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New page: ---------------------- ON THE CITY OF GOD, BOOK XIX ---------------------- Index Translated by [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcus_Dods_%...
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ON THE CITY OF GOD, BOOK XIX
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[[Directory:Logic Museum/Augustine City of God|Index]]

Translated by [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcus_Dods_%28theologian%29 Marcus Dods]


*[[#c0|Introduction]]
*[[#c1|Chapter 1]] That Varro Has Made Out that Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Different Sects of Philosophy Might Be Formed by the Various Opinions Regarding the Supreme Good
*[[#c2|Chapter 2]] How Varro, by Removing All the Differences Which Do Not Form Sects, But are Merely Secondary Questions, Reaches Three Definitions of the Chief Good, of Which We Must Choose One
*[[#c3|Chapter 3]] Which of the Three Leading Opinions Regarding the Chief Good Should Be Preferred, According to Varro, Who Follows Antiochus and the Old Academy
*[[#c4|Chapter 4]] What the Christians Believe Regarding the Supreme Good and Evil, in Opposition to the Philosophers, Who Have Maintained that the Supreme Good is in Themselves
*[[#c5|Chapter 5]] Of the Social Life, Which, Though Most Desirable, is Frequently Disturbed by Many Distresses
*[[#c6|Chapter 6]] Of the Error of Human Judgments When the Truth is Hidden
*[[#c7|Chapter 7]] Of the Diversity of Languages, by Which the Intercourse of Men is Prevented; And of the Misery of Wars, Even of Those Called Just
*[[#c8|Chapter 8]] That the Friendship of Good Men Cannot Be Securely Rested In, So Long as the Dangers of This Life Force Us to Be Anxious
*[[#c9|Chapter 9]] Of the Friendship of the Holy Angels, Which Men Cannot Be Sure of in This Life, Owing to the Deceit of the Demons Who Hold in Bondage the Worshippers of a Plurality of Gods
*[[#c10|Chapter 10]] The Reward Prepared for the Saints After They Have Endured the Trial of This Life
*[[#c11|Chapter 11]] Of the Happiness of the Eternal Peace, Which Constitutes the End or True Perfection of the Saints
*[[#c12|Chapter 12]] That Even the Fierceness of War and All the Disquietude of Men Make Towards This One End of Peace, Which Every Nature Desires
*[[#c13|Chapter 13]] Of the Universal Peace Which the Law of Nature Preserves Through All Disturbances, and by Which Every One Reaches His Desert in a Way Regulated by the Just Judge
*[[#c14|Chapter 14]] Of the Order and Law Which Obtain in Heaven and Earth, Whereby It Comes to Pass that Human Society Is Served by Those Who Rule It
*[[#c15|Chapter 15]] Of the Liberty Proper to Man's Nature, and the Servitude Introduced by Sin,-A Servitude in Which the Man Whose Will is Wicked is the Slave of His Own Lust, Though He is Free So Far as Regards Other Men
*[[#c16|Chapter 16]] Of Equitable Rule
*[[#c17|Chapter 17]] What Produces Peace, and What Discord, Between the Heavenly and Earthly Cities
*[[#c18|Chapter 18]] How Different the Uncertainty of the New Academy is from the Certainty of the Christian Faith
*[[#c19|Chapter 19]] Of the Dress and Habits of the Christian People
*[[#c20|Chapter 20]] That the Saints are in This Life Blessed in Hope
*[[#c21|Chapter 21]] Whether There Ever Was a Roman Republic Answering to the Definitions of Scipio in Cicero's Dialogue
*[[#c22|Chapter 22]] Whether the God Whom the Christians Serve is the True God to Whom Alone Sacrifice Ought to Be Paid
*[[#c23|Chapter 23]] Porphyry's Account of the Responses Given by the Oracles of the gods Concerning Christ
*[[#c24|Chapter 24]] The Definition Which Must Be Given of a People and a Republic, in Order to Vindicate the Assumption of These Titles by the Romans and by Other Kingdoms
*[[#c25|Chapter 25]] That Where There is No True Religion There are No True Virtues
*[[#c26|Chapter 26]] Of the Peace Which is Enjoyed by the People that are Alienated from God, and the Use Made of It by the People of God in the Time of Its Pilgrimage
*[[#c27|Chapter 27]] That the Peace of Those Who Serve God Cannot in This Mortal Life Be Apprehended in Its Perfection
*[[#c28|Chapter 28]] The End of the Wicked


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||<div id="c0"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [] ||The City of God (Book XIX) Argument-In this book the end of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, is discussed. Augustin reviews the opinions of the philosophers regarding the supreme good, and their vain efforts to make for themselves a happiness in this life; and, while he refutes these, he takes occasion to show what the peace and happiness belonging to the heavenly city, or the people of Christ, are both now and hereafter.
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||<div id="c1"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [I] Quoniam de civitatis utriusque, terrenae scilicet et caelestis, debitis finibus deinceps mihi video disputandum: prius exponenda sunt, quantum operis huius terminandi ratio patitur, argumenta mortalium, quibus sibi ipsi beatitudinem facere in huius vitae infelicitate moliti sunt, ut ab eorum rebus uanis spes nostra quid differat, quam Deus nobis dedit, et res ipsa, hoc est vera beatitudo, quam dabit, non tantum auctoritate divina, sed adhibita etiam ratione, qualem propter infideles possumus adhibere, clarescat.. De finibus enim bonorum et malorum multa et multipliciter inter se philosophi disputarunt; quam quaestionem maxima intentione versantes invenire conati sunt, qui efficiat hominem beatum. Illud enim est finis boni nostri, propter quod appetenda sunt cetera, ipsum autem propter se ipsum; et illud finis mali, propter quod vitanda sunt cetera, ipsum autem propter se ipsum. Finem boni ergo nunc dicimus, non quo consumatur, ut non sit, sed quo perficiatur, ut plenum sit; et finem mali, non quo esse desinat, sed quo usque nocendo perducat. Fines itaque isti sunt summum bonum et summum malum. De quibus inveniendis atque in hac vita summo bono adipiscendo, vitando autem summo malo, multum, sicut dixi, laboraverunt, qui studium sapientiae in saeculi huius uanitate professi sunt; nec tamen eos, quamuis diversis errantes modis, naturae limes in tantum ab itinere veritatis deviare permisit, ut non alii in animo, alii in corpore, alii in utroque fines bonorum ponerent et malorum. Ex qua tripertita velut generalium distributione sectarum Marcus Varro in libro de philosophia tam multam dogmatum varietatem diligenter et subtiliter scrutatus advertit, ut ad ducentas octoginta et octo sectas, non quae iam essent, sed quae esse possent, adhibens quasdam differentias facillime perveniret. Quod ut breviter ostendam, inde oportet incipiam, quod ipse advertit et posuit in libro memorato, quattuor esse quaedam, quae homines sine magistro, sine ullo doctrinae adminiculo, sine industria vel arte vivendi, quae virtus dicitur et procul dubio discitur, velut naturaliter appetunt, aut voluptatem, qua delectabiliter movetur corporis sensus, aut quietem, qua fit ut nullam molestiam corporis quisque patiatur, aut utramque, quam tamen uno nomine voluptatis Epicurus appellat, aut universaliter prima naturae, in quibus et haec sunt et alia, vel in corpore, ut membrorum integritas et salus atque incolumitas eius, vel in animo, ut sunt ea, quae vel parua vel magna in hominum reperiuntur ingeniis. Haec igitur quattuor, id est voluptas, quies, utrumque, prima naturae, ita sunt in nobis, ut vel virtus, quam postea doctrina inserit, propter haec appetenda sit, aut ista propter virtutem, aut utraque propter se ipsa; ac per hoc fiunt hinc duodecim sectae; per hanc enim rationem singulae triplicantur; quod cum in una demonstravero, difficile non erit id in ceteris invenire. Cum ergo voluptas corporis animi virtuti aut subditur aut praefertur aut iungitur, tripertita variatur diversitate sectarum. Subditur autem virtuti, quando in usum virtutis adsumitur. Pertinet quippe ad virtutis officium et vivere patriae et propter patriam filios procreare, quorum neutrum fieri potest sine corporis voluptate; nam sine illa nec cibus potusque sumitur, ut vivatur, nec concumbitur, ut generatio propagetur. Cum vero praefertur virtuti, ipsa appetitur propter se ipsam, virtus autem adsumenda creditur propter illam, id est, ut nihil virtus agat nisi ad consequendam vel conservandam corporis voluptatem; quae vita deformis est quidem, quippe ubi virtus seruit dominae voluptati (quamuis nullo modo haec dicenda sit virtus/; sed tamen etiam ista horribilis turpitudo habuit quosdam philosophos patronos et defensores suos. Virtuti porro voluptas iungitur, quando neutra earum propter alteram, sed propter se ipsas ambae appetuntur. Quapropter sicut voluptas vel subdita vel praelata vel iuncta virtuti tres sectas facit, ita quies, ita utrumque, ita prima naturae alias ternas inveniuntur efficere. Pro varietate quippe humanarum opinionum virtuti aliquando subduntur, aliquando praeferuntur, aliquando iunguntur, ac sic ad duodenarium sectarum numerum pervenitur. Sed iste quoque numerus duplicatur adhibita una differentia, socialis videlicet vitae, quoniam, quisquis sectatur aliquam istarum duodecim sectam, profecto aut propter se tantum id agit aut etiam propter socium, cui debet hoc velle quod sibi. Quocirca duodecim sunt eorum, qui propter se tantum unamquamque tenendam putant, et aliae duodecim eorum, qui non solum propter se sic vel sic philosophandum esse decernunt, sed etiam propter alios, quorum bonum appetunt sicut suum. Hae autem sectae viginti quattuor iterum geminantur addita differentia ex Academicis novis et fiunt quadraginta octo. Illarum quippe viginti quattuor unamquamque sectarum potest quisque sic tenere ac defendere ut certam, quem ad modum defenderunt Stoici quod hominis bonum, quo beatus esset, in animi tantummodo virtute consisteret; potest alius ut incertam, sicut defenderunt Academici novi, quod eis etsi non certum, tamen veri simile videbatur. Viginti quattuor ergo fiunt per eos, qui eas velut certas propter veritatem, et aliae viginti quattuor per eos, qui easdem quamuis incertas propter veri similitudinem sequendas putant. Rursus, quia unamquamque istarum quadraginta octo sectarum potest quisque sequi habitu ceterorum. philosophorum, itemque alius potest habitu Cynicorum, ex hac etiam differentia duplicantur et nonaginta sex fiunt. Deinde quia earum singulas quasque ita tueri homines possunt atque sectari, ut aut otiosam diligant vitam, sicut hi, qui tantummodo studiis doctrinae uacare voluerunt atque valuerunt, aut negotiosam, sicut hi, qui cum philosopharentur tamen administratione rei publicae regendisque rebus humanis occupatissimi fuerunt, aut ex utroque genere temperatam, sicut hi, qui partim erudito otio partim necessario negotio alternantia vitae suae tempora tribuerunt: propter has differentias potest etiam triplicari numerus iste sectarum et ad ducentas octoginta octo perduci. Haec de Varronis libro, quantum potui, breviter ac dilucide posui, sententias eius meis explicans verbis. Quo modo autem refutatis ceteris unam eligat, quam uult esse Academicorum ueterum (quos a Platone institutos usque ad Polemonem, qui ab illo quartus eius scholam tenuit, quae Academia dicta est, habuisse certa dogmata uult videri et ob hoc distinguit ab Academicis novis, quibus incerta sunt omnia, quod philosophiae genus ab Arcesila coepit successore Polemonis), eamque sectam, id est ueterum Academicorum, sicut dubitatione ita omni errore carere arbitretur, longum est per omnia demonstrare; nec tamen omni ex parte res omittenda est. Removet ergo prius illas omnes differentias, quae numerum multiplicavere sectarum, quas ideo removendas putat, quia non in eis est finis boni. Neque enim existimat ullam philosophiae sectam esse dicendam, quae non eo distet a ceteris, quod diversos habeat fines bonorum et malorum. Quando quidem nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit; quod autem beatum facit, ipse est finis boni; nulla est igitur causa philosophandi, nisi finis boni: quam ob rem quae nullum boni finem sectatur, nulla philosophiae secta dicenda est. Cum ergo quaeritur de sociali vita, utrum sit tenenda sapienti, ut summum bonum, quo fit homo beatus, ita velit et curet amici sui, quem ad modum suum, an suae tantummodo beatitudinis causa faciat quidquid facit: non de ipso summo bono quaestio est, sed de adsumendo vel non adsumendo socio ad huius participationem boni, non propter se ipsum, sed propter eundem socium, ut eius bono ita gaudeat, sicut gaudet suo. Item cum quaeritur de Academicis novis, quibus incerta sunt omnia, utrum ita sint res habendae, in quibus philosophandum est, an, sicut aliis philosophis placuit, certas eas habere debeamus: non quaeritur quid in boni fine sectandum sit, sed de ipsius boni veritate, quod sectandum videtur, utrum sit necne dubitandum; hoc est, ut id planius eloquar, utrum ita sectandum sit, ut, qui sectatur, dicat esse verum, an ita, ut, qui sectatur, dicat verum sibi videri, etiamsi forte sit falsum, tamen uterque sectetur unum atque idem bonum. In illa etiam differentia,quae adhibetur ex habitu et consuetudine Cynicorum, non quaeritur, quisnam sit finis boni, sed utrum in illo habitu et consuetudine sit vivendum ei, qui verum sectatur bonum, quodlibet ei verum videatur esse atque sectandum. Denique fuerunt, qui cum diversa sequerentur bona finalia, alii virtutem, alii voluptatem, eundem tamen habitum et consuetudinem tenebant, ex quo Cynici appellabantur. Ita illud quidquid est, unde philosophi Cynici discernuntur a ceteris, ad eligendum. ac tenendum bonum, quo beati fierent, utique nil valebat. Nam si aliquid ad hoc interesset, profecto idem habitus eundem finem sequi cogeret, et diversus habitus eundem sequi finem non sineret. ||As I see that I have still to discuss the fit destinies of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly, I must first explain, so far as the limits of this work allow me, the reasonings by which men have attempted to make for themselves a happiness in this unhappy life, in order that it may be evident, not only from divine authority, but also from such reasons as can be adduced to unbelievers, how the empty dreams of the philosophers differ from the hope which God gives to us, and from the substantial fulfillment of it which He will give us as our blessedness. Philosophers have expressed a great variety of diverse opinions regarding the ends of goods and of evils, and this question they have eagerly canvassed, that they might, if possible, discover what makes a man happy. For the end of our good is that for the sake of which other things are to be desired, while it is to be desired for its own sake; and the end of evil is that on account of which other things are to be shunned, while it is avoided on its own account. Thus, by the end of good, we at present mean, not that by which good is destroyed, so that it no longer exists, but that by which it is finished, so that it becomes complete; and by the end of evil we mean, not that which abolishes it, but that which completes its development. These two ends, therefore, are the supreme good and the supreme evil; and, as I have said, those who have in this vain life professed the study of wisdom have been at great pains to discover these ends, and to obtain the supreme good and avoid the supreme evil in this life. And although they erred in a variety of ways, yet natural insight has prevented them from wandering from the truth so far that they have not placed the supreme good and evil, some in the soul, some in the body, and some in both. From this tripartite distribution of the sects of philosophy, Marcus Varro, in his book De Philosophia, has drawn so large a variety of opinions, that, by a subtle and minute analysis of distinctions, he numbers without difficulty as many as 288 sects,-not that these have actually existed, but sects which are possible.To illustrate briefly what he means, I must begin with his own introductory statement in the above-mentioned book, that there are four things which men desire, as it were by nature without a master, without the help of any instruction, without industry or the art of living which is called virtue, and which is certainly learned: either pleasure, which is an agreeable stirring of the bodily sense; or repose, which excludes every bodily inconvenience; or both these, which Epicurus calls by the one name, pleasure; or the primary objects of nature, which comprehend the things already named and other things, either bodily, such as health, and safety, and integrity of the members, or spiritual, such as the greater and less mental gifts that are found in men. Now these four things-pleasure, repose, the two combined, and the primary objects of nature-exist in us in such sort that we must either desire virtue on their account, or them for the sake of virtue, or both for their own sake; and consequently there arise from this distinction twelve sects, for each is by this consideration tripled. I will illustrate this in one instance, and, having done so, it will not be difficult to understand the others. According, then, as bodily pleasure is subjected, preferred, or united to virtue, there are three sects. It is subjected to virtue when it is chosen as subservient to virtue. Thus it is a duty of virtue to live for one's country, and for its sake to beget children, neither of which can be done without bodily pleasure. For there is pleasure in eating and drinking, pleasure also in sexual intercourse. But when it is preferred to virtue, it is desired for its own sake, and virtue is chosen only for its sake, and to effect nothing else than the attainment or preservation of bodily pleasure. And this, indeed, is to make life hideous; for where virtue is the slave of pleasure it no longer deserves the name of virtue. Yet even this disgraceful distortion has found some philosophers to patronize and defend it. Then virtue is united to pleasure when neither is desired for the other's sake, but both for their own. And therefore, as pleasure, according as it is subjected, preferred, or united to virtue, makes three sects, so also do repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the prime natural blessings, make their three sects each. For as men's opinions vary, and these four things are sometimes subjected, sometimes preferred, and sometimes united to virtue, there are produced twelve sects. But this number again is doubled by the addition of one difference, viz., the social life; for whoever attaches himself to any of these sects does so either for his own sake alone, or for the sake of a companion, for whom he ought to wish what he desires for himself. And thus there will be twelve of those who think some one of these opinions should be held for their own sakes, and other twelve who decide that they ought to follow this or that philosophy not for their own sakes only, but also for the sake of others whose good they desire as their own. These twenty-four sects again are doubled, and become forty-eight by adding a difference taken from the New Academy. For each of these four and twenty sects can hold and defend their opinion as certain, as the Stoics defended the position that the supreme good of man consisted solely in virtue; or they can be held as probable, but not certain, as the New Academics did. There are, therefore, twenty-four who hold their philosophy as certainly true, other twenty-four who hold their opinions as probable, but not certain. Again, as each person who attaches himself to any of these sects may adopt the mode of life either of the Cynics or of the other philosophers, this distinction will double the number, and so make ninety-six sects. Then, lastly, as each of these sects may be adhered to either by men who love a life of ease, as those who have through choice or necessity addicted themselves to study, or by men who love a busy life, as those who, while philosophizing, have been much occupied with state affairs and public business, or by men who choose a mixed life, in imitation of those who have apportioned their time partly to erudite leisure, partly to necessary business: by these differences the number of the sects is tripled, and becomes 288.I have thus, as briefly and lucidly as I could, given in my own words the opinions which Varro expresses in his book. But how he refutes all the rest of these sects, and chooses one, the Old Academy, instituted by Plato, and continuing to Polemo, the fourth teacher of that school of philosophy which held that their system was certain; and how on this ground he distinguishes it from the New Academy, which began with Polemo's successor Arcesilaus, and held that all things are uncertain; and how he seeks to establish that the Old Academy was as free from error as from doubt,-all this, I say, were too long to enter upon in detail, and yet I must not altogether pass it by in silence. Varro then rejects, as a first step, all those differences which have multiplied the number of sects; and the ground on which he does so is that they are not differences about the supreme good. He maintains that in philosophy a sect is created only by its having an opinion of its own different from other schools on the point of the ends-in-chief. For man has no other reason for philosophizing than that he may be happy; but that which makes him happy is itself the supreme good. In other words, the supreme good is the reason of philosophizing; and therefore that cannot be called a sect of philosophy which pursues no way of its own towards the supreme good. Thus, when it is asked whether a wise man will adopt the social life, and desire and be interested in the supreme good of his friend as in his own, or will, on the contrary, do all that he does merely for his own sake, there is no question here about the supreme good, but only about the propriety of associating or not associating a friend in its participation: whether the wise man will do this not for his own sake, but for the sake of his friend in whose good he delights as in his own. So, too, when it is asked whether all things about which philosophy is concerned are to be considered uncertain, as by the New Academy, or certain, as the other philosophers maintain, the question here is not what end should be pursued, but whether or not we are to believe in the substantial existence of that end; or, to put it more plainly, whether he who pursues the supreme good must maintain that it is a true good, or only that it appears to him to be true, though possibly it may be delusive,-both pursuing one and the same good. The distinction, too, which is founded on the dress and manners of the Cynics, does not touch the question of the chief good, but only the question whether he who pursues that good which seems to himself true should live as do the Cynics. There were, in fact, men who, though they pursued different things as the supreme good, some choosing pleasure, others virtue, yet adopted that mode of life which gave the Cynics their name. Thus, whatever it is which distinguishes the Cynics from other philosophers, this has no bearing on the choice and pursuit of that good which constitutes happiness. For if it had any such bearing, then the same habits of life would necessitate the pursuit of the same chief good, and diverse habits would necessitate the pursuit of different ends.
