of an inquiry
all but constantly finds me in.

The anchoring or the inauguration of an "abductive bearing" (AB) within
the operations of an "advisory function" (AF), and the enscouncement or
the installation of this positively constructive advisory, in its turn,
within the office of an irreducibly negative monitory function, one that
watches over the active, aesthetic, and affective aspects of experience
with an eye to the circumstance that not all goods can be actualized at
once -- this array of inferences from the apical structure of the PONS
ought to suffice to remind each agent of inquiry of how it all hinges
on the affective values that one feels and the effective acts that
one does.

In principle, therefore, logic assumes a purely ancillary role in regard
to the ethics of active conduct and the aesthetics of affective values.
On balance, however, logic can achieve heights of abstraction, points of
perspective, and summits of reflection that are otherwise unavailable to
a mind embroiled in the tangle of its continuing actions and immersed in
the flow of its current passions.  By rising above this plain immersion
in the dementias swept out by action and passion, logic can acquire the
status of a handle, something an agent can use in its situation to avoid
being swept along with the tide of affairs, something that keeps it from
being swept up with all that the times press on it to sweep out of mind.
By means of this instrument, logic affords the mind an ability to survey
the passing scene in ways that it cannot hope to imagine while engaged in
the engrossing business of keeping its gnosis to the grindstone, and so it
becomes apt to adopt the attitude that it needs in order to become capable
of reflecting on its very own actions, affects, and axioms.

3.3. Reflection on Reflection

Before this discussion can proceed any further I need to introduce a
technical vocabulary that is specifically designed to articulate the
relation of thought to action and the relation of conduct to purpose.
This terminology makes use of a classical distinction between "action",
as simply taken, and "conduct", as fully considered in the light of its
means, its ways, and its ends.  To the extent that affects, motivations,
and purposes are bound up with one another, the objects that lie within
the reach of this language that are able to be grasped by means of its
concepts provide a form of cognitive handle on the complex arrays of
affective impulsions and the unruly masses of emotional obstructions
that serve both to drive and to block the effective performance of
inquiry.

Once the differentiation between sheer activity and deliberate conduct is
comprehended on informal grounds and motivated by intuitive illustrations,
the formal capabilities of their logical distinction can be sharpened up
and turned to instrumental advantage in accomplishing two further aims:

1.  To elucidate the precise nature of the
    relation between action and conduct.

2.  To facilitate a study of the whole variety
    of contingent relations that are possible
    and maintained between action and conduct.

When the relations among these categories are described and analyzed in
greater detail, it becomes possible forge their separate links together,
and thus to integrate their several lines of information into a fuller
comprehension of the relations among thought, the purposes of thought,
and the purposes of action in general.

It is possible to introduce the needed vocabulary, while at the same time
advancing a number of concurrent goals of this project, by resorting to the
following strategy.  I inject into this discussion a selected set of passages
from the work of C.S. Peirce, chosen with a certain multiplicity of aims in mind.

1.  These excerpts are taken from Peirce's most thoughtful definitions
    and discussions of pragmatism.  Thus, the general tenor of their
    advice is pertinent to the long-term guidance of this project.

2.  With regard to the target vocabulary, these texts are especially 
    acute in their ability to make all the right distinctions in all
    the right places, and so they serve to illustrate the requisite
    concepts in the context of their most appropriate uses.

3.  Aside from their content being crucial to the scope of the present
    inquiry, their form, manner, sequence, and interrelations supply
    the kind of material needed to illustrate an important array
    of issues involved in the topic of reflection.

4.  Finally, my reflections on these passages are designed to
    illustrate the variety of relations that occur between the
    POV of a writer, especially as it develops through time, and
    the POV of a reader, in the light of the ways that it deflects
    its own echoes through a text in order to detect the POV of the
    writer that led to its being formed in that manner.

The first excerpt appears in the form of a dictionary entry,
intended as a definition of "pragmatism".

| Pragmatism.  The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up
| by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of 
| apprehension:  "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have 
| practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.  
| Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception
| of the object."
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.2, 1878/1902).

The second excerpt presents another version of the "pragmatic maxim",
a recommendation about a way of clarifying meaning that can be taken
to stake out the general POV of pragmatism.

| Pragmaticism was originally enounced in the form of a maxim, as follows:  
| Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you 
| conceive the objects of your conception to have.  Then, your conception
| of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.438, 1878/1905).

