Changes

In many cases the three senses of the word ''system'' reflect distinctive orders of structure and function in the types of systems indicated, suggesting that there is something essential and substantive about the distinctions between objects, changes, and forms.  With regard to the underlying reality, however, these differences can be as artificial as any that conventional language poses between nouns, verbs, and sentences.  Of course, when the underlying system is degenerate, or not fully realized in all the relevant aspects, then it is fair to say that it falls under some categories more than others.  In the general case, however, the three senses of the word ''system'' merely embody the spectrum of attitudes and intentions that observing and interpreting agents can take up with respect to the same underlying type of system.

In many cases the three senses of the word ''system'' reflect distinctive orders of structure and function in the types of systems indicated, suggesting that there is something essential and substantive about the distinctions between objects, changes, and forms.  With regard to the underlying reality, however, these differences can be as artificial as any that conventional language poses between nouns, verbs, and sentences.  Of course, when the underlying system is degenerate, or not fully realized in all the relevant aspects, then it is fair to say that it falls under some categories more than others.  In the general case, however, the three senses of the word ''system'' merely embody the spectrum of attitudes and intentions that observing and interpreting agents can take up with respect to the same underlying type of system.

An object system may seem little more than a set, the barest attempt to unify a manifold of interesting phenomena under a common concept, but no object system becomes an object of discussion and thought without invoking the informal precursors of formal systems, in other words, systems of practice, casually taken up, that reflection has the power to formalize in time.  And any formal system, put to work in practice, has a temporal and dynamic aspect, especially in the transitions taking place from sign to interpretant sign that fill out its connotative component.  Thus, a formal system implicitly involves a temporal system, even if its own object system is not itself temporal in nature but rests in a stable, a static, or an abstract state.

An object system may seem little more than a set, the barest attempt to unify a manifold of interesting phenomena under a common concept, but no object system becomes an object of discussion and thought without invoking the informal precursors of formal systems, in other words, systems of practice, casually taken up, that reflection has the power to formalize in time.  And any formal system, put to work in practice, has a temporal and dynamic aspect, especially in the transitions taking place from sign to interpretant sign that fill out its connotative component.  Thus, a formal system implicitly involves a temporal system, even if its own object system is not itself temporal in nature but rests in a stable, a static, or an abstract state.

Formal systems and their SOPs are subject to conversion into object systems, becoming the objects of higher order formal systems through the operation of a critical intelectual step usually called "reflection".

Formal systems and their systems of practice are subject to conversion into object systems, becoming the objects of higher order formal systems through the operation of a critical intellectual step usually called ''reflection''.

Using the pragmatic theory of sign relations, I regard every OS in the context of a particular FS.  I take these two as one, for now, because an FS and its OS are defined in relation to each other and are not really separable in practice.  Later, I will discuss a form of independence that can exist between the two, but only in the derivative sense that many FSs can be brought to bear on what turn out to be equivalent OSs.

Using the pragmatic theory of sign relations, I regard every object system in the context of a particular formal system.  I take these two as one, for now, because a formal system and its object system are defined in relation to each other and are not really separable in practice.  Later, I will discuss a form of independence that can exist between the two, but only in the derivative sense that many formal systems can be brought to bear on what turn out to be equivalent object systems.

Any physical system, subject to recognizably lawful constraints, can generally be turned to use as a channel of communication, contingent only on the limitations imposed by its inherent informational capacity.  Therefore, any OS of sufficient capacity that resides under an agent's interpretive control can used as a medium for language and converted to convey the more specialized FS.

Any physical system, subject to recognizably lawful constraints, can generally be turned to use as a channel of communication, contingent only on the limitations imposed by its inherent informational capacity.  Therefore, any object system of sufficient capacity that resides under an agent's interpretive control can used as a medium for language and converted to convey the more specialized formal system.

In every situation, the three kinds of system, or views of a system, are naturally related to each other through the concept of a sign relation.  Applied in their turn, sign relations contain within themselves the germ of a particular idea, that no system can be called complete until it has the means to reflect on its own nature, at least in some measure.  Thus, by integrating the three senses of the word "system" within the notion of a sign relation, I am trying to make it as easy as possible to move around in a space of apparently indispensible perspectives.  To wit, regarding sign relations as formal objects in and of themselves, an intelligent agent needs the capacities:  (1) to reflect on the objective forms of their phenomenal appearances, and (2) to participate in the active forms of their interpretive conduct.  Further, an agent needs the flexibility to take up each of these stances toward sign relations at will, reflecting on them or joining in them as the situation demands.

In every situation, the three kinds of system, or views of a system, are naturally related to each other through the concept of a sign relation.  Applied in their turn, sign relations contain within themselves the germ of a particular idea, that no system can be called complete until it has the means to reflect on its own nature, at least in some measure.  Thus, by integrating the three senses of the word "system" within the notion of a sign relation, I am trying to make it as easy as possible to move around in a space of apparently indispensible perspectives.  To wit, regarding sign relations as formal objects in and of themselves, an intelligent agent needs the capacities:  (1) to reflect on the objective forms of their phenomenal appearances, and (2) to participate in the active forms of their interpretive conduct.  Further, an agent needs the flexibility to take up each of these stances toward sign relations at will, reflecting on them or joining in them as the situation demands.