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||<div id="c2"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [II] In tribus quoque illis vitae generibus, uno scilicet non segniter, sed in contemplatione vel inquisitione veritatis otioso, altero in gerendis rebus humanis negotioso, tertio ex utroque genere temperato, cum quaeritur quid horum sit potius eligendum, non finis boni habet controversiam; sed quid horum trium difficultatem vel facilitatem adferat ad consequendum vel retinendum finem boni, id in ista quaestione versatur. Finis enim boni, cum ad eum quisque peruenerit, protinus beatum facit; in otio autem litterato, vel in negotio publico, vel quando utrumque vicibus agitur, non continuo quisque beatus est. Multi quippe in quolibet horum trium possunt vivere, et in appetendo boni fine, quo fit homo beatus, errare. Alia est igitur quaestio de finibus bonorum et malorum, quae unamquamque philosophorum sectam facit, et aliae sunt quaestiones de sociali vita, de cunctatione Academicorum, de uestitu et victu Cynicorum, de tribus vitae generibus, otioso, actuoso, ex utroque modificato; quarum nulla est, in qua de bonorum et malorum finibus disputatur. Proinde quoniam Marcus Varro has quattuor adhibens differentias, id est ex vita sociali, ex Academicis novis, ex Cynicis, ex isto vitae genere tripertito ad sectas ducentas octoginta octo pervenit, et si quae aliae possunt similiter adici: remotis eis omnibus, quoniam de sectando summo bono nullam inferunt quaestionem et ideo sectae nec sunt nec vocandae sunt, ad illas duodecim, in quibus quaeritur, quod sit bonum hominis, quo adsecuto fit beatus, ut ex eis unam veram, ceteras falsas ostendat esse, reuertitur. Nam remoto illo tripertito genere vitae duae partes huius numeri detrahuntur et sectae nonaginta sex remanent. Remota vero differentia ex Cynicis addita ad dimidium rediguntur et quadraginta octo fiunt. Auferamus etiam quod ex Academicis novis adhibitum est: rursus dimidia pars remanet, id est viginti quattuor. De sociali quoque vita quod accesserat similiter auferatur: duodecim sunt reliquae, quas ista differentia, ut viginti quattuor fierent, duplicaverat. De his ergo duodecim nihil dici potest, cur sectae non sint habendae. Nihil quippe aliud in eis quaeritur quam finis bonorum et malorum. Inventis autem bonorum finibus profecto e contrario sunt malorum. Hae autem ut fiant duodecim sectae, illa quattuor triplicantur, voluptas, quies, utrumque et prima naturae, quae primigenia Varro vocat. Haec quippe quattuor dum singillatim virtuti aliquando subduntur, ut non propter se ipsa, sed propter officium virtutis appetenda videantur, aliquando praeferuntur, ut non propter se ipsa, sed propter haec adipiscenda vel conservanda necessaria virtus putetur, aliquando iunguntur, ut propter se ipsa et virtus et ista appetenda credantur, quaternarium numerum triplum reddunt et ad duodecim sectas perveniunt. Ex illis autem quattuor rebus Varro tres tollit, voluptatem scilicet et quietem et utrumque; non quod eas inprobet, sed quod primigenia illa naturae et voluptatem in se habeant et quietem. Quid ergo opus est ex his duabus tria quaedam facere, duo scilicet, cum singillatim appetuntur voluptas aut quies, et tertium, cum ambae simul, quando quidem prima naturae et ipsas et praeter ipsas alia multa contineant? De tribus ergo sectis ei placet diligenter esse tractandum, quaenam sit potius eligenda. Non enim veram plus quam unam vera ratio esse permittit, sive in his tribus sit sive alicubi alibi, quod post videbimus. Interim de his tribus quo modo unam Varro eligat, quantum breviter aperteque possumus, disseramus. Istae nempe tres sectae ita fiunt, cum vel prima naturae propter virtutem, vel virtus propter prima naturae, vel utraque, id est et virtus et prima naturae, propter se ipsa sunt expetenda. ||The same may be said of those three kinds of life, the life of studious leisure and search after truth, the life of easy engagement in affairs, and the life in which both these are mingled. When it is asked, which of these should be adopted, this involves no controversy about the end of good, but inquires which of these three puts a man in the best position for finding and retaining the supreme good. For this good, as soon as a man finds it, makes him happy; but lettered leisure, or public business, or the alternation of these, do not necessarily constitute happiness. Many, in fact, find it possible to adopt one or other of these modes of life, and yet to miss what makes a man happy. The question, therefore, regarding the supreme good and the supreme evil, and which distinguishes sects of philosophy, is one; and these questions concerning the social life, the doubt of the Academy, the dress and food of the Cynics, the three modes of life-the active, the contemplative, and the mixed-these are different questions, into none of which the question of the chief good enters. And therefore, as Marcus Varro multiplied the sects to the number of 288 (or whatever larger number he chose) by introducing these four differences derived from the social life, the New Academy, the Cynics, and the threefold form of life, so, by removing these differences as having no bearing on the supreme good, and as therefore not constituting what can properly be called sects, he returns to those twelve schools which concern themselves with inquiring what that good is which makes man happy, and he shows that one of these is true, the rest false. In other words, he dismisses the distinction founded on the threefold mode of life, and so decreases the whole number by two-thirds, reducing the sects to ninety-six. Then, putting aside the Cynic peculiarities, the number decreases by a half, to forty-eight. Taking away next the distinction occasioned by the hesitancy of the New Academy, the number is again halved, and reduced to twenty-four. Treating in a similar way the diversity introduced by the consideration of the social life, there are left but twelve, which this difference had doubled to twenty-four. Regarding these twelve, no reason can be assigned why they should not be called sects. For in them the sole inquiry is regarding the supreme good and the ultimate evil,-that is to say, regarding the supreme good, for this being found, the opposite evil is thereby found. Now, to make these twelve sects, he multiplies by three these four things-pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined, and the primary objects of nature which Varro calls primigenia. For as these four things are sometimes subordinated to virtue, so that they seem to be desired not for their own sake, but for virtue's sake; sometimes preferred to it, so that virtue seems to be necessary not on its own account, but in order to attain these things; sometimes joined with it, so that both they and virtue are desired for their own sakes,-we must multiply the four by three, and thus we get twelve sects. But from those four things Varro eliminates three-pleasure, repose, pleasure and repose combined-not because he thinks these are not worthy of the place assigned them, but because they are included in the primary objects of nature. And what need is there, at any rate, to make a threefold division out of these two ends, pleasure and repose, taking them first severally and then conjunctly, since both they, and many other things besides, are comprehended in the primary objects of nature? Which of the three remaining sects must be chosen? This is the question that Varro dwells upon. For whether one of these three or some other be chosen, reason forbids that more than one be true. This we shall afterwards see; but meanwhile let us explain as briefly and distinctly as we can how Varro makes his selection from these three, that is, from the sects which severally hold that the primary objects of nature are to be desired for virtue's sake, that virtue is to be desired for their sake, and that virtue and these objects are to be desired each for their own sake.
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||<div id="c3"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [III] Quid ergo istorum trium sit verum atque sectandum, isto modo persuadere conatur. Primum, quia summum bonum in philosophia non arboris, non pecoris, non Dei, sed hominis quaeritur, quid sit ipse homo, quaerendum putat. Sentit quippe in eius natura duo esse quaedam, corpus et animam, et horum quidem duorum melius esse animam longeque praestabilius omnino non dubitat, sed utrum anima sola sit homo, ut ita sit ei corpus tamquam equus equiti (eques enim non homo et equus, sed solus homo est; ideo tamen eques dicitur, quod aliquo modo se habet ad equum), an corpus solum sit homo, aliquo modo se habens ad animam, sicut poculum ad potionem (non enim calix et potio, quam continet calix, simul dicitur poculum, sed calix solus; ideo tamen quod potioni continendae sit adcommodatus), an vero nec anima sola nec solum corpus, sed simul utrumque sit homo, cuius sit pars una sive anima sive corpus, ille autem totus ex utroque constet, ut homo sit (sicut duos equos iunctos bigas vocamus, quorum sive dexter sive sinister pars est bigarum, unum vero eorum, quoquo modo se habeat ad alterum, bigas non dicimus, sed ambo simul). Horum autem trium hoc elegit tertium hominemque nec animam solam nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et corpus esse arbitratur. Proinde summum bonum hominis, quo fit beatus, ex utriusque rei bonis constare dicit, et animae scilicet et corporis. Ac per hoc prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda ipsamque virtutem, quam doctrina inserit velut artem vivendi, quae in animae bonis est excellentissimum bonum. Quapropter eadem virtus, id est ars agendae vitae, cum acceperit prima naturae, quae sine illa erant, sed tamen erant etiam quando eis doctrina adhuc deerat, omnia propter se ipsa appetit simulque etiam se ipsam, omnibusque simul et se ipsa utitur, eo fine, ut omnibus delectetur atque perfruatur, magis minusque, ut quaeque inter se maiora atque minora sunt, tamen omnibus gaudens et quaedam minora, si necessitas postulat, propter maiora vel adipiscenda vel tenenda contemnens. Omnium autem bonorum vel animi vel corporis nihil sibi virtus omnino praeponit. Haec enim bene utitur et se ipsa et ceteris, quae hominem faciunt beatum, bonis. Vbi vero ipsa non est, quamlibet multa sint bona, non bono eius sunt, cuius sunt, ac per hoc nec eius bona dicenda sunt, cui male utenti utilia esse non possunt. Haec ergo vita hominis, quae virtute et aliis animi et corporis bonis, sine quibus virtus esse non.potest, fruitur, beata esse dicitur; si vero et aliis, sine quibus esse virtus potest, vel ullis vel pluribus, beatior; si autem prorsus omnibus, ut nullum omnino bonum desit vel animi vel corporis, beatissima. Non enim hoc est vita, quod virtus, quoniam non omnis vita, sed sapiens vita virtus est; et tamen qualiscumque vita sine ulla virtute potest esse; virtus vero sine ulla vita non potest esse. Hoc et de memoria dixerim atque ratione, et si quid tale aliud est in homine. Sunt enim haec et ante doctrinam, sine his autem non potest esse ulla doctrina, ac per hoc nec virtus, quae utique discitur. Bene autem currere, pulchrum esse corpore, viribus ingentibus praeualere et cetera huius modi talia sunt, ut et virtus sine his esse possit et ipsa sine virtute; bona sunt tamen, et secundum istos etiam ipsa propter se ipsa diligit virtus, utiturque illis et fruitur, sicut virtutem decet. Hanc vitam beatam etiam socialem perhibent esse, quae amicorum bona propter se ipsa diligat sicut sua eisque propter ipsos hoc velit quod sibi; sive in domo sint, sicut coniux et liberi et quicumque domestici, sive in loco, ubi domus est eius, sicuti est urbs, ut sunt hi qui cives vocantur, sive in orbe toto, ut sunt gentes quas ei societas humana coniungit, sive in ipso mundo, qui censetur nomine caeli et terrae, sicut esse dicunt deos, quos volunt amicos esse homini sapienti, quos nos familiarius angelos dicimus. De bonorum autem et e contrario malorum finibus negant ullo modo esse dubitandum et hanc inter se et nouos Academicos adfirmant esse distantiam, nec eorum interest quicquam, sive Cynico sive alio quolibet habitu et victu in his finibus, quos veros putant, quisque philosophetur. Ex tribus porro illis vitae generibus, otioso, actuoso et quod ex utroque compositum est, hoc tertium sibi placere adseuerant. Haec sensisse atque docuisse Academicos ueteres Varro adserit, auctore Antiocho, magistro Ciceronis et suo, quem sane Cicero in pluribus fuisse Stoicum quam ueterem Academicum uult videri. Sed quid ad nos, qui potius de rebus ipsis iudicare debemus, quam pro magno de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire? ||Which of these three is true and to be adopted he attempts to show in the following manner. As it is the supreme good, not of a tree, or of a beast, or of a god, but of man that philosophy is in quest of, he thinks that, first of all, we must define man. He is of opinion that there are two parts in human nature, body and soul, and makes no doubt that of these two the soul is the better and by far the more worthy part. But whether the soul alone is the man, so that the body holds the same relation to it as a horse to the horseman, this he thinks has to be ascertained. The horseman is not a horse and a man, but only a man, yet he is called a horseman, because he is in some relation to the horse. Again, is the body alone the man, having a relation to the soul such as the cup has to the drink? For it is not the cup and the drink it contains which are called the cup, but the cup alone; yet it is so called because it is made to hold the drink. Or, lastly, is it neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but both together, which are man, the body and the soul being each a part, but the whole man being both together, as we call two horses yoked together a pair, of which pair the near and the off horse is each a part, but we do not call either of them, no matter how connected with the other, a pair, but only both together? Of these three alternatives, then, Varro chooses the third, that man is neither the body alone, nor the soul alone, but both together. And therefore the highest good, in which lies the happiness of man, is composed of goods of both kinds, both bodily and spiritual. And consequently he thinks that the primary objects of nature are to be sought for their own sake, and that virtue, which is the art of living, and can be communicated by instruction, is the most excellent of spiritual goods. This virtue, then, or art of regulating life, when it has received these primary objects of nature which existed independently of it, and prior to any instruction, seeks them all, and itself also, for its own sake; and it uses them, as it also uses itself, that from them all it may derive profit and enjoyment, greater or less, according as they are themselves greater or less; and while it takes pleasure in all of them, it despises the less that it may obtain or retain the greater when occasion demands. Now, of all goods, spiritual or bodily, there is none at all to compare with virtue. For virtue makes a good use both of itself and of all other goods in which lies man's happiness; and where it is absent, no matter how many good things a man has, they are not for his good, and consequently should not be called good things while they belong to one who makes them useless by using them badly. The life of man, then, is called happy when it enjoys virtue and these other spiritual and bodily good things without which virtue is impossible. It is called happier if it enjoys some or many other good things which are not essential to virtue; and happiest of all, if it lacks not one of the good things which pertain to the body and the soul. For life is not the same thing as virtue, since not every life, but a wisely regulated life, is virtue; and yet, while there can be life of some kind without virtue, there cannot be virtue without life. This I might apply to memory and reason, and such mental faculties; for these exist prior to instruction, and without them there cannot be any instruction, and consequently no virtue, since virtue is learned. But bodily advantages, such as swiftness of foot, beauty, or strength, are not essential to virtue, neither is virtue essential to them, and yet they are good things; and, according to our philosophers, even these advantages are desired by virtue for its own sake, and are used and enjoyed by it in a becoming manner.They say that this happy life is also social, and loves the advantages of its friends as its own, and for their sake wishes for them what it desires for itself, whether these friends live in the same family, as a wife, children, domestics; or in the locality where one's home is, as the citizens of the same town; or in the world at large, as the nations bound in common human brotherhood; or in the universe itself, comprehended in the heavens and the earth, as those whom they call gods, and provide as friends for the wise man, and whom we more familiarly call angels. Moreover, they say that, regarding the supreme good and evil, there is no room for doubt, and that they therefore differ from the New Academy in this respect, and they are not concerned whether a philosopher pursues those ends which they think true in the Cynic dress and manner of life or in some other. And, lastly, in regard to the three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, they declare in favor of the third. That these were the opinions and doctrines of the Old Academy, Varro asserts on the authority of Antiochus, Cicero's master and his own, though Cicero makes him out to have been more frequently in accordance with the Stoics than with the Old Academy. But of what importance is this to us, who ought to judge the matter on its own merits, rather than to understand accurately what different men have thought about it?
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||<div id="c4"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [IV] Si ergo quaeratur a nobis, quid civitas Dei de his singulis interrogata respondeat ac primum de finibus bonorum malorumque quid sentiat: respondebit aeternam vitam esse summum bonum, aeternam vero mortem summum malum; propter illam proinde adipiscendam istamque vitandam recte nobis esse vivendum. Propter quod scriptum est: Iustus ex fide vivit; quoniam neque bonum nostrum iam videmus, unde oportet ut credendo quaeramus, neque ipsum recte vivere nobis ex nobis est, nisi credentes adivuet et orantes qui et ipsam fidem dedit, qua nos ab illo adivuandos esse credamus. Illi autem, qui in ista vita fines bonorum et malorum esse putaverunt, sive in corpore sive in animo sive in utroque ponentes summum bonum, atque, ut id explicatius eloquar, sive in voluptate sive in virtute sive in utraque, sive in quiete sive in virtute sive in utraque, sive in voluptate simul et quiete sive in virtute sive in utrisque, sive in primis naturae sive in virtute sive in utrisque, hic beati esse et a se ipsis beatificari mira uanitate voluerunt. Inrisit hos Veritas per prophetam dicentem: Dominus novit cogitationes hominum vel, sicut hoc testimonium posuit apostolus Paulus: Dominus novit cogitationes sapientium, quoniam uanae sunt. Quis enim sufficit quantovis eloquentiae flumine vitae huius miserias explicare? Quam lamentatus est Cicero in consolatione de morte filiae, sicut potuit; sed quantum est quod potuit? Ea quippe, quae dicuntur prima naturae, quando, ubi, quo modo tam bene se habere in hac vita possunt, ut non sub incertis casibus fluctuent? Quis enim dolor contrarius voluptati, quae inquietudo contraria quieti in corpus cadere sapientis non potest? Membrorum certe amputatio vel debilitas hominis expugnat incolumitatem, deformitas pulchritudinem, inbecillitas sanitatem, vires lassitudo, mobilitatem torpor aut tarditas; et quid horum est, quod nequeat in carnem sapientis inruere? Status quoque corporis atque motus, cum decentes et congruentes sunt, inter naturae prima numerantur; sed quid si aliqua mala valetudo membra tremore concutiat? quid si usque ad ponendas in terra manus dorsi spina curuetur et hominem quodam modo quadrupedem faciat? Nonne omnem statuendi corporis et movendi speciem decusque peruertet? Quid ipsius animi primigenia quae appellantur bona, ubi duo prima ponunt propter conprehensionem perceptionemque veritatis sensum et intellectum? Sed qualis quantusque remanet sensus, si, ut alia taceam, fiat homo surdus et caecus? Ratio vero et intellegentia quo recedet, ubi sopietur, si aliquo morbo efficiatur insanus? Phrenetici multa absurda cum dicunt vel faciunt, plerumque a bono suo proposito et moribus aliena, immo .suo bono proposito moribusque contraria, sive illa cogitemus sive videamus, si digne consideremus, lacrimas tenere vix possumus aut forte nec possumus. Quid dicam de his, qui daemonum patiuntur incursus? Vbi habent absconditam vel obrutam intellegentiam suam, quando secundum suam voluntatem et anima eorum et corpore malignus utitur spiritus? Et quis confidit hoc malum in hac vita evenire non posse sapienti? Deinde perceptio veritatis in hac carne qualis aut quanta est, quando, sicut legimus in veraci libro sapientiae, corpus corruptibile adgrauat animam et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem? Impetus porro vel appetitus actionis, si hoc modo recte Latine appellatur ea, quam Graeci vocant *o(rmh/n, quia et ipsam primis naturae deputant bonis, nonne ipse est, quo geruntur etiam insanorum illi miserabiles motus et facta, quae horremus, quando peruertitur sensus ratioque sopitur? Porro ipsa virtus, quae non est inter prima naturae, quoniam eis postea doctrina introducente supervenit, cum sibi bonorum culmen vindicet humanorum, quid hic agit nisi perpetua bella cum vitiis, nec exterioribus, sed interioribus, nec alienis, sed plane nostris et propriis, maxime illa, quae Graece *swfrosu/nh, Latine temperantia nominatur, qua carnales frenantur libidines, ne in quaeque flagitia mentem consentientem trahant? Neque enim nullum est vitium, cum, sicut dicit apostolus, caro concupiscit adversus spiritum f cui vitio contraria virtus est, cum, sicut idem dicit, spiritus concupiscit adversus carnem. Haec enim, inquit, inuicem adversantur, ut non ea quae uultis faciatis. Quid autem facere volumus, cum perfici volumus fine summi boni, nisi ut caro adversus spiritum non concupiscat, nec sit in nobis hoc vitium, contra quod spiritus concupiscat? Quod in hac vita, quamuis velimus, quoniam facere non valemus, id saltem in adiutorio Dei facimus, ne carni concupiscenti adversus spiritum spiritu succumbente cedamus et ad perpetrandum peccatum nostra consensione pertrahamur. Absit ergo ut, quamdiu in hoc bello intestino sumus, iam nos beatitudinem, ad quam vincendo volumus pervenire, adeptos esse credamus. Et quis est usque adeo sapiens, ut contra libidines nullum habeat omnino conflictum? Quid illa virtus, quae prudentia dicitur, nonne tota vigilantia sua bona discernit a malis, ut in illis appetendis istisque vitandis nullus error obrepat, ac per hoc et ipsa nos in malis vel mala in nobis esse testatur? Ipsa enim docet malum esse ad peccandum consentire bonumque esse ad peccandum non consentire libidini. Illud tamen malum, cui nos non consentire docet prudentia, facit temperantia, nec prudentia nec temperantia tollit huic vitae. Quid iustitia, cuius munus est sua cuique tribuere (unde fit in ipso homine quidam iustus ordo naturae, ut anima subdatur Deo et animae caro, ac per hoc Deo et anima et caro), nonne demonstrat in eo se adhuc opere laborare potius quam in huius operis iam fine requiescere? Tanto minus quippe anima subditur Deo, quanto minus Deum in ipsis suis cogitationibus concipit; et tanto minus animae subditur caro, quanto magis adversus spiritum concupiscit. Quamdiu ergo nobis inest haec infirmitas, haec pestis, hic languor, quo modo nos iam saluos, et si nondum saluos, quo modo iam beatos illa finali beatitudine dicere audebimus? Iam vero illa virtus, cuius nomen est fortitudo, in quantacumque sapientia evidentissima testis est humanorum malorum, quae compellitur patientia tolerare. Quae mala Stoici philosophi miror qua fronte mala non esse contendant, quibus fatentur, si tanta fuerint, ut ea sapiens vel non possit vel non debeat sustinere, cogi eum mortem sibimet inferre atque ex hac vita emigrare. Tantus autem superbiae stupor est in his hominibus hic se habere finem boni et a se ipsis fieri beatos putantibus, ut sapiens eorum, hoc est, qualem mirabili uanitate describunt, etiamsi excaecetur obsurdescat obmutescat, membris debilitetur doloribus crucietur et, si quid aliud talium malorum dici aut cogitari potest, incidat in eum, quo sibi mortem cogatur inferre, hanc in his malis vitam constitutam eum non pudeat beatam vocare. O vitam beatam, quae ut finiatur mortis quaerit auxilium! Si beata est, maneatur in ea. Quo modo ista non sunt mala, quae vincunt fortitudinis bonum eandemque fortitudinem non solum sibi cedere, verum etiam defirare compellunt, ut eandem vitam et dicat beatam et persuadeat esse fugiendam? Quis usque adeo caecus est, ut non videat, quod, si beata esset, fugienda non esset? Sed aperta infirmitatis voce fugiendam fatentur. Quid igitur causae est, cur non etiam miseram fracta superbiae ceruice fateantur? Vtrum, obsecro, Cato ille patientia an potius inpatientia se peremit? Non enim hoc fecisset, nisi victoriam Caesaris inpatienter tulisset. Vbi est fortitudo? Nempe cessit, nempe succubuit, nempe usque adeo superata est, ut vitam beatam derelinqueret desereret fugeret. An non erat iam beata? Misera ergo erat. Quo modo igitur mala non erant, quae vitam miseram fugiendamque faciebant? Quapropter etiam ipsi, qui mala ista esse confessi sunt, sicut Peripatetici, sicut ueteres Academici, quorum sectam Varro defendit, tolerabilius quidem loquuntur, sed eorum quoque mirus est error, quod in his malis, etsi tam gravia sint, ut morte fugienda sint ab ipso sibimet inlata, qui haec patitur, vitam beatam tamen esse contendunt. "Mala sunt, inquit, tormenta atque cruciatus corporis, et tanto sunt peiora, quanto potuerint esse maiora; quibus ut careas, ex hac vita fugiendum est." Qua vita, obsecro? "Hac, inquit, quae tantis adgrauatur malis." Certe ergo beata est in eisdem ipsis malis, propter quae dicis esse fugiendam? An ideo beatam dicis, quia licet tibi ab his malis morte discedere? Quid si ergo in eis aliquo divino iudicio tenereris nec permittereris mori nec umquam sine illis esse sinereris? Nempe tunc saltem miseram talem diceres vitam. Non igitur propterea misera non est, quia cito relinquitur. Quando quidem si sempiterna sit, etiam abs te ipso misera iudicatur; non itaque propterea, quoniam brevis est, nulla miseria debet videri aut, quod est absurdius, quia brevis miseria est, ideo etiam beatitudo appellari. Magna vis est in eis malis, quae cogunt hominem secundum ipsos etiam sapientem sibimet auferre quod homo est; cum dicant, et verum dicant, hanc esse naturae primam quodam modo et maximam vocem, ut homo concilietur sibi et propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat, ita sibi amicus, ut esse se animal et in hac coniunctione corporis atque animae vivere velit uehementer atque appetat. Magna vis est in eis malis, quibus iste naturae vincitur sensus, quo mors omni modo omnibus viribus conatibusque vitatur, et ita vincitur, ut, quae vitabatur, optetur appetatur et, si non potuerit aliunde contingere, ab homine ipso sibimet inferatur. Magna vis est in eis malis, quae fortitudinem faciunt homicidam; si tamen adhuc dicenda est fortitudo, quae ita his malis vincitur, ut hominem, quem sicut