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CICERO'S TREATISE ON THE TOPICS

Introduction and translation by C. D. Yonge. From The orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Oxford 1852.

This treatise was written a short time before the events which gave rise to the first Philippic. Cicero obtained an honorary lieutenancy, with the intention of visiting his son at Athens; on his way towards Rhegium he spent an evening at Velia with Trebatius, where he began this treatise, which he finished at sea, before he arrived in Greece. It is little more than an abstract of what had been written by Aristotle on the same subject, and which Trebatius had begged him to explain to him; and Middleton says, that as he had not Aristotle's essay with him, he drew this up from memory, and he appears to have finished it in a week, as it was the nineteenth of July that he was at Velia, and he sent this work to Trebatius from Rhegium on the twenty-seventh. He himself apologizes to Trebatius in the letter which accompanied it, (Ep. Fam. vii. 19,) for its obscurity, which, however, he says, was unavoidably caused by the nature of the subject.


Latin English
[1] Maiores nos res scribere ingressos, C. Trebati, et his libris quos brevi tempore satis multos edidimus digniores, e cursu ipso revocavit voluntas tua. Cum enim mecum in Tusculano esses et in bibliotheca separatim uterque nostrum ad suum studium libellos quos vellet evolveret, incidisti in Aristotelis Topica quaedam, quae sunt ab illo pluribus libris explicata. Qua inscriptione commotus continuo a me librorum eorum sententiam requisisti; I. We had begun to write, O Caius Trebatius, on subjects more important and more worthy of these books, of which we have published a sufficient number in a short time, when your request recalled me from my course. For when you were with me in my Tusculan villa, and when each of us was separately in the library opening such books as were suited to our respective tastes and studies, you fell on a treatise of Aristotle's called the Topics; which he has explained in many books; and, excited by the title, you immediately asked me to explain to you the doctrines laid down in those books.
[2] quam cum tibi euissem, disciplinam inveniendorum argumentorum, ut sine ullo errore ad ea ratione et via perveniremus, ab Aristotele inventam illis libris contineri, verecunde tu quidem ut omnia, sed tamen facile ut cernerem te ardere studio, mecum ut tibi illa traderem egisti. Cum autem ego te non tam vitandi laboris mei causa quam quia tua id interesse arbitrarer, vel ut eos per te ipse legeres vel ut totam rationem a doctissimo quodam rhetore acciperes, hortatus essem, utrumque, ut ex te audiebam, es expertus. And when I had explained them to you, and told you that the system for the discovery of arguments was contained in them, in order that we might arrive, without making any mistake, at the system on which they rested by the way discovered by Aristotle, you urged me, modestly indeed, as you do everything, but still in a way which let me plainly see your eagerness to be gratified, to make you master of the whole of Aristotle's method. And when I exhorted you, (not so much for the sake of saving myself trouble, as because I really thought it advantageous for you yourself,) either to read them yourself, or to get the whole system explained to you by some learned rhetorician, you told me that you had already tried both methods.
[3] Sed a libris te obscuritas reiecit; rhetor autem ille magnus haec, ut opinor, Aristotelia se ignorare respondit. Quod quidem minime sum admiratus eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum, qui ab ipsis philosophis praeter admodum paucos ignoretur; quibus eo minus ignoscendum est, quod non modo rebus eis quae ab illo dictae et inventae sunt allici debuerunt, sed dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cum copia tum etiam suavitate. But the obscurity of the subject deterred you from the books; and that illustrious rhetorician to whom you had applied answered you, I suppose, that he knew nothing of these rules of Aristotle. And this I was not so much surprised at, namely, that that philosopher was not known to the rhetorician, inasmuch as he is not much known even to philosophers, except to a very few. And such ignorance is the less excusable in them, because they not only ought to have been allured by those things which he has discovered and explained, but also by the incredible richness and sweetness of his eloquence.
[4] Non potui igitur tibi saepius hoc roganti et tamen verenti ne mihi gravis esses—facile enim id cernebam—debere diutius, ne ipsi iuris interpreti fieri videretur iniuria. Etenim cum tu mihi meisque multa saepe scripsisses, veritus sum ne, si ego gravarer, aut ingratum id aut superbum videretur. Sed dum fuimus una, tu optimus es testis quam fuerim occupatus; I could not therefore remain any longer in your debt, since you often made me this request, and yet appeared to fear being troublesome to me, (for I could easily see that), lest I should appear unjust to him who is the very interpreter of the law. In truth, as you had often written many things for me and mine, I was afraid that if I delayed obliging you in this, it would appear very ungrateful or very arrogant conduct on my part. But while we were together, you yourself are the best witness of how I was occupied;
[5] ut autem a te discessi in Graeciam proficiscens, cum opera mea nec res publica nec amici uterentur nec honeste inter arma versari possem, ne si tuto quidem mihi id liceret, ut veni Veliam tuaque et tuos vidi, admonitus huius aeris alieni nolui deesse ne tacitae quidem flagitationi tuae. Itaque haec, cum mecum libros non haberem, memoria repetita in ipsa navigatione conscripsi tibique ex itinere misi, ut mea diligentia mandatorum tuorum te quoque, etsi admonitore non eges, ad memoriam nostrarum rerum excitarem. Sed iam tempus est ad id quod instituimus accedere. but after I left you, on my way into Greece, when neither the republic nor any friends were occupying my attention, and when I could not honourably remain amid the armies, (not even if I could have done so safely,) as soon as I came to Velia and beheld your house and your family, I was reminded of this debt; and would no longer be wanting to your silent request. Therefore, as I had no books with me, I have written these pages on my voyage, from memory; and I have sent them to you while on my journey, in order that by my diligence in obeying your commands, I might rouse you to a recollection of my affairs, although you do not require a reminder. But, however, it is time to come to the object which we have undertaken.
[6] Cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat partis, unam inveniendi alteram iudicandi, utriusque princeps, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles fuit. Stoici autem in altera elaboraverunt; iudicandi enim vias diligenter persecuti sunt ea scientia quam dialektikón appellant, inveniendi artem quae topikó dicitur, quae et ad usum potior erat et ordine naturae certe prior, totam reliquerunt. II. As every careful method of arguing has two divisions, --one of discovering, one of deciding,--Aristotle was, as it appears to me, the chief discoverer of each. But the Stoics also have devoted some pains to the latter, for they have diligently considered the methods of carrying on a discussion by that science which they call dialectics; but the art of discovering arguments, which is called topics, and which was more serviceable for practical use, and certainly prior in the order of nature, they have wholly disregarded.
[7] Nos autem, quoniam in utraque summa utilitas est et utramque, si erit otium, persequi cogitamus, ab ea quae prior est ordiemur. Ut igitur earum rerum quae absconditae sunt demonstrato et notato loco facilis inventio est, sic, cum pervestigare argumentum aliquod volumus, locos nosse debemus; sic enim appellatae ab Aristotele sunt eae quasi sedes, e quibus argumenta promuntur. But we, since both arts are of the greatest utility, and since we intend to examine each if we have time, will now begin with that which is naturally the first. As therefore the discovery of those things which are hidden is easy, if the place where they are hidden is pointed out and clearly marked; so, when we wish to examine any argument, we ought to know the topics,--for so they are called by Aristotle, being, as it were, seats from which arguments are derived.
[8] Itaque licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem. Sed ex his locis in quibus argumenta inclusa sunt, alii in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, alii assumuntur extrinsecus. In ipso tum ex toto, tum ex partibus eius, tum ex nota, tum ex eis rebus quae quodam modo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur. Extrinsecus autem ea ducuntur quae absunt longeque disiuncta sunt. Therefore we may give as a definition, that a topic is the seat of an argument, and that an argument is a reason which causes men to believe a thing which would otherwise be doubtful. But of those topics in which arguments are contained, some dwell on that particular point which is the subject of discussion; some are derived from external circumstances. When derived from the subject itself, they proceed at times from it taken as a whole, at times from its parts, at times from some sign, and at others from things which are disposed in some manner or other towards the subject under discussion; but those topics are derived from external circumstances which are at a distance and far removed from the same subject.
[9] Sed ad id totum de quo disseritur tum definitio adhibetur, quae quasi involutum evolvit id de quo quaeritur; eius argumenti talis est formula: Ius civile est aequitas constituta eis qui eiusdem civitatis sunt ad res suas obtinendas; eius autem aequitatis utilis cognitio est; utilis ergo est iuris civilis scientia; But a definition is employed with reference to the entire matter under discussion which unfolds the matter which is the subject of inquiry as if it had been previously enveloped in mystery. The formula of that argument is of this sort: "Civil law is equity established among men who belong to the same city, for the purpose of insuring each man in the possession of his property and rights: and the knowledge of this equity is useful: therefore the knowledge of civil law is useful."
[10] —tum partium enumeratio, quae tractatur hoc modo: Si neque censu nec vindicta nec testamento liber factus est, non est liber; neque ulla est earum rerum; non est igitur liber;—tum notatio, cum ex verbi vi argumentum aliquod elicitur hoc modo: Cum lex assiduo vindicem assiduum esse iubeat, locupletem iubet locupleti; is est enim assiduus, ut ait L. Aelius, appellatus ab aere dando. Then comes the enumeration of the parts, which is dealt with in this manner: "If a slave has not been declared free either by the censor, or by the praetor's rod, or by the will of his master, he is not free: but none of those things is the case: therefore he is not free." Then comes the sign; when some argument is derived from the meaning of a word, in this way:--as the Aelian Sentian law orders an assiduus to support an assiduus, (1) it orders a rich man to support a rich man, for a rich man is an assiduus, called so, Aelius says, from asse dando.
