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→Excerpt 14. Peirce (CE 1, 168–169)
====Excerpt 14. Peirce (CE 1, 168–169)====
====Excerpt 14. Peirce (CE 1, 168–169)====
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<p>Taking it for granted, then, that the inner and outer worlds are superposed throughout, without possibility of separation, let us now proceed to another point. There is a third world, besides the inner and the outer; and all three are coëxtensive and contain every experience. Suppose that we have an experience. That experience has three determinations — three different references to a substratum or substrata, lying behind it and determining it.</p>
<p>Taking it for granted, then, that the inner and outer worlds are superposed throughout, without possibility of separation, let us now proceed to another point. There is a third world, besides the inner and the outer; and all three are coëxtensive and contain every experience. Suppose that we have an experience. That experience has three determinations — three different references to a substratum or substrata, lying behind it and determining it.</p>
<p>In the second place, it is a determination of our own soul, it is ''our'' experience; we feel that it is so because it lasts in time. Were it a flash of sensation, there for less than an instant, and then utterly gone from memory, we should not have time to think it ours. But while it lasts, and we reflect upon it, it enters into the internal world.</p>
<p>In the second place, it is a determination of our own soul, it is ''our'' experience; we feel that it is so because it lasts in time. Were it a flash of sensation, there for less than an instant, and then utterly gone from memory, we should not have time to think it ours. But while it lasts, and we reflect upon it, it enters into the internal world.</p>
<p>We have now considered that experience as a determination of the modifying object and of the modified soul; now, I say, it may be and is naturally regarded as also a determination of an idea of the Universal mind; a preëxistent, archetypal Idea. Arithmetic, the law of number, ''was'' before anything to be numbered or any mind to number had been created. It ''was'' though it did not ''exist''. It was not ''a fact'' nor a thought, but it was an unuttered word. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος. We feel an experience to be a determination of such an archetypal <font size="2">L</font><font size="1">OGOS</font>, by virtue of its // ''depth of tone'' / logical intension //, and thereby it is in the ''logical world''.</p>
<p>We have now considered that experience as a determination of the modifying object and of the modified soul; now, I say, it may be and is naturally regarded as also a determination of an idea of the Universal mind; a preëxistent, archetypal Idea. Arithmetic, the law of number, ''was'' before anything to be numbered or any mind to number had been created. It ''was'' though it did not ''exist''. It was not ''a fact'' nor a thought, but it was an unuttered word. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος. We feel an experience to be a determination of such an archetypal <font size="2">L</font><font size="1">OGOS</font>, by virtue of its // ''depth of tone'' / logical intension //, and thereby it is in the ''logical world''.</p>
<p>Note the great difference between this view and Hegel's. Hegel says, logic is the science of the pure idea. I should describe it as the science of the laws of experience in virtue of its being a determination of the idea, or in other words as the formal science of the logical world.</p>
<p>Note the great difference between this view and Hegel's. Hegel says, logic is the science of the pure idea. I should describe it as the science of the laws of experience in virtue of its being a determination of the idea, or in other words as the formal science of the logical world.</p>
<p>In this point of view, efforts to ascertain precisely how the intellect works in thinking, — that is to say investigation of internal characterictics — is no more to the purpose which logical writers as such, however vaguely have in view, than would be the investigation of external characteristics.</p>
<p>In this point of view, efforts to ascertain precisely how the intellect works in thinking, — that is to say investigation of internal characteristics — is no more to the purpose which logical writers as such, however vaguely have in view, than would be the investigation of external characteristics.</p>
<p>C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 168–169</p>
<p align="right">C.S. Peirce, ''Chronological Edition'', CE 1, 168–169</p>
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<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, "Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''" (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>
<p>Charles Sanders Peirce, “Harvard Lectures ''On the Logic of Science''” (1865), ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, Volume 1, 1857–1866'', Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.</p>
====Excerpt 15. Peirce (CE 1, 174–175)====
====Excerpt 15. Peirce (CE 1, 174–175)====