virtus regendum tuendumque suscepit, non modo non possit per patientiam custodire, sed ipsa insuper cogatur occidere. Debet quidem etiam mortem sapiens ferre patienter, sed quae accidit aliunde. Secundum istos autem si eam sibi ipse inferre compellitur, profecto fatendum est eis non solum mala, sed intolerabilia etiam mala esse, quae hoc eum perpetrare compellunt. Vita igitur, quae istorum tam magnorum tamque gravium malorum aut premitur oneribus aut subiacet casibus, nullo modo beata diceretur, si homines, qui hoc dicunt, sicut victi malis ingravescentibus, cum sibi ingerunt mortem, cedunt infelicitati, ita victi certis rationibus, cum quaerunt beatam vitam, dignarentur cedere veritati et non sibi putarent in ista mortalitate fine summi boni esse gaudendum, ubi virtutes ipsae, quibus hic certe nihil melius atque utilius in homine reperitur, quanto maiora sunt adiutoria contra vim periculorum laborum dolorum, tanto fideliora testimonia miseriarum. Si enim verae virtutes sunt, quae nisi in eis, quibus vera inest pietas, esse non possunt: non se profitentur hoc posse, ut nullas miserias patiantur homines, in quibus sunt (neque enim mendaces sunt verae virtutes, ut hoc profiteantur), sed ut vita humana, quae tot et tantis huius saeculi malis esse cogitur misera, spe futuri saeculi sit beata, sicut et salua. Quo modo enim beata est, quae nondum salua est? Vnde et apostolus Paulus non de hominibus inprudentibus inpatientibus, intemperantibus et iniquis, sed de his, qui secundum veram pietatem viverent .et ideo virtutes, quas haberent, veras haberent, ait: Spe enim salui facti sumus. Spes autem quae videtur, non est spes. Quod enim videt quis, quid et sperat? Si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam expectamus. Sicut ergo spe salui, ita spe beati facti sumus, et sicut salutem, ita beatitudinem non iam tenemus praesentem, sed expectamus futuram, et hoc per patientiam j quia in malis sumus, quae patienter tolerare debemus, donec ad illa veniamus bona, ubi omnia <erunt>, quibus ineffabiliter delectemur, nihil erit autem, quod iam tolerare debeamus. Talis salus, quae in futuro erit saeculo, ipsa erit etiam finalis beatitudo. Quam beatitudinem isti philosophi, quoniam non videntes nolunt credere, hic sibi conantur falsissimam fabricare, quanto superbiore, tanto mendaciore virtute. ||If, then, we be asked what the city of God has to say upon these points, and, in the first place, what its opinion regarding the supreme good and evil is, it will reply that life eternal is the supreme good, death eternal the supreme evil, and that to obtain the one and escape the other we must live rightly. And thus it is written, "The just lives by faith," Habakkuk 2:4 for we do not as yet see our good, and must therefore live by faith; neither have we in ourselves power to live rightly, but can do so only if He who has given us faith to believe in His help do help us when we believe and pray. As for those who have supposed that the sovereign good and evil are to be found in this life, and have placed it either in the soul or the body, or in both, or, to speak more explicitly, either in pleasure or in virtue, or in both; in repose or in virtue, or in both; in pleasure and repose, or in virtue, or in all combined; in the primary objects of nature, or in virtue, or in both,-all these have, with a marvelous shallowness, sought to find their blessedness in this life and in themselves. Contempt has been poured upon such ideas by the Truth, saying by the prophet, "The Lord knows the thoughts of men" (or, as the Apostle Paul cites the passage, "The Lord knows the thoughts of the wise") "that they are vain."For what flood of eloquence can suffice to detail the miseries of this life? Cicero, in the Consolation on the death of his daughter, has spent all his ability in lamentation; but how inadequate was even his ability here? For when, where, how, in this life can these primary objects of nature be possessed so that they may not be assailed by unforeseen accidents? Is the body of the wise man exempt from any pain which may dispel pleasure, from any disquietude which may banish repose? The amputation or decay of the members of the body puts an end to its integrity, deformity blights its beauty, weakness its health, lassitude its vigor, sleepiness or sluggishness its activity,-and which of these is it that may not assail the flesh of the wise man? Comely and fitting attitudes and movements of the body are numbered among the prime natural blessings; but what if some sickness makes the members tremble? what if a man suffers from curvature of the spine to such an extent that his hands reach the ground, and he goes upon all-fours like a quadruped? Does not this destroy all beauty and grace in the body, whether at rest or in motion? What shall I say of the fundamental blessings of the soul, sense and intellect, of which the one is given for the perception, and the other for the comprehension of truth? But what kind of sense is it that remains when a man becomes deaf and blind? where are reason and intellect when disease makes a man delirious? We can scarcely, or not at all, refrain from tears, when we think of or see the actions and words of such frantic persons, and consider how different from and even opposed to their own sober judgment and ordinary conduct their present demeanor is. And what shall I say of those who suffer from demoniacal possession? Where is their own intelligence hidden and buried while the malignant spirit is using their body and soul according to his own will? And who is quite sure that no such thing can happen to the wise man in this life? Then, as to the perception of truth, what can we hope for even in this way while in the body, as we read in the true book of Wisdom, "The corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle presses down the mind that muses upon many things?" Wisdom 9:15 And eagerness, or desire of action, if this is the right meaning to put upon the Greek ??µ?, is also reckoned among the primary advantages of nature; and yet is it not this which produces those pitiable movements of the insane, and those actions which we shudder to see, when sense is deceived and reason deranged?In fine, virtue itself, which is not among the primary objects of nature, but succeeds to them as the result of learning, though it holds the highest place among human good things, what is its occupation save to wage perpetual war with vices,-not those that are outside of us, but within; not other men's, but our own,-a war which is waged especially by that virtue which the Greeks call s?f??s???, and we temperance, and which bridles carnal lusts, and prevents them from winning the consent of the spirit to wicked deeds? For we must not fancy that there is no vice in us, when, as the apostle says, "The flesh lusts against the spirit;" Galatians 5:17 for to this vice there is a contrary virtue, when, as the same writer says, "The spirit lusts against the flesh." "For these two," he says, "are contrary one to the other, so that you cannot do the things which you would." But what is it we wish to do when we seek to attain the supreme good, unless that the flesh should cease to lust against the spirit, and that there be no vice in us against which the spirit may lust? And as we cannot attain to this in the present life, however ardently we desire it, let us by God's help accomplish at least this, to preserve the soul from succumbing and yielding to the flesh that lusts against it, and to refuse our consent to the perpetration of sin. Far be it from us, then, to fancy that while we are still engaged in this intestine war, we have already found the happiness which we seek to reach by victory. And who is there so wise that he has no conflict at all to maintain against his vices?What shall I say of that virtue which is called prudence? Is not all its vigilance spent in the discernment of good from evil things, so that no mistake may be admitted about what we should desire and what avoid? And thus it is itself a proof that we are in the midst of evils, or that evils are in us; for it teaches us that it is an evil to consent to sin, and a good to refuse this consent. And yet this evil, to which prudence teaches and temperance enables us not to consent, is removed from this life neither by prudence nor by temperance. And justice, whose office it is to render to every man his due, whereby there is in man himself a certain just order of nature, so that the soul is subjected to God, and the flesh to the soul, and consequently both soul and flesh to God,-does not this virtue demonstrate that it is as yet rather laboring towards its end than resting in its finished work? For the soul is so much the less subjected to God as it is less occupied with the thought of God; and the flesh is so much the less subjected to the spirit as it lusts more vehemently against the spirit. So long, therefore, as we are beset by this weakness, this plague, this disease, how shall we dare to say that we are safe? and if not safe, then how can we be already enjoying our final beatitude? Then that virtue which goes by the name of fortitude is the plainest proof of the ills of life, for it is these ills which it is compelled to bear patiently. And this holds good, no matter though the ripest wisdom co-exists with it. And I am at a loss to understand how the Stoic philosophers can presume to say that these are no ills, though at the same time they allow the wise man to commit suicide and pass out of this life if they become so grievous that he cannot or ought not to endure them. But such is the stupid pride of these men who fancy that the supreme good can be found in this life, and that they can become happy by their own resources, that their wise man, or at least the man whom they fancifully depict as such, is always happy, even though he become blind, deaf, dumb, mutilated, racked with pains, or suffer any conceivable calamity such as may compel him to make away with himself; and they are not ashamed to call the life that is beset with these evils happy. O happy life, which seeks the aid of death to end it? If it is happy, let the wise man remain in it; but if these ills drive him out of it, in what sense is it happy? Or how can they say that these are not evils which conquer the virtue of fortitude, and force it not only to yield, but so to rave that it in one breath calls life happy and recommends it to be given up? For who is so blind as not to see that if it were happy it would not be fled from? And if they say we should flee from it on account of the infirmities that beset it, why then do they not lower their pride and acknowledge that it is miserable? Was it, I would ask, fortitude or weakness which prompted Cato to kill himself? for he would not have done so had he not been too weak to endure Cжsar's victory. Where, then, is his fortitude? It has yielded, it has succumbed, it has been so thoroughly overcome as to abandon, forsake, flee this happy life. Or was it no longer happy? Then it was miserable. How, then, were these not evils which made life miserable, and a thing to be escaped from?And therefore those who admit that these are evils, as the Peripatetics do, and the Old Academy, the sect which Varro advocates, express a more intelligible doctrine; but theirs also is a surprising mistake, for they contend that this is a happy life which is beset by these evils, even though they be so great that he who endures them should commit suicide to escape them. "Pains and anguish of body," says Varro, "are evils, and so much the worse in proportion to their severity; and to escape them you must quit this life." What life, I pray? This life, he says, which is oppressed by such evils. Then it is happy in the midst of these very evils on account of which you say we must quit it? Or do you call it happy because you are at liberty to escape these evils by death? What, then, if by some secret judgment of God you were held fast and not permitted to die, nor suffered to live without these evils? In that case, at least, you would say that such a life was miserable. It is soon relinquished, no doubt but this does not make it not miserable; for were it eternal, you yourself would pronounce it miserable. Its brevity, therefore, does not clear it of misery; neither ought it to be called happiness because it is a brief misery. Certainly there is a mighty force in these evils which compel a man-according to them even a wise man-to cease to be a man that he may escape them, though they say, and say truly, that it is as it were the first and strongest demand of nature that a man cherish himself, and naturally therefore avoid death, and should so stand his own friend as to wish and vehemently aim at continuing to exist as a living creature, and subsisting in this union of soul and body. There is a mighty force in these evils to overcome this natural instinct by which death is by every means and with all a man's efforts avoided, and to overcome it so completely that what was avoided is desired, sought after, and if it cannot in any other way be obtained, is inflicted by the man on himself. There is a mighty force in these evils which make fortitude a homicide,-if, indeed, that is to be called fortitude which is so thoroughly overcome by these evils, that it not only cannot preserve by patience the man whom it undertook to govern and defend, but is itself obliged to kill him. The wise man, I admit, ought to bear death with patience, but when it is inflicted by another. If, then, as these men maintain, he is obliged to inflict it on himself, certainly it must be owned that the ills which compel him to this are not only evils, but intolerable evils. The life, then, which is either subject to accidents, or environed with evils so considerable and grievous, could never have been called happy, if the men who give it this name had condescended to yield to the truth, and to be conquered by valid arguments, when they inquired after the happy life, as they yield to unhappiness, and are overcome by overwhelming evils, when they put themselves to death, and if they had not fancied that the supreme good was to be found in this mortal life; for the very virtues of this life, which are certainly its best and most useful possessions, are all the more telling proofs of its miseries in proportion as they are helpful against the violence of its dangers, toils, and woes. For if these are true virtues,-and such cannot exist save in those who have true piety,-they do not profess to be able to deliver the men who possess them from all miseries; for true virtues tell no such lies, but they profess that by the hope of the future world this life, which is miserably involved in the many and great evils of this world, is happy as it is also safe. For if not yet safe, how could it be happy? And therefore the Apostle Paul, speaking not of men without prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, but of those whose lives were regulated by true piety, and whose virtues were therefore true, says, "For we are saved by hope: now hope which is seen is not hope; for what a man sees, why does he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it." Romans 8:24 As, therefore, we are saved, so we are made happy by hope. And as we do not as yet possess a present, but look for a future salvation, so is it with our happiness, and this "with patience;" for we are encompassed with evils, which we ought patiently to endure, until we come to the ineffable enjoyment of unmixed good; for there shall be no longer anything to endure. Salvation, such as it shall be in the world to come, shall itself be our final happiness. And this happiness these philosophers refuse to believe in, because they do not see it, and attempt to fabricate for themselves a happiness in this life, based upon a virtue which is as deceitful as it is proud.
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||<div id="c5"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [V] Quod autem socialem vitam volunt esse sapientis, nos multo amplius adprobamus. Nam unde ista Dei civitas, de qua huius operis ecce iam undevicensimum librum versamus in manibus, vel inchoaretur exortu vel progrederetur excursu vel adprehenderet debitos fines, si non esset socialis vita sanctorum? Sed in huius mortalitatis aerumna quot et quantis abundet malis humana societas, quis enumerare valeat? quis aestimare sufficiat? Audiant apud comicos suos hominem cum sensu atque consensu omnium hominum dicere: Duxi uxorem; quam ibi miseriam vidi! Nati filii, Alia cura. Quid itidem illa , quae in amore vitia commemorat idem Terentius, "iniuriae suspiciones, inimicitiae bellum, pax rursum": nonne res humanas ubique impleuerunt? nonne et in amicorum honestis amoribus plerumque contingunt? nonne his usque quaque plenae sunt res humanae, ubi iniurias suspiciones, inimicitias bellum mala certa sentimus; pacem vero incertum bonum, quoniam corda eorum, cum quibus eam tenere volumus, ignoramus, et si hodie nosse possemus, qualia cras futura essent utique nesciremus. Qui porro inter se amiciores solent esse vel debent, quam qui una etiam continentur domo? Et tamen quis inde securus est, cum tanta saepe mala ex eorum occultis insidiis extiterint, tanto amariora, quanto pax dulcior fuit, quae vera putata est, cum astutissime fingeretur? Propter quod omnium pectora sic adtingit, ut cogat in gemitum, quod ait Tullius: "Nullae sunt occultiores insidiae quam hae, quae latent in simulatione officii aut in aliquo necessitudinis nomine. Nam eum, qui palam est adversarius, facile cavendo vitare possis; hoc vero occultum intestinum ac domesticum malum non solum existit, verum etiam opprimit, antequam prospicere atque explorare potueris." Propter quod etiam divina vox illa: Et inimici hominis domestici eius cum magno dolore cordis auditur, quia, etsi quisque tam fortis sit, ut aequo animo perferat, vel tam vigilans, ut provido consilio caveat, quae adversus eum molitur amicitia simulata, eorum tamen hominum perfidorum malo, cum eos esse pessimos experitur, si ipse bonus est, graviter excrucietur necesse est, sive semper mali fuerint et se bonos finxerint, sive in istam malitiam ex bonitate mutati sint. Si ergo domus commune perfugium in his malis humani generis, tuta non est, quid civitas, quae quanto maior est, tanto forum eius litibus et civilibus et criminalibus plenius, etiamsi quiescant non solum turbulentae, verum saepius et cruentae seditiones ac bella civilia, a quorum euentis sunt aliquando liberae civitates, a periculis numquam? ||We give a much more unlimited approval to their idea that the life of the wise man must be social. For how could the city of God (concerning which we are already writing no less than the nineteenth book of this work) either take a beginning or be developed, or attain its proper destiny, if the life of the saints were not a social life? But who can enumerate all the great grievances with which human society abounds in the misery of this mortal state? Who can weigh them? Hear how one of their comic writers makes one of his characters express the common feelings of all men in this matter: "I am married; this is one misery. Children are born to me; they are additional cares." What shall I say of the miseries of love which Terence also recounts-"slights, suspicions, quarrels, war today, peace tomorrow?" Is not human life full of such things? Do they not often occur even in honorable friendships? On all hands we experience these slights, suspicions, quarrels, war, all of which are undoubted evils; while, on the other hand, peace is a doubtful good, because we do not know the heart of our friend, and though we did know it today, we should be as ignorant of what it might be tomorrow. Who ought to be, or who are more friendly than those who live in the same family? And yet who can rely even upon this friendship, seeing that secret treachery has often broken it up, and produced enmity as bitter as the amity was sweet, or seemed sweet by the most perfect dissimulation? It is on this account that the words of Cicero so move the heart of every one, and provoke a sigh: "There are no snares more dangerous than those which lurk under the guise of duty or the name of relationship. For the man who is your declared foe you can easily baffle by precaution; but this hidden, intestine, and domestic danger not merely exists, but overwhelms you before you can foresee and examine it." It is also to this that allusion is made by the divine saying, "A man's foes are those of his own household," Matthew 10:36 -words which one cannot hear without pain; for though a man have sufficient fortitude to endure it with equanimity, and sufficient sagacity to baffle the malice of a pretended friend, yet if he himself is a good man, he cannot but be greatly pained at the discovery of the perfidy of wicked men, whether they have always been wicked and merely feigned goodness, or have fallen from a better to a malicious disposition. If, then, home, the natural refuge from the ills of life, is itself not safe, what shall we say of the city, which, as it is larger, is so much the more filled with lawsuits civil and criminal, and is never free from the fear, if sometimes from the actual outbreak, of disturbing and bloody insurrections and civil wars?
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||<div id="c6"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [VI] Quid ipsa iudicia hominum de hominibus, quae civitatibus in quantalibet pace manentibus deesse non possunt, qualia putamus esse, quam misera, quam dolenda? Quando quidem hi iudicant, qui conscientias eorum, de quibus iudicant, cernere nequeunt. Vnde saepe coguntur tormentis innocentium testium ad alienam causam pertinentem quaerere veritatem. Quid cum in sua causa quisque torquetur et, cum quaeritur utrum sit nocens, cruciatur et innocens luit pro incerto scelere certissimas poenas, non quia illud commisisse detegitur, sed quia non commisisse nescitur? Ac per hoc ignorantia iudicis plerumque est calamitas innocentis. Et quod est intolerabilius magisque plangendum rigandumque, si fieri possit, fontibus lacrimarum, cum propterea iudex torqueat accusatum, ne occidat nesciens innocentem, fit per ignorantiae miseriam, ut et tortum et innocentem occidat, quem ne innocentem occideret torserat. Si enim secundum istorum sapientiam elegerit ex hac vita fugere quam diutius illa sustinere tormenta: quod non commisit, commisisse se dicit. Quo damnato et occiso, utrum nocentem an innocentem iudex occiderit, adhuc nescit, quem ne innocentem nesciens occideret torsit; ac per hoc innocentem et ut sciret torsit, et dum nesciret occidit. In his tenebris vitae socialis sedebit iudex ille sapiens an non audebit? Sedebit plane. Constringit enim eum et ad hoc officium pertrahit humana societas, quam deserere nefas ducit. Hoc enim nefas esse non ducit, quod testes innocentes in causis torquentur alienis; quod hi, qui arguuntur, vi doloris plerumque superati et de se falsa confessi etiam puniuntur innocentes, cum iam torti fuerint innocentes; quod, etsi non morte puniantur, in ipsis vel ex ipsis tormentis plerumque moriuntur; quod aliquando et ipsi, qui arguunt, humanae societati fortasse, ne crimina inpunita sint, prodesse cupientes et mentientibus testibus reoque ipso contra tormenta durante inmaniter nec fatente probare quod obiciunt non valentes, quamuis vera obiecerint, a iudice nesciente damnantur. Haec tot et tanta mala non deputat esse peccata; non enim haec facit sapiens iudex nocendi voluntate, sed necessitate nesciendi, et tamen, quia cogit humana societas, necessitate etiam iudicandi. Haec est ergo quam dicimus miseria certe hominis, etsi non malitia sapientis. An vero necessitate nesciendi atque iudicandi torquet insontes, punit insontes, et parum est illi, quod non est reus, si non sit insuper et beatus? Quanto consideratius et homine dignius agnoscit in ista necessitate miseriam eamque odit in se et, si pie sapit, clamat ad Deum: De necessitatibus meis erue me! ||What shall I say of these judgments which men pronounce on men, and which are necessary in communities, whatever outward peace they enjoy? Melancholy and lamentable judgments they are, since the judges are men who cannot discern the consciences of those at their bar, and are therefore frequently compelled to put innocent witnesses to the torture to ascertain the truth regarding the crimes of other men. What shall I say of torture applied to the accused himself? He is tortured to discover whether he is guilty, so that, though innocent, he suffers most undoubted punishment for crime that is still doubtful, not because it is proved that he committed it, but because it is not ascertained that he did not commit it. Thus the ignorance of the judge frequently involves an innocent person in suffering. And what is still more unendurable-a thing, indeed, to be bewailed, and, if that were possible, watered with fountains of tears-is this, that when the judge puts the accused to the question, that he may not unwittingly put an innocent man to death, the result of this lamentable ignorance is that this very person, whom he tortured that he might not condemn him if innocent, is condemned to death both tortured and innocent. For if he has chosen, in obedience to the philosophical instructions to the wise man, to quit this life rather than endure any longer such tortures, he declares that he has committed the crime which in fact he has not committed. And when he has been condemned and put to death, the judge is still in ignorance whether he has put to death an innocent or a guilty person, though he put the accused to the torture for the very purpose of saving himself from condemning the innocent; and consequently he has both tortured an innocent man to discover his innocence, and has put him to death without discovering it. If such darkness shrouds social life, will a wise judge take his seat on the bench or no? Beyond question he will. For human society, which he thinks it a wickedness to abandon, constrains him and compels him to this duty. And he thinks it no wickedness that innocent witnesses are tortured regarding the crimes of which other men are accused; or that the accused are put to the torture, so that they are often overcome with anguish, and, though innocent, make false confessions regarding themselves, and are punished; or that, though they be not condemned to die, they often die during, or in consequence of, the torture; or that sometimes the accusers, who perhaps have been prompted by a desire to benefit society by bringing criminals to justice, are themselves condemned through the ignorance of the judge, because they are unable to prove the truth of their accusations though they are true, and because the witnesses lie, and the accused endures the torture without being moved to confession. These numerous and important evils he does not consider sins; for the wise judge does these things, not with any intention of doing harm, but because his ignorance compels him, and because human society claims him as a judge. But though we therefore acquit the judge of malice, we must none the less condemn human life as miserable. And if he is compelled to torture and punish the innocent because his office and his ignorance constrain him, is he a happy as well as a guiltless man? Surely it were proof of more profound considerateness and finer feeling were he to recognize the misery of these necessities, and shrink from his own implication in that misery; and had he any piety about him, he would cry to God "From my necessities deliver Thou me."