[11] Ducuntur etiam argumenta ex eis rebus quae quodam modo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur. Sed hoc genus in pluris partis distributum est. Nam alia coniugata appellamus, alia ex genere, alia ex forma, alia ex similitudine, alia ex differentia, alia ex contrario, alia ex adiunctis, alia ex antecedentibus, alia ex consequentibus, alia ex repugnantibus, alia ex causis, alia ex effectis, alia ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum. III. Arguments are also derived from things which bear some kind of relation to that which is the object of discussion. But this kind is distributed under many heads; for we call some connected with one another either by nature, or by their form, or by their resemblance to one another, or by their differences, or by their contrariety to one another, or by adjuncts, or by their antecedents, or by their consequents, or by what is opposed to each of them, or by causes, or by effects, or by a comparison with what is greater, or equal, or less.
[12] Coniugata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis eiusdem. Eiusdem autem generis verba sunt quae orta ab uno varie commutantur, ut sapiens sapienter sapientia. Haec verborum coniugatio suzug¤a dicitur, ex qua huius modi est argumentum: Si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere. Arguments are said to be connected together which are derived from words of the same kind. But words are of the same kind which, originating from one word, are altered in various ways; as "sapiens, sapienter, sapientia." The connexion of these words is called suzugia; from which arises an argument of this kind: "If the land is common, every one has a right to feed his cattle on it."
[13] A genere sic ducitur: Quoniam argentum omne mulieri legatum est, non potest ea pecunia quae numerata domi relicta est non esse legata; forma enim a genere, quoad suum nomen retinet, nunquam seiungitur, numerata autem pecunia nomen argenti retinet; legata igitur videtur. An argument is derived from the kind of word, thus: "Since all the money has been bequeathed to the woman, it is impossible that that ready money which was left in the house should not have been bequeathed. For the species is never separated from the genus as long as it retains its name: but ready money retains the name of money: therefore it is plain that it was bequeathed."
[14] A forma generis, quam interdum, quo planius accipiatur, partem licet nominare hoc modo: Si ita Fabiae pecunia legata est a viro, si ei viro materfamilias esset; si ea in manum non convenerat, nihil debetur. Genus enim est uxor; eius duae formae: una matrumfamilias, eae sunt, quae in manum convenerunt; altera earum, quae tantum modo uxores habentur. Qua in parte cum fuerit Fabia, legatum ei non videtur. An argument is derived from the species, which we may sometimes name, in order that it may be more clearly understood, in this manner: "If the money was bequeathed to Fabia by her husband, on the supposition that she was the mother of his family; if she was not his wife, then nothing is due to her." For the wife is the genus: there are two kinds of wife; one being those mothers of a family which become wives by coemptio; the other kind are those which are only considered wives: and as Fabia was one of those last, it appears that nothing was bequeathed to her.
[15] A similitudine hoc modo: Si aedes eae corruerunt vitiumve faciunt quarum usus fructus legatus est, heres restituere non debet nec reficere, non magis quam servum restituere, si is cuius usus fructus legatus esset deperisset. An argument is derived from similarity, in this way: "If those houses have fallen down, or got into disrepair, a life interest in which is bequeathed to some one, the heir is not bound to restore or to repair them, any more than he is bound to replace a slave, if a slave, a life-interest in whom has been bequeathed to some one, has died."
[16] A differentia: Non, si uxori vir legavit argentum omne quod suum esset, idcirco quae in nominibus fuerunt legata sunt. Multum enim differt in arcane positum sit argentum an in tabulis debeatur. An argument is derived from difference, thus: "It does not follow, if a man has bequeathed to his wife all the money which belonged to hirn, that therefore he bequeathed all which was down in his books as due to him; for there is a great difference whether the money is laid up in his strong box, or set down as due in his accounts."
[17] Ex contrario autem sic: Non debet ea mulier cui vir bonorum suorum usum fructum legavit cellis vinariis et oleariis plenis relictis, putare id ad se pertinere. Usus enim, non abusus, legatus est. Ea sunt inter se contraria. An argument is derived from contraries, thus: "That woman to whom her husband has left a life-interest in all his property, has no right, if his cellars of wine and oil are left full, to think that they belong to her; for the use of them is what has been bequeathed to her, and not the misuse: and they are contrary to one another."
[18] Ab adiunctis: Si ea mulier testamentum fecit quae se capite nunquam deminuit, non videtur ex edicto praetoris secundum eas tabulas possessio dari. Adiungitur enim, ut secundum servorum, secundum exsulum, secundum puerorum tabulas possessio videatur ex edicto dari. IV. An argument is derived from adjuncts, thus: "If woman has made a will who has never given up her liberty by marriage, it does not appear that possession ought to be given by the edict of the praetor to the legatee under that will; for it is added, that in that case possession would seem proper to be given by that same edict, according to the wills of slaves, or exiles, or infants."
[19] Ab antecedentibus autem et consequentibus et repugnantibus hoc modo; ab antecedentibus: Si viri culpa factum est divortium, etsi mulier nuntium remisit, tamen pro liberis manere nihil oportet. Arguments are derived from antecedents, and consequents, and contradictories, in this way. From antecedents: "If a divorce has been caused by the fault of the husband, although the woman has demanded it, still she is not bound to leave any of her dowry for her children."
[20] A consequentibus: Si mulier, cum fuisset nupta cum eo quicum conubium non esset, nuntium remisit; quoniam qui nati sunt patrem non sequuntur, pro liberis manere nihil oportet. From consequents: "If a woman having married a man with whom she had no right of intermarriage, has demanded a divorce, since the children who have been born do not follow their father, the father has no right to keep back any portion of the woman's dowry."
[21] A repugnantibus: Si paterfamilias uxori ancillarum usum fructum legavit a filio neque a secundo herede legavit, mortuo filio mulier usum fructum non amittet. Quod enim semel testamento alicui datum est, id ab eo invito cui datum est auferri non potest. Repugnat enim recte accipere et invitum reddere. From contradictories: "If the head of a family has left to his wife in reversion after his son the life-interest in the female slaves, and has made no mention of any other reversionary heir, if the son dies, the woman shall not lose her life-interest. For that which has once been given to any one by will, cannot be taken away from the legatee to whom it has been given without his consent; for it is a contradiction for any one to have a right to receive a thing, and yet to be forced to give it up against his will."
[22] Ab efficientibus rebus hoc modo: Omnibus est ius parietem directum ad parietem communem adiungere vel solidum vel fornicatum. Sed qui in pariete communi demoliendo damni infecti promiserit, non debebit praestare quod fornix viti fecerit. Non enim eius vitio qui demolitus est damnum factum est, sed eius operis vitio quod ita aedificatum est ut suspendi non posset. An argument is derived from efficient causes, in this way: "All men have a right to add to a common party wall, a wall extending its whole length, either solid or on arches; but if any one in demolishing the common wall should promise to pay for any damages which may arise from his action, he will not be bound to pay for any damage sustained or caused by such arches: for the damage has been done, not by the party which demolished the common wall, but in consequence of some fault in the work, which was built in such a manner as to be unable to support itself."
[23] Ab effectis rebus hoc modo: Cum mulier viro in manum convenit, omnia quae mulieris fuerunt viri fiunt dotis nomine. An argument is derived from what has been done, in this way: "When a woman becomes the wife of a man, everything which has belonged to the woman now becomes property of the husband under the name of dowry."
Ex comparatione autem omnia valent quae sunt huius modi: Quod in re maiore valet valeat in minore, ut si in urbe fines non reguntur, nec aqua in urbe arceatur. Item contra: Quod in minore valet, valeat in maiore. Licet idem exemplum convertere. Item: Quod in re pari valet valeat in hac quae par est; ut: Quoniam usus auctoritas fundi biennium est, sit etiam aedium. At in lege aedes non appellantur et sunt ceterarum rerum omnium quarum annuus est usus. Valeat aequitas, quae paribus in causis paria iura desiderat. But in the way of comparison there are many kinds of valid arguments; in this way: "That which is valid in a greater affair, ought to be valid in a less: so that, if the law does not regulate the limits in the city, still more will it not compel any one to turn off the water in the city." Again, on the other hand: "Whatever is valid in a smaller matter ought to be valid also in a greater one. One may convert the preceding example." Also, "That which is valid in a parallel case ought to be valid in this which is a parallel case." As, "Since the usurpation of a farm depends on a term of two years, the law with respect to houses ought to be the same." But in the law houses are not mentioned, and so they are supposed to come under the same class as all other things, the property in which is determined by one year's use.
[24] Quae autem assumuntur extrinsecus, ea maxime ex auctoritate ducuntur. Itaque Graeci talis argumentationes étšxnouw vocant, id est artis expertis, ut si ita respondeas: Quoniam P. Scaevola id solum esse ambitus aedium dixerit, quod parietis communis tegendi causa tectum proiceretur, ex quo tecto in eius aedis qui protexisset aqua deflueret, id ambitus videri. Equity then must prevail, which requires similar laws in similar cases. (2) But those arguments which are derived from external circumstances are deduced chiefly from authority. Therefore the Greeks call argumentations of that kind atechnoi, that is, devoid of art. As if you were to answer in this way:--"In the case of some one building a roof for the purpose of covering a common wall, Publius Scaevola asserted that there was no right of carrying that roof so far that the water which ran off it should run on to any part of any building which did not belong to the owner of the roof. This I affirm to be law."