Over time, Peirce tried to express the basic idea
contained in the "pragmatic maxim" (PM) in numerous
different ways.  In the remainder of this work, the
gist of the pragmatic maxim, the logical content that
appropriates its general intention over a variety of
particular contexts, the common denominator of all of
its versionary approximations, can be referred to with
maximal simplicity as "PM".  Otherwise, subscripts can
be used in contexts where it is necessary to mention a
particular form, for instance, referring to the versions
just given as "PM_1" and "PM_2", respectively.

Considered side by side like this, any perceptible differences between
PM_1 and PM_2 appear to be trivial and insignificant, lacking in every
conceivable practical consequence, as indeed would be the case if both
statements were properly understood.  One would like to say that both
variants belong to the same "pragmatic equivalence class" (PEC), where
all of the peculiarities of their individual expressions are absorbed
into the effective synonymy of a single operational maxim of conduct.
Unfortunately, no matter how well this represents the ideal, it does
not describe the present state of understanding with respect to the
pragmatic maxim, and this is the situation that my work is given
to address.

I am taking the trouble to recite both of these very close variants
of the pragmatic maxim because I want to examine how their subsequent
interpretations have tended to diverge over time and to analyze why the
traditions of interpretation that stem from them are likely to develop in
such a way that they eventually come to be at cross-purposes to each other.

There is a version of the pragmatic maxim, more commonly cited,
that uses "we" and "our" instead of "you" and "your".  At first
sight, this appears to confer a number of clear advantages on the
expression of the maxim.  The second person is ambiguous with regard
to number, and it can be read as both singular and plural, since the ...

Unfortunately, people have a tendency to translate "our concept of the object"
into "the meaning of a concept".  This displacement of the genuine article from
"the object" to "the meaning" obliterates the contingently indefinite commonality
of "our" manner of thinking and replaces it with the absolutely definite pretension
to "the" unique truth of the matter // changing the emphasis from common conception
to unique intention.  This apparently causes them to read "the whole of our conception"
as "the whole meaning of a conception" ...  // from 'thee' and 'thy' to 'the' and 'our'//

The pragmatic maxim, taking the form of an injunctive prescription, a piece
of advice, or a practical recommendation, provides an operational description
of a certain philosophical outlook or "frame of reference".  This is the general
POV that is called "pragmatism", or "pragmaticism", as Peirce later renamed it
when he wanted more pointedly to emphasize the principles that distingush his
own particular POV from the general run of its appropriations, interpretations,
and common misconstruals.  Thus the pragmatic maxim, in a way that is deliberately
consistent with the principles of the POV to which it leads, enunciates a practical
idea and provides a truly pragmatic definition of that very same POV.

I am quoting a version of the pragmatic maxim whose form of address to
the reader exemplifies a "second person" POV on the part of the writer.
In spite of the fact that this particular variation does not appear in
print until a later date, my own sense of the matter leads me to think
that it actually reacaptures the original form of the pragmatic insight.
My reasons for believing this are connected with Peirce's early notion
of "tuity", the second person character of the mind's dialogue with
nature and with other minds, and a topic to be addressed in detail
at a later point in this discussion.

By way of a piece of evidence for this impression, one that is internal
to the texts, both versions begin with the second person POV that is
implied by their imperative mood.

Just as the sign in a sign relation addresses the interpretant intended
in the mind of its interpreter, PM_2 is addressed to an interpretant or
effect intended in the mind of its reader.

The third excerpt puts a gloss on the meaning of a "practical bearing"
and provides an alternative statement of the pragmatic maxim (PM_3).

| Such reasonings and all reasonings turn upon the idea that if one exerts
| certain kinds of volition, one will undergo in return certain compulsory
| perceptions.  Now this sort of consideration, namely, that certain lines
| of conduct will entail certain kinds of inevitable experiences is what
| is called a "practical consideration".  Hence is justified the maxim,
| belief in which constitutes pragmatism;  namely, 
| 
| In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should
| consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity
| from the truth of that conception;  and the sum of these consequences will
| constitute the entire meaning of the conception. 
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.9, 1905).

The fourth excerpt illustrates one of Peirce's many attempts to get the sense
of the pragmatic POV across by rephrasing the pragmatic maxim in an alternative
way (PM_4).  In introducing this version, he addresses an order of prospective
critics who do not deem a simple heuristic maxim, much less one that concerns
itself with a routine matter of logical procedure, as forming a sufficient
basis for a whole philosophy.

| On their side, one of the faults that I think they might find with me is that
| I make pragmatism to be a mere maxim of logic instead of a sublime principle
| of speculative philosophy.  In order to be admitted to better philosophical
| standing I have endeavored to put pragmatism as I understand it into the
| same form of a philosophical theorem.  I have not succeeded any better
| than this: 
| 
| Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible
| in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose
| only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding
| practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in
| the imperative mood.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.18, 1903).