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||<div id="c7"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [VII] Post civitatem vel urbem sequitur orbis terrae, in quo tertium gradum ponunt societatis humanae, incipientes a domo atque inde ad urbem, deinde ad orbem progrediendo venientes; qui utique, sicut aquarum congeries, quanto maior est, tanto periculis plenior. In quo primum linguarum diversitas hominem alienat ab homine. Nam si duo sibimet inuicem fiant obuiam neque praeterire, sed simul esse aliqua necessitate cogantur, quorum neuter linguam novit alterius: facilius sibi muta animalia, etiam diversi generis, quam illi, cum sint homines ambo, sociantur. Quando enim quae sentiunt inter se communicare non possunt, propter solam diversitatem linguae nihil prodest ad consociandos homines tanta similitudo naturae, ita ut libentius homo sit cum cane suo quam cum homine alieno. At enim opera data est, ut imperiosa civitas non solum iugum, verum etiam linguam suam domitis gentibus per pacem societatis inponeret, per quam non deesset, immo et abundaret etiam interpretum copia. Verum est; sed hoc quam multis et quam grandibus bellis, quanta strage hominum, quanta effusione humani sanguinis comparatum est? Quibus transactis, non est tamen eorundem malorum finita miseria. Quamuis enim non defuerint neque desint hostes exterae nationes, contra quas semper bella gesta sunt et geruntur: tamen etiam ipsa imperii latitudo peperit peioris generis bella, socialia scilicet et civilia, quibus miserabilius quatitur humanum genus, sive cum belligeratur, ut aliquando conquiescant, sive cum timetur, ne rursus exsurgant. Quorum malorum multas et multiplices clades, duras et diras necessitates si ut dignum est eloqui velim, quamquam nequaquam sicut res postulat possim: quis erit prolixae disputationis modus? Sed sapiens, inquiunt, iusta bella gesturus est. Quasi non, si se hominem meminit, multo magis dolebit iustorum necessitatem sibi extitisse bellorum, quia nisi iusta essent, ei gerenda non essent, ac per hoc sapienti nulla bella essent. Iniquitas enim partis adversae iusta bella ingerit gerenda sapienti; quae iniquitas utique homini est dolenda, quia hominum est, etsi nulla ex ea bellandi necessitas nasceretur. Haec itaque mala tam magna, tam horrenda, tam saeua quisquis cum dolore considerat, miseriam fateatur; quisquis autem vel patitur ea sine animi dolore vel cogitat, multo utique miserius ideo se putat beatum, quia et humanum perdidit sensum. ||After the state or city comes the world, the third circle of human society,-the first being the house, and the second the city. And the world, as it is larger, so it is fuller of dangers, as the greater sea is the more dangerous. And here, in the first place, man is separated from man by the difference of languages. For if two men, each ignorant of the other's language, meet, and are not compelled to pass, but, on the contrary, to remain in company, dumb animals, though of different species, would more easily hold intercourse than they, human beings though they be. For their common nature is no help to friendliness when they are prevented by diversity of language from conveying their sentiments to one another; so that a man would more readily hold intercourse with his dog than with a foreigner. But the imperial city has endeavored to impose on subject nations not only her yoke, but her language, as a bond of peace, so that interpreters, far from being scarce, are numberless. This is true; but how many great wars, how much slaughter and bloodshed, have provided this unity! And though these are past, the end of these miseries has not yet come. For though there have never been wanting, nor are yet wanting, hostile nations beyond the empire, against whom wars have been and are waged, yet, supposing there were no such nations, the very extent of the empire itself has produced wars of a more obnoxious description-social and civil wars-and with these the whole race has been agitated, either by the actual conflict or the fear of a renewed outbreak. If I attempted to give an adequate description of these manifold disasters, these stern and lasting necessities, though I am quite unequal to the task, what limit could I set? But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. For it is the wrongdoing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrong-doing, even though it gave rise to no war, would still be matter of grief to man because it is man's wrong-doing. Let every one, then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery. And if any one either endures or thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more miserable plight still, for he thinks himself happy because he has lost human feeling.
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||<div id="c8"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [VIII] Si autem non contingat quaedam ignorantia similis dementiae, quae tamen in huius vitae misera condicione saepe contingit, ut credatur vel amicus esse, qui inimicus est, vel Inimicus, qui amicus est: quid nos consolatur in hac humana societate erroribus aerumnisque plenissima nisi fides non ficta et mutua dilectio verorum et bonorum amicorum? Quos quanto plures et in locis pluribus habemus, tanto longius latiusque metuimus, ne quid eis contingat mali de tantis malorum aggeribus huius saeculi. Non enim tantummodo solliciti sumus, ne fame, ne bellis, ne morbis, ne captivitatibus affligantur, ne in eadem seruitute talia patiantur, qualia nec cogitare sufficimus; verum etiam, ubi timor est multo amarior, ne in perfidiam malitiam nequitiamque mutentur. Et quando ista contingunt (tanto utique plura, quanto illi sunt plures) et in nostram notitiam perferuntur, quibus cor nostrum flagris uratur, quis potest, nisi qui talia sentit, advertere? Mortuos quippe audire mallemus, quamuis et hoc sine dolore non possimus audire. Quorum enim nos vita propter amicitiae solacia delectabat, unde fieri potest, ut eorum mors nullam nobis ingerat maestitudinem? Quam qui prohibet, prohibeat, si potest, amica conloquia, interdicat amicalem vel intercidat affectum, humanarum omnium necessitudinum vincula mentis inmiti stupore disrumpat aut sic eis utendum censeat, ut nulla ex eis animum dulcedo perfundat. Quod si fieri nullo modo potest, etiam hoc quo pacto futurum est, ut eius nobis amara mors non sit, cuius dulcis est vita? Hinc enim est et luctus quoddam non inhumani cordis quasi uulnus aut ulcus, cui sanando adhibentur officiosae consolationes. Non enim propterea non est quod sanetur, quoniam quanto est animus melior, tanto in eo citius faciliusque sanatur. Cum igitur etiam de carissimorum mortibus, maxime quorum sunt humanae societati officia necessaria, nunc mitius, nunc asperius affligatur vita mortalium: mortuos tamen eos, quos diligimus, quam vel a fide vel a bonis moribus lapsos, hoc est in ipsa anima mortuos, audire seu videre mallemus. Qua ingenti materia malorum plena est terra, propter quod scriptum est: Numquid non temptatio est vita humana super terram? et propter quod ipse Dominus ait: Vae mundo ab scandalis, et iterum: Quoniam abundavit, inquit, iniquitas, refrigescet caritas multorum. Ex quo fit, ut bonis amicis mortuis gratulemur et, cum mors eorum nos contristet, ipsa nos certius consoletur, quoniam caruerunt malis, quibus in hac vita etiam boni homines vel conteruntur vel deprauantur vel in utroque periclitantur. ||In our present wretched condition we frequently mistake a friend for an enemy, and an enemy for a friend. And if we escape this pitiable blindness, is not the unfeigned confidence and mutual love of true and good friends our one solace in human society, filled as it is with misunderstandings and calamities? And yet the more friends we have, and the more widely they are scattered, the more numerous are our fears that some portion of the vast masses of the disasters of life may light upon them. For we are not only anxious lest they suffer from famine, war, disease, captivity, or the inconceivable horrors of slavery, but we are also affected with the much more painful dread that their friendship may be changed into perfidy, malice, and injustice. And when these contingencies actually occur,-as they do the more frequently the more friends we have, and the more widely they are scattered,-and when they come to our knowledge, who but the man who has experienced it can tell with what pangs the heart is torn? We would, in fact, prefer to hear that they were dead, although we could not without anguish hear of even this. For if their life has solaced us with the charms of friendship, can it be that their death should affect us with no sadness? He who will have none of this sadness must, if possible, have no friendly intercourse. Let him interdict or extinguish friendly affection; let him burst with ruthless insensibility the bonds of every human relationship; or let him contrive so to use them that no sweetness shall distil into his spirit. But if this is utterly impossible, how shall we contrive to feel no bitterness in the death of those whose life has been sweet to us? Hence arises that grief which affects the tender heart like a wound or a bruise, and which is healed by the application of kindly consolation. For though the cure is affected all the more easily and rapidly the better condition the soul is in, we must not on this account suppose that there is nothing at all to heal. Although, then, our present life is afflicted, sometimes in a milder, sometimes in a more painful degree, by the death of those very dear to us, and especially of useful public men, yet we would prefer to hear that such men were dead rather than to hear or perceive that they had fallen from the faith, or from virtue,-in other words, that they were spiritually dead. Of this vast material for misery the earth is full, and therefore it is written, "Is not human life upon earth a trial?" Job 7:1 And with the same reference the Lord says, "Woe to the world because of offenses!" Matthew 17:7 and again, "Because iniquity abounded, the love of many shall wax cold." Matthew 24:12 And hence we enjoy some gratification when our good friends die; for though their death leaves us in sorrow, we have the consolatory assurance that they are beyond the ills by which in this life even the best of men are broken down or corrupted, or are in danger of both results.
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||<div id="c9"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [IX] In societate vero sanctorum angelorum, quam philosophi illi, qui nobis deos amicos esse voluerunt, quarto constituerunt loco, velut ad mundum venientes ab orbe terrarum, ut sic quodam modo complecterentur et caelum, nullo modo quidem metuimus, ne tales amici vel morte nos sua vel deprauatione contristent. Sed quia nobis non ea, qua homines, familiaritate miscentur (quod etiam ipsum ad aerumnas huius pertinet vitae) et aliquando Satanas, sicut legimus, transfigurat se velut angelum lucis ad temptandos eos, quos ita vel erudiri opus est vel decipi iustum est: magna Dei misericordia necessaria est, ne quisquam, cum bonos angelos amicos se habere putat, habeat malos daemones fictos amicos, eosque tanto nocentiores, quanto astutiores ac fallaciores, patiatur inimicos. Et cui magna ista Dei misericordia necessaria est nisi magnae humanae miseriae, quae ignorantia tanta premitur, ut facile istorum simulatione fallatur? Et illos quidem philosophos in impia civitate, qui deos sibi amicos esse dixerunt, in daemones malignos incidisse certissimum est, quibus tota ipsa civitas subditur, aeternum cum eis habitura supplicium. Ex eorum quippe sacris vel potius sacrilegiis, quibus eos colendos, et ex ludis inmundissimis, ubi eorum crimina celebrantur, quibus eos placandos putarunt eisdem ipsis auctoribus et exactoribus talium tantorumque dedecorum, satis ab eis qui colantur apertum est. ||The philosophers who wished us to have the gods for our friends rank the friendship of the holy angels in the fourth circle of society, advancing now from the three circles of society on earth to the universe, and embracing heaven itself. And in this friendship we have indeed no fear that the angels will grieve us by their death or deterioration. But as we cannot mingle with them as familiarly as with men (which itself is one of the grievances of this life), and as Satan, as we read, 2 Corinthians 11:14 sometimes transforms himself into an angel of light, to tempt those whom it is necessary to discipline, or just to deceive, there is great need of God's mercy to preserve us from making friends of demons in disguise, while we fancy we have good angels for our friends; for the astuteness and deceitfulness of these wicked spirits is equalled by their hurtfulness. And is this not a great misery of human life, that we are involved in such ignorance as, but for God's mercy, makes us a prey to these demons? And it is very certain that the philosophers of the godless city, who have maintained that the gods were their friends, had fallen a prey to the malignant demons who rule that city, and whose eternal punishment is to be shared by it. For the nature of these beings is sufficiently evinced by the sacred or rather sacrilegious observances which form their worship, and by the filthy games in which their crimes are celebrated, and which they themselves originated and exacted from their worshippers as a fit propitiation.
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||<div id="c10"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [X] Sed neque sancti et fideles unius veri Dei summique cultores ab eorum fallaciis et multiformi temptatione securi sunt. In hoc enim loco infirmitatis et diebus malignis etiam ista sollicitudo non est inutilis, ut illa securitas, ubi pax plenissima atque certissima est, desiderio feruentiore quaeratur. Ibi enim erunt naturae munera, hoc est, quae naturae nostrae ab omnium naturarum creatore donantur, non solum bona, verum etiam sempiterna, non solum in animo, qui sanatur per sapientiam, verum etiam in corpore, quod resurrectione renouabitur; ibi virtutes, non contra ulla vitia vel mala quaecumque certantes, sed habentes victoriae praemium aeternam pacem, quam nullus adversarius inquietet. Ipsa est enim beatitudo finalis, ipse perfectionis finis, qui consumentem non habet finem. Hic autem dicimur quidem beati, quando pacem habemus, quantulacumque hic haberi potest in vita bona; sed haec beatitudo illi, quam finalem dicimus, beatitudini comparata prorsus miseria reperitur. Hanc ergo pacem, qualis hic potest esse, mortales homines in rebus mortalibus quando habemus, si recte vivimus, bonis eius recte utitur virtus; quando vero eam non habemus, etiam malis, quae homo patitur, bene utitur virtus. Sed tunc est vera virtus, quando et omnia bona, quibus bene utitur, et quidquid in bono usu bonorum et malorum facit, et se ipsam ad eum finem refert, ubi nobis talis et tanta pax erit, qua melior et maior esse non possit. ||But not even the saints and faithful worshippers of the one true and most high God are safe from the manifold temptations and deceits of the demons. For in this abode of weakness, and in these wicked days, this state of anxiety has also its use, stimulating us to seek with keener longing for that security where peace is complete and unassailable. There we shall enjoy the gifts of nature, that is to say, all that God the Creator of all natures has bestowed upon ours,-gifts not only good, but eternal,-not only of the spirit, healed now by wisdom, but also of the body renewed by the resurrection. There the virtues shall no longer be struggling against any vice or evil, but shall enjoy the reward of victory, the eternal peace which no adversary shall disturb. This is the final blessedness, this the ultimate consummation, the unending end. Here, indeed, we are said to be blessed when we have such peace as can be enjoyed in a good life; but such blessedness is mere misery compared to that final felicity. When we mortals possess such peace as this mortal life can afford, virtue, if we are living rightly, makes a right use of the advantages of this peaceful condition; and when we have it not, virtue makes a good use even of the evils a man suffers. But this is true virtue, when it refers all the advantages it makes a good use of, and all that it does in making good use of good and evil things, and itself also, to that end in which we shall enjoy the best and greatest peace possible.
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||<div id="c11"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XI] Quapropter possemus dicere fines bonorum nostrorum esse pacem, sicut aeternam diximus vitam, praesertim quia ipsi civitati Dei, de qua nobis est ista operosissima disputatio, in sancto dicitur psalmo: Lauda Hierusalem Dominum, conlauda Deum tuum Sion. quoniam confirmavit seras portarum tuarum, benedixit filios tuos in te, qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Quando enim confirmatae fuerint serae portarum eius, iam in illam nullus intrabit nec ab illa ullus exibit. Ac per hoc fines eius eam debemus hic intellegere pacem, quam volumus demonstrare finalem. Nam et ipsius civitatis mysticum nomen, id est Hierusalem, quod et ante iam diximus, visio pacis interpretatur. Sed quoniam pacis nomen etiam in his rebus mortalibus frequentatur, ubi utique non est vita aeterna, propterea finem civitatis huius, ubi erit summum bonum eius, aeternam vitam maluimus commemorare quam pacem. De quo fine apostolus ait: Nunc vero liberati a peccato, serui autem facti Deo, habetis fructum uestrum in sanctificationem, finem vero vitam aeternam. Sed rursus quia vita aeterna ab eis, qui familiaritatem non habent cum scripturis sanctis, potest accipi etiam malorum vita, vel secundum quosdam etiam philosophos propter animae inmortalitatem vel secundum etiam fidem nostram propter poenas interminabiles impiorum, qui utique in aeternum cruciari non poterunt, nisi etiam vixerint in aeternum: profecto finis civitatis huius, in quo summum habebit bonum, vel pax in vita aeterna vel vita aeterna in pace dicendus est, ut facilius ab omnibus possit intellegi. Tantum est enim pacis bonum, ut etiam in rebus terrenis atque mortalibus nihil gratius soleat audiri, nihil desiderabilius concupisci, nihil postremo possit melius inveniri. De quo si aliquanto diutius loqui voluerimus, non erimus, quantum arbitror, onerosi legentibus, et propter finem civitatis huius, de qua nobis sermo est, et propter ipsam dulcedinem pacis, quae omnibus cara est. ||And thus we may say of peace, as we have said of eternal life, that it is the end of our good; and the rather because the Psalmist says of the city of God, the subject of this laborious work, "Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem; praise your God, O Zion: for He has strengthened the bars of your gates; He has blessed your children within you; who has made your borders peace." For when the bars of her gates shall be strengthened, none shall go in or come out from her; consequently we ought to understand the peace of her borders as that final peace we are wishing to declare. For even the mystical name of the city itself, that is, Jerusalem, means, as I have already said, "Vision of Peace." But as the word peace is employed in connection with things in this world in which certainly life eternal has no place, we have preferred to call the end or supreme good of this city life eternal rather than peace. Of this end the apostle says, "But now, being freed from sin, and become servants to God, you have your fruit unto holiness, and the end life eternal." Romans 6:22 But, on the other hand, as those who are not familiar with Scripture may suppose that the life of the wicked is eternal life, either because of the immortality of the soul, which some of the philosophers even have recognized, or because of the endless punishment of the wicked, which forms a part of our faith, and which seems impossible unless the wicked live for ever, it may therefore be advisable, in order that every one may readily understand what we mean, to say that the end or supreme good of this city is either peace in eternal life, or eternal life in peace. For peace is a good so great, that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying. So that if we dwell for a little longer on this subject, we shall not, in my opinion, be wearisome to our readers, who will attend both for the sake of understanding what is the end of this city of which we speak, and for the sake of the sweetness of peace which is dear to all.