[25] His igitur locis qui sunt eiti ad omne argumentum reperiendum tamquam elementis quibusdam significatio et demonstratio datur. Utrum igitur hactenus satis est? Tibi quidem tam acuto et tam occupato puto. Sed quoniam avidum hominem ad has discendi epulas recepi, sic accipiam, ut reliquiarum sit potius aliquid quam te hinc patiar non satiatum discedere. [26] Quando ergo unus quisque eorum locorum quos eui sua quaedam habet membra, ea quam subtilissime persequamur. V. By these topics then which have been explained, a means of discovering and proving every sort of argument is supplied, as if they were elements of argument. Have we then said enough up to this point? I think we have, as far at least as you, an acute man and one deeply skilled in law, are concerned. But since I have to deal with a man who is very greedy when the feast in question is one of learning, I will prosecute the subject so that I will rather put forth something more than is necessary, than allow you to depart unsatisfied. As, then, each separate one of those topics which I have mentioned has its own proper members, I will follow them out as accurately as I can; and first of all I will speak of the definition itself. Et primum de ipsa definitione dicatur.
Definitio est oratio quae id quod definitur explicat quid sit. Definitionum autem duo genera prima: unum earum rerum quae sunt, alterum earum quae intelleguntur. [27] Esse ea dico quae cerni tangique possunt, ut fundum aedes, parietem stillicidium, mancipium pecudem, supellectilem penus et cetera; quo ex genere quaedam interdum vobis definienda sunt. Non esse rursus ea dico quae tangi demonstrarive non possunt, cerni tamen animo atque intellegi possunt, ut si usus capionem, si tutelam, si gentem, si agnationem definias, quarum rerum nullum subest corpus, est tamen quaedam conformatio insignita et impressa intellegentia, quam notionem voco. Ea saepe in argumentando definitione explicanda est. Definition is a speech which explains that which is defined. But of definitions there are two principal kinds: one, of those things which exist; the other, of those which are understood. The things which I call existing are those which can be seen or touched; as a farm, a house, a wall, a gutter, a slave, an ox, furniture, provisions, and so on; of which kind of things some require at times to be defined by us. Those things, again, I say have no existence, which are incapable of being touched or proved, but which can be perceived by the mind and understood; as if you were to define usucaption, guardianship, nationality, or relationship; all, things which have no body, but which nevertheless have a certain conformation plainly marked out and impressed upon the mind, which I call the notion of them. They often require to be explained by definition while we are arguing about them.
[28] Atque etiam definitiones aliae sunt partitionum aliae divisionum; partitionum, cum res ea quae proposita est quasi in membra discerpitur, ut si quis ius civile dicat id esse quod in legibus, senatus consultis, rebus iudicatis, iuris peritorum auctoritate, edictis magistratuum, more, aequitate consistat. Divisionum autem definitio formas omnis complectitur quae sub eo genere sunt quod definitur hoc modo: Abalienatio est eius rei quae mancipi est aut traditio alteri nexu aut in iure cessio inter quos ea iure civili fieri possunt. Sunt etiam alia genera definitionum, sed ad huius libri institutum illa nihil pertinent; tantum est dicendum qui sit definitionis modus. And again, there are definitions by partition, and others by division: by partition, when the matter which is to be defined is separated, as it were, into different members; as if any one were to say that civil law was that which consists of laws, resolutions of the senate, precedents, the authority of lawyers, the edicts of magistrates, custom, and equity. But a definition by division embraces every form which comes under the entire genus which is defined; in this way: "Alienation is the surrender of anything which is a man's private property, or a legal cession of it to men who are able by law to avail themselves of such cession." VI. There are also other kinds of definitions, but these have no connexion with the subject of this book; we have only got to say what is the manner of expressing a definition.
[29] Sic igitur veteres praecipiunt: cum sumpseris ea quae sint ei rei quam definire velis cum aliis communia, usque eo persequi, dum proprium efficiatur, quod nullam in aliam rem transferri possit. Ut haec: Hereditas est pecunia. Commune adhuc; multa enim genera pecuniae. Adde quod sequitur: quae morte alicuius ad quempiam pervenit. Nondum est definitio; multis enim modis sine hereditate teneri pecuniae mortuorum possunt. Unum adde verbum: iure; iam a communitate res diiuncta videbitur, ut sit explicata definitio sic: Hereditas est pecunia quae morte alicuius ad quempiam pervenit iure. Nondum est satis; adde: nec ea aut legata testamento aut possessione retenta; confectum est. Itemque: Gentiles sunt inter se qui eodem nomine sunt. Non est satis. Qui ab ingenuis oriundi sunt. Ne id quidem satis est. Quorum maiorum nemo servitutem servivit. Abest etiam nunc. Qui capite non sunt deminuti. Hoc fortasse satis est. Nihil enim video Scaevolam pontificem ad hanc definitionem addidisse. Atque haec ratio valet in utroque genere definitionum, sive id quod est, sive id quod intellegitur definiendum est. This, then, is what the ancients prescribe: that when you have taken those things which are common to the thing which you wish to define with other things, you must pursue them till you make out of them altogether some peculiar property which cannot be transferred to anything else. As this: "An inheritance is money." Up to this point the definition is common, for there are many kinds of money. Add what follows: "which by somebody's death comes to some one else." It is not yet a definition, for money belonging to the dead can be possessed in many ways without inheritance. Add one word, "lawfully." By this time the matter will appear distinguished from general terms, so that the definition may stand thus:--"An inheritance is money which by somebody's death has lawfully come to some one else." It is not enough yet. Add, "without being either bequeathed by will, or held as some one else's property." The definition is complete. Again, take this:--"Those are gentiles who are of the same name as one another." That is insufficient. "And who are born of noble blood." Even that is not enough. "Who have never had any ancestor in the condition of a slave." Something is still wanting. "Who have never parted with their franchise." This, perhaps, may do. For I am not aware that Scaevola, the pontiff, added anything to this definition. And this principle holds good in each kind of definition, whether the thing to be defined is something which exists, or something which is understood.
[30] Partitionum autem et divisionum genus quale esset ostendimus, sed quid inter se differant planius dicendum est. In partitione quasi membra sunt, ut corporis, caput, umeri, manus, latera, crura, pedes et cetera. In divisione formae, quas Graeci eýdh vocant, nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant, non pessime id quidem sed inutiliter ad mutandos casus in dicendo. Nolim enim, ne si Latine quidem dici possit, specierum et speciebus dicere; et saepe his casibus utendum est; at formis et formarum velim. Cum autem utroque verbo idem significetur, commoditatem in dicendo non arbitror neglegendam. VII. But we have shown now what is meant by partition, and by division. But it is necessary to explain more clearly wherein they differ. In partition, there are as it were members; as of a body--head, shoulders, hands, sides, legs, feet, and so on. In division there are forms which the Greeks call ideai; our countrymen who treat of such subjects call them species. And it is not a bad name, though it is an inconvenient one if we want to use it in different cases. For even if it were Latin to use such words, I should not like to say specierum and speciebus. And we have often occasion to use these cases. But I have no such objection to saying formarum and formis; and as the meaning of each word is the same, I do not think that convenience of sound is wholly to be neglected.
[31] Genus et formam definiunt hoc modo: Genus est notio ad pluris differentias pertinens; forma est notio cuius differentia ad caput generis et quasi fontem referri potest. Notionem appello quod Graeci tum nnoian tum pròlhcin. Ea est insita et ante percepta cuiusque cognitio enodationis indigens. Formae sunt igitur eae in quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur; ut si quis ius in legem, morem, aequitatem dividat. Formas qui putat idem esse quod partis, confundit artem et similitudine quadam conturbatus non satis acute quae sunt secernenda distinguit. Men define genus and species or form in this manner:-- "Genus is a notion relating to many differences. Species is a notion, the difference of which can be referred to the head and as it were fountain of the genus." I mean by notion that which the Greeks call sometimes ennoia, and sometimes prolêpsis. It is knowledge implanted and previously acquired of each separate thing, but one which requires development. Species, then, are those forms into which genus is divided without any single one being omitted; as if any one were to divide justice into law, custom, and equity. A person who thinks that species are the same things as parts, is confounding the art; and being perplexed by some resemblance, he does not distinguish with sufficient acuteness what ought to be distinguished.
[32] Saepe etiam definiunt et oratores et poetae per translationem verbi ex similitudine cum aliqua suavitate. Sed ego a vestris exemplis nisi necessario non recedam. Solebat igitur Aquilius collega et familiaris meus, cum de litoribus ageretur, quae omnia publica esse vultis, quaerentibus eis quos ad id pertinebat, quid esset litus, ita definire, qua fluctus eluderet; hoc est, quasi qui adulescentiam florem aetatis, senectutem occasum vitae velit definire; translatione enim utens discedebat a verbis propriis rerum ac suis. Quod ad definitiones attinet, hactenus; reliqua videamus. Often, also, both orators and poets define by metaphor, relying on some verbal resemblance, and indeed not without giving a certain degree of pleasure. But I will not depart from your examples unless I am actually compelled to do so. Aquillius, then, my colleague and intimate friend, was accustomed, when there was any discussion about shores, (all of which you lawyers insist upon it are public,) to define them to men who asked to whom that which was shore belonged, in this way: "Wherever the waves dashed;" that is, as if a man were to define youth as the flower of a man's age, or old age as the setting of life. Using a metaphor, he departs from the words proper to the matter in hand and to his own art. This is enough as to definition. Let us now consider the other points.