I am including Peirce's preamble to his restatement of the principle
because I think that the note of irony and the foreshadowing of comedy
intimated by it are important to understanding the gist of what follows.
In this rendition the statement of the principle of pragmatism is recast
in a partially self-referent fashion, and since it is itself delivered as
a "theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood"
the full content of its own deeper meaning is something that remains to
be unwrapped, precisely through a self-application to its own expression
of the very principle it expresses.  To wit, this statement, the form of
whose phrasing is forced by conventional biases to take on the style of
a declarative judgment, describes itself as a "confused form of thought",
in need of being amended, converted, and translated into its operational
interpretant, that is to say, its viable pragmatic equivalent.

The fifth excerpt, PM_5, is useful by way of additional clarification,
and was aimed to correct a variety of historical misunderstandings that
arose over time with regard to the intended meaning of the pragmatic POV.

| The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action —-
| a stoical axiom which, to the present writer at the age of
| sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at
| thirty.  If it be admitted, on the contrary, that action
| wants an end, and that that end must be something of a
| general description, then the spirit of the maxim itself,
| which is that we must look to the upshot of our concepts
| in order rightly to apprehend them, would direct us towards
| something different from practical facts, namely, to general
| ideas, as the true interpreters of our thought.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.3, 1902).

If anyone thinks that an explanation on this order, whatever
degree of directness and explicitness one perceives it to have,
ought to be enough to correct any amount of residual confusion,
then one is failing to take into consideration the persistence
of a "particulate" interpretation, that is, a favored, isolated,
and partial interpretation, once it has taken or mistaken its
moment.

A sixth excerpt, PM_6, is useful in stating the bearing of
the pragmatic maxim on the topic of reflection, namely, that
it makes all of pragmatism boil down to nothing more or less
than a method of reflection.

| The study of philosophy consists, therefore, in reflexion, and pragmatism
| is that method of reflexion which is guided by constantly holding in view
| its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes, whether these ends
| be of the nature and uses of action or of thought.  ... 
| 
| It will be seen that pragmatism is not a Weltanschauung but is a
| method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.13 note 1, 1902).

The seventh excerpt is a late reflection on the reception of pragmatism.
With a sense of exasperation that is almost palpable, this comment tries
to justify the maxim of pragmatism and to reconstruct its misreadings by
pinpointing a number of false impressions that the intervening years have
piled on it, and it attempts once more to correct the deleterious effects
of these mistakes.  Recalling the very conception and birth of pragmatism,
it reviews its initial promise and its intended lot in the light of its 
subsequent vicissitudes and its apparent fate.  Adopting the style of
a "post mortem" analysis, it presents a veritable autopsy of the ways
that the main truth of pragmatism, for all its practicality, can be
murdered by a host of misdissecting disciplinarians, by its most 
devoted followers.  This doleful but dutiful undertaking is
presented next.

| This employment five times over of derivates of 'concipere' must then have
| had a purpose.  In point of fact it had two.  One was to show that I was
| speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of intellectual purport.
| The other was to avoid all danger of being understood as attempting to
| explain a concept by percepts, images, schemata, or by anything but
| concepts.  I did not, therefore, mean to say that acts, which are
| more strictly singular than anything, could constitute the purport,
| or adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol.  I compared action
| to the finale of the symphony of thought, belief being a demicadence.
| Nobody conceives that the few bars at the end of a musical movement
| are the purpose of the movement.  They may be called its upshot.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.402 note 3, 1906).

There are notes of emotion ranging from apology to pique to be detected
in this eulogy of pragmatism, and all the manner of a pensive elegy that
affects the tone of its contemplation.  It recounts the various ways that 
the good of the best among our maxims is "oft interrèd with their bones",
how the aim of the pragmatic maxim to clarify thought gets clouded over
with the dust of recalcitrant prepossessions, drowned in the drift of
antediluvian predilections, lost in the clamor of prevailing trends
and the shuffle of assorted novelties, and even buried with the
fractious contentions that it can tend on occasion to inspire.
It details the evils that are apt to be done in the name of
this précis of pragmatism if ever it is construed beyond
its ambition, and sought to be elevated from a working
POV to the imperial status of a Weltanshauung.