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||<div id="c12"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XII] Quod mecum quisquis res humanas naturamque communem utcumque intuetur agnoscit; sicut enim nemo est qui gaudere nolit, ita nemo est qui pacem habere nolit. Quando quidem et ipsi, qui bella volunt, nihil aliud quam vincere volunt; ad gloriosam ergo pacem bellando cupiunt pervenire. Nam quid est aliud victoria nisi subiectio repugnantium? quod cum factum fuerit, pax erit. Pacis igitur intentione geruntur et bella, ab his etiam, qui virtutem bellicam student exercere imperando atque pugnando. Vnde pacem constat belli esse optabilem finem. Omnis enim homo etiam belligerando pacem requirit; nemo autem bellum pacificando. Nam et illi qui pacem, in qua sunt, perturbari volunt, non pacem oderunt, sed eam pro arbitrio suo cupiunt commutari. Non ergo ut sit pax nolunt, sed ut ea sit quam volunt. Denique etsi per seditionem se ab aliis separaverint, cum eis ipsis conspiratis vel coniuratis suis nisi qualemcumque speciem pacis teneant, non efficiunt quod intendunt. Proinde latrones ipsi, ut uehementius et tutius infesti sint paci ceterorum, pacem volunt habere sociorum. Sed etsi unus sit tam praepollens viribus et conscios ita cavens, ut nulli socio se committat solusque insidians et praeualens quibus potuerit oppressis et extinctis praedas agat, cum eis certe, quos occidere non potest et quos uult latere quod facit, qualemcumque umbram pacis tenet. In domo autem sua cum uxore et cum filiis, et si quos alios illic habet, studet profecto esse pacatus; eis quippe ad nutum obtemperantibus sine dubio delectatur. Nam si non fiat, indignatur corripit vindicat et domus suae pacem, si ita necesse sit, etiam saeviendo componit, quam sentit esse non posse, nisi cuidam principio, quod ipse in domo sua est, cetera in eadem domestica societate subiecta sint. Ideoque si offerretur ei seruitus plurium, vel civitatis vel gentis, ita ut sic ei seruirent, quem ad modum sibi domi suae seruiri volebat: non se iam latronem latebris conderet, sed regem conspicuum sublimaret, cum eadem in illo cupiditas et malitia permaneret. Pacem itaque cum suis omnes habere cupiunt, quos ad arbitrium suum volunt vivere. Nam et cum quibus bellum gerunt, suos facere, si possint, volunt eisque subiectis leges suae pacis inponere. Sed faciamus aliquem, qualem canit poetica et fabulosa narratio, quem fortasse propter ipsam insociabilem feritatem semihominem quam hominem dicere maluerunt. Quamuis ergo huius regnum dirae speluncae fuerit solitudo tamque malitia singularis, ut ex hac ei nomen inventum sit (Graece namque malus *kako\s dicitur, quod ille vocabatur), nulla coniux ei blandum ferret referretque sermonem, nullis filiis vel adluderet paruulis vel grandiusculis imperaret, nullo amici conloquio frueretur, nec Vulcani patris, quo vel hinc tantum non parum felicior fuit, quia tale monstrum ipse non genuit; nihil cuiquam daret, sed a quo posset quidquid vellet et quando posset quem vellet auferret: tamen in ipsa sua spelunca solitaria, cuius, ut describitur, semper recenti caede tepebat humus, nihil aliud quam pacem volebat, in qua nemo illi molestus esset, nec eius quietem vis ullius terrorue turbaret. Cum corpore denique suo pacem habere cupiebat, et quantum habebat, tantum bene illi erat. Quando quidem membris obtemperantibus imperabat, et ut suam mortalitatem adversum se ex indigentia rebellantem ac seditionem famis ad dissociandam atque excludendam de corpore animam concitantem quanta posset festinatione pacaret, rapiebat necabat vorabat et quamuis inmanis ac ferus paci tamen suae vitae ac salutis inmaniter ac ferociter consulebat; ac per hoc si pacem, quam in sua spelunca atque in se ipso habere satis agebat, etiam cum aliis habere vellet, nec malus nec monstrum nec semihomo vocaretur. Aut si eius corporis forma et atrorum ignium vomitus ab eo deterrebat hominum societatem, forte non nocendi cupiditate, sed vivendi necessitate saeviebat. Verum iste non fuerit vel, quod magis credendum est, non talis fuerit, qualis poetica uanitate describitur; nisi enim nimis accusaretur Cacus, parum Hercules laudaretur. Talis ergo homo sive semihomo melius, ut dixi, creditur non fuisse, sicut multa figmenta poetarum. Ipsae enim saevissimae ferae, unde ille partem habuit feritatis (nam et semiferus dictus est), genus proprium quadam pace custodiunt coeundo gignendo pariendo, fetus fovendo atque nutriendo, cum sint pleraeque insociabiles et solivagae; non scilicet ut oves cerui columbae sturni apes, sed ut leones <lupi> uulpes aquilae noctuae. Quae enim tigris non filiis suis mitis inmurmurat et pacata feritate blanditur? Quis miluus, quantumlibet solitarius rapinis circumuolet, non coniugium copulat, nidum congerit, oua confovet, pullos alit et quasi cum sua matre familias societatem domesticam quanta potest pace conservat? Quanto magis homo fertur quodam modo naturae suae legibus ad ineundam societatem pacemque cum hominibus, quantum in ipso est, omnibus obtinendam, cum etiam mali pro suorum pace belligerent omnesque, si possint, suos facere velint, ut uni cuncti et cuncta deseruiant; quo pacto, nisi in eius pacem vel amando vel timendo consentiant? Sic enim superbia peruerse imitatur Deum. Odit namque cum sociis aequalitatem sub illo, sed inponere uult sociis dominationem suam pro illo. Odit ergo iustam pacem Dei et amat iniquam pacem suam. Non amare tamen qualemcumque pacem nullo modo potest. Nullius quippe vitium ita contra naturam est, ut naturae deleat etiam extrema uestigia. Itaque pacem iniquorum in pacis comparatione iustorum ille videt nec pacem esse dicendam, qui novit praeponere recta pravis et ordinata peruersis. Quod autem peruersum est, etiam hoc necesse est ut in aliqua et ex aliqua et cum aliqua rerum parte pacatum sit, in quibus est vel ex quibus constat; alioquin nihil esset omnino. Velut si quisquam capite deorsum pendeat, peruersus est utique situs corporis et ordo membrorum, quia id, quod desuper esse natura postulat, subter est, et quod illa subter uult esse, desuper factum est; conturbavit carnis pacem ista peruersitas et ideo molesta est: verum tamen anima corpori suo pacata est et pro eius salute satagit, et ideo est qui doleat; quae si molestiis eius exclusa discesserit, quamdiu compago membrorum manet, non est sine quadam partium pace quod remanet, et ideo est adhuc qui pendeat. Et quod terrenum corpus in terram nititur et vinculo quo suspensum est renititur, in suae pacis ordinem tendit et locum quo requiescat quodam modo voce ponderis poscit, iamque exanime ac sine ullo sensu a pace tamen naturali sui ordinis non recedit, vel cum tenet eam, vel cum fertur ad eam. Si enim adhibeantur medicamenta atque curatio, quae formam cadaveris dissolvi dilabique non sinat, adhuc pax quaedam partes partibus iungit totamque molem adplicat terreno et convenienti ac per hoc pacato loco. Si autem nulla adhibeatur cura condendi, sed naturali cursui relinquatur, tamdiu quasi tumultuatur dissidentibus exhalationibus et nostro inconvenientibus sensui (id enim est quod in putore sentitur), donec mundi conveniat elementis et in eorum pacem paulatim particulatimque discedat. Nullo modo tamen inde aliquid legibus summi illius creatoris ordinatorisque subtrahitur, a quo pax universitatis administratur; quia, etsi de cadavere maioris animantis animalia minuta nascantur, eadem lege creatoris quaeque corpuscula in salutis pace suis animulis seruiunt; etsi mortuorum carnes ab aliis animalibus deuorentur, easdem leges per cuncta diffusas ad salutem generis cuiusque mortalium congrua congruis pacificantes, quaqua versum trahantur et rebus quibuscumque iungantur et in res quaslibet convertantur et commutentur, inveniunt. ||Whoever gives even moderate attention to human affairs and to our common nature, will recognize that if there is no man who does not wish to be joyful, neither is there any one who does not wish to have peace. For even they who make war desire nothing but victory,-desire, that is to say, to attain to peace with glory. For what else is victory than the conquest of those who resist us? and when this is done there is peace. It is therefore with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for by war. For every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by making peace. For even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed into a peace that suits them better. They do not, therefore, wish to have no peace, but only one more to their mind. And in the case of sedition, when men have separated themselves from the community, they yet do not effect what they wish, unless they maintain some kind of peace with their fellow-conspirators. And therefore even robbers take care to maintain peace with their comrades, that they may with greater effect and greater safety invade the peace of other men. And if an individual happen to be of such unrivalled strength, and to be so jealous of partnership, that he trusts himself with no comrades, but makes his own plots, and commits depredations and murders on his own account, yet he maintains some shadow of peace with such persons as he is unable to kill, and from whom he wishes to conceal his deeds. In his own home, too, he makes it his aim to be at peace with his wife and children, and any other members of his household; for unquestionably their prompt obedience to his every look is a source of pleasure to him. And if this be not rendered, he is angry, he chides and punishes; and even by this storm he secures the calm peace of his own home, as occasion demands. For he sees that peace cannot be maintained unless all the members of the same domestic circle be subject to one head, such as he himself is in his own house. And therefore if a city or nation offered to submit itself to him, to serve him in the same style as he had made his household serve him, he would no longer lurk in a brigand's hiding-places, but lift his head in open day as a king, though the same coveteousness and wicked ness should remain in him. And thus all men desire to have peace with their own circle whom they wish to govern as suits themselves. For even those whom they make war against they wish to make their own, and impose on them the laws of their own peace.But let us suppose a man such as poetry and mythology speak of,-a man so insociable and savage as to be called rather a semi-man than a man. Although, then, his kingdom was the solitude of a dreary cave, and he himself was so singularly bad-hearted that he was named ?a???, which is the Greek word for bad; though he had no wife to soothe him with endearing talk, no children to play with, no sons to do his bidding, no friend to enliven him with intercourse, not even his father Vulcan (though in one respect he was happier than his father, not having begotten a monster like himself); although he gave to no man, but took as he wished whatever he could, from whomsoever he could, when he could yet in that solitary den, the floor of which, as Virgil says, was always reeking with recent slaughter, there was nothing else than peace sought, a peace in which no one should molest him, or disquiet him with any assault or alarm. With his own body he desired to be at peace, and he was satisfied only in proportion as he had this peace. For he ruled his members, and they obeyed him; and for the sake of pacifying his mortal nature, which rebelled when it needed anything, and of allaying the sedition of hunger which threatened to banish the soul from the body, he made forays, slew, and devoured, but used the ferocity and savageness he displayed in these actions only for the preservation of his own life's peace. So that, had he been willing to make with other men the same peace which he made with himself in his own cave, he would neither have been called bad, nor a monster, nor a semi-man. Or if the appearance of his body and his vomiting smoky fires frightened men from having any dealings with him, perhaps his fierce ways arose not from a desire to do mischief, but from the necessity of finding a living. But he may have had no existence, or, at least, he was not such as the poets fancifully describe him, for they had to exalt Hercules, and did so at the expense of Cacus. It is better, then, to believe that such a man or semi-man never existed, and that this, in common with many other fancies of the poets, is mere fiction. For the most savage animals (and he is said to have been almost a wild beast) encompass their own species with a ring of protecting peace. They cohabit, beget, produce, suckle, and bring up their young, though very many of them are not gregarious, but solitary,-not like sheep, deer, pigeons, starlings, bees, but such as lions, foxes, eagles, bats. For what tigress does not gently purr over her cubs, and lay aside her ferocity to fondle them? What kite, solitary as he is when circling over his prey, does not seek a mate, build a nest, hatch the eggs, bring up the young birds, and maintain with the mother of his family as peaceful a domestic alliance as he can? How much more powerfully do the laws of man's nature move him to hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men so far as in him lies, since even wicked men wage war to maintain the peace of their own circle, and wish that, if possible, all men belonged to them, that all men and things might serve but one head, and might, either through love or fear, yield themselves to peace with him! It is thus that pride in its perversity apes God. It abhors equality with other men under Him; but, instead of His rule, it seeks to impose a rule of its own upon its equals. It abhors, that is to say, the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust peace; but it cannot help loving peace of one kind or other. For there is no vice so clean contrary to nature that it obliterates even the faintest traces of nature.He, then, who prefers what is right to what is wrong, and what is well-ordered to what is perverted, sees that the peace of unjust men is not worthy to be called peace in comparison with the peace of the just. And yet even what is perverted must of necessity be in harmony with, and in dependence on, and in some part of the order of things, for otherwise it would have no existence at all. Suppose a man hangs with his head downwards, this is certainly a perverted attitude of body and arrangement of its members; for that which nature requires to be above is beneath, and vice versв. This perversity disturbs the peace of the body, and is therefore painful. Nevertheless the spirit is at peace with its body, and labors for its preservation, and hence the suffering; but if it is banished from the body by its pains, then, so long as the bodily framework holds together, there is in the remains a kind of peace among the members, and hence the body remains suspended. And inasmuch as the earthly body tends towards the earth, and rests on the bond by which it is suspended, it tends thus to its natural peace, and the voice of its own weight demands a place for it to rest; and though now lifeless and without feeling, it does not fall from the peace that is natural to its place in creation, whether it already has it, or is tending towards it. For if you apply embalming preparations to prevent the bodily frame from mouldering and dissolving, a kind of peace still unites part to part, and keeps the whole body in a suitable place on the earth,-in other words, in a place that is at peace with the body. If, on the other hand, the body receive no such care, but be left to the natural course, it is disturbed by exhalations that do not harmonize with one another, and that offend our senses; for it is this which is perceived in putrefaction until it is assimilated to the elements of the world, and particle by particle enters into peace with them. Yet throughout this process the laws of the most high Creator and Governor are strictly observed, for it is by Him the peace of the universe is administered. For although minute animals are produced from the carcass of a larger animal, all these little atoms, by the law of the same Creator, serve the animals they belong to in peace. And although the flesh of dead animals be eaten by others, no matter where it be carried, nor what it be brought into contact with, nor what it be converted and changed into, it still is ruled by the same laws which pervade all things for the conservation of every mortal race, and which bring things that fit one another into harmony.
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||<div id="c13"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XIII] Pax itaque corporis est ordinata temperatura partium, pax animae inrationalis ordinata requies appetitionum, pax animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio, pax corporis et animae ordinata vita et salus animantis, pax hominis mortalis et Dei ordinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia, pax hominum ordinata concordia, pax domus ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi concordia cohabitantium, pax civitatis ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi concordia civium, pax caelestis civitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et inuicem in Deo, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. Proinde miseri, quia, in quantum miseri sunt, utique in pace non sunt, tranquillitate quidem ordinis carent, ubi perturbatio nulla est; Verum tamen quia merito iusteque sunt miseri, in ea quoque ipsa miseria sua praeter ordinem esse non possunt; non quidem coniuncti beatis, sed ab eis tamen ordinis lege seiuncti. Qui cum sine perturbatione sunt, rebus, in quibus sunt, quantacumque congruentia coaptantur; ac per hoc inest eis ordinis nonnulla tranquillitas, inest ergo nonnulla pax. Verum ideo miseri sunt, quia, etsi in aliqua securitate non dolent, non tamen ibi sunt, ubi securi esse ac dolere non debeant; miseriores autem, si pax eis cum ipsa lege non est, qua naturalis ordo administratur. Cum autem dolent, ex qua parte dolent, pacis perturbatio facta est; in illa vero adhuc pax est, in qua nec dolor urit nec compago ipsa dissolvitur. Sicut ergo est quaedam vita sine dolore, dolor autem sine aliqua vita esse non potest: sic est quaedam pax sine ullo bello, bellum vero esse sine aliqua pace non potest; non secundum id, quod bellum est, sed secundum id, quod ab eis vel in eis geritur, quae aliquae naturae sunt; quod nullo modo essent, si non qualicumque pace subsisterent. Quapropter est natura, in qua nullum malum est vel etiam in qua nullum esse malum potest; esse autem natura, in qua nullum bonum sit, non potest. Proinde nec ipsius diaboli natura, in quantum natura est, malum est; sed peruersitas eam malam facit. Itaque in veritate non stetit, sed veritatis iudicium non euasit; in ordinis tranquillitate non mansit, nec ideo tamen a potestate ordinatoris effugit. Bonum Dei, quod illi est in natura, non eum subtrahit iustitiae Dei, qua ordinatur in poena; nec ibi Deus bonum insequitur quod creavit, sed malum quod ille commisit. Neque enim totum aufert quod naturae dedit, sed aliquid adimit, aliquid relinquit, ut sit qui doleat quod ademit. Et ipse dolor testimonium est boni adempti et boni relicti. Nisi enim bonum relictum esset, bonum amissum dolere non posset. Nam qui peccat, peior est, si laetatur in damno aequitatis; qui vero cruciatur, si nihil inde adquirat boni, dolet damnum salutis. Et quoniam aequitas ac salus utrumque bonum est bonique amissione dolendum est potius quam laetandum (si tamen non sit compensatio melioris; melior est autem animi aequitas quam corporis sanitas): profecto convenientius iniustus dolet in supplicio, quam laetatus est in delicto. Sicut ergo laetitia deserti boni in peccato testis est voluntatis malae, ita dolor amissi boni in supplicio testis est naturae bonae. Qui enim dolet amissam naturae suae pacem, ex aliquibus reliquiis pacis id dolet, quibus fit, ut sibi amica natura sit. Hoc autem in extremo supplicio recte fit, ut iniqui et impii naturalium bonorum damna in cruciatibus defleant, sentientes eorum ablatorem iustissimum Deum, quem contempserunt benignissimum largitorem. Deus ergo naturarum omnium sapientissimus conditor et iustissimus ordinator, qui terrenorum ornamentorum maximum instituit mortale genus humanum, dedit hominibus quaedam bona huic vitae congrua, id est pacem temporalem pro modulo mortalis vitae in ipsa salute et incolumitate ac societate sui generis, et quaeque huic paci vel tuendae vel recuperandae necessaria sunt (sicut ea, quae apte et convenienter adiacent sensibus, lux vox, aurae spirabiles aquae potabiles, et quidquid ad alendum tegendum curandum ornandumque corpus congruit), eo pacto aequissimo, ut, qui mortalis talibus bonis paci mortalium adcommodatis recte usus fuerit, accipiat ampliora atque meliora, ipsam scilicet inmortalitatis pacem eique convenientem gloriam et honorem in vita aeterna ad fruendum Deo et proximo in Deo; qui autem perperam, nec illa accipiat et haec amittat. ||The peace of the body then consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious repose of the appetites, and that of the rational soul the harmony of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and harmonious life and health of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place. And hence, though the miserable, in so far as they are such, do certainly not enjoy peace, but are severed from that tranquillity of order in which there is no disturbance, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are deservedly and justly miserable, they are by their very misery connected with order. They are not, indeed, conjoined with the blessed, but they are disjoined from them by the law of order. And though they are disquieted, their circumstances are notwithstanding adjusted to them, and consequently they have some tranquillity of order, and therefore some peace. But they are wretched because, although not wholly miserable, they are not in that place where any mixture of misery is impossible. They would, however, be more wretched if they had not that peace which arises from being in harmony with the natural order of things. When they suffer, their peace is in so far disturbed; but their peace continues in so far as they do not suffer, and in so far as their nature continues to exist. As, then, there may be life without pain, while there cannot be pain without some kind of life, so there may be peace without war, but there cannot be war without some kind of peace, because war supposes the existence of some natures to wage it, and these natures cannot exist without peace of one kind or other.And therefore there is a nature in which evil does not or even cannot exist; but there cannot be a nature in which there is no good. Hence not even the nature of the devil himself is evil, in so far as it is nature, but it was made evil by being perverted. Thus he did not abide in the truth, John 8:44 but could not escape the judgment of the Truth; he did not abide in the tranquillity of order, but did not therefore escape the power of the Ordainer. The good imparted by God to his nature did not screen him from the justice of God by which order was preserved in his punishment; neither did God punish the good which He had created, but the evil which the devil had committed. God did not take back all He had imparted to his nature, but something He took and something He left, that there might remain enough to be sensible of the loss of what was taken. And this very sensibility to pain is evidence of the good which has been taken away and the good which has been left. For, were nothing good left, there could be no pain on account of the good which had been lost. For he who sins is still worse if he rejoices in his loss of righteousness. But he who is in pain, if he derives no benefit from it, mourns at least the loss of health. And as righteousness and health are both good things, and as the loss of any good thing is matter of grief, not of joy,-if, at least, there is no compensation, as spiritual righteousness may compensate for the loss of bodily health,-certainly it is more suitable for a wicked man to grieve in punishment than to rejoice in his fault. As, then, the joy of a sinner who has abandoned what is good is evidence of a bad will, so his grief for the good he has lost when he is punished is evidence of a good nature. For he who laments the peace his nature has lost is stirred to do so by some relics of peace which make his nature friendly to itself. And it is very just that in the final punishment the wicked and godless should in anguish bewail the loss of the natural advantages they enjoyed, and should perceive that they were most justly taken from them by that God whose benign liberality they had despised. God, then, the most wise Creator and most just Ordainer of all natures, who placed the human race upon earth as its greatest ornament, imparted to men some good things adapted to this life, to wit, temporal peace, such as we can enjoy in this life from health and safety and human fellowship, and all things needful for the preservation and recovery of this peace, such as the objects which are accommodated to our outward senses, light, night, the air, and waters suitable for us, and everything the body requires to sustain, shelter, heal, or beautify it: and all under this most equitable condition, that every man who made a good use of these advantages suited to the peace of this mortal condition, should receive ampler and better blessings, namely, the peace of immortality, accompanied by glory and honor in an endless life made fit for the enjoyment of God and of one another in God; but that he who used the present blessings badly should both lose them and should not receive the others.
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||<div id="c14"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XIV] Omnis igitur usus rerum temporalium refertur ad fructum pacis terrenae in terrena civitate; in caelesti autem civitate refertur ad fructum pacis aeternae. Quapropter si inrationalia essemus animantia, nihil appeteremus praeter ordinatam temperaturam partium corporis et requiem appetitionum; nihil ergo praeter quietem carnis et copiam voluptatum, ut pax corporis prodesset paci animae. Si enim desit pax corporis, impeditur etiam inrationalis animae pax, quia requiem appetitionum consequi non potest. Vtrumque autem simul ei paci prodest, quam inter se habent anima et corpus, id est ordinatae vitae ac salutis. Sicut enim pacem corporis amare se ostendunt animantia, cum fugiunt dolorem, et pacem animae, cum propter explendas indigentias appetitionum voluptatem sequuntur: ita mortem fugiendo satis indicant, quantum diligant pacem, qua sibi conciliantur anima et corpus. Sed quia homini rationalis anima inest, totum hoc, quod habet commune cum bestiis, subdit paci animae rationalis, ut mente aliquid contempletur et secundum hoc aliquid agat, ut sit ei ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio, quam pacem rationalis animae dixeramus. Ad hoc enim velle debet nec dolore molestari nec desiderio perturbari nec morte dissolvi, ut aliquid utile cognoscat et secundum eam cognitionem vitam moresque componat. Sed ne ipso studio cognitionis propter humanae mentis infirmitatem in pestem alicuius erroris incurrat, opus habet magisterio divino, cui certus obtemperet, et adiutorio, ut liber obtemperet. Et quoniam, quamdiu est in isto mortali corpore, peregrinatur a Domino: ambulat per fidem, non per speciem; ac per hoc omnem pacem vel corporis vel animae vel simul corporis et animae refert ad illam pacem, quae homini mortali est cum inmortali Deo, ut ei sit ordinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia. Iam vero quia duo praecipua praecepta, hoc est dilectionem Dei et dilectionem proximi, docet magister Deus, in quibus tria invenit homo quae diligat, Deum, se ipsum et proximum, atque ille in se diligendo non errat, qui Deum diligit: consequens est, ut etiam proximo ad diligendum Deum consulat, quem iubetur sicut se ipsum diligere (sic uxori, sic filiis, sic domesticis, sic ceteris quibus potuerit hominibus), et ad hoc sibi a proximo, si forte indiget, consuli velit; ac per hoc erit pacatus, quantum in ipso est, omni homini pace hominum, id est ordinata concordia, cuius hic ordo est, primum ut nulli noceat, deinde ut etiam prosit cui potuerit. Primitus ergo inest ei suorum cura; ad eos quippe habet oportuniorem facilioremque aditum consulendi, vel naturae ordine vel ipsius societatis humanae. Vnde apostolus dicit: Quisquis autem suis et maxime domesticis non providet, fidem denegat et est infideli deterior. Hinc itaque etiam pax domestica oritur, id est ordinata imperandi oboediendique concordia cohabitantium.mperant enim, qui consulunt; sicut vir uxori, parentes filiis, domini seruis. Oboediunt autem quibus consulitur; sicut mulieres maritis, filii parentibus, serui dominis. Sed in domo iusti viventis ex fide et adhuc ab illa caelesti civitate peregrinantis etiam qui imperant seruiunt eis, quibus videntur imperare. Neque enim dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi, nec principandi superbia, sed providendi misericordia. ||The whole use, then, of things temporal has a reference to this result of earthly peace in the earthly community, while in the city of God it is connected with eternal peace. And therefore, if we were irrational animals, we should desire nothing beyond the proper arrangement of the parts of the body and the satisfaction of the appetites,-nothing, therefore, but bodily comfort and abundance of pleasures, that the peace of the body might contribute to the peace of the soul. For if bodily peace be awanting, a bar is put to the peace even of the irrational soul, since it cannot obtain the gratification of its appetites. And these two together help out the mutual peace of soul and body, the peace of harmonious life and health. For as animals, by shunning pain, show that they love bodily peace, and, by pursuing pleasure to gratify their appetites, show that they love peace of soul, so their shrinking from death is a sufficient indication of their intense love of that peace which binds soul and body in close alliance. But, as man has a rational soul, he subordinates all this which he has in common with the beasts to the peace of his rational soul, that his intellect may have free play and may regulate his actions, and that he may thus enjoy the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which constitutes, as we have said, the peace of the rational soul. And for this purpose he must desire to be neither molested by pain, nor disturbed by desire, nor extinguished by death, that he may arrive at some useful knowledge by which he may regulate his life and manners. But, owing to the liability of the human mind to fall into mistakes, this very pursuit of knowledge may be a snare to him unless he has a divine Master, whom he may obey without misgiving, and who may at the same time give him such help as to preserve his own freedom. And because, so long as he is in this mortal body, he is a stranger to God, he walks by faith, not by sight; and he therefore refers all peace, bodily or spiritual or both, to that peace which mortal man has with the immortal God, so that he exhibits the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. But as this divine Master inculcates two precepts,-the love of God and the love of our neighbor,-and as in these precepts a man finds three things he has to love,-God, himself, and his neighbor,-and that he who loves God loves himself thereby, it follows that he must endeavor to get his neighbor to love God, since he is ordered to love his neighbor as himself. He ought to make this endeavor in behalf of his wife, his children, his household, all within his reach, even as he would wish his neighbor to do the same for him if he needed it; and consequently he will be at peace, or in well-ordered concord, with all men, as far as in him lies. And this is the order of this concord, that a man, in the first place, injure no one, and, in the second, do good to every one he can reach. Primarily, therefore, his own household are his care, for the law of nature and of society gives him readier access to them and greater opportunity of serving them. And hence the apostle says, "Now, if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he has denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." 1 Timothy 5:8 This is the origin of domestic peace, or the well-ordered concord of those in the family who rule and those who obey. For they who care for the rest rule,-the husband the wife, the parents the children, the masters the servants; and they who are cared for obey,-the women their husbands, the children their parents, the servants their masters. But in the family of the just man who lives by faith and is as yet a pilgrim journeying on to the celestial city, even those who rule serve those whom they seem to command; for they rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of the duty they owe to others-not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy.