[33] Partitione tum sic utendum est, nullam ut partem relinquas; ut, si partiri velis tutelas, inscienter facias, si ullam praetermittas. At si stipulationum aut iudiciorum formulas partiare, non est vitiosum in re infinita praetermittere aliquid. Quod idem in divisione vitiosum est. Formarum enim certus est numerus quae cuique generi subiciantur; partium distributio saepe est infinitior, tamquam rivorum a fonte diductio. VIII. But we must employ partition in such a manner as to omit no part whatever. As if you wish to partition guardianship, you would act ignorantly if you were to omit any kind. But if you were partitioning off the different formulas of stipulations or judicial decisions, then it is not a fault to omit something in a matter which is of boundless extent. But in division it is a fault; for there is a settled number of species which are subordinate to each genus. The distribution of the parts is often more interminable still, like the drawing streams from a fountain.
[34] Itaque in oratoriis artibus quaestionis genere proposito, quot eius formae sint, subiungitur absolute. At cum de ornamentis verborum sententiarumve praecipitur, quae vocant sxæmata, non fit idem. Res est enim infinitior; ut ex hoc quoque intellegatur quid velimus inter partitionem et divisionem interesse. Quamquam enim vocabula prope idem valere videbantur, tamen quia res differebant, nomina rerum distare voluerunt. Therefore in the art of an orator, when the genus of a question is once laid down, the number of its species is added absolutely; but when rules are given concerning the embellishments of words and sentences, which are called schêmata, the case is different; for the circumstances are more infinite: so that it may be understood from this also what the difference is which we assert to exist between partition and division. For although the words appear nearly equivalent to one another still, because the things are different, the expressions are also established as not synonymous to one another.
[35] Multa etiam ex notatione sumuntur. Ea est autem, cum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur; quam Graeci §tumolog¤an appellant, id est verbum ex verbo veriloquium; nos autem novitatem verbi non satis apti fugientes genus hoc notationem appellamus, quia sunt verba rerum notae. Itaque hoc quidem Aristoteles sÊmbolon appellat, quod Latine est nota. Sed cum intellegitur quid significetur, minus laborandum est de nomine. Many arguments are also derived from observation, and that is when they are deduced from the meaning of a word, which the Greeks call etumologia; or as we might translate it, word for word, veriloquium. But we, while avoiding the novel appearance of a word which is not very suitable, call this kind of argument notatio, because words are the notes by which we distinguish things. And therefore Aristotle calls the same source of argument sumbolon, which is equivalent to the Latin nota. But when it is known what is meant we need not be so particular about the name.
[36] Multa igitur in disputando notatione eliciuntur ex verbo, ut cum quaeritur postliminium quid sit—non dico quae sint postlimini; nam id caderet in divisionem, quae talis est: Postliminio redeunt haec: homo, navis, mulus clitellarius, equus, equa quae frenos recipere solet—; sed cum ipsius postlimini vis quaeritur et verbum ipsum notatur; in quo Servius noster, ut opinor, nihil putat esse notandum nisi post, et liminium illud productionem esse verbi vult, ut in finitimo, legitimo, aeditimo non plus inesse timum quam in meditullio tullium; In a discussion then, many arguments are derived from words by means of observation; as when the question is asked, what is postliminiun (I do not mean what are the objects to which this word applies, for that would be division, which is something of this sort: "Postliminium applies to a man, a ship, a mule with panniers, a horse, a mare who is accustomed to be bridled")--but when the meaning of the word itself, postliminium, is asked, and when the word itself is observed. And in this our countryman, Servius, as it seems, thinks that there is nothing to be observed except post, and he insists upon it that liminium is a mere extension of the word; as in finitimus, legitimus, oeditimus, timus has no more meaning than tullius has in meditullius.
[37] Scaevola autem P. F. iunctum putat esse verbum, ut sit in eo et post et limen; ut, quae a nobis alienata, cum ad hostem pervenerint, ex suo tamquam limine exierint, hinc ea cum redierint post ad idem limen, postliminio redisse videantur. Quo genere etiam Mancini causa defendi potest, postliminio redisse; deditum non esse, quoniam non sit receptus; nam neque deditionem neque donationem sine acceptione intellegi posse. But Scaevola, the son of Publius Scaevola, thinks the word is a compound one, so that it is made up of post and limen. So that those things which have been alienated from us, when they have come into the possession of our enemies, and, as it were, departed from their own threshold, then when they have returned behind that same threshold, appear to have returned postliminio. By which definition even the cause of Mancinus may be defended by saying that he returned postliminio,--that he was not surrendered, inasmuch as he was not received. For that no surrender and no gift can be understood to have taken place if there has been no reception of it.
[38] Sequitur is locus qui constat ex eis rebus quae quodam modo adfectae sunt ad id de quo ambigitur; quem modo dixi in plures partes distributum. Cuius est primus locus ex coniugatione, quam Graeci suzug¤an vocant, finitimus notationi, de qua modo dictum est; ut, si aquam pluviam eam modo intellegeremus quam imbri collectam videremus, veniret Mucius, qui, quia coniugata verba essent pluvia et pluendo, diceret omnem aquam oportere arceri quae pluendo crevisset. IX. We next come to that topic which is derived from those things which are disposed in some way or other to that thing which is the subject of discussion. And I said just now that it was divided into many parts. And the first topic is derived from combination, which the Greeks call suzugia, being a kindred thing to observation, which we have just been discussing; as, if we were only to understand that to be rain-water which we saw to have been collected from rain; Mucius would come, who, because the words pluvia and pluendo were akin, would say that all water ought to be kept out, which had been increased by raining.
[39] Cum autem a genere ducetur argumentum, non erit necesse id usque a capite arcessere. Saepe etiam citra licet, dum modo supra sit quod sumitur, quam id ad quod sumitur; ut aqua pluvia ultimo genere ea est quae de caelo veniens crescit imbri, sed propiore, in quo quasi ius arcendi continetur, genus est aqua pluvia nocens: eius generis formae loci vitio et manu nocens, quarum altera iubetur ab arbitro coerceri altera non iubetur. But when an argument is derived from a genus, then it will not be necessary to trace it back to its origin; we may often stop on this side of that point, provided that which is deduced is higher than that for which it is deduced; as, "Rain-water in its ultimate genus is that which descends from heaven and is increased by showers;" but in reference to its more proximate sense, under which the right of keeping it off is comprised, the genus is, mischievous rain-water. The subordinate species of that genus are waters which injure through a natural defect of the place, or those which are injurious on account of the works of man: for one of these kinds may be restrained by an arbitrator; but not the other.
[40] Commode etiam tractatur haec argumentatio quae ex genere sumitur, cum ex toto partis persequare hoc modo: Si dolus malus est, cum aliud agitur aliud simulatur, enumerare licet quibus id modis fiat, deinde in eorum aliquem id quod arguas dolo malo factum includere; quod genus argumenti in primis firmum videri solet. Again, this argumentation is handled very advantageously, which is derived from a species, when you pursue all the separate parts by tracing them back to the whole; in this way: "If that is dolus malus when one thing is aimed at, and another pretended;" we may enumerate the different modes in which that can be done, and then under some one of them we may range that which we are trying to prove has been done dolo malo. And that kind of argument is usually accounted one of the most irrefragable of all.
[41] Similitudo sequitur, quae late patet, sed oratoribus et philosophis magis quam vobis. Etsi enim omnes loci sunt omnium disputationum ad argumenta suppeditanda, tamen aliis disputationibus abundantius occurrunt aliis angustius. Itaque genera tibi nota sint; ubi autem eis utare, quaestiones ipsae te admonebunt. X. The next thing is similarity, which is a very extensive topic; but one more useful for orators and for philosophers than for men of your profession. For although all topics belong to every kind of discussion, so as to supply arguments for each, still they occur more abundantly in discussions on some subjects, and more sparingly in others. Therefore the genera are known to you; but when you are to employ them the questions themselves will instruct you.
[42] Sunt enim similitudines quae ex pluribus collationibus perveniunt quo volunt hoc modo: Si tutor fidem praestare debet, si socius, si cui mandaris, si qui fiduciam acceperit, debet etiam procurator. Haec ex pluribus perveniens quo vult appellatur inductio, quae Graece §pagvgó nominatur, qua plurimum est usus in sermonibus Socrates. For there are resemblances which by means of comparisons arrive at the point they aim at; in this manner: "If a guardian is bound to behave with good faith, and a partner, and any one to whom you have entrusted anything, and any one who has undertaken a trust, then so ought an agent." This argument, arriving at the point at which it aims by a comparison of many instances, is called induction; which in Greek is called epagôgê; and it is the kind of argument which Socrates employed a great deal in his discourses.
[43] Alterum similitudinis genus collatione sumitur, cum una res uni, par pari comparatur hoc modo: Quem ad modum, si in urbe de finibus controversia est, quia fines magis agrorum videntur esse quam urbis, finibus regendis adigere arbitrum non possis, sic, si aqua pluvia in urbe nocet, quoniam res tota magis agrorum est, aquae pluviae arcendae adigere arbitrum non possis. Another kind of resemblance is obtained by comparison, when one thing is compared to some other single thing, and like to like; in this way: "As if in any city there is a dispute as to boundaries, because the boundaries of fields appear more extensive than those of cities, you may find it impossible to bring an arbitrator to settle the question of boundaries; so if rain-water is injurious in a city, since the whole matter is one more for country magistrates, you may not be able to bring an arbitrator to settle the question of keeping off rain-water."
[44] Ex eodem similitudinis loco etiam exempla sumuntur, ut Crassus in causa Curiana exemplis plurimis usus est, qui testamento sic heredes instituti, ut si filius natus esset in decem mensibus isque mortuus prius quam in suam tutelam venisset, hereditatem obtinuissent. Quae commemoratio exemplorum valuit, eaque vos in respondendo uti multum soletis. Again, from the same topic of resemblance, examples are derived; as, "Crassus in Curius's trial used many examples, speaking of the man who by his will had appointed his heir in such a manner, that if he had had a son born within ten months of his death, and that son had died before coming into possession of the property held in trust for him, the reversionary heir would succeed to the inheritance. And the enumeration of precedents which Crassus brought forward prevailed." And you are accustomed to use this style of argument very frequently in replies.
