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==Anthesis==

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Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun.

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Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun.

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— C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.274

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— C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.274

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One of Peirce's clearest and most complete definitions of a sign is one he gives in the context of providing a definition for logic, and so it is informative to view it in that setting.

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Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.  Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C.

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Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic.  A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.  Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C.~~ ~~ It is from this definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized.&~~nbsp~~; (C.S. Peirce, ~~NEM~~ 4, 20–21).

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It is from this definition, together with a definition of “formal”, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.  I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non‑psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized.

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— C.S. Peirce, New Elements of Mathematics, vol. 4, 20–21

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In the general discussion of diverse theories of signs, the question ~~frequently~~ arises whether signhood is an absolute, essential, indelible, or ontological property of a thing, or whether it is a relational, interpretive, and mutable role a thing ~~can~~ be said to have only within a particular context of relationships.

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In the general discussion of diverse theories of signs, the question arises whether signhood is an absolute, essential, indelible, or ontological property of a thing, or whether it is a relational, interpretive, and mutable role a thing may be said to have only within a particular context of relationships.

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Peirce's definition of a sign defines it in relation to its ~~object~~ and its interpretant ~~sign~~, and thus it defines signhood in ~~[[logic of relatives|~~relative terms]], by means of a predicate with three places.  In ~~this~~ definition, signhood is a role in a [[triadic relation]], a role a thing bears or plays in a ~~given~~ context of relationships — it is not an absolute, non‑relative property of a thing‑in‑itself, one it possesses independently of all relationships to other things.

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Peirce's definition of a sign defines it in relation to its objects and its interpretant signs, and thus defines signhood in relative terms, by means of a predicate with three places.  In that definition, signhood is a role in a triadic relation, a role a thing bears or plays in a determinate context of relationships — it is not an absolute or non‑relative property of a thing‑in‑itself, one it possesses independently of all relationships to other things.

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Some of the terms ~~that~~ Peirce uses in his definition of a sign may need to be elaborated for the contemporary reader.

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Some of the terms Peirce uses in his definition of a sign may need to be elaborated for the contemporary reader.

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<ul>

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<ul><li>Correspondence.  From the way Peirce uses the term throughout his work, it is clear he means what he elsewhere calls a “triple correspondence”, and thus this is just another way of referring to the whole triadic sign relation itself.  In particular, his use of the term should not be taken to imply a dyadic correspondence, like the kinds of “mirror image” correspondence between realities and representations bandied about in contemporary controversies about “correspondence theories of truth”.</li></ul>

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<li>Correspondence.  From the way ~~that~~ Peirce uses ~~this~~ term throughout his work, it is clear ~~that~~ he means what he elsewhere calls a “triple correspondence”, and thus this is just another way of referring to the whole triadic sign relation itself.  In particular, his use of ~~this~~ term should not be taken to imply a dyadic correspondence, like the kinds of “mirror image” correspondence between realities and representations ~~that are~~ bandied about in contemporary controversies about “correspondence theories of truth”.</li>

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<li>Determination.  Peirce's concept of determination is broader in several directions than the sense of the word ~~that refers~~ to strictly deterministic causal-temporal processes.  First, and especially in this context, he is invoking a more general concept of determination, what is called a formal or informational determination, as in saying “two points determine a line”, rather than the more special cases of causal and temporal determinisms.  Second, he characteristically allows for what is called determination in measure, that is, an order of determinism ~~that admits~~ a full spectrum of more and less determined relationships.</li>

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<ul><li>Determination.  Peirce's concept of determination is broader in several directions than the sense of the word referring to strictly deterministic causal‑temporal processes.  First, and especially in this context, he is invoking a more general concept of determination, what is called a formal or informational determination, as in saying “two points determine a line”, rather than the more special cases of causal and temporal determinisms.  Second, he characteristically allows for what is called determination in measure, that is, an order of determinism admitting a full spectrum of more and less determined relationships.</li></ul>