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||<div id="c15"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XV] Hoc naturalis ordo praescribit, ita Deus hominem condidit. Nam: Dominetur, inquit, piscium maris et volatilium caeli et omnium repentium, quae repunt super terram. Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit nisi inrationabilibus dominari; non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Inde primi iusti pastores pecorum magis quam reges hominum constituti sunt, ut etiam sic insinuaret Deus, quid postulet ordo creaturarum, quid exigat meritum peccatorum. Condicio quippe seruitutis iure intellegitur inposita peccatori. Proinde nusquam scripturarum legimus seruum, antequam hoc vocabulo Noe iustus peccatum filii vindicaret. Nomen itaque istud culpa meruit, non natura. Origo autem vocabuli seruorum in Latina lingua inde creditur ducta, quod hi, qui iure belli possent occidi, a victoribus cum servabantur serui fiebant, a servando appellati; quod etiam ipsum sine peccati merito non est. Nam et cum iustum geritur bellum, pro peccato e contrario dimicatur; et omnis victoria, cum etiam malis provenit, divino iudicio victos humiliat vel emendans peccata vel puniens. Testis est homo Dei Daniel, cum in captivitate positus peccata sua et peccata populi sui confitetur Deo et hanc esse causam illius captivitatis pio dolore testatur. Prima ergo seruitutis causa peccatum est, ut homo homini condicionis vinculo subderetur; quod non fit nisi Deo iudicante, apud quem non est iniquitas et novit diversas poenas meritis distribuere delinquentium. Sicut autem supernus Dominus dicit; Omnis, qui facit peccatum, seruus est peccati, ac per hoc multi quidem religiosi dominis iniquis, non tamen liberis seruiunt: A quo enim quis devictus est, huic et seruus addictus est. Et utique felicius seruitur homini, quam libidini, cum saevissimo dominatu uastet corda mortalium, ut alias omittam, libido ipsa dominandi. Hominibus autem illo pacis ordine, quo aliis alii subiecti sunt, sicut prodest humilitas seruientibus, ita nocet superbia dominantibus. Nullus autem natura, in qua prius Deus hominem condidit, seruus est hominis aut peccati. Verum et poenalis seruitus ea lege ordinatur, quae naturalem ordinem conservari iubet, perturbari uetat; quia si contra eam legem non esset factum, nihil esset poenali seruitute cohercendum. Ideoque apostolus etiam seruos monet subditos esse dominis suis et ex animo eis cum bona voluntate seruire; ut scilicet, si non possunt a dominis liberi fieri, suam seruitutem ipsi quodam modo liberam faciant, non timore subdolo sed fideli dilectione seruiendo, donec transeat iniquitas et euacuetur omnis principatus et potestas humana et sit Deus omnia in omnibus. ||This is prescribed by the order of nature: it is thus that God has created man. For "let them," He says, "have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every creeping thing which creeps on the earth." Genesis 1:26 He did not intend that His rational creature, who was made in His image, should have dominion over anything but the irrational creation,-not man over man, but man over the beasts. And hence the righteous men in primitive times were made shepherds of cattle rather than kings of men, God intending thus to teach us what the relative position of the creatures is, and what the desert of sin; for it is with justice, we believe, that the condition of slavery is the result of sin. And this is why we do not find the word "slave" in any part of Scripture until righteous Noah branded the sin of his son with this name. It is a name, therefore, introduced by sin and not by nature. The origin of the Latin word for slave is supposed to be found in the circumstance that those who by the law of war were liable to be killed were sometimes preserved by their victors, and were hence called servants. And these circumstances could never have arisen save through sin. For even when we wage a just war, our adversaries must be sinning; and every victory, even though gained by wicked men, is a result of the first judgment of God, who humbles the vanquished either for the sake of removing or of punishing their sins. Witness that man of God, Daniel, who, when he was in captivity, confessed to God his own sins and the sins of his people, and declares with pious grief that these were the cause of the captivity. Daniel ix The prime cause, then, of slavery is sin, which brings man under the dominion of his fellow,-that which does not happen save by the judgment of God, with whom is no unrighteousness, and who knows how to award fit punishments to every variety of offence. But our Master in heaven says, "Every one who does sin is the servant of sin." John 8:34 And thus there are many wicked masters who have religious men as their slaves, and who are yet themselves in bondage; "for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage." 2 Peter 2:19 And beyond question it is a happier thing to be the slave of a man than of a lust; for even this very lust of ruling, to mention no others, lays waste men's hearts with the most ruthless dominion. Moreover, when men are subjected to one another in a peaceful order, the lowly position does as much good to the servant as the proud position does harm to the master. But by nature, as God first created us, no one is the slave either of man or of sin. This servitude is, however, penal, and is appointed by that law which enjoins the preservation of the natural order and forbids its disturbance; for if nothing had been done in violation of that law, there would have been nothing to restrain by penal servitude. And therefore the apostle admonishes slaves to be subject to their masters, and to serve them heartily and with good-will, so that, if they cannot be freed by their masters, they may themselves make their slavery in some sort free, by serving not in crafty fear, but in faithful love, until all unrighteousness pass away, and all principality and every human power be brought to nothing, and God be all in all.
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||<div id="c16"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XVI] Quocirca etiamsi habuerunt seruos iusti patres nostri, sic administrabant domesticam pacem, ut secundum haec temporalia bona filiorum sortem a seruorum condicione distinguerent; ad Deum autem colendum, in quo aeterna bona speranda sunt, omnibus domus suae membris pari dilectione consulerent. Quod naturalis ordo ita praescribit, ut nomen patrum familias hinc exortum sit et tam late uulgatum, ut etiam inique dominantes hoc se gaudeant appellari. Qui autem veri patres familias sunt, omnibus in familia sua tamquam filiis ad colendum et promerendum Deum consulunt, desiderantes atque optantes venire ad caelestem domum, ubi necessarium non sit officium imperandi mortalibus, quia necessarium non erit officium consulendi iam in illa inmortalitate felicibus; quo donec veniatur, magis debent patres quod dominantur, quam serui tolerare quod seruiunt. Si quis autem in domo per inoboedientiam domesticae paci adversatur, corripitur seu verbo seu verbere seu quolibet alio genere poenae iusto atque licito quantum societas humana concedit, pro eius qui corripit utilitate, ut paci unde dissiluerat coaptetur. Sicut enim non est beneficentiae adivuando efficere, ut bonum quod maius est amittatur: ita non est innocentiae parcendo sinere, ut in malum gravius incidatur. Pertinet ergo ad innocentis officium, non solum nemini malum inferre, verum etiam cohibere a peccato vel punire peccatum, ut aut ipse qui plectitur corrigatur experimento, aut alii terreantur exemplo. Quia igitur hominis domus initium sive particula debet esse civitatis, omne autem initium ad aliquem sui generis finem et omnis pars ad universi, cuius pars est, integritatem refertur, satis apparet esse consequens, ut ad pacem civicam pax domestica referatur, id est, ut ordinata imperandi oboediendique concordia cohabitantium referatur ad ordinatam imperandi obediendique concordiam civium. Ita fit, ut ex lege civitatis praecepta sumere patrem familias oporteat, quibus domum suam sic regat, ut sit paci adcommoda civitatis. ||And therefore, although our righteous fathers had slaves, and administered their domestic affairs so as to distinguish between the condition of slaves and the heirship of sons in regard to the blessings of this life, yet in regard to the worship of God, in whom we hope for eternal blessings, they took an equally loving oversight of all the members of their household. And this is so much in accordance with the natural order, that the head of the household was called paterfamilias; and this name has been so generally accepted, that even those whose rule is unrighteous are glad to apply it to themselves. But those who are true fathers of their households desire and endeavor that all the members of their household, equally with their own children, should worship and win God, and should come to that heavenly home in which the duty of ruling men is no longer necessary, because the duty of caring for their everlasting happiness has also ceased; but, until they reach that home, masters ought to feel their position of authority a greater burden than servants their service. And if any member of the family interrupts the domestic peace by disobedience, he is corrected either by word or blow, or some kind of just and legitimate punishment, such as society permits, that he may himself be the better for it, and be readjusted to the family harmony from which he had dislocated himself. For as it is not benevolent to give a man help at the expense of some greater benefit he might receive, so it is not innocent to spare a man at the risk of his falling into graver sin. To be innocent, we must not only do harm to no man, but also restrain him from sin or punish his sin, so that either the man himself who is punished may profit by his experience, or others be warned by his example. Since, then, the house ought to be the beginning or element of the city, and every beginning bears reference to some end of its own kind, and every element to the integrity of the whole of which it is an element, it follows plainly enough that domestic peace has a relation to civic peace,-in other words, that the well-ordered concord of domestic obedience and domestic rule has a relation to the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and civic rule. And therefore it follows, further, that the father of the family ought to frame his domestic rule in accordance with the law of the city, so that the household may be in harmony with the civic order.
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||<div id="c17"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XVII] Sed domus hominum, qui non vivunt ex fide, pacem terre nam ex huius temporalis vitae rebus commodisque sectatur; domus autem hominum ex fide viventium expectat ea, quae in futurum aeterna promissa sunt, terrenisque rebus ac temporalibus tamquam peregrina utitur, non quibus capiatur et avertatur quo tendit in Deum, sed quibus sustentetur ad facilius toleranda minimeque augenda onera corporis corruptibilis, quod adgrauat animam. Idcirco rerum vitae huic mortali necessariarum utrisque hominibus et utrique domui communis est usus; sed finis utendi cuique suus proprius multumque diversus. Ita etiam terrena civitas, quae non vivit ex fide, terrenam pacem appetit in eoque defigit imperandi oboediendique concordiam civium, ut sit eis de rebus ad mortalem vitam pertinentibus humanarum quaedam compositio, voluntatum. Civitas autem caelestis vel potius pars eius, quae in hac mortalitate peregrinatur et vivit ex fide, etiam ista pace necesse est utatur, donec ipsa, cui talis pax necessaria est, mortalitas transeat; ac per hoc, dum apud terrenam civitatem velut captivam vitam suae peregrinationis agit, iam promissione redemptionis et dono spiritali tamquam pignore accepto legibus terrenae civitatis, quibus haec administrantur, quae sustentandae mortali vitae adcommodata sunt, obtemperare non dubitat, ut, quoniam communis est ipsa mortalitas, seruetur in rebus ad eam pertinentibus inter civitatem utramque concordia. Verum quia terrena civitas habuit quosdam suos sapientes, quos divina improbat disciplina, qui vel suspicati vel decepti a emonibus crederent multos deos conciliandos esse rebus humanis atque ad eorum diversa quodam modo officia diversa subdita pertinere, ad alium corpus, ad alium animum, inque ipso corpore ad alium caput, ad alium ceruicem et cetera singula ad singulos; similiter in animo ad alium ingenium, ad alium doctrinam, ad alium iram, ad alium concupiscentiam; inque ipsis rebus vitae adiacentibus ad alium pecus, ad alium triticum, ad alium vinum, ad alium oleum, ad alium siluas, ad alium nummos, ad alium navigationem, ad alium bella atque victorias, ad alium coniugia, ad alium partum ac fecunditatem et ad alios alia cetera; caelestis autem civitas <cum> unum Deum solum colendum nosset eique tantum modo seruiendum seruitute illa, quae Graece *latrei/a dicitur et non nisi Deo debetur, fideli pietate censeret: factum est, ut religionis leges cum terrena civitate non posset habere communes proque his ab ea dissentire haberet necesse atque oneri esse diversa sentientibus eorumque iras et odia et persecutionum impetus sustinere, nisi cum animos adversantium aliquando terrore suae multitudinis et semper divino adiutorio propulsaret. Haec ergo caelestis civitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex omnibus gentibus cives euocat atque in omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit societatem, non curans quidquid in moribus legibus institutisque diversum est, quibus pax terrena vel conquiritur vel tenetur, nihil eorum rescindens vel destruens, immo etiam servans ac sequens, quod licet diversum in diversis nationibus, ad unum tamen eundemque finem terrenae pacis intenditur, si religionem, qua unus summus et verus Deus colendus docetur, non impedit. Vtitur ergo etiam caelestis civitas in hac sua peregrinatione pace terrena et de rebus ad mortalem hominum naturam pertinentibus humanarum voluntatum compositionem, quantum salua pietate ac religione conceditur, tuetur atque appetit eamque terrenam pacem refert ad caelestem pacem, quae vere ita pax est, ut rationalis dumtaxat creaturae sola pax habenda atque dicenda sit, ordinatissima scilicet et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et inuicem in Deo; quo cum ventum erit, non erit vita mortalis, sed plane certeque vitalis, nec corpus animale, quod, dum, corrumpitur, adgrauat animam, sed spiritale sine ulla indigentia ex omni parte subditum voluntati. Hanc pacem, dum peregrinatur in fide, habet atque ex hac fide iuste vivit, cum ad illam pacem adipiscendam refert quidquid bonarum actionum gerit erga Deum et proximum, quoniam vita civitatis utique socialis est. ||But the families which do not live by faith seek their peace in the earthly advantages of this life; while the families which live by faith look for those eternal blessings which are promised, and use as pilgrims such advantages of time and of earth as do not fascinate and divert them from God, but rather aid them to endure with greater ease, and to keep down the number of those burdens of the corruptible body which weigh upon the soul. Thus the things necessary for this mortal life are used by both kinds of men and families alike, but each has its own peculiar and widely different aim in using them. The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away. Consequently, so long as it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city, though it has already received the promise of redemption, and the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered; and thus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in regard to what belongs to it. But, as the earthly city has had some philosophers whose doctrine is condemned by the divine teaching, and who, being deceived either by their own conjectures or by demons, supposed that many gods must be invited to take an interest in human affairs, and assigned to each a separate function and a separate department,-to one the body, to another the soul; and in the body itself, to one the head, to another the neck, and each of the other members to one of the gods; and in like manner, in the soul, to one god the natural capacity was assigned, to another education, to another anger, to another lust; and so the various affairs of life were assigned,-cattle to one, corn to another, wine to another, oil to another, the woods to another, money to another, navigation to another, wars and victories to another, marriages to another, births and fecundity to another, and other things to other gods: and as the celestial city, on the other hand, knew that one God only was to be worshipped, and that to Him alone was due that service which the Greeks call ?at?e?a, and which can be given only to a god, it has come to pass that the two cities could not have common laws of religion, and that the heavenly city has been compelled in this matter to dissent, and to become obnoxious to those who think differently, and to stand the brunt of their anger and hatred and persecutions, except in so far as the minds of their enemies have been alarmed by the multitude of the Christians and quelled by the manifest protection of God accorded to them. This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. It therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it even preserves and adopts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced. Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth, and, so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessaries of life, and makes this earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven; for this alone can be truly called and esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures, consisting as it does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God. When we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal, and our body shall be no more this animal body which by its corruption weighs down the soul, but a spiritual body feeling no want, and in all its members subjected to the will. In its pilgrim state the heavenly city possesses this peace by faith; and by this faith it lives righteously when it refers to the attainment of that peace every good action towards God and man; for the life of the city is a social life.
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||<div id="c18"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XVIII] Quod autem adtinet ad illam differentiam, quam de Academicis novis Varro adhibuit, quibus incerta sunt omnia, omnino civitas Dei talem dubitationem tamquam dementiam detestatur, habens de rebus, quas mente atque ratione comprehendit, etiamsi paruam propter corpus corruptibile, quod adgrauat animam (quoniam, sicut dicit apostolus, ex parte scimus), tamen certissimam scientiam, creditque sensibus in rei cuiusque evidentia, quibus per corpus animus utitur, quoniam miserabilius fallitur, qui numquam putat eis esse credendum; credit etiam scripturis sanctis et ueteribus et novis, quas canonicas appellamus, unde fides ipsa concepta est, ex qua iustus vivit; per quam sine dubitatione ambulamus, quamdiu peregrinamur a Domino; qua salua atque certa d e quibusdam rebus, quas neque sensu neque ratione percepimus neque nobis per scripturam canonicam claruerunt nec per testes, quibus non credere absurdum est, in nostram notitiam peruenerunt, sine iusta reprehensione dubitamus. ||As regards the uncertainty about everything which Varro alleges to be the differentiating characteristic of the New Academy, the city of God thoroughly detests such doubt as madness. Regarding matters which it apprehends by the mind and reason it has most absolute certainty, although its knowledge is limited because of the corruptible body pressing down the mind, for, as the apostle says, "We know in part." 1 Corinthians 13:9 It believes also the evidence of the senses which the mind uses by aid of the body; for [if one who trusts his senses is sometimes deceived], he is more wretchedly deceived who fancies he should never trust them. It believes also the Holy Scriptures, old and new, which we call canonical, and which are the source of the faith by which the just lives Habakkuk 2:4 and by which we walk without doubting while we are absent from the Lord. 2 Corinthians 5:6 So long as this faith remains inviolate and firm, we may without blame entertain doubts regarding some things which we have neither perceived by sense nor by reason, and which have not been revealed to us by the canonical Scriptures, nor come to our knowledge through witnesses whom it is absurd to disbelieve.
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||<div id="c19"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XIX] Nihil sane ad istam pertinet civitatem quo habitu vel more vivendi, si non est contra divina praecepta, istam fidem, qua pervenitur ad Deum, quisque sectetur; unde ipsos quoque philosophos, quando Christiani fiunt, non habitum vel consuetudinem victus, quae nihil inpedit religionem, sed falsa dogmata mutare compellit. Vnde illam quam Varro adhibuit ex Cynicis differentiam, si nihil turpiter atque intemperanter agat, omnino non curat. Ex tribus vero illis vitae generibus, otioso, actuoso et ex utroque composito, quamuis salua fide quisque possit in quolibet eorum vitam ducere et ad sempiterna praemia pervenire, interest tamen quid amore teneat veritatis, quid officio caritatis inpendat. Nec sic esse quisque debet otiosus, ut in eodem otio utilitatem non cogitet proximi, nec sic actuosus, ut contemplationem non requirat Dei. In otio non iners uacatio delectare debet, sed aut inquisitio aut inventio veritatis, ut in ea quisque proficiat et quod invenerit ne alteri inuideat. In actione vero non amandus est honor in hac vita sive potentia, quoniam omnia uana sub sole, sed opus ipsum, quod per eundem honorem vel potentiam fit, si recte atque utiliter fit, id est, ut valeat ad eam salutem subditorum, quae secundum Deum est; unde iam superius disputavimus. Propter quod ait apostolus: Qui episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat. Exponere voluit quid sit episcopatus, quia nomen est operis, non honoris. Graecum est enim atque inde ductum vocabulum, quod ille qui praeficitur eis quibus praeficitur superintendit, curam scilicet eorum gerens; *skopo\s quippe intentio est; ergo *e)piskopei=n, si velimus, Latine superintendere possumus dicere, ut intellegat non se esse episcopum, qui praeesse dilexerit, non prodesse. Itaque ab studio cognoscendae veritatis nemo prohibetur, quod ad laudabile pertinet otium; locus vero superio, sine quo regi populus non potest, etsi ita teneatur atque administretur ut decet, tamen indecenter appetitur. Quam ob rem otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus inponit, percipiendae atque intuendae uacandum est veritati; si autem inponitur, suscipienda est propter caritatis necessitatem; sed nec sic omni modo veritatis delectatio deserenda est, ne subtrahatur illa suavitas et opprimat ista necessitas. ||It is a matter of no moment in the city of God whether he who adopts the faith that brings men to God adopts it in one dress and manner of life or another, so long only as he lives in conformity with the commandments of God. And hence, when philosophers themselves become Christians, they are compelled, indeed, to abandon their erroneous doctrines, but not their dress and mode of living, which are no obstacle to religion. So that we make no account of that distinction of sects which Varro adduced in connection with the Cynic school, provided always nothing indecent or self-indulgent is retained. As to these three modes of life, the contemplative, the active, and the composite, although, so long as a man's faith is preserved, he may choose any of them without detriment to his eternal interests, yet he must never overlook the claims of truth and duty. No man has a right to lead such a life of contemplation as to forget in his own ease the service due to his neighbor; nor has any man a right to be so immersed in active life as to neglect the contemplation of God. The charm of leisure must not be indolent vacancy of mind, but the investigation or discovery of truth, that thus every man may make solid attainments without grudging that others do the same. And, in active life, it is not the honors or power of this life we should covet, since all things under the sun are vanity, but we should aim at using our position and influence, if these have been honorably attained, for the welfare of those who are under us, in the way we have already explained. It is to this the apostle refers when he says, "He that desires the episcopate desires a good work." 1 Timothy 3:1 He wished to show that the episcopate is the title of a work, not of an honor. It is a Greek word, and signifies that he who governs superintends or takes care of those whom he governs: for ?p? means over, and s??pe??, to see; therefore ?p?s??pe?? means "to oversee." So that he who loves to govern rather than to do good is no bishop. Accordingly no one is prohibited from the search after truth, for in this leisure may most laudably be spent; but it is unseemly to covet the high position requisite for governing the people, even though that position be held and that government be administered in a seemly manner. And therefore holy leisure is longed for by the love of truth; but it is the necessity of love to undertake requisite business. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we are free to sift and contemplate truth; but if it be laid upon us, we are necessitated for love's sake to undertake it. And yet not even in this case are we obliged wholly to relinquish the sweets of contemplation; for were these to be withdrawn, the burden might prove more than we could bear.
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||<div id="c20"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XX] Quam ob rem summum bonum civitatis Dei cum sit pax aeterna atque perfecta, non per quam mortales transeant nascendo atque moriendo, sed in qua inmortales maneant nihil adversi omnino patiendo: quis est qui illam vitam vel beatissimam neget vel in eius comparatione istam, quae hic agitur, quantislibet animi et corporis externarumque rerum bonis plena sit, non miserrimam iudicet? Quam tamen quicumque sic habet, ut eius usum referat ad illius finem, quam diligit ardentissime ac fidelissime sperat, non absurde dici etiam nunc beatus potest, spe illa potius quam re ista. Res ista vero sine spe illa beatitudo falsa et magna miseria est; non enim veris animi bonis utitur, quoniam non est vera sapientia, quae intentionem suam in his quae prudenter discernit, gerit fortiter, cohibet temperanter iusteque distribuit, non ad illum dirigit finem, ubi erit Deus omnia in omnibus, aeternitate certa et pace perfecta. ||Since, then, the supreme good of the city of God is perfect and eternal peace, not such as mortals pass into and out of by birth and death, but the peace of freedom from all evil, in which the immortals ever abide; who can deny that that future life is most blessed, or that, in comparison with it, this life which now we live is most wretched, be it filled with all blessings of body and soul and external things? And yet, if any man uses this life with a reference to that other which he ardently loves and confidently hopes for, he may well be called even now blessed, though not in reality so much as in hope. But the actual possession of the happiness of this life, without the hope of what is beyond, is but a false happiness and profound misery. For the true blessings of the soul are not now enjoyed; for that is no true wisdom which does not direct all its prudent observations, manly actions, virtuous self-restraint, and just arrangements, to that end in which God shall be all and all in a secure eternity and perfect peace.