[45] Ficta enim exempla similitudinis habent vim; sed ea oratoria magis sunt quam vestra; quamquam uti etiam vos soletis, sed hoc modo: Finge mancipio aliquem dedisse id quod mancipio dari non potest. Num idcirco id eius factum est qui accepit? aut num is qui mancipio dedit ob eam rem se ulla re obligavit? In hoc genere oratoribus et philosophis concessum est, ut muta etiam loquantur, ut mortui ab inferis excitentur, ut aliquid quod fieri nullo modo possit augendae rei gratia dicatur aut minuendae, quae Íperboló dicitur, multa alia mirabilia. Sed latior est campus illorum. Eisdem tamen ex locis, ut ante dixi, et [in] maximis et minimis [in] quaestionibus argumenta ducuntur. Even fictitious examples have all the force of real ones, but they belong rather to the orator than to you lawyers, although you also do use them sometimes, but in this way: "Suppose a man had given a slave a thing which a slave is by law incapable of receiving, is it on that account the act of the man who received it? or has he, who gave that present to his slave, on that account taken any obligations on himself?" And in this kind of argument orators and philosophers are allowed to make even dumb things talk; so that the dead may be raised from the shades below, or that anything which intrinsically is absolutely impossible, may, for the sake of adding force to the argument, or diminishing, be spoken of as real: and that figure is called hyperbole. And they may say other marvellous things; but theirs is a wider field. Still, out of the same topics, as I have said before, arguments are derived for the most important and the most trivial inquiries.
[46] Sequitur similitudinem differentia rei maxime contraria superiori; sed est eiusdem dissimile et simile invenire. Eius generis haec sunt: Non, quem ad modum quod mulieri debeas, recte ipsi mulieri sine tutore auctore solvas, item, quod pupillo aut pupillae debeas, recte possis eodem modo solvere. XI. After similarity there follows difference between things; which is as different as possible from the preceding topic; still it is the same art which finds out resemblances and dissimilarities. These are instances of the same sort:-- "If you have contracted a debt to a woman, you can pay her without having recourse to a trustee; but what you owe to a minor, whether male or female, you cannot pay in the same manner."
[47] Deinceps locus est qui e contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera plura; unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt, ut sapientia stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaedam contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas. Ex quibus contrariis argumenta talia existunt: Si stultitiam fugimus, sapientiam sequamur, et bonitatem si malitiam. Haec quae ex eodem genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa. The next topic is one which is derived from contraries. But the genera of contraries are several. One is of such things as differ in the same kind; as wisdom and folly. But those things are said to be in the same kind, which, when they are proposed, are immediately met by certain contraries, as if placed opposite to them: as slowness is contrary to rapidity, and not weakness. From which contraries such arguments as these are deduced:--"If we avoid folly, let us pursue wisdom; and if we avoid wickedness, let us pursue goodness." These things, as they are contrary qualities in the same class, are called opposites.
[48] Sunt enim alia contraria, quae privantia licet appellemus Latine, Graeci appellant sterhtikã. Praeposito enim 'in' privatur verbum ea vi quam haberet si 'in' praepositum non fuisset, dignitas indignitas, humanitas inhumanitas, et cetera generis eiusdem, quorum tractactio est eadem quae superiorum quae adversa dixi. For there are other contraries, which we may call in Latin, privantia, and which the Greeks call sterêtika. For the preposition in deprives the word of that force which it would have if in were not prefixed; as, "dignity, indignity--humanity, inhumanity," and other words of the same kind, the manner of dealing with which is the same as that of dealing with other kinds which I have called opposites.
[49] Nam alia quoque sunt contrariorum genera, velut ea quae cum aliquo conferuntur, ut duplum simplum, multa pauca, longum breve, maius minus. Sunt etiam illa valde contraria quae appellantur negantia; ea épofatikå Graece, contraria aientibus: Si hoc est, illud non est. Quid enim opus exemplo est? Tantum intellegatur, in argumento quaerendo contrariis omnibus contraria non convenire. For there are also other kinds or contraries; as those which are compared to something or other; as, "twofold and simple; many and few; long and short; greater and less." There are also those very contrary things which are called negatives, which the Greeks call apophatika: as, "If this is the case, that is not." For what need is there for an instance? only let it be understood that in seeking for an argument it is not every contrary which is suitable to be opposed to another.
[50] Ab adiunctis autem posui equidem exemplum paulo ante, multa adiungi, quae suscipienda essent si statuissemus ex edicto secundum eas tabulas possessionem dari, quas is instituisset cui testamenti factio nulla esset. Sed locus hic magis ad coniecturales causas, quae versantur in iudiciis, valet, cum quaeritur quid aut sit aut evenerit aut futurum sit aut quid omnino fieri possit. XII. But I gave a little while ago an instance drawn from adjuncts; showing that many things are added as accessories, which ought to be admitted, if we decided that possession ought to be given by the praetor's edict, in compliance with the will which that person made who had no right whatever to make a will. But this topic has more influence in conjectural causes, which are frequent in courts of justice, when we are inquiring either what is, or what has been, or what is likely to be, or what possibly may happen.
[51] Ac loci quidem ipsius forma talis est. Admonet autem hic locus, ut quaeratur quid ante rem, quid cum re, quid post rem evenerit. 'Nihil hoc ad ius; ad Ciceronem,' inquiebat Gallus noster, si quis ad eum quid tale rettulerat, ut de facto quaereretur. Tu tamen patiere nullum a me artis institutae locum praeteriri; ne, si nihil nisi quod ad te pertineat scribendum putabis, nimium te amare videare. Est igitur magna ex parte locus hic oratorius non modo non iuris consultorum, sed ne philosophorum quidem. And the form of the topic itself is as follows. But this topic reminds us to inquire what happened before the transaction of which we are speaking, or at the same time with the transaction, or after the transaction. "This has nothing to do with the law, you had better apply to Cicero," our friend Gallus used to say, if any one brought him any cause which required an inquiry into matters of fact. But you will prefer that no topic of the art which I have begun to treat of should be omitted by me, lest if you should think that nothing was to be written here except what had reference to yourself, you should seem to be too selfish. This then is for the most part an oratorical topic; not only not much suited to lawyers, but not even to philosophers.
[52] Ante rem enim quaeruntur quae talia sunt: apparatus, colloquia, locus, constitutum, convivium; cum re autem: pedum crepitus, strepitus hominum, corporum umbrae et si quid eius modi; at post rem: pallor, rubor, titubatio, si qua alia signa conturbationis et conscientiae, praeterea restinctus ignis, gladius cruentus ceteraque quae suspicionem facti possunt movere. For the circumstances which happened before the matter in question are inquired into, such as any preparation, any conferences, any place, any prearranged convivial meeting. And the circumstances which happened at the same time with the matter in question, are the noise of footfalls, the noise of men, the shadow of a body, or anything of that sort. The circumstances subsequent to the matter in question are, blushing, paleness, trepidation, or any other tokens of agitation or consciousness; and besides these, any such fact as a fire extinguished, a bloody sword, or any circumstance which can excite a suspicion of such an act.
[53] Deinceps est locus dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus. Nam coniuncta, de quibus paulo ante dictum est, non semper eveniunt; consequentia autem semper. Ea enim dico consequentia quae rem necessario consequuntur; itemque et antecedentia et repugnantia. Quidquid enim sequitur quamque rem, id cohaeret cum re necessario; et quidquid repugnat, id eius modi est ut cohaerere numquam possit. Cum tripertito igitur distribuatur locus hic, in consecutionem, antecessionem, repugnantiam, reperiendi argumenti locus simplex est, tractandi triplex. Nam quid interest, cum hoc sumpseris, pecuniam numeratam mulieri deberi cui sit argentum omne legatum, utrum hoc modo concludas argumentum: Si pecunia signata argentum est, legata est mulieri. Est autem pecunia signata argentum. Legata igitur est; an illo modo: Si numerata pecunia non est legata, non est numerata pecunia argentum. Est autem numerata pecunia argentum; legata igitur est; an illo modo: Non et legatum argentum est et non est legata numerata pecunia. Legatum autem argentum est; legata igitur numerata pecunia est? XIII. The next topic is one peculiar to dialecticians; derived from consequents, and antecedents, and inconsistencies; and this one is very different from that drawn from differences. For adjuncts, of which we were speaking just now, do not always exist, but consequents do invariably. I call those things consequents which follow an action of necessity. And the same rule holds as to antecedents and inconsistencies; for whatever precedes each thing, that of necessity coheres with that theme; and whatever is inconsistent with it is of such a nature that it can never cohere with it. As then this topic is distributed in three divisions, into consequence, antecession, and inconsistency, there is one single topic to help us find the argument, but a threefold way of dealing with it. For what difference does it make, when you have once assumed that the ready money is due to the woman to whom all the money has been bequeathed, whether you conclude your argument in this way:--"If coined money is money, it has been bequeathed to the woman; but coined money is money; therefore it has been bequeathed to her,"--or in this way: "If ready money has not been bequeathed to her, then ready money is not money; but ready money is money; therefore it has been bequeathed to her;"--or in this way: "The cases of money not having been bequeathed, and of ready money not having been bequeathed, are identical; but money was bequeathed to her; therefore ready money was bequeathed to her?"