The next three elaborations of this POV are bound to sound mysterious
at this point, but they are necessary to the integrity of the whole work.
In any case, it is a good thing to assemble all these pieces in one place,
for future reference if nothing else.

| When we come to study the great principle of continuity
| and see how all is fluid and every point directly partakes
| the being of every other, it will appear that individualism
| and falsity are one and the same.  Meantime, we know that man
| is not whole as long as he is single, that he is essentially a 
| possible member of society.  Especially, one man's experience is
| nothing, if it stands alone.  If he sees what others cannot, we
| call it hallucination.  It is not "my" experience, but "our"
| experience that has to be thought of;  and this "us" has
| indefinite possibilities.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.402 note 2, 1893).

| Nevertheless, the maxim has approved itself to the writer, after
| many years of trial, as of great utility in leading to a relatively
| high grade of clearness of thought.  He would venture to suggest that
| it should always be put into practice with conscientious thoroughness,
| but that, when that has been done, and not before, a still higher grade
| of clearness of thought can be attained by remembering that the only
| ultimate good which the practical facts to which it directs attention
| can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness;
| so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual
| reactions at all, but in the manner in which those reactions
| contribute to that development.  ... 
| 
| Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good
| lies in the evolutionary process in some way.  If so, it
| is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but
| in something general or continuous.  Synechism is founded
| on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous,
| the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with
| general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process
| of the growth of reasonableness.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.3, 1902).

| No doubt, Pragmaticism makes thought ultimately apply to action exclusively -—
| to conceived action.  But between admitting that and either  saying that it
| makes thought, in the sense of the purport of symbols, to consist in acts, or
| saying that the true ultimate purpose of thinking is action, there is much the
| same difference as there is between saying that the artist-painter's living art
| is applied to dabbing paint upon canvas, and saying that that art-life consists
| in dabbing paint, or that its ultimate aim is dabbing paint.  Pragmaticism makes
| thinking to consist in the living inferential metaboly of symbols whose purport
| lies in conditional general resolutions to act.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.402 note 3, 1906).

The final excerpt touches on a what can appear as a quibbling triviality
or a significant problem, depending on one's POV.  It mostly arises when
sophisticated mentalities make a point of trying to apply the pragmatic
maxim in the most absurd possible ways they can think of.  I apologize
for quoting such a long passage, but the full impact of Peirce's point 
only develops over an extended argument.

| There can, of course, be no question that a man will act
| in accordance with his belief so far as his belief has any
| practical consequences.  The only doubt is whether this is
| all that belief is, whether belief is a mere nullity so far
| as it does not influence conduct.  What possible effect upon
| conduct can it have, for example, to believe that the diagonal
| of a square is incommensurable with the side?  ... 
| 
| The proposition that the diagonal is incommensurable has stood in the textbooks
| from time immemorial without ever being assailed and I am sure that the most
| modern type of mathematician holds to it most  decidedly.  Yet it seems
| quite absurd to say that there is any objective practical difference
| between commensurable and incommensurable. 
| 
| Of course you can say if you like that the act of expressing a quantity as a 
| rational fraction is a piece of conduct and that it is in itself a practical 
| difference that one kind of quantity can be so expressed and the other not.  
| But a thinker must be shallow indeed if he does not see that to admit a 
| species of practicality that consists in one's conduct about words and 
| modes of expression is at once to break down all the bars against the 
| nonsense that pragmatism is designed to exclude. 
| 
| What the pragmatist has his pragmatism for is to be able to say:  here is
| a definition and it does not differ at all from your confusedly apprehended
| conception because there is no practical difference.  But what is to prevent
| his opponent from replying that there is a practical difference which consists
| in his recognizing one as his conception and not the other?  That is, one is
| expressible in a way in which the other is not expressible. 
| 
| Pragmatism is completely volatilized if you admit that sort of practicality.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.32-33, 1903).

Let me just state what I think are the three main issues at stake in this passage,
leaving a fuller consideration of their implications to a later stage of this work.

1.  Reflective agents, as a price for their extra powers of reflection, fall prey
    to a new class of errors and liabilities, any one of which might be diagnosed
    as a "reflective illusion" or a "delusion of reflection" (DOR).  There is one
    type of DOR that is especially easy for reflective agents to fall into, and
    they must constantly monitor its swings in order to guard the integrity of
    their reflective processes against the variety of false images that it
    admits and the diversity of misleading pathways that it leads onto.
    This DOR turns on thinking that objects of a nature to be reflected
    on by an agent must have a nature that is identical to the nature
    of the agent that reflects on them.