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||<div id="c21"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XXI] Quapropter nunc est locus, ut quam potero breviter ac dilucide expediam, quod in secundo huius operis libro me demonstraturum esse promisi, secundum definitiones, quibus apud Ciceronem utitur Scipio in libris de re publica, numquam rem publicam fuisse Romanam. Breviter enim rem publicam definit esse rem populi. Quae definitio si vera est, numquam fuit Romana res publica, quia numquam fuit res populi, quam definitionem voluit esse rei publicae. Populum enim esse definivit coetum multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatum. Quid autem dicat iuris consensum, disputando explicat, per hoc ostendens geri sine iustitia non posse rem publicam; ubi ergo iustitia vera non est, nec ius potest esse. Quod enim iure fit, profecto iuste fit; quod autem fit iniuste, nec iure fieri potest. Non enim iura dicenda sunt vel putanda iniqua hominum constituta. cum illud etiam ipsi ius esse dicant, quod de iustitiae fonte manaverit, falsumque esse, quod a quibusdam non recte sentientibus dici solet, id esse ius, quod ei, qui plus potest, utile est. Quocirca ubi non est vera iustitia, iuris consensu sociatus coetus hominum non potest esse et ideo nec populus iuxta illam Scipionis vel Ciceronis definitionem; et si non populus, nec res populi, sed qualiscumque multitudinis, quae populi nomine digna non est. Ac per hoc, si res publica res est populi et populus non est, qui consensu non sociatus est iuris, non est autem ius, ubi nulla iustitia est: procul dubio colligitur, ubi iustitia non est, non esse rem publicam. Iustitia porro ea virtus est, quae sua cuique distribuit. Quae igitur iustitia est hominis, quae ipsum hominem Deo vero tollit et inmundis daemonibus subdit? Hocine est sua cuique distribuere? An qui fundum aufert eius, a quo emptus est, et tradit ei, qui nihil habet in eo iuris, iniustus est; et qui se ipsum aufert dominanti Deo, a quo factus est, et malignis seruit spiritibus, iustus est? Disputatur certe acerrime atque fortissime in eisdem ipsis de re publica libris adversus iniustitiam pro iustitia. Et quoniam, cum prius ageretur pro iniustitiae partibus contra iustitiam et diceretur nisi per iniustitiam rem publicam stare gerique non posse, hoc veluti validissimum positum erat, iniustum esse, ut homines hominibus dominantibus seruiant; quam tamen iniustitiam nisi sequatur imperiosa civitas, cuius est magna res publica, non eam posse provinciis imperare: responsum est a parte iustitiae ideo iustum esse, quod talibus hominibus sit utilis seruitus, et pro utilitate eorum fieri, cum recte fit, id est cum improbis aufertur iniuriarum licentia, et domiti melius se habebunt, quia indomiti deterius se habuerunt; subditumque est, ut ista ratio firmaretur, veluti a natura sumptum nobile exemplum atque dictum est: "Cur igitur Deus homini, animus imperat corpori, ratio libidini ceterisque vitiosis animi partibus?" Plane hoc exemplo satis edoctum est quibusdam esse utilem seruitutem, et Deo quidem ut seruiatur utile esse omnibus. Seruiens autem Deo animus recte imperat corpori, inque ipso animo ratio Deo Domino subdita recte imperat libidini vitiisque ceteris. Quapropter ubi homo Deo non seruit, quid in eo putandum est esse iustitiae? quando quidem Deo non seruiens nullo modo potest iuste animus corpori aut humana ratio vitiis imperare. Et si in homine tali non est ulla iustitia, procul dubio nec in hominum coetu, qui ex hominibus talibus constat. Non est hic ergo iuris ille consensus, qui hominum multitudinem populum facit, cuius res dicitur esse res publica . Nam de utilitate quid dicam, cuius etiam communione sociatus coetus hominum, sicut sese habet ista definitio, populus nuncupatur? Quamuis enim, si diligenter adtendas, nec utilitas sit ulla viventium, qui vivunt impie, sicut vivit omnis, qui non seruit Deo seruitque daemonibus, tanto magis impiis, quanto magis sibi, cum sint inmundissimi spiritus, tamquam diis sacrificari volunt: tamen quod de iuris consensu diximus satis esse arbitror, unde appareat per hanc definitionem non esse populum, cuius res publica esse dicatur, in quo iustitia non est. Si enim dicunt non spiritibus inmundis, sed diis bonis atque sanctis in sua re publica seruisse Romanos: numquid eadem totiens repetenda sunt, quae iam satis, immo ultra quam satis est diximus? Quis enim ad hunc locum per superiores huius operis libros pervenit, qui dubitare adhuc possit malis et inpuris daemonibus seruisse Romanos, nisi vel nimium stolidus vel inpudentissime contentiosus? Sed ut taceam quales sint, quos sacrificiis colebant: in lege veri Dei scriptum est: Sacrificans diis eradicabitur nisi Domino tantum. Nec bonis igitur nec malis diis sacrificari voluit, qui hoc cum tanta comminatione praecepit. ||This, then, is the place where I should fulfill the promise gave in the second book of this work, and explain, as briefly and clearly as possible, that if we are to accept the definitions laid down by Scipio in Cicero's De Republica, there never was a Roman republic; for he briefly defines a republic as the weal of the people. And if this definition be true, there never was a Roman republic, for the people's weal was never attained among the Romans. For the people, according to his definition, is an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests. And what he means by a common acknowledgment of right he explains at large, showing that a republic cannot be administered without justice. Where, therefore, there is no true justice there can be no right. For that which is done by right is justly done, and what is unjustly done cannot be done by right. For the unjust inventions of men are neither to be considered nor spoken of as rights; for even they themselves say that right is that which flows from the fountain of justice, and deny the definition which is commonly given by those who misconceive the matter, that right is that which is useful to the stronger party. Thus, where there is not true justice there can be no assemblage of men associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and therefore there can be no people, as defined by Scipio or Cicero; and if no people, then no weal of the people, but only of some promiscuous multitude unworthy of the name of people. Consequently, if the republic is the weal of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is no republic where there is no justice. Further, justice is that virtue which gives every one his due. Where, then, is the justice of man, when he deserts the true God and yields himself to impure demons? Is this to give every one his due? Or is he who keeps back a piece of ground from the purchaser, and gives it to a man who has no right to it, unjust, while he who keeps back himself from the God who made him, and serves wicked spirits, is just?This same book, De Republica, advocates the cause of justice against injustice with great force and keenness. The pleading for injustice against justice was first heard, and it was asserted that without injustice a republic could neither increase nor even subsist, for it was laid down as an absolutely unassailable position that it is unjust for some men to rule and some to serve; and yet the imperial city to which the republic belongs cannot rule her provinces without having recourse to this injustice. It was replied in behalf of justice, that this ruling of the provinces is just, because servitude may be advantageous to the provincials, and is so when rightly administered,-that is to say, when lawless men are prevented from doing harm. And further, as they became worse and worse so long as they were free, they will improve by subjection. To confirm this reasoning, there is added an eminent example drawn from nature: for "why," it is asked, "does God rule man, the soul the body, the reason the passions and other vicious parts of the soul?" This example leaves no doubt that, to some, servitude is useful; and, indeed, to serve God is useful to all. And it is when the soul serves God that it exercises a right control over the body; and in the soul itself the reason must be subject to God if it is to govern as it ought the passions and other vices. Hence, when a man does not serve God, what justice can we ascribe to him, since in this case his soul cannot exercise a just control over the body, nor his reason over his vices? And if there is no justice in such an individual, certainly there can be none in a community composed of such persons. Here, therefore, there is not that common acknowledgment of right which makes an assemblage of men a people whose affairs we call a republic. And why need I speak of the advantageousness, the common participation in which, according to the definition, makes a people? For although, if you choose to regard the matter attentively, you will see that there is nothing advantageous to those who live godlessly, as every one lives who does not serve God but demons, whose wickedness you may measure by their desire to receive the worship of men though they are most impure spirits, yet what I have said of the common acknowledgment of right is enough to demonstrate that, according to the above definition, there can be no people, and therefore no republic, where there is no justice. For if they assert that in their republic the Romans did not serve unclean spirits, but good and holy gods, must we therefore again reply to this evasion, though already we have said enough, and more than enough, to expose it? He must be an uncommonly stupid, or a shamelessly contentious person, who has read through the foregoing books to this point, and can yet question whether the Romans served wicked and impure demons. But, not to speak of their character, it is written in the law of the true God, "He that sacrifices unto any god save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed." Exodus 22:20 He, therefore, who uttered so menacing a commandment decreed that no worship should be given either to good or bad gods.
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||<div id="c22"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XXII] Sed responderi potest: "Quis iste Deus est aut unde dignus probatur, cui deberent obtemperare Romani, ut nullum deorum praeter ipsum colerent sacrificiis?" Magnae caecitatis est, adhuc quaerere, quis iste sit Deus. Ipse est Deus, cuius prophetae praedixerunt ista quae cernimus. Ipse est Deus, a quo responsum accepit Abraham: In semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes. Quod in Christo fieri, qui secundum carnem de illo semine exortus est, idem ipsi qui remanserunt huius nominis inimici, velint nolintue, cognoscunt. Ipse est Deus, cuius divinus Spiritus per eos locutus est, quorum praedicta atque completa per ecclesiam, quam videmus toto orbe diffusam, in libris superioribus posui. Ipse est Deus, quem Varro doctissimus Romanorum Iovem putat, quamuis nesciens quid loquatur; quod tamen ideo commemorandum putavi, quoniam vir tantae scientiae nec nullum istum Deum potuit existimare nec vilem. Hunc enim eum esse credidit, quem summum putavit deum. Postremo ipse est Deus, quem doctissimus philosophorum, quamuis Christianorum acerrimus inimicus, etiam per eorum oracula, quos deos putat, deum magnum Porphyrius confitetur. ||But it may be replied, Who is this God, or what proof is there that He alone is worthy to receive sacrifice from the Romans? One must be very blind to be still asking who this God is. He is the God whose prophets predicted the things we see accomplished. He is the God from whom Abraham received the assurance, "In your seed shall all nations be blessed." Genesis 22:18 That this was fulfilled in Christ, who according to the flesh sprang from that seed, is recognized, whether they will or no, even by those who have continued to be the enemies of this name. He is the God whose divine Spirit spoke by the men whose predictions I cited in the preceding books, and which are fulfilled in the Church which has extended over all the world. This is the God whom Varro, the most learned of the Romans, supposed to be Jupiter, though he knows not what he says; yet I think it right to note the circumstance that a man of such learning was unable to suppose that this God had no existence or was contemptible, but believed Him to be the same as the supreme God. In fine, He is the God whom Porphyry, the most learned of the philosophers, though the bitterest enemy of the Christians, confesses to be a great God, even according to the oracles of those whom he esteems gods.
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||<div id="c23"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XXIII] Nam in libris, quos *e)k *logi/wn *filosofi/as appellat, in quibus exequitur atque conscribit rerum ad philosophiam pertinentium velut divina responsa, ut ipsa verba eius, quem ad modum ex Graeca lingua in Latinam interpretata sunt, ponam: "Interroganti, inquit, quem deum placando reuocare possit uxorem suam a Christianismo, haec ait versibus Apollo." Deinde verba velut Apollinis ista sunt: "Forte magis poteris in aqua inpressis litteris scribere aut adinflans leues pinnas per aera avis volare, quam pollutae reuoces impiae uxoris sensum. Pergat quo modo uult inanibus fallaciis + perseuerans et lamentari fallaciis mortuum Deum cantans, quem iudicibus recta sentientibus perditum pessima in speciosis ferro vincta mors interfecit." Deinde post hos versus Apollinis, qui non stante metro Latine interpretati sunt, subiunxit atque ait: "In his quidem inremediabile sententiae eorum manifestavit dicens, quoniam Iudaei suscipiunt Deum magis quam isti." Ecce, ubi decolorans Christum Iudaeos praeposuit Christianis, confitens quod Iudaei suscipiant Deum. Sic enim exposuit versus Apollinis, ubi iudicibus recta sentientibus Christum dicit occisum, tamquam illis iuste iudicantibus merito sit ille punitus. Viderint quid de Christo uates mendax Apollinis dixerit atque iste crediderit aut fortasse uatem, quod non dixit, dixisse iste ipse confinxerit. Quam sibi constet vel ipsa oracula inter se faciat convenire, postea videbimus; hic tamen Iudaeos, tamquam Dei susceptores, recte dicit iudicasse de Christo, quod eum morte pessima excruciandum esse censuerint. Deus itaque Iudaeorum, cui perhibet testimonium, audiendus fuit dicens: Sacrificans diis eradicabitur nisi Domino tantum. Sed ad manifestiora veniamus et audiamus quam magnum Deum dicat esse Iudaeorum. Item ad ea, quae interrogavit Apollinem, quid melius, verbum sive ratio an lex: "Respondit, inquit, versibus haec dicens." Ac deinde subicit Apollinis versus, in quibus et isti sunt, ut quantum satis est inde decerpam: "In Deum vero, inquit, generatorem et in regem ante omnia, quem tremit et caelum et terra atque mare et infernorum abdita et ipsa numina perhorrescunt; quorum lex est Pater, quem valde sancti honorant Hebraei." Tali oraculo dei sui Apollinis Porphyrius tam magnum Deum dixit Hebraeorum, ut eum et ipsa numina perhorrescant. Cum ergo Deus iste dixerit: Sacrificans diis eradicabitur, miror quod ipse Porphyrius non perhorruerit et sacrificans diis eradicari non formidaverit. Dicit etiam bona philosophus iste de Christo, quasi oblitus illius , de qua paulo ante locuti sumus, contumeliae suae, aut quasi in somnis dii eius maledixerint Christo et evigilantes eum bonum esse cognoverint digneque laudaverint. Denique tamquam mirabile aliquid atque incredibile prolaturus: "Praeter opinionem, inquit, profecto quibusdam videatur esse quod dicturi sumus. Christum enim dii piissimum pronuntiaverunt et inmortalem factum et cum bona praedicatione eius meminerunt; Christianos vero pollutos, inquit, et contaminatos et errore implicatos esse dicunt et multis talibus adversus eos blasphemiis utuntur." Deinde subicit velut oracula deorum blasphemantium Christianos et post haec: De Christo autem, inquit, interrogantibus si est Deus, ait Hecate: "Quoniam quidem inmortalis anima post corpus [ut] incedit, nosti; a sapientia autem abscisa semper errat. Viri pietate praestantissimi est illa anima; hanc colunt aliena a se veritate." Deinde post verba huius quasi oraculi sua ipse contexens: "Piissimum igitur virum, inquit, eum dixit et eius animam, sicut et aliorum piorum, post obitum inmortalitate dignatam et hanc colere Christianos ignorantes." "Interrogantibus autem, inquit: Cur ergo damnatus est? oraculo respondit dea: Corpus quidem debilitantibus tormentis semper oppositum est; anima autem piorum caelesti sedi insidet. Illa vero anima aliis animabus fataliter dedit, quibus fata non adnuerunt deorum dona obtinere neque habere Iovis inmortalis agnitionem, errore implicari. Propterea ergo diis exosi, quia, quibus fato non fuit nosse Deum nec dona ab diis accipere, his fataliter dedit iste errore implicari. Ipse vero pius et in caelum, sicut pii, concessit. Itaque hunc quidem non blasphemabis, misereberis autem hominum dementiam, ex eo in eis facile praecepsque periculum." Quis ita stultus est, ut non intellegat aut ab homine callido eoque Christianis inimicissimo haec oracula fuisse conficta aut consilio simili ab inpuris daemonibus ista fuisse responsa, ut scilicet, quoniam laudant Christum, propterea credantur veraciter vituperare Christianos atque ita, si possint, intercludant viam salutis aeternae, in qua fit quisque Christianus? Suae quippe nocendi astutiae milleformi sentiunt non esse contrarium, si credatur eis laudantibus Christum, dum tamen credatur etiam vituperantibus Christianos; ut eum, qui utrumque crediderit, talem Christi faciant laudatorem, ne velit esse Christianus, ac sic quamuis ab illo laudatus ab istorum tamen daemonum dominatu eum non liberet Christus; praesertim quia ita laudant Christum, ut, quisquis in eum talem crediderit, qualis ab eis praedicatur, Christianus verus non sit, sed Photinianus haereticus, qui tantummodo hominem, non etiam Deum noverit Christum, et ideo per eum saluus esse non possit nec istorum mendaciloquorum daemonum laqueos vitare vel soluere. Nos autem neque Apollinem vituperantem Christum neque Hecaten possumus adprobare laudantem. Ille quippe tamquam iniquum Christum uult credi, quem iudicibus recta sentientibus dicit occisum; ista hominem piissimum, sed hominem tantum. Vna est tamen et illius et huius intentio, ut nolint homines esse Christianos, quia, nisi Christiani erunt, ab eorum erui potestate non poterunt. Iste vero philosophus, vel potius qui talibus adversus Christianos quasi oraculis credunt, prius faciant, si possunt, ut inter se de ipso Christo Hecate atque Apollo concordent eumque aut ambo condemnent aut ambo conlaudent. Quod si facere potuissent, nihilo minus nos et vituperatores et laudatores Christi fallaces daemones vitaremus. Cum vero eorum deus et dea inter se de Christo, ille vituperando, ista laudando dissentiant: profecto eis blasphemantibus Christianos non credunt homines, si recte ipsi sentiant. Sane Christum laudans vel Porphyrius vel Hecate, cum dicat eum ipsum fataliter dedisse Christianis, ut implicarentur errore, causas tamen eiusdem, sicut putat, pandit erroris. Quas antequam ex verbis eius exponam, prius quaero, si fataliter dedit Christus Christianis erroris implicationem, utrum volens an nolens dederit. Si volens, quo modo iustus? Si nolens, quo modo beatus? Sed iam causas ipsius audiamus erroris. "Sunt, inquit, spiritus terreni minimi loco quodam malorum daemonum potestati subiecti. Ab his sapientes Hebraeorum (quorum unus iste etiam Iesus fuit, sicut audisti divina Apollinis, qua e superius dicta sunt) _ ab his ergo Hebraei daemonibus pessimis et minoribus spiritibus uetabant religiosos et ipsis uacare prohibebant; venerari autem magis caelestes deos, amplius autem venerari Deum Patrem. Hoc autem, inquit, et dii praecipiunt et in superioribus ostendimus, quem ad modum animum advertere ad Deum monent et illum colere ubique imperant. Verum indocti et impiae naturae, quibus vere fatum non concessit ab diis dona obtinere neque habere Iovis inmortalis notionem, non audientes et deos et divinos viros deos quidem omnes recusaverunt, prohibitos autem daemones et hos non odisse, sed reuereri. Deum autem simulantes colere, ea sola, per quae Deus adoratur, non agunt. Nam Deus quidem, utpote omnium Pater, nullius indiget; sed nobis est bene, cum eum per iustitiam et castitatem aliasque virtutes adoramus, ipsam vitam precem ad ipsum facientes per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. Inquisitio enim purgat, inquit; imitatio deificat affectionem ad ipsum operando." Bene quidem praedicavit Deum Patrem, et quibus sit colendus moribus dixit; quibus praeceptis prophetici libri pleni sunt Hebraeorum, quando sanctorum vita sive imperatur sive laudatur. Sed in Christianis tantum errat aut tantum calumniatur, quantum volunt daemones, quos opinatur deos; quasi cuiquam difficile sit recolere, quae turpia, quae dedecora erga deorum obsequium in theatris agebantur et templis, et adtendere quae legantur dicantur audiantur in ecclesiis, vel Deo vero quid offeratur, et hinc intellegere ubi aedificium, et ubi ruina sit morum. Quis autem huic dixit vel inspiravit, nisi diabolicus spiritus, tam uanum apertumque mendacium, quod daemones ab Hebraeis coli prohibitos reuereantur potius, quam oderint Christiani? Sed Deus ille, quem coluerunt sapientes Hebraeorum, etiam caelestibus sanctis angelis et virtutibus Dei, quos beatissimos tamquam cives in hac nostra peregrinatione mortali veneramur et amamus, sacrificari uetat intonans in lege sua, quam dedit Hebraeo populo suo, et valde minaciter dicens: Sacrificans diis eradicabitur. Et ne quisquam putaret daemonibus pessimis terrenisque spiritibus, quos iste dicit minimos vel minores, ne sacrificetur esse praeceptum (quia et ipsi in scripturis sanctis dicti sunt dii, non Hebraeorum, sed gentium; quod evidenter in psalmo septuaginta interpretes posuerunt, dicentes: Quoniam <omnes> dii gentium daemonia), _ ne quis ergo putaret istis quidem daemoniis prohibitum, caelestibus autem vel omnibus vel aliquibus sacrificari esse permissum, mox addidit: Nisi Domino soli, id est nisi Domino tantum; ne forte in eo, quod ait: Domino soli, Dominum solem credat esse quispiam, cui sacrificandum putet; quod non ita esse intellegendum in scripturis Graecis facillime reperitur. Deus igitur Hebraeorum, cui tam magnum tantus etiam iste philosophus perhibet testimonium, legem dedit Hebraeo populo suo, Hebraeo sermone conscriptam, non obscuram et incognitam, sed omnibus iam gentibus diffamatam, in qua lege scriptum est: Sacrificans diis eradicabitur nisi Domino tantum. Quid opus est in hac eius lege ei usque prophetis de hac re multa perquirere; immo non perquirere, non enim abstrusa vel rara sunt, sed aperta et crebra colligere et in hac disputatione mea ponere, quibus luce clarius apparet nulli omnino nisi tantum sibi Deum verum et summum voluisse sacrificari? Ecce hoc unum breviter, immo granditer, minaciter, sed veraciter dictum ab illo Deo, quem tam excellenter eorum doctissimi praedicant, audiatur timeatur impleatur, ne inoboedientes eradicatio consequatur. Sacrificans, inquit, diis eradicabitur nisi Domino tantum; non quo rei egeat alicuius, sed quia nobis expedit, ut res eius simus. Huic enim canitur in sacris litteris Hebraeorum: Dixi Domino; Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. Huius autem praeclarissimum atque optimum sacrificium nos Ipsi sumus, hoc est civitas eius, cuius rei mysterium celebramus oblationibus nostris, quae fidelibus notae sunt, sicut in libris praecedentibus disputavimus. Cessaturas enim victimas, quas in umbra futuri offerebant Iudaei, et unum sacrificium gentes a solis ortu usque ad occasum, sicut iam fieri cernimus, oblaturas per prophetas Hebraeos oracula increpuere divina; ex quibus quantum satis visum est, nonnulla protulimus et huic iam operi adspersimus. Quapropter ubi non est ista iustitia, ut secundum suam gratiam civitati oboedienti Deus imperet unus et summus, ne cuiquam sacrificet nisi tantum sibi, et per hoc in omnibus hominibus ad eandem civitatem pertinentibus atque oboedientibus Deo animus etiam corpori atque ratio vitiis ordine legitimo fideliter imperet; ut, quem ad modum iustus unus, ita coetus populusque iustorum vivat ex fide, quae operatur per dilectionem, qua homo diligit Deum, sicut diligendus est Deus, et proximum sicut semet ipsum, _ ubi ergo non est ista iustitia, profecto non est coetus hominum iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Quod si non est, utique populus non est, si vera est haec populi definitio. Ergo nec res publica est, quia res populi non est, ubi ipse populus non est. ||For in his book called ?? ?????? f???s?f?a?, in which he collects and comments upon the responses which he pretends were uttered by the gods concerning divine things, he says-I give his own words as they have been translated from the Greek: "To one who inquired what god he should propitiate in order to recall his wife from Christianity, Apollo replied in the following verses." Then the following words are given as those of Apollo: "You will probably find it easier to write lasting characters on the water, or lightly fly like a bird through the air, than to restore right feeling in your impious wife once she has polluted herself. Let her remain as she pleases in her foolish deception, and sing false laments to her dead God, who was condemned by right-minded judges, and perished ignominiously by a violent death." Then after these verses of Apollo (which we have given in a Latin version that does not preserve the metrical form), he goes on to say: "In these verses Apollo exposed the incurable corruption of the Christians, saying that the Jews, rather than the Christians, recognized God." See how he misrepresents Christ, giving the Jews the preference to the Christians in the recognition of God. This was his explanation of Apollo's verses, in which he says that Christ was put to death by right-minded or just judges,-in other words, that He deserved to die. I leave the responsibility of this oracle regarding Christ on the lying interpreter of Apollo, or on this philosopher who believed it or possibly himself invented it; as to its agreement with Porphyry's opinions or with other oracles, we shall in a little have something to say. In this passage, however, he says that the Jews, as the interpreters of God, judged justly in pronouncing Christ to be worthy of the most shameful death. He should have listened, then, to this God of the Jews to whom he bears this testimony, when that God says, "He that sacrifices to any other god save to the Lord alone shall be utterly destroyed." But let us come to still plainer expressions, and hear how great a God Porphyry thinks the God of the Jews is. Apollo, he says, when asked whether word, i.e., reason, or law is the better thing, replied in the following verses. Then he gives the verses of Apollo, from which I select the following as sufficient: "God, the Generator, and the King prior to all things, before whom heaven and earth, and the sea, and the hidden places of hell tremble, and the deities themselves are afraid, for their law is the Father whom the holy Hebrews honor." In this oracle of his god Apollo, Porphyry avowed that the God of the Hebrews is so great that the deities themselves are afraid before Him. I am surprised, therefore, that when God said, He that sacrifices to other gods shall be utterly destroyed, Porphyry himself was not afraid lest he should be destroyed for sacrificing to other gods.This philosopher, however, has also some good to say of Christ, oblivious, as it were, of that contumely of his of which we have just been speaking; or as if his gods spoke evil of Christ only while asleep, and recognized Him to be good, and