[54] Appellant autem dialectici eam conclusionem argumenti, in qua, cum primum assumpseris, consequitur id quod annexum est primum conclusionis modum; cum id quod annexum est negaris, ut id quoque cui fuerit annexum negandum sit, secundus is appellatur concludendi modus; cum autem aliqua coniuncta negaris et ex eis unum aut plura sumpseris, ut quod relinquitur tollendum sit, is tertius appellatur conclusionis modus. But the dialecticians call that conclusion of the argument in which, when you have first made an assumption, that which is connected with it follows as a consequence of the assumption, the first mood of the conclusion; and when, because you have denied the consequence, it follows that that also to which it was a consequence must be denied also, that is the second mood. But when you deny some things in combination, (and then another negation is added to them,) and from these things you assume something, so that what remains is also done away with, that is called the third mood of the conclusion.
[55] Ex hoc illa rhetorum ex contrariis conclusa, quae ipsi §nyumæmata appellant; non quod omnis sententia proprio nomine §nyÊmhma non dicatur, sed, ut Homerus propter excellentiam commune poetarum nomen efficit apud Graecos suum, sic, cum omnis sententia §nyÊmhma dicatur, quia videtur ea quae ex contrariis conficitur acutissima, sola proprie nomen commune possedit. Eius generis haec sunt: From this are derived those results of the rhetoricians drawn from contraries, which they call enthymemes. Not that every sentence may not be legitimately called an enthymeme; but, as Homer on account of his preeminence has appropriated the general name of poet to himself as his own among all the Greeks; so, though every sentence is an enthymeme, still, because that which is made up of contraries appears the most acute argument of the kind, that alone has possessed itself of the general name as its own peculiar distinction. Its kinds are these:
hoc metuere, alterum in metu non ponere!
       eam quam nihil accusas damnas, bene quam
       meritam esse autumas
       dicis male merere?
       id quod scis prodest nihil; id quod nescis obest? *
"Can you fear this man, and not fear that one?"—

"You condemn this woman, against whom you bring no accusation; and do you say that this other one deserves punishment, whom you believe to deserve reward?"— "That which you do know is no good; that which you do not know is a great hindrance to you."

[56] Hoc disserendi genus attingit omnino vestras quoque in respondendo disputationes, sed philosophorum magis, quibus est cum oratoribus illa ex repugnantibus sententiis communis conclusio quae a dialecticis tertius modus, a rhetoribus §nyÊmhma dicitur. Reliqui dialecticorum modi plures sunt, qui ex disiunctionibus constant: Aut hoc aut illud; hoc autem; non igitur illud. Itemque: Aut hoc aut illud; non autem hoc; illud igitur. Quae conclusiones idcirco ratae sunt quod in disiunctione plus uno verum esse non potest. XIV. This kind of disputing is very closely connected with the mode of discussion adopted by you lawyers in reply, and still more closely with that adopted by philosophers, as they share with the orators in the employment of that general conclusion which is drawn from inconsistent sentences, which is called by dialecticians the third mood, and by rhetoricians an enthymeme. There are many other moods used by the rhetoricians, which consist of disjunctive propositions:--"Either this or that is the case; but this is the case; then that is not the case." And again:-- "Either this or that is the case; but this is not the case; then that is the case."
[57] Atque ex eis conclusionibus quas supra scripsi prior quartus posterior quintus a dialecticis modus appellatur. Deinde addunt coniunctionum negantiam sic: Non et hoc et illud; hoc autem; non igitur illud. Hic modus est sextus. Septimus autem: Non et hoc et illud; non autem hoc; illud igitur. Ex eis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur, in quo est tota fere dialektikæ. Sed ne hae quidem quas eui ad hanc institutionem necessariae. And these conclusions are valid, because in a disjunctive proposition only one alternative can be true. And from those conclusions which I have mentioned above, the former is called by the dialecticians the fourth mood, and the latter the fifth. Then they add a negation of conjunctive propositions; as, "It is not both this and that; but it is this; therefore it is not that." This is the sixth mood. The seventh is, "It is not both this and that, but it is not this; therefore it is that." From these moods innumerable conclusions are derived, in which nearly the whole science of dialectics consists. But even those which I have now explained are not necessary for this present discussion.
[58] Proximus est locus rerum efficientium, quae causae appellantur; deinde rerum effectarum ab efficientibus causis. Harum exempla, ut reliquorum locorum, paulo ante posui equidem ex iure civili; sed haec patent latius. Causarum enim genera duo sunt; unum, quod vi sua id quod sub eam vim subiectum est certe efficit, ut: Ignis accendit; alterum, quod naturam efficiendi non habet sed sine quo effici non possit, ut si quis aes statuae causam velit dicere, quod sine eo non possit effici. XV. The next topic is drawn from efficient circumstances, which are called causes; and the next from the results produced by these efficient causes. I have already given instances of these, as of the other topics, and those too drawn from civil law; but these have a wider application. There are then two kinds of causes; one which of its own force to a certainty produces that effect which is subordinate to it; as, "Fire burns;" the other is that which has no nature able to produce the effect in question, though still that effect cannot be produced without it; as, if any one were to say, that "brass was the cause of a statue; because a statue cannot be made without it."
[59] Huius generis causarum, sine quo non efficitur, alia sunt quieta, nihil agentia, stolida quodam modo, ut locus, tempus, materia, ferramenta, et cetera generis eiusdem; alia autem praecursionem quandam adhibent ad efficiendum et quaedam afferunt per se adiuvantia, etsi non necessaria, ut: Amori congressio causam attulerat, amor flagitio. Ex hoc genere causarum ex aeternitate pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur. Atque ut earum causarum sine quibus effici non potest genera divisi, sic etiam efficientium dividi possunt. Sunt enim aliae causae quae plane efficiant nulla re adiuvante, aliae quae adiuvari velint, ut: Sapientia efficit sapientis sola per se; beatos efficiat necne sola per sese quaestio est. Now of this kind of causes which are indispensable to a thing being done, some are quiet, some passive, some, as it were, senseless; as, place, time, materials, tools, and other things of the same sort. But some exhibit a sort of preparatory process towards the production of the effect spoken of; and some of themselves do contribute some aid to it; although it is not indispensable; as meeting may have supplied the cause to love; love to crime. From this description of causes depending on one another in infinite series, is derived the doctrine of fate insisted on by the Stoics. And as I have thus divided the genera of causes, without which nothing can be effected, so also the genera of the efficient causes can be divided in the same manner. For there are some causes which manifestly produce the effect, without any assistance from any quarter; others which require external aid; as for instance, wisdom alone by herself makes men wise; but whether she is able alone to make men happy is a question.
[60] Qua re cum in disputationem inciderit causa efficiens aliquid necessario, sine dubitatione licebit quod efficitur ab ea causa concludere. Cum autem erit talis causa, ut in ea non sit efficiendi necessitas, necessaria conclusio non sequitur. Atque illud quidem genus causarum quod habet vim efficiendi necessariam errorem afferre non fere solet; hoc autem sine quo non efficitur saepe conturbat. Non enim, si sine parentibus filii esse non possunt, propterea in parentibus causa fuit gignendi necessaria. XVI. Wherefore, when any cause efficient as to some particular end has inevitably presented itself in a discussion, it is allowable without any hesitation to conclude that what that cause must inevitably effect is effected. But when the cause is of such a nature that it does not inevitably effect the result, then the conclusion which follows is not inevitable. And that description of causes which has an inevitable effect does not usually engender mistakes; but this description, without which a thing cannot take place, does often cause perplexity. For it does not follow, because sons cannot exist without parents, that there was therefore any unavoidable cause in the parents to have children.
[61] Hoc igitur sine quo non fit, ab eo in quo certe fit diligenter est separandum. Illud enim est tamquam utinam ne in nemore Pelio—Nisi enim 'accedissent abiegnae ad terram trabes,' Argo illa facta non esset, nec tamen fuit in his trabibus efficiendi vis necessaria. At cum in Aiacis navim crispisulcans igneum fulmen iniectum est, inflammatur navis necessario. This, therefore, without which an effect cannot be produced, must be carefully separated from that by which it is certainly produced. For that is like--“Would that the lofty pine on Pelion's brow Had never fall'n beneath the woodman's axe!” For if the beam of fir had never fallen to the ground, that Argo would not have been built; and yet there was not in the beams any unavoidably efficient power. But when "The fork'd and fiery bolt of Jove" was hurled at Ajax's vessel, that ship was then inevitably burnt.
[62] Atque etiam est causarum dissimilitudo, quod aliae sunt, ut sine ulla appetitione animi, sine voluntate, sine opinione suum quasi opus efficiant, vel ut omne intereat quod ortum sit; aliae autem aut voluntate efficiunt aut perturbatione animi aut habitu aut natura aut arte aut casu: voluntate, ut tu, cum hunc libellum legis; perturbatione, ut si quis eventum horum temporum timeat; habitu, ut qui facile et cito irascitur; natura, ut vitium in dies crescat; arte, ut bene pingat; casu, ut prospere naviget. Nihil horum sine causa nec quidquam omnino; sed huius modi causae non necessariae. And again, there is a difference between causes, because some are such that without any particular eagerness of mind, without any expressed desire or opinion, they effect what is, as it were, their own work; as for instance, "that everything must die which has been born." But other results are effected either by some desire or agitation of mind, or by habit, or nature, or art, or chance. By desire, as in your case, when you read this book; by agitation, as in the case of any one who fears the ultimate issue of the present crisis; by habit, as in the case of a man who gets easily and rapidly in a passion; by nature, as vice increases every day; by art, as in the case of a man who paints well; by chance, as in the case of a man who has a prosperous voyage. None of these things are without some cause, and yet none of them are wholly owing to any single cause. But causes of this kind are not necessary ones.