An agent acts under many different kinds of constraints,
whether by choice of method, compulsion of nature, or the
mere chance of looking outward in a given direction and
henceforth taking up a fixed outlook.  The fact that one
is constrained to reason in a particular manner, whether
one is predisposed to cognitive, computational, conceptual,
or creative terms, and whether one is restrained to finitary,
imaginary, rational, or transcendental expressions, does not
mean that one is bound to consider only the sorts of objects
that fall into the corresonding lot.  It only forces the
issue of just how literally or figuratively one is able
to grasp the matter in view.

To imagine that the nature of the object is bound to be the same
as the nature of the sign, or to think that the law that determines
the object's matter has to be the same as the rule that codifies the
agent's manner, are tanatamount to special cases of those reflective
illusions whose form of diagnosis I just outlined.  For example, it
is the delusion of a purely cognitive and rational psychology, on
seeing the necessity of proceeding in a cognitive and rational
manner, to imagine that its subject is also purely cognitive
and rational, and to think that this abstraction of the
matter has any kind of coherence when considered
against the integrity of its object.

2.  The general rule of pragmatism to seek the difference that
    makes a difference has its corollories in numerous principles
    of indifference.  Not every difference in the meantime makes
    a difference in the end.  That is, not every  difference of
    circumstance that momentarily impacts on the trajectory of
    a system nor every difference of eventuality that transiently
    develops within its course makes a difference in its ultimate
    result, and this is true no matter whether one considers the
    history of intertwined conduct and experience that belongs to
    a single agent or whether it pertains to a whole community of
    agents.  Furthermore, not every difference makes a difference
    of consequence with respect to every conception or purpose
    that seeks to include it under its "sum".  Finally, not
    every difference makes the same sort of difference with
    regard to each of the intellectual concepts or purported
    outcomes that it has a bearing on.

To express the issue in a modern idiom, this is the question of whether
a concept has a definition that is "path-dependent" or "path-invariant",
that is, when the essence of that abstract conception is reduced to a
construct that employs only operational terms.  It is because of this
issue that most notions of much import, like mass, meaning, momentum, 
and number, are defined in terms of the appropriate equivalence classes
and operationalized relative to their proper frames of reference.

3.  The persistent application of the pragmatic maxim, especially in mathematics,
    eventually brings it to bear on one rather ancient question.  The issue is
    over the reality of conceptual objects, including mathematical "objects"
    and Platonic "forms" or "ideas".  In this context, the adjective "real"
    means nothing other than "having properties", but the import of this
    "having" has to be grasped in the same moment of understanding that
    this old schematic of thought loads the verb "to have" with one of
    its strongest connotations, namely, that nothing has a property in
    the proper sense of the word unless it has that property in its own 
    right, without regard to what anybody thinks about it.  In other words,
    to say that an object has a property is to say that it has that property
    independently, if not of necessity exclusively, of what anybody may think
    about the matter.  But what can it mean for one to say that a mathematical
    object is "real", that it has the properties that it has independently of
    what anybody thinks of it, when all that one has of this object are but
    signs of it, and when the only access that one has to this object is
    by means of thinking, a process of shuffling, sifting, and sorting
    through nothing more real or more ideal than signs in the mind?

The acuteness of this question can be made clear if one pursues the
accountability of the pragmatic maxim into higher orders of infinity.
Consider the number of "effects" that form the "whole" of a conception
in PM1, or else the number of "consequences" that fall under the "sum"
in PM2.  What happens when it is possible to conceive of an infinity of
practical consequences as falling among the consequential effects or the
effective consequences of an intellectual conception?  The point of this
question is not to require that all of the items of practical bearing be
surveyed in a single glance, that all of these effects and consequences
be enumerated at once, but only that the cardinal number of conceivable
practical bearings, or effects and consequences, be infinite.

Recognizing the fact that "conception" is an "-ionized" term, and so can
denote an  ongoing process as well as a finished result, it is possible
to ask the cardinal question of conceptual accountability in another way:

What is one's conception of the practical consequences that result by
necessity from a case where the "conception" of practical consequences
that result by necessity from the truth of a conception constitutes an
infinite process, that is, from a case where the conceptual process of
generating these consequences is capable of exceeding any finite bound
that one can conceive?

It is may be helpful to append at this point a few additional comments
that Peirce made with respect to the concept of reality in general.

| And what do we mean by the real?  It is a conception
| which we must first have had when we discovered that
| there was an unreal, an illusion;  that is,  when we
| first corrected ourselves.  Now the distinction for
| which alone this fact logically called, was between
| an 'ens' relative to private inward determinations,
| to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and
| an 'ens' such as would stand in the long run.
| The real, then, is that which, sooner or later,
| information and reasoning would finally result
| in, and which is therefore independent of the
| vagaries of me and you.  Thus, the very origin
| of the conception of reality shows that this
| conception essentially involves the notion
| of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and
| capable of a definite increase of knowledge.
|
| (Peirce, CP 5.311, 1868).

| The real is that which is not whatever we
| happen to think it, but is unaffected by
| what we may think of it. 
|
|(Peirce, CE 2:467, 1871).

| Thus we may define the real as that whose characters
| are independent of what anybody may think them to be.
|
|(Peirce, CP 5.405, 1878).

Having read these exhibits into evidence, if not yet to the
point of self-evidence, and considered them to some degree
for the individual lights they throw on the subject, let me
now examine the relationships that can be found among them.

These excerpts are significant not only for what they say, but for how
they say it.  What they say, their matter, is crucial to the whole course
the present inquiry.  How they say it, their manner, is itself the matter
of numerous further discussions, a few of which, carried out by Peirce
himself, are already included in the sample presented.

Depending on the reader's POV, this sequence of excerpts can appear to
reflect anything from a radical change and a serious correction of the
underlying POV to a mere clarification and a natural development of it,
all maintaining the very same spirit as the original expression of it.
Whatever the case, let these three groups of excerpts be recognized as
forming three successive "levels of reflection" (LOR's) on the series of
POV's in question, regardless of whether one sees them as disconnected,
as ostensibly related, or else as inherently the very same POV in spirit.

From my own POV, that strives to share this spirit in some measure,
it appears that the whole variety of statements, no matter what their
dates of original composition, initial publication, or subsequent revision,
only serve to illustrate different LOR's on what is essentially and practically
a single and coherent POV, one that can be drawn on as a unified frame of reference
and henceforward referred to as the "pragmatic" POV or as just plain "pragmatism".

There is a case to be made for the ultimate inseparability of all of the issues
that are brought up in the foregoing sample of excerpts, but an interval of time
and a tide of text are likely to come and go before there can be any sense of an
end to the period of questioning, before all of the issues that these texts betide
can begin to be settled, before there can be a due measure of conviction on what
they charge inquiry with, and before the repercussions of the whole sequence of
reflections they lead into can be brought to a point of closure.  If one accepts
the idea that all of these excerpts are expressions of one and the same POV, but
considered at different points of development, as enunciated, as reviewed, and
as revised over an interval of many years, then they can be taken to illustrate
the diverse kinds of changes that occur in the formulation, the development,
and the clarification of a continuing POV.

Document History

April 2004

Inquiry Driven Systems -- Ontology List

3.2.  Reflective Inquiry

3.2.1.  Integrity and Unity of Inquiry

01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05520.html
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05521.html

3.2.2.  Apparitions and Allegations

03.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05522.html
04.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05523.html
05.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05524.html
06.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05525.html
07.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05526.html
08.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05527.html
09.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05528.html

Inquiry Driven Systems -- Inquiry List

3.2.  Reflective Inquiry

3.2.1.  Integrity and Unity of Inquiry

01.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001328.html
02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001329.html

3.2.2.  Apparitions and Allegations

03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001330.html
04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001331.html
05.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001332.html
06.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001333.html
07.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001334.html
08.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001335.html
09.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-April/001336.html

June 2002

| Subject:  Inquiry Driven Systems : An Inquiry Into Inquiry
| Contact:  Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@oakland.edu>
| Version:  Draft 8.75
| Created:  23 Jun 1996
| Revised:  10 Jun 2002
| Advisor:  M.A. Zohdy
| Setting:  Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA
| Excerpt:  3.2.8 (Priorisms of Normative Sciences)
| Excerpt:  3.2.9 (Principle of Rational Action)
| Excerpt:  3.2.10 (The Pragmatic Cosmos)
| Excerpt:  3.3 (Reflection on Reflection)
|
| http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm

Priorisms of Normative Sciences -- Ontology List

01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04264.html
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04265.html

Principle of Rational Action -- Ontology List

01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04266.html