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<li>Non-psychological.  Peirce's “non-psychological conception of logic” must be distinguished from any variety of anti-psychologism.  He was quite interested in matters of psychology and had much of import to say about them.  But logic and psychology operate on different planes of study even when they have occasion to view the same data, as logic is a [[normative science]] where psychology is a [[descriptive science]], and so they have very different aims, methods, and rationales.</li>

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<ul><li>Non‑psychological.  Peirce's “non‑psychological conception of logic” must be distinguished from any variety of anti‑psychologism.  He was quite interested in matters of psychology and had much of import to say about them.  But logic and psychology operate on different planes of study even when they have occasion to view the same data, as logic is a normative science where psychology is a descriptive science, and so they have very different aims, methods, and rationales.</li></ul>

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==Signs and inquiry==

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: Main article : [[Inquiry]]

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<ul><li>Main article : [[Inquiry]]</li></ul>

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There is a close relationship between the pragmatic theory of signs and the pragmatic theory of [[inquiry]].  In fact, the correspondence between the two studies exhibits so many congruences and parallels ~~that~~ it is often best to treat them as integral parts of one and the same subject.  In a very real sense, inquiry is the process by which sign relations come to be established and continue to evolve.  In other words, inquiry, “thinking” in its best sense, “is a term denoting the various ways in which things acquire significance” (~~John~~ Dewey).~~  Thus, there is~~ an active ~~and~~ intricate form of cooperation ~~that needs to be appreciated and maintained~~ between ~~these~~ converging modes of investigation.  Its proper character is best understood by realizing ~~that~~ the theory of inquiry is adapted to study the developmental aspects of sign relations, a subject ~~which~~ the theory of signs is specialized to treat from structural ~~and comparative~~ points of view.

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There is a close relationship between the pragmatic theory of signs and the pragmatic theory of inquiry.  In fact, the correspondence between the two studies exhibits so many congruences and parallels it is often best to treat them as integral parts of one and the same subject.  In a very real sense, inquiry is the process by which sign relations come to be established and continue to evolve.  In other words, inquiry, “thinking” in its best sense, “is a term denoting the various ways in which things acquire significance” (Dewey, 38).

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Tracing the passage of inquiry through the medium of signs calls for an active, intricate form of cooperation between the converging modes of investigation.  Its proper character is best understood by realizing the theory of inquiry is adapted to study the developmental aspects of sign relations, a subject the theory of signs is specialized to treat from comparative and structural points of view.

==Examples of sign relations==

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==References==

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* Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.  [https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Archive].  [https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052 Journal].  [https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey/Papers/1302117/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry ~~Online~~].

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* Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), pp. 40–52.  [https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html Archive].  [https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052 Journal].  Online [https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey/Papers/1302117/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry (doc)] [https://www.academia.edu/57812482/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry (pdf)].

* Deledalle, Gérard (2000), C.S. Peirce's Philosophy of Signs, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN.

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* Dewey, John. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY. [https://www.gutenberg.org/files/37423/37423-h/37423-h.htm Online].

* Eisele, Carolyn (1979), in Studies in the Scientific and Mathematical Philosophy of C.S. Peirce, Richard Milton Martin (ed.), Mouton, The Hague.

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* Murphey, M. (1961), The Development of Peirce's Thought.  Reprinted, Hackett, Indianapolis, IN, 1993.

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* Peirce, C.S. (1902), “Parts of Carnegie Application” (L 75), in Carolyn Eisele (ed., 1976), The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, 13–73.  [https://cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/l75.htm Online].

* Percy, Walker (2000), pp. 271–291 in Signposts in a Strange Land, P. Samway (ed.), Saint Martin's Press.

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* [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sign_relation&oldid=161631069 Sign Relation], [https://en.wikipedia.org/ Wikipedia]

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[[Category:Charles Sanders Peirce]]

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[[Category:Cognitive science]]

[[Category:Computer science]]

[[Category:Graph theory]]

Jon Awbrey

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Sign relation (view source)

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