[63] Omnium autem causarum in aliis inest constantia, in aliis non inest. In natura et in arte constantia est, in ceteris nulla. Sed tamen earum causarum quae non sunt constantes aliae sunt perspicuae, aliae latent. Perspicuae sunt quae appetitionem animi iudiciumque tangunt; latent quae subiectae sunt fortunae. Cum enim nihil sine causa fiat, hoc ipsum est fortuna, qui eventus obscura causa et latenter efficitur. Etiam ea quae fiunt partim sunt ignorata partim voluntaria; ignorata, quae necessitate effecta sunt; voluntaria, quae consilio. XVII. But in some of these causes there is a uniform operation, and in others there is not. In nature and in art there is uniformity; but in the others there is none. But still of those causes which are not uniform, some are evident, others are concealed. Those are evident which touch the desire or judgment of the mind; those are concealed which are subject to fortune: for as nothing is done without some cause, this very obscure cause, which works in a concealed manner, is the issue of fortune. Again, these results which are produced are partly unintended, partly intentional. Those are unintended which are produced by necessity; those are intentional which are produced by design. But those results which are produced by fortune are either unintended or intentional.
[64] Nam iacere telum voluntatis est, ferire quem nolueris fortunae. Ex quo aries subicitur ille in vestris actionibus: si telum manu fugit magis quam iecit. Cadunt etiam in ignorationem atque imprudentiam perturbationes animi; quae quamquam sunt voluntariae—obiurgatione enim et admonitione deiciuntur—tamen habent tantos motus, ut ea quae voluntaria sunt aut necessaria interdum aut certe ignorata videantur. For to shoot an arrow is an act of intention; to hit a man whom you did not mean to hit is the result of fortune. And this is the topic which you use like a battering-ram in your forensic pleadings; if a weapon has flown from the man's hand rather than been thrown by him. Also agitation of mind may be divided into absence of knowledge and absence of intention. And although they are to a certain extent voluntary, (for they are diverted from their course by reproof or by admonition,) still they are liable to such emotions that even those acts of theirs which are intentional sometimes seem either unavoidable, or at all events unintentional.
[65] Toto igitur loco causarum explicato, ex earum differentia in magnis quidem causis vel oratorum vel philosophorum magna argumentorum suppetit copia; in vestris autem si non uberior, at fortasse subtilior. Privata enim iudicia maximarum quidem rerum in iuris consultorum mihi videntur esse prudentia. Nam et adsunt multum et adhibentur in consilia et patronis diligentibus ad eorum prudentiam confugientibus hastas ministrant. The whole topic of these causes then being now fully explained, from their differences there is derived a great abundance of arguments in all the important discussions of orators and philosophers. And in the cases which you lawyers argue, if there is not so plentiful a stock, what there are, are perhaps more subtle and shrewd. For in private actions the decisions in the most important cases appear to me to depend a great deal on the acuteness of the lawyers. For they are constantly present, and are taken into counsel; and they supply weapons to able advocates whenever they have recourse to their professional wisdom.
[66] In omnibus igitur eis iudiciis, in quibus ex fide bona est additum, ubi vero etiam ut inter bonos bene agier oportet, in primisque in arbitrio rei uxoriae, in quo est quod eius aequius melius, parati eis esse debent. Illi dolum malum, illi fidem bonam, illi aequum bonum, illi quid socium socio, quid eum qui negotia aliena curasset ei cuius ea negotia fuissent, quid eum qui mandasset, eumve cui mandatum esset, alterum alteri praestare oporteret, quid virum uxori, quid uxorem viro tradiderunt. Licebit igitur diligenter argumentorum cognitis locis non modo oratoribus et philosophis, sed iuris etiam peritis copiose de consultationibus suis disputare. In all those judicial proceedings then, in which the words "according to good faith" are added, or even those words, "as ought to be done by one good man to another;" and above all, in all cases of arbitration respecting matrimonial rights, in which the words " juster and better" occur, the lawyers ought to be always ready. For they know what "dishonest fraud," or "good faith," or "just," or "good" mean. They are acquainted with the law between partners; they know what the man who has the management of the affairs of another is bound to do with respect to him whose affairs he manages; they have laid down rules to show what the man who has committed a charge of another, and what he who has had it committed to him, ought to do; what a husband ought to confer on his wife, and a wife on her husband. It will, therefore, when they have by diligence arrived at a proper understanding of the topics from which the necessary arguments are derived, be in the power not only of orators and philosophers, but of lawyers also, to discuss with abundance of argument all the questions which can arise for their consideration.
[67] Coniunctus huic causarum loco ille locus est qui efficitur ex causis. Ut enim causa quid sit effectum indicat, sic quod effectum est quae fuerit causa demonstrat. Hic locus suppeditare solet oratoribus et poetis, saepe etiam philosophis, sed eis qui ornate et copiose loqui possunt, mirabilem copiam dicendi, cum denuntiant quid ex quaque re sit futurum. Causarum enim cognitio cognitionem eventorum facit. XVIII. Conjoined to this topic of causes is that topic which is supplied by causes [sc. that topic of the effects of causes]. For as cause indicates effect so what has been effected points out what the efficient cause has been. This topic ordinarily supplies to orators and poets, and often to philosophers also, that is to say, to those who have an elegant and argumentative and rich style of eloquence, a wonderful store of arguments, when they predict what will result from each circumstance. For the knowledge of causes produces a knowledge of effects.
[68] Reliquus est comparationis locus, cuius genus et exemplum supra positum est ut ceterorum; nunc explicanda tractatio est. Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur; in quibus spectantur haec: numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio. The remaining topic is that of comparison, the genus and instances of which have been already explained, as they have in the case of the other topics. At present we must explain the manner of dealing with this one. Those things then are compared which are greater than one another, or less than one another, or equal to one another. In which these points are regarded; number, appearance, power, and some particular relation to some particular thing.
[69] Numero sic comparabuntur, plura bona ut paucioribus bonis anteponantur, pauciora mala malis pluribus, diuturniora bona brevioribus, longe et late pervagata angustis, ex quibus plura bona propagentur quaeque plures imitentur et faciant. Specie autem comparantur, ut anteponantur quae propter se expetenda sunt eis quae propter aliud et ut innata atque insita assumptis atque adventiciis, integra contaminatis, iucunda minus iucundis, honesta ipsis etiam utilibus, proclivia laboriosis, necessaria non necessariis, sua alienis, rara vulgaribus, desiderabilia eis quibus facile carere possis, perfecta incohatis, tota partibus, ratione utentia rationis expertibus, voluntaria necessariis, animata inanimis, naturalia non naturalibus, artificiosa non artificiosis. Things will be compared in number thus: so that more advantages may be preferred to fewer; fewer evils to more; more lasting advantages to those which are more short-lived; those which have an extensive application to those the effect of which is narrowed: those from which still further advantages may be derived, and those which many people may imitate and reproduce. Things again will be compared with reference to their appearance, so that those things may be preferred which are to be desired for their own sake, to those which are only sought for the sake of something else: and so that innate and inherent advantages may be preferred to acquired and adventitious ones; complete good to mixed good; pleasant things to things less pleasant; honourable things to such as are merely useful; easy things to difficult ones; necessary to unnecessary things; one's own advantage to that of others; rare things to common ones; desirable things to those which you can easily do without; things complete to things which are only begun; wholes to parts; things proceeding on reason to things void of reason; voluntary to necessary things; animate to inanimate things; things natural to things not natural; things skilfully produced by art to things with which art has no connexion.
[70] Vis autem in comparatione sic cernitur: efficiens causa gravior quam non efficiens; quae se ipsis contenta sunt meliora quam quae egent aliis; quae in nostra quam quae in aliorum potestate sunt; stabilia incertis; quae eripi non possunt eis quae possunt. Affectio autem ad res aliquas est huius modi: principum commoda maiora quam reliquorum; itemque quae iucundiora, quae pluribus probata, quae ab optimo quoque laudata. Atque ut haec in comparatione meliora, sic deteriora quae eis sunt contraria. But power in a comparison is perceived in this way: efficient cause is more important than one which effects nothing; those causes which can act by themselves are superior to those which stand in need of the aid of others; those which are in our power are preferable to those which are in the power of another; lasting causes surpass those which are uncertain; things of which no one can deprive us are better than things which can be easily taken away. But the way in which people or things are disposed towards some things is of this sort: the interests of the chief citizens are more important than those of the rest: and also, those things which are more agreeable, which are approved of by more people, or which are praised by the most virtuous men, are preferable. And as in a comparison these things are the better, so those which are contrary to them are the worse.
[71] Parium autem comparatio nec elationem habet nec summissionem; est enim aequalis. Multa autem sunt quae aequalitate ipsa comparantur; quae ita fere concluduntur: Si consilio iuvare cives et auxilio aequa in laude ponendum est, pari gloria debent esse ei qui consulunt et ei qui defendunt; at quod primum, est; quod sequitur igitur. Perfecta est omnis argumentorum inveniendorum praeceptio, ut, cum profectus sis a definitione, a partitione, a notatione, a coniugatis, a genere, a formis, a similitudine, a differentia, a contrariis, ab adiunctis, a consequentibus, ab antecedentibus, a repugnantibus, a causis, ab effectis, a comparatione maiorum, minorum, parium, nulla praeterea sedes argumenti quaerenda sit. But the comparison between things like or equal to each other has no elation or submission; for it is on equal terms: but there are many things which are compared on account of their very equality; which are usually concluded in this manner: "If to assist one's fellow-citizens with counsel and personal aid deserves equal praise, those men who act as counsellors ought to enjoy an equal glory with those who are the actual defenders of a state." But the first premise is certainly the case; therefore so must the consequent be. Every rule necessary for the discovery of arguments is now concluded; so that as you have proceeded from definition, from partition, from observation, from words connected with one another, from genus, from species, from similarity, from difference, from contraries, from accessories, from consequents, from antecedents, from things inconsistent with one another, from causes, from effects, from a comparison with greater, or lesser, or equal things,--there is no topic of argument whatever remaining to be discovered.
