Changes

=====1.3.5.1.  The Will to Form=====

=====1.3.5.1.  The Will to Form=====

The power of form, the will to give form to oneself.  "Happiness" admitted as a goal.  Much strength and energy behind the emphasis on forms.  The delight in looking at a life that seems so easy. - To the French, the Greeks looked like children.

(Nietzsche, The Will to Power S94, 58).

The power of form, the will to give form to oneself.  "Happiness" admitted as a goal.  Much strength and energy behind the emphasis on forms.  The delight in looking at a life that seems so easy. — To the French, the Greeks looked like children.

| align="right" | Nietzsche, ''The Will to Power'' S94, 58

Let me see if can summarize as quickly as possible the problem that I see before me.  Each time that I try to express my experience, to lend it a form that others can recognize, to put it in a shape that I myself can later recall, or to store it in a state that allows me the chance of its re-experience, I generate an image of the way things are, or at least a description of how things seem to me.  I call this process "reflection", since it fabricates an image in a medium of signs that reflects an aspect of experience.  Often this experience can be said to be "of" - what? - something that exists or persists at least partially outside the immediate experience, some action, event, or object that is imagined to inform the present experience, or perhaps some conduct of one's own that obtrudes for a moment into the world of others and meets with a reaction there.  In all of these cases, where the experience is everted to refer to an object and becomes the attribute of something with an external aspect, something that is thus supposed to be a prior cause of the experience, the reflection on experience doubles as a reflection on that conduct, performance, or transaction that the experience is an experience "of".  In short, if the experience has an eversion that makes it of an object, then its reflection is again a reflection that is also of this object.

Let me see if can summarize as quickly as possible the problem that I see before me.  Each time that I try to express my experience, to lend it a form that others can recognize, to put it in a shape that I myself can later recall, or to store it in a state that allows me the chance of its re-experience, I generate an image of the way things are, or at least a description of how things seem to me.  I call this process "reflection", since it fabricates an image in a medium of signs that reflects an aspect of experience.  Often this experience can be said to be "of" - what? - something that exists or persists at least partially outside the immediate experience, some action, event, or object that is imagined to inform the present experience, or perhaps some conduct of one's own that obtrudes for a moment into the world of others and meets with a reaction there.  In all of these cases, where the experience is everted to refer to an object and becomes the attribute of something with an external aspect, something that is thus supposed to be a prior cause of the experience, the reflection on experience doubles as a reflection on that conduct, performance, or transaction that the experience is an experience "of".  In short, if the experience has an eversion that makes it of an object, then its reflection is again a reflection that is also of this object.