gave Him His deserved praise, when they awoke. For, as if he were about to proclaim some marvellous thing passing belief, he says, "What we are going to say will certainly take some by surprise. For the gods have declared that Christ was very pious, and has become immortal, and that they cherish his memory: that the Christians, however, are polluted, contaminated, and involved in error. And many other such things," he says, "do the gods say against the Christians." Then he gives specimens of the accusations made, as he says, by the gods against them, and then goes on: "But to some who asked Hecate whether Christ were a God, she replied, You know the condition of the disembodied immortal soul, and that if it has been severed from wisdom it always errs. The soul you refer to is that of a man foremost in piety: they worship it because they mistake the truth." To this so-called oracular response he adds the following words of his own: "Of this very pious man, then, Hecate said that the soul, like the souls of other good men, was after death dowered with immortality, and that the Christians through ignorance worship it. And to those who ask why he was condemned to die, the oracle of the goddess replied, The body, indeed, is always exposed to torments, but the souls of the pious abide in heaven. And the soul you inquire about has been the fatal cause of error to other souls which were not fated to receive the gifts of the gods, and to have the knowledge of immortal Jove. Such souls are therefore hated by the gods; for they who were fated not to receive the gifts of the gods, and not to know God, were fated to be involved in error by means of him you speak of. He himself, however, was good, and heaven has been opened to him as to other good men. You are not, then, to speak evil of him, but to pity the folly of men: and through him men's danger is imminent."Who is so foolish as not to see that these oracles were either composed by a clever man with a strong animus against the Christians, or were uttered as responses by impure demons with a similar design,-that is to say, in order that their praise of Christ may win credence for their vituperation of Christians; and that thus they may, if possible, close the way of eternal salvation, which is identical with Christianity? For they believe that they are by no means counter working their own hurtful craft by promoting belief in Christ, so long as their calumniation of Christians is also accepted; for they thus secure that even the man who thinks well of Christ declines to become a Christian, and is therefore not delivered from their own rule by the Christ he praises. Besides, their praise of Christ is so contrived that whosoever believes in Him as thus represented will not be a true Christian but a Photinian heretic, recognizing only the humanity, and not also the divinity of Christ, and will thus be precluded from salvation and from deliverance out of the meshes of these devilish lies. For our part, we are no better pleased with Hecate's praises of Christ than with Apollo's calumniation of Him. Apollo says that Christ was put to death by right-minded judges, implying that He was unrighteous. Hecate says that He was a most pious man, but no more. The intention of both is the same, to prevent men from becoming Christians, because if this be secured, men shall never be rescued from their power. But it is incumbent on our philosopher, or rather on those who believe in these pretended oracles against the Christians, first of all, if they can, to bring Apollo and Hecate to the same mind regarding Christ, so that either both may condemn or both praise Him. And even if they succeeded in this, we for our part would notwithstanding repudiate the testimony of demons, whether favorable or adverse to Christ. But when our adversaries find a god and goddess of their own at variance about Christ the one praising, the other vituperating Him, they can certainly give no credence, if they have any judgment, to mere men who blaspheme the Christians.When Porphyry or Hecate praises Christ, and adds that He gave Himself to the Christians as a fatal gift, that they might be involved in error, he exposes, as he thinks, the causes of this error. But before I cite his words to that purpose, I would ask, If Christ did thus give Himself to the Christians to involve them in error, did He do so willingly, or against His will? If willingly, how is He righteous? If against His will, how is He blessed? However, let us hear the causes of this error. "There are," he says," in a certain place very small earthly spirits, subject to the power of evil demons. The wise men of the Hebrews, among whom was this Jesus, as you have heard from the oracles of Apollo cited above, turned religious persons from these very wicked demons and minor spirits, and taught them rather to worship the celestial gods, and especially to adore God the Father. This," he said, "the gods enjoin; and we have already shown how they admonish the soul to turn to God, and command it to worship Him. But the ignorant and the ungodly, who are not destined to receive favors from the gods, nor to know the immortal Jupiter, not listening to the gods and their messages, have turned away from all gods, and have not only refused to hate, but have venerated the prohibited demons. Professing to worship God, they refuse to do those things by which alone God is worshipped. For God, indeed, being the Father of all, is in need of nothing; but for us it is good to adore Him by means of justice, chastity, and other virtues, and thus to make life itself a prayer to Him, by inquiring into and imitating His nature. For inquiry," says he, "purifies and imitation deifies us, by moving us nearer to Him." He is right in so far as he proclaims God the Father, and the conduct by which we should worship Him. Of such precepts the prophetic books of the Hebrews are full, when they praise or blame the life of the saints. But in speaking of the Christians he is in error, and caluminates them as much as is desired by the demons whom he takes for gods, as if it were difficult for any man to recollect the disgraceful and shameful actions which used to be done in the theatres and temples to please the gods, and to compare with these things what is heard in our churches, and what is offered to the true God, and from this comparison to conclude where character is edified, and where it is ruined. But who but a diabolical spirit has told or suggested to this man so manifest and vain a lie, as that the Christians reverenced rather than hated the demons, whose worship the Hebrews prohibited? But that God, whom the Hebrew sages worshipped, forbids sacrifice to be offered even to the holy angels of heaven and divine powers, whom we, in this our pilgrimage, venerate and love as our most blessed fellow-citizens. For in the law which God gave to His Hebrew people He utters this menace, as in a voice of thunder: "He that sacrifices unto any god, save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed." Exodus 22:20 And that no one might suppose that this prohibition extends only to the very wicked demons and earthly spirits, whom this philosopher calls very small and inferior,-for even these are in the Scripture called gods, not of the Hebrews, but of the nations, as the Septuagint translators have shown in the psalm where it is said, "For all the gods of the nations are demons,"-that no one might suppose, I say, that sacrifice to these demons was prohibited, but that sacrifice might be offered to all or some of the celestials, it was immediately added, "save unto the Lord alone." The God of the Hebrews, then, to whom this renowned philosopher bears this signal testimony, gave to His Hebrew people a law, composed in the Hebrew language, and not obscure and unknown, but published now in every nation, and in this law it is written, "He that sacrifices unto any god, save unto the Lord alone, he shall be utterly destroyed." What need is there to seek further proofs in the law or the prophets of this same thing? Seek, we need not say, for the passages are neither few nor difficult to find; but what need to collect and apply to my argument the proofs which are thickly sown and obvious, and by which it appears clear as day that sacrifice may be paid to none but the supreme and true God? Here is one brief but decided, even menacing, and certainly true utterance of that God whom the wisest of our adversaries so highly extol. Let this be listened to, feared, fulfilled, that there may be no disobedient soul cut off. "He that sacrifices," He says, not because He needs anything, but because it behoves us to be His possession. Hence the Psalmist in the Hebrew Scriptures sings, "I have said to the Lord, You are my God, for Thou needest not my good." For we ourselves, who are His own city, are His most noble and worthy sacrifice, and it is this mystery we celebrate in our sacrifices, which are well known to the faithful, as we have explained in the preceding books. For through the prophets the oracles of God declared that the sacrifices which the Jews offered as a shadow of that which was to be would cease, and that the nations, from the rising to the setting of the sun, would offer one sacrifice. From these oracles, which we now see accomplished, we have made such selections as seemed suitable to our purpose in this work. And therefore, where there is not this righteousness whereby the one supreme God rules the obedient city according to His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him, and whereby, in all the citizens of this obedient city, the soul consequently rules the body and reason the vices in the rightful order, so that, as the individual just man, so also the community and people of the just, live by faith, which works by love, that love whereby man loves God as He ought to be loved, and his neighbor as himself,-there, I say, there is not an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and by a community of interests. But if there is not this, there is not a people, if our definition be true, and therefore there is no republic; for where there is no people there can be no republic.
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||<div id="c24"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XXIV] Si autem populus non isto, sed alio definiatur modo, velut si dicatur; "Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus", profecto, ut videatur qualis quisque populus sit, illa sunt intuenda, quae diligit. Quaecumque tamen diligat, si coetus est multitudinis non pecorum, sed rationalium creaturarum et eorum quae diligit concordi communione sociatus est, non absurde populus nuncupatur; tanto utique melior, quanto in melioribus, tantoque deterior, quanto est in deterioribus concors. Secundum istam definitionem nostram Romanus populus populus est et res eius sine dubitatione res publica. Quid autem primis temporibus suis quidue sequentibus populus ille dilexerit et quibus moribus ad cruentissimas seditiones atque inde ad socialia atque civilia bella perveniens ipsam concordiam, quae salus est quodam modo populi, ruperit atque corruperit, testatur historia; de qua in praecedentibus libris multa posuimus. Nec ideo tamen vel ipsum non esse populum vel eius rem dixerim non esse rem publicam, quamdiu manet qualiscumque rationalis multitudinis coetus, rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus. Quod autem de isto populo et de ista re publica dixi, hoc de Atheniensium vel quorumcumque Graecorum, hoc de Aegyptiorum, hoc de illa priore Babylone Assyriorum, quando in rebus publicis suis imperia vel parua vel magna tenuerunt, et de alia quacumque aliarum gentium intellegar dixisse atque sensisse. Generaliter quippe civitas impiorum, cui non imperat Deus oboedienti sibi, ut sacrificium non offerat nisi tantummodo sibi, et per hoc in illa et animus corpori ratioque vitiis recte ac fideliter imperet, caret iustitiae veritate. ||But if we discard this definition of a people, and, assuming another, say that a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love, then, in order to discover the character of any people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet whatever it loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings and not of beasts, and is bound together by an agreement as to the objects of love, it is reasonably called a people; and it will be a superior people in proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it is bound together by lower. According to this definition of ours, the Roman people is a people, and its weal is without doubt a commonwealth or republic. But what its tastes were in its early and subsequent days, and how it declined into sanguinary seditions and then to social and civil wars, and so burst asunder or rotted off the bond of concord in which the health of a people consists, history shows, and in the preceding books I have related at large. And yet I would not on this account say either that it was not a people, or that its administration was not a republic, so long as there remains an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of love. But what I say of this people and of this republic I must be understood to think and say of the Athenians or any Greek state, of the Egyptians, of the early Assyrian Babylon, and of every other nation, great or small, which had a public government. For, in general, the city of the ungodly, which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save to Him alone, and which, therefore, could not give to the soul its proper command over the body, nor to the reason its just authority over the vices, is void of true justice.
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||<div id="c25"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XXV] Quamlibet enim videatur animus corpori et ratio vitiis laudabiliter imperare, si Deo animus et ratio ipsa non seruit, sicut sibi esse seruiendum ipse Deus praecepit, nullo modo corpori vitiisque recte imperat. Nam qualis corporis atque vitiorum potest esse mens domina veri Dei nescia nec eius imperio subiugata, sed vitiosissimis daemonibus corrumpentibus prostituta? Proinde virtutes, quas habere sibi videtur, per quas imperat corpori et vitiis, ad quodlibet adipiscendum vel tenendum rettulerit nisi ad Deum, etiam ipsae vitia sunt potius quam virtutes. Nam licet a quibusdam tunc verae atque honestae putentur esse virtutes, cum referuntur ad se ipsas nec propter aliud expetuntur: etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt, ideo non virtutes, sed vitia iudicanda sunt. Sicut enim non est a carne sed super carnem, quod carnem facit vivere: sic non est ab homine sed super hominem, quod hominem facit beate vivere; nec solum hominem, sed etiam quamlibet potestatem virtutemque caelestem. ||For though the soul may seem to rule the body admirably, and the reason the vices, if the soul and reason do not themselves obey God, as God has commanded them to serve Him, they have no proper authority over the body and the vices. For what kind of mistress of the body and the vices can that mind be which is ignorant of the true God, and which, instead of being subject to His authority, is prostituted to the corrupting influences of the most vicious demons? It is for this reason that the virtues which it seems to itself to possess, and by which it restrains the body and the vices that it may obtain and keep what it desires, are rather vices than virtues so long as there is no reference to God in the matter. For although some suppose that virtues which have a reference only to themselves, and are desired only on their own account, are yet true and genuine virtues, the fact is that even then they are inflated with pride, and are therefore to be reckoned vices rather than virtues. For as that which gives life to the flesh is not derived from flesh, but is above it, so that which gives blessed life to man is not derived from man, but is something above him; and what I say of man is true of every celestial power and virtue whatsoever.
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||<div id="c26"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XXVI] Quocirca ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est, de quo dicunt sacrae litterae Hebraeorum: Beatus populus, cuius est Dominus Deus ipsius. Miser igitur populus ab isto alienatus Deo. Diligit tamen etiam ipse quandam pacem suam non inprobandam, quam quidem non habebit in fine, quia non ea bene utitur ante finem. Hanc autem ut interim habeat in hac vita, etiam nostri interest; quoniam, quamdiu permixtae sunt ambae civitates, utimur et nos pace Babylonis; ex qua ita per fidem populus Dei liberatur, ut apud hanc interim peregrinetur. Propter quod et apostolus admonuit ecclesiam, ut oraret pro regibus eius atque sublimibus, addens et dicens: Vt quietam et tranquillam vitam agamus cum omni pietate et caritate, et propheta Hieremias, cum populo Dei ueteri praenuntiaret captivitatem et divinitus imperaret, ut oboedienter irent in Babyloniam Deo suo etiam ista patientia seruientes, monuit et ipse ut oraretur pro illa dicens: Quia in eius est pace pax uestra, utique interim temporalis, quae bonis malisque communis est. ||Wherefore, as the life of the flesh is the soul, so the blessed life of man is God, of whom the sacred writings of the Hebrews say, "Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord." Miserable, therefore, is the people which is alienated from God. Yet even this people has a peace of its own which is not to be lightly esteemed, though, indeed, it shall not in the end enjoy it, because it makes no good use of it before the end. But it is our interest that it enjoy this peace meanwhile in this life; for as long as the two cities are commingled, we also enjoy the peace of Babylon. For from Babylon the people of God is so freed that it meanwhile sojourns in its company. And therefore the apostle also admonished the Church to pray for kings and those in authority, assigning as the reason, "that we may live a quiet and tranquil life in all godliness and love." And the prophet Jeremiah, when predicting the captivity that was to befall the ancient people of God, and giving them the divine command to go obediently to Babylonia, and thus serve their God, counselled them also to pray for Babylonia, saying, "In the peace thereof shall you have peace," -the temporal peace which the good and the wicked together enjoy.
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||<div id="c27"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XXVII] Pax autem nostra propria et hic est cum Deo per fidem et in aeternum erit cum illo per speciem. Sed hic sive illa communis sive nostra propria talis est pax, ut solacium miseriae sit potius quam beatitudinis gaudium. Ipsa quoque nostra iustitia, quamuis vera sit propter verum boni finem, ad quem refertur, tamen tanta est in hac vita, ut potius remissione peccatorum constet quam perfectione virtutum. Testis est oratio totius civitatis Dei, quae peregrinatur in terris. Per omnia quippe membra sua clamat ad Deum: Dimittc nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris. Nec pro eis est efficax haec oratio, quorum fides sine operibus mortua est; sed pro eis, quorum fides per dilectionem operatur. Quia enim Deo quidem subdita, in hac tamen condicione mortali et corpore corruptibili, quod adgrauat animam, non perfecte vitiis imperat ratio, ideo necessaria est iustis talis oratio. Nam profecto quamquam imperetur, nequaquam sine conflictu vitiis imperatur; et utique subrepit aliquid in hoc loco infirmitatis etiam bene confligenti sive hostibus talibus victis subditisque dominanti, unde si non facili operatione, certe labili locutione aut volatili cogitatione peccetur. Et ideo, quamdiu vitiis imperatur, plena pax non est, quia et illa, quae resistunt, periculoso debellantur proelio, et illa, quae victa sunt, nondum securo triumphantur otio, sed adhuc sollicito premuntur imperio. In his ergo temptationibus, de quibus omnibus in divinis eloquiis breviter dictum est: Numquid non temptatio est vita humana super terram? quis ita vivere se praesumat, ut dicere Deo: Dimitte nobis debita nostra necesse non habeat nisi homo elatus? nec vero magnus, sed inflatus ac tumidus, cui per iustitiam resistit, qui gratiam largitur humilibus. Propter quod scriptum est: Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam. Hic itaque in unoquoque iustitia est, ut oboedienti Deus homini, animus corpori, ratio autem vitiis etiam repugnantibus imperet, vel subigendo vel resistendo, atque ut ab ipso Deo petatur et meritorum gratia et venia delictorum ac de acceptis bonis gratiarum actio persolvatur. In illa vero pace finali, quo referenda et cuius adipiscendae causa habenda est ista iustitia, quoniam sanata inmortalitate atque incorruptione natura vitia non habebit nec unicuique nostrum vel ab alio vel a se ipso quippiam repugnabit, non opus erit ut ratio vitiis, quae nulla erunt, imperet; sed imperabit Deus homini, animus corpori, tantaque ibi erit oboediendi suavitas et facilitas, quanta vivendi regnandique felicitas. Et hoc illic in omnibus atque in singulis aeternum erit aeternumque esse certum erit, et ideo pax beatitudinis huius vel beatitudo pacis huius summum bonum erit. ||But the peace which is peculiar to ourselves we enjoy now with God by faith, and shall hereafter enjoy eternally with Him by sight. But the peace which we enjoy in this life, whether common to all or peculiar to ourselves, is rather the solace of our misery than the positive enjoyment of felicity. Our very righteousness, too, though true in so far as it has respect to the true good, is yet in this life of such a kind that it consists rather in the remission of sins than in the perfecting of virtues. Witness the prayer of the whole city of God in its pilgrim state, for it cries to God by the mouth of all its members, "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." Matthew 6:12 And this prayer is efficacious not for those whose faith is "without works and dead," James 2:17 but for those whose faith "works by love." Galatians 5:6 For as reason, though subjected to God, is yet "pressed down by the corruptible body," Wisdom 9:15 so long as it is in this mortal condition, it has not perfect authority over vice, and therefore this prayer is needed by the righteous. For though it exercises authority, the vices do not submit without a struggle. For however well one maintains the conflict, and however thoroughly he has subdued these enemies, there steals in some evil thing, which, if it does not find ready expression in act, slips out by the lips, or insinuates itself into the thought; and therefore his peace is not full so long as he is at war with his vices. For it is a doubtful conflict he wages with those that resist, and his victory over those that are defeated is not secure, but full of anxiety and effort. Amidst these temptations, therefore, of all which it has been summarily said in the divine oracles, "Is not human life upon earth a temptation?" Job 7:1 who but a proud man can presume that he so lives that he has no need to say to God, "Forgive us our debts?" And such a man is not great, but swollen and puffed up with vanity, and is justly resisted by Him who abundantly gives grace to the humble. Whence it is said, "God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble." In this, then, consists the righteousness of a man, that he submit himself to God, his body to his soul, and his vices, even when they rebel, to his reason, which either defeats or at least resists them; and also that he beg from God grace to do his duty, and the pardon of his sins, and that he render to God thanks for all the blessings he receives. But, in that final peace to which all our righteousness has reference, and for the sake of which it is maintained, as our nature shall enjoy a sound immortality and incorruption, and shall have no more vices, and as we shall experience no resistance either from ourselves or from others, it will not be necessary that reason should rule vices which no longer exist, but God shall rule the man, and the soul shall rule the body, with a sweetness and facility suitable to the felicity of a life which is done with bondage. And this condition shall there be eternal, and we shall be assured of its eternity; and thus the peace of this blessedness and the blessedness of this peace shall be the supreme good.
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||<div id="c28"><b>BOOK XIX</b> [XXVIII] Eorum autem, qui non pertinent ad istam civitatem Dei, erit e contrario miseria sempiterna, quae mors etiam secunda dicitur, quia nec anima ibi vivere dicenda est, quae a vita Dei alienata erit, nec corpus, quod aeternis doloribus subiacebit; ac per hoc ideo durior ista secunda mors erit, quia finiri morte non poterit. Sed quoniam sicut miseria beatitudini et mors vitae, ita bellum paci videtur esse contrarium: merito quaeritur, sicut pax in bonorum finibus praedicata est atque laudata, quod vel quale bellum e contrario in finibus malorum possit intellegi. Verum qui hoc quaerit, adtendat quid in bello noxium perniciosumque sit, et videbit nihil aliud quam rerum esse inter se adversitatem atque conflictum. Quod igitur bellum gravius et amarius cogitari potest, quam ubi voluntas sic adversa est passioni et passio voluntati, ut nullius earum victoria tales inimicitiae finiantur, et ubi sic confligit cum ipsa natura corporis vis doloris, ut neutrum alteri cedat? Hic enim quando contingit iste conflictus, aut dolor vincit et sensum mors adimit, aut natura vincit et dolorem sanitas tollit. Ibi autem et dolor permanet ut affligat, et natura perdurat ut sentiat; quia utrumque ideo non deficit, ne poena deficiat. Ad hos autem fines bonorum et malorum, illos expetendos, istos cavendos, quoniam per iudicium transibunt ad illos boni, ad istos mali: de hoc iudicio, quantum Deus donaverit, in consequenti volumine disputabo. ||But, on the other hand, they who do not belong to this city of God shall inherit eternal misery, which is also called the second death, because the soul shall then be separated from God its life, and therefore cannot be said to live, and the body shall be subjected to eternal pains. And consequently this second death shall be the more severe, because no death shall terminate it. But war being contrary to peace, as misery to happiness, and life to death, it is not without reason asked what kind of war can be found in the end of the wicked answering to the peace which is declared to be the end of the righteous? The person who puts this question has only to observe what it is in war that is hurtful and destructive, and he shall see that it is nothing else than the mutual opposition and conflict of things. And can he conceive a more grievous and bitter war than that in which the will is so opposed to passion, and passion to the will, that their hostility can never be terminated by the victory of either, and in which the violence of pain so conflicts with the nature of the body, that neither yields to the other? For in this life, when this conflict has arisen, either pain conquers and death expels the feeling of it, or nature conquers and health expels the pain. But in the world to come the pain continues that it may torment, and the nature endures that it may be sensible of it; and neither ceases to exist, lest punishment also should cease. Now, as it is through the last judgment that men pass to these ends, the good to the supreme good, the evil to the supreme evil, I will treat of this judgment in the following book.

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