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<font size="3">&#9758;</font> This page belongs to resource collections on [[Logic Live|Logic]] and [[Inquiry Live|Inquiry]].

<font size="3">&#9758;</font> This page belongs to resource collections on [[Logic Live|Logic]] and [[Inquiry Live|Inquiry]].

'''''Pragmatic theory of truth''''' refers to those accounts, definitions, and theories of the concept ''[[truth]]'' that distinguish the philosophies of [[pragmatism]] and [[pragmaticism]].  The conception of truth in question varies along lines that reflect the influence of several thinkers, initially and notably, [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]], but a number of common features can be identified.  The most characteristic features are (1) a reliance on the ''[[pragmatic maxim]]'' as a means of clarifying the meanings of difficult concepts, ''truth'' in particular, and (2) an emphasis on the fact that the ''[[poiesis|product]]'' variously branded as ''[[belief]]'', ''[[certainty]]'', ''[[knowledge]]'', or ''[[truth]]'' is the result of a ''[[process]]'', namely, ''[[inquiry]]''.

'''''Pragmatic theory of truth''''' refers to those accounts, definitions, and theories of the concept ''[[truth]]'' that distinguish the philosophies of [[pragmatism]] and [[pragmaticism]].  The conception of truth in question varies along lines that reflect the influence of several thinkers, initially and notably, [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]], but a number of common features can be identified.  The most characteristic features are (1) a reliance on the ''[[pragmatic maxim]]'' as a means of clarifying the meanings of difficult concepts, ''truth'' in particular, and (2) an emphasis on the fact that the ''product'' variously branded as ''belief'', ''certainty'', ''knowledge'', or ''truth'' is the result of a ''process'', namely, ''[[inquiry]]''.

==Background==

==Background==

==Peirce==

==Peirce==

{{main|Charles Sanders Peirce}}

{{main|Charles Sanders Peirce}}

<blockquote>

<blockquote>

Now thought is of the nature of a sign.  In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out — the right method of transforming signs — then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us.  In that case, that to which the representation should conform, is itself something in the nature of a representation, or sign — something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself.  (Peirce 1906, CP 5.553).

Now thought is of the nature of a sign.  In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out &mdash; the right method of transforming signs &mdash; then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us.  In that case, that to which the representation should conform, is itself something in the nature of a representation, or sign &mdash; something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself.  (Peirce 1906, CP 5.553).

</blockquote>

</blockquote>

Dewey says more of what he understands by ''truth'' in terms of his preferred concept of ''[[warranted assertibility]]'' as the end-in-view and conclusion of inquiry (Dewey, 14–15).

Dewey says more of what he understands by ''truth'' in terms of his preferred concept of ''[[warranted assertibility]]'' as the end-in-view and conclusion of inquiry (Dewey, 14–15).

==Criticism==

==Criticism==

First, due originally to [[Bertrand Russell]] (1907) in a discussion of James's theory, is that pragmatism mixes up the notion of truth with ''epistemology''. Pragmatism describes an ''indicator'' or a ''sign'' of truth.  It really cannot be regarded as a theory of the ''meaning'' of the word "true". There's a difference between ''stating an indicator'' and ''giving the meaning''. For example, when the streetlights turn at the end of a day, that's an [[indicator]], a sign, that evening is coming on.  It would be an obvious mistake to say that the word "evening" just means "the time that the streetlights turn on".  In the same way, while it might be an ''indicator'' of truth, that a proposition is part of that perfect science at the ideal limit of inquiry, that just isn't what "truth" ''means''.

First, due originally to [[Bertrand Russell]] (1907) in a discussion of James's theory, is that pragmatism mixes up the notion of truth with ''epistemology''. Pragmatism describes an ''indicator'' or a ''sign'' of truth.  It really cannot be regarded as a theory of the ''meaning'' of the word "true". There's a difference between ''stating an indicator'' and ''giving the meaning''. For example, when the streetlights turn at the end of a day, that's an [[indicator]], a sign, that evening is coming on.  It would be an obvious mistake to say that the word "evening" just means "the time that the streetlights turn on".  In the same way, while it might be an ''indicator'' of truth, that a proposition is part of that perfect science at the ideal limit of inquiry, that just isn't what "truth" ''means''.

Russell's objection isn't so much an [[Logical argument|argument]] against [[pragmatism]], so much as it is a [[request]] — that we make sure that we aren't confusing an ''indicator'' of truth with the ''meaning'' of the concept truth. There is a difference between the two and pragmatism confuses them.   

Russell's objection isn't so much an argument against pragmatism, so much as it is a request &mdash; that we make sure that we aren't confusing an ''indicator'' of truth with the ''meaning'' of the concept truth. There is a difference between the two and pragmatism confuses them.   

Other objections to pragmatism include how we define what it means to say a [[belief]] "works", or that it is "useful to believe". The vague usage of these terms, first popularized by James, has led to much debate.

Other objections to pragmatism include how we define what it means to say a belief "works", or that it is "useful to believe". The vague usage of these terms, first popularized by James, has led to much debate.

Another objection — which can be applied to all of the epistemic theories — is that pragmatism appears to be incompatible with the T-scheme mentioned above (and Tarski's inductive definition, in relation to the connectives ~, & and so on). According to the T-scheme, if ~A is true, then A is not true. But presumably both a proposition A and its negation ~A might be useful to believe, which contradicts the T-scheme. For any determinate proposition A, either A is true or ~A is true. But it might be that neither is useful to believe. And so on.

Another objection &mdash; which can be applied to all of the epistemic theories &mdash; is that pragmatism appears to be incompatible with the T-scheme mentioned above (and Tarski's inductive definition, in relation to the connectives ~, & and so on). According to the T-scheme, if ~A is true, then A is not true. But presumably both a proposition A and its negation ~A might be useful to believe, which contradicts the T-scheme. For any determinate proposition A, either A is true or ~A is true. But it might be that neither is useful to believe. And so on.

A final objection is that pragmatism of James's variety (and [[Richard Rorty|Rorty]]'s) entails relativism. What is useful for ''you'' to believe might not be useful for ''me'' to believe. It follows that "truth" for you is different from "truth" for me (and that the relevant facts don't matter). This is relativism.  

A final objection is that pragmatism of James's variety (and [[Richard Rorty|Rorty]]'s) entails relativism. What is useful for ''you'' to believe might not be useful for ''me'' to believe. It follows that "truth" for you is different from "truth" for me (and that the relevant facts don't matter). This is relativism.