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At this point one arrives at the general question:
At this point one arrives at the general question:
: What is the logical relation of virtues to teachings?
In particular:
In particular:
<ol style="list-style-type:lower-latin">
<li>Does one category necesarily imply the other?</li>
<li>Are the categories mutually exclusive?</li>
<li>Do they form independent categories?</li>
</ol>
Are virtues the species and teachings the genus, or perhaps vice versa? Or do virtues and teachings form domains that are essentially distinct? Whether one is a species of the other or whether the two are essentially different, what are the features that apparently distinguish the one from the other?
Let me begin by assuming a situation that is plausibly general enough, that some virtues can be taught, symbolized as <math>V \land T</math>, and that some cannot, symbolized as <math>V \land \lnot T</math>. I am not trying to say yet whether both kinds of cases actually occur, but merely wish to consider what follows from the likely alternatives. Then the question as to what distinguishes virtues from teachings has two senses:
# Among virtues that are special cases of teachings, <math>V \land T</math>, the features that distinguish virtues from teachings are known as ''specific differences''. These qualities serve to mark out virtues for special consideration from amidst the common herd of teachings and tend to distinguish the more exemplary species of virtues from the more inclusive genus of teachings.
# Among virtues that transcend the realm of teachings, <math>V \land \lnot T</math>, the features that distinguish virtues from teachings are aptly called ''exclusionary exemptions''. These properties place the reach of virtues beyond the grasp of what is attainable through any order of teachings and serve to remove the orbit of virtues a discrete pace from the general run of teachings.
of "virtuosity" or their very quality of "excellence" that distinguishes the
virtues from the teachings, whether this character appears to do nothing but
of what can be achieved through any learning or teaching at all. But this
In either case it can always be said, though without contributing anything of substance to the understanding of the problem, that it is their very property of ''virtuosity'' or their very quality of ''excellence'' that distinguishes the virtues from the teachings, whether this character appears to do nothing but add specificity to what can be actualized through learning alone, or solely through teaching, or whether it requires a nature that transcends the level of what can be achieved through any learning or teaching at all. But this sort of answer only begs the question. The real question is whether this mark is apparent or real, and how it ought to be analyzed and construed.
<pre>
Assuming a tentative understanding of the categories that I indicated
Assuming a tentative understanding of the categories that I indicated
in the above terms, the questions that I am worried about are these:
in the above terms, the questions that I am worried about are these:
