Changes

Rightly taken, this point, too, is purely definitional.  It classifies thinking as a species of action that has, or is meant to have, a purpose.  In particular, thinking is the kind of action that passes from sign to interpretant sign in relation to an object.  If one wishes to object that not all that passes for thinking has any assignable purpose, and if one desires to maintain an alternative POV that recognizes forms of aimless thinking, then it is nothing more than a technical problem to translate between the two ways of thinking, reclassifying unconducive thinking as a “degenerate form” from the standpoint of the pragmatic POV.

Rightly taken, this point, too, is purely definitional.  It classifies thinking as a species of action that has, or is meant to have, a purpose.  In particular, thinking is the kind of action that passes from sign to interpretant sign in relation to an object.  If one wishes to object that not all that passes for thinking has any assignable purpose, and if one desires to maintain an alternative POV that recognizes forms of aimless thinking, then it is nothing more than a technical problem to translate between the two ways of thinking, reclassifying unconducive thinking as a “degenerate form” from the standpoint of the pragmatic POV.

'''Point 3.'''     Reflection on thinking is reflection on conduct.

Point 3. Reflection on thinking is reflection on conduct.

Even though it can appear too evident, too immediate, and too obvious to bear pointing out, there are several good reasons to make a point of noticing this simple corollary of the previous point, namely, that if thinking is a special case of conduct then reflection on thinking is a special case of reflection on conduct.

Even though it can appear too evident, too immediate, and too obvious to bear pointing out, there are several good reasons to make a point of noticing this simple corollary of the previous point, namely, that if thinking is a special case of conduct then reflection on thinking is a special case of reflection on conduct.

First of all, it means that reflection on thinking and relection on conduct have a reciprocal bearing on each other, the way that special cases and general types always do.  Reflection on thinking can tell us something about reflection on conduct in general.  This is because the special case informs the general type and can be used inductively to discover its possible properties.  Reflection on conduct in general can tell us something about reflection on thinking.  This is because the general type constrains the special case and can be used deductively to derive its necessary properties.

First of all, it means that reflection on thinking and reflection on conduct have a reciprocal bearing on each other, the way that special cases and general types always do.  Reflection on thinking can tell us something about reflection on conduct in general.  This is because the special case informs the general type and can be used inductively to discover its possible properties.  Reflection on conduct in general can tell us something about reflection on thinking.  This is because the general type constrains the special case and can be used deductively to derive its necessary properties.

bearing on the order of the normative sciences:

bearing on the order of the normative sciences:

logic < ethics < aesthetics

logic &lt; ethics &lt; aesthetics

There is more to this point than first meets the eye, especially when it is considered in the light of its abstract form.  Aside from its present application to the matters of reflection, thinking, and conduct, one can see in this instance the form of a distributive law, that distributes an operation ("reflection") across a relation ("implication" or "inclusion"), and where this order of dyadic relation is the very one that constitutes the ordering of special cases under general forms.  The point of this is that the general intention of this dyadic relation, in its full extension, must be to capture the relation of a special application of any principle (say, a distributive law) to its own general formulation.  For instance, therefore, reflection on a special kind of distribution is a special kind of reflection on distribution in general.

There is more to this point than first meets the eye, especially when it is considered in the light of its abstract form.  Aside from its present application to the matters of reflection, thinking, and conduct, one can see in this instance the form of a distributive law, that distributes an operation (&ldquo;reflection&rdquo;) across a relation (&ldquo;implication&rdquo; or &ldquo;inclusion&rdquo;), and where this order of dyadic relation is the very one that constitutes the ordering of special cases under general forms.  The point of this is that the general intention of this dyadic relation, in its full extension, must be to capture the relation of a special application of any principle (say, a distributive law) to its own general formulation.  For instance, therefore, reflection on a special kind of distribution is a special kind of reflection on distribution in general.

In light of these relations between the specialization of thinking and the general capacity for conduct, I can now turn to a logical analysis of the concept of conduct for the light it reflects on the nature of thought.

In light of these relations between the specialization of thinking and the general capacity for conduct, I can now turn to a logical analysis of the concept of conduct for the light it reflects on the nature of thought.

Point 4.

Point 4.