[72] Sed quoniam ita a principio divisimus, ut alios locos diceremus in eo ipso de quo ambigitur haerere, de quibus satis est dictum, alios assumi extrinsecus, de eis pauca dicamus, etsi ea nihil omnino ad vestras disputationes pertinent; sed tamen totam rem efficiamus, quandoquidem coepimus. Neque enim tu is es quem nihil nisi ius civile delectet, et quoniam haec ita ad te scribuntur ut etiam in aliorum manus sint ventura, detur opera, ut quam plurimum eis quos recta studia delectant prodesse possimus. XIX. But since we originally divided the inquiry in such a way that we said that other topics also were contained in the very matter which was the subject of inquiry; (but of those we have spoken at sufficient length:) that others were derived from external subjects; and of these we will say a little; although those things have no relation whatever to your discussions. But still we may as well make the whole thing complete, since we have begun it. Nor are you a man who takes no delight in anything except civil law; and since this treatise is dedicated to you, though not so exclusively but that it will also come into the hands of other people, we must take pains to be as serviceable as possible to those men who are addicted to laudable pursuits.
[73] Haec ergo argumentatio, quae dicitur artis expers, in testimonio posita est. Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quod ab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fidem. Persona autem non qualiscumque est testimoni pondus habet; ad fidem enim faciendam auctoritas quaeritur; sed auctoritatem aut natura aut tempus affert. Naturae auctoritas in virtute inest maxima; in tempore autem multa sunt quae afferant auctoritatem: ingenium, opes, aetas, fortuna, ars, usus, necessitas, concursio etiam non numquam rerum fortuitarum. Nam et ingeniosos et opulentos et aetatis spatio probatos dignos quibus credatur putant; non recte fortasse, sed vulgi opinio mutari vix potest ad eamque omnia dirigunt et qui iudicant et qui existimant. Qui enim rebus his quas dixi excellunt, ipsa virtute videntur excellere. This sort of argumentation then which is said not to be founded on art, depends on testimony. But we call everything testimony which is deduced from any external circumstances for the purpose of implanting belief. Now it is not every one who is of sufficient weight to give valid testimony; for authority is requisite to make us believe things. But it is either a man's natural character or his age which invests him with anthority. The authority derived from a man's natural character depends chiefly on his virtue; but on his age there are many things which confer authority; genius, power, fortune, skill, experience, necessity, and sometimes even a concourse of accidental circumstances. For men think able and opulent men, and men who have been esteemed during a long period of their lives, worthy of being believed. Perhaps they are not always right; but still it is not easy to change the sentiments of the common people; and both those who form judgments and those who adopt vague opinions shape everything with reference to them. For those men who are eminent for those qualities which I have mentioned, seem to be eminent for virtue itself.
[74] Sed reliquis quoque rebus quas modo enumeravi quamquam in his nulla species virtutis est, tamen interdum confirmatur fides, si aut ars quaedam adhibetur—magna est enim vis ad persuadendum scientiae—aut usus; plerumque enim creditur eis qui experti sunt. Facit etiam necessitas fidem, quae tum a corporibus tum ab animis nascitur. Nam et verberibus, tormentis, igni fatigati quae dicunt ea videtur veritas ipsa dicere, et quae perturbationibus animi, dolore, cupiditate, iracundia, metu, qui necessitatis vim habent, afferunt auctoritatem et fidem. But in the other circumstances also which I have just enumerated, although there is in them no appearance of virtue, still sometimes belief is confirmed by them, if either any skill is displayed,-- for the influence of knowledge in inspiring belief is very great; or any experience, --for people are apt to believe those who are men of experience. XX. Necessity also engenders belief, which sways both bodies and minds. For what men say when worn out with tortures, and stripes, and fire, appears to be uttered by truth itself. And those statements which proceed from agitation of mind, such as pain, cupidity, passion, and fear, because those feelings have the force of necessity, bring authority and belief.
[75] Cuius generis etiam illa sunt ex quibus verum nonnunquam invenitur, pueritia, somnus, imprudentia, vinolentia, insania. Nam et parvi saepe indicaverunt aliquid, quo id pertineret ignari, et per somnum, vinum, insaniam multa saepe patefacta sunt. Multi etiam in res odiosas imprudenter inciderunt, ut Staieno nuper accidit, qui ea locutus est bonis viris subauscultantibus pariete interposito, quibus patefactis in iudiciumque prolatis ille rei capitalis iure damnatus est. Huic simile quiddam de Lacedaemonio Pausania accepimus. And of this kind are those circumstances from which at times the truth is discovered; childhood, sleep, ignorance, drunkenness, insanity. For children have often indicated something, though ignorant to what it related; and many things have often been discovered by sleep, and wine, and insanity. Many men also have without knowing it fallen into great difficulties, as lately happened to Stalenus; who said things in the hearing of certain excellent men, though a wall was between them, which, when they were revealed and brought before a judicial tribunal, were thought so wicked that he was rightly convicted of a capital offence. And we have heard something similar concerning Pausanias the Lacedaemonian.
[76] Concursio autem fortuitorum talis est, ut si interventum est casu, cum aut ageretur aliquid quod proferendum non esset, aut diceretur. In hoc genere etiam illa est in Palamedem coniecta suspicionum proditionis multitudo; quod genus refutare interdum veritas vix potest. Huius etiam est generis fama vulgi, quoddam multitudinis testimonium. Quae autem virtute fidem faciunt ea bipertita sunt; ex quibus alterum natura valet alterum industria. Deorum enim virtus natura excellit, hominum autem industria. But the concourse of fortuitous events is often of this kind; when anything has happened by chance to interrupt, when anything was being done or said which it was desirable should not have been done or said. Of this kind is that multitude of suspicions of treason which were heaped upon Palamedes. And circumstances of this kind are sometimes scarcely able to be refuted by truth itself. Of this kind too is ordinary report among the common people; which is as it were the testimony of the multitude. But those things which create belief on account of the virtue of the witness are of a two-fold kind; one of which is valid on account of nature, the other by industry. For the virtue of the gods is eminent by nature; but that of men, because of their industry.
[77] Divina haec fere sunt testimonia: primum orationis—oracula enim ex eo ipso appellata sunt, quod inest in his deorum oratio—; deinde rerum, in quibus insunt quasi quaedam opera divina: primum ipse mundus eiusque omnis ordo et ornatus; deinceps aerii volatus avium atque cantus; deinde eiusdem aeris sonitus et ardores multarumque rerum in terra portenta atque etiam per exta inventa praesensio; a dormientibus quoque multa significata visis. Quibus ex locis sumi interdum solent ad fidem faciendam testimonia deorum. Testimonies of this kind are nearly divine: first of all, that of oration, (for oracles were so called from that very same word, as there is in them the oration of the gods;) then that of things in which there are, as it were, many divine works; first of all, the word itself, and its whole order and ornaments; then the airy fiights and songs of birds; then the sound and heat of that same air; and the numerous prodigies of divers kinds seen on the earth; and also, the power of foreseeing the future by means of the entrails of victims: many things, too, which are shown to the living by those who are asleep: from all which topics the testimonies of the gods are at times adduced so as to create belief.
[78] In homine virtutis opinio valet plurimum. Opinio est autem non modo eos virtutem habere qui habeant, sed eos etiam qui habere videantur. Itaque quos ingenio, quos studio, quos doctrina praeditos vident quorumque vitam constantem et probatam, ut Catonis, Laeli, Scipionis, aliorumque plurium, rentur eos esse qualis se ipsi velint; nec solum eos censent esse talis qui in honoribus populi reque publica versantur, sed et oratores et philosophos et poetas et historicos, ex quorum et dictis et scriptis saepe auctoritas petitur ad faciendam fidem. In the case of a man, the opinion of his virtue is of the greatest weight. For opinion goes to this extent, that those men have virtue, not only who do really possess it, but those also who appear to possess it. Therefore, those men whom they see endowed with genius and diligence and learning, and whose life they see is consistent and approved of, like Cato, and Laelius, and Scipio, and many others, they consider such men as they themselves would wish to be. And not only do they think them such who enjoy honours conferred on them by the people, and who busy themselves with affairs of state, but also those who are orators, and philosophers, and poets, and historians; from whose sayings and writings authority is often sought for to establish belief.
[79] Eitis omnibus argumentandi locis illud primum intellegendum est nec ullam esse disputationem in qua non aliquis locus incurrat, nec fere omnis locos incidere in omnem quaestionem et quibusdam quaestionibus alios, quibusdam alios esse aptiores locos. Quaestionum duo genera sunt: alterum infinitum, definitum alterum. Definitum est quod Ípòyesin Graeci, nos causam; infinitum quod yšsin illi appellant, nos propositum possumus nominare. XXI. Having thus explained all the topics serviceable for arguing, the first thing to be understood is, that there is no discussion whatever to which some topic or other is not applicable; and on the other hand, that it is not every topic which is applicable to every discussion; but that different topics are suited to different subjects. There are two kinds of inquiry: one, infinite; the other, definite. The definite one is that which the Greeks call hypothesis, and we, a cause; the infinite one, that which they call thesis, and which we may properly term a proposition.
[80] Causa certis personis, locis, temporibus, actionibus, negotiis cernitur aut in omnibus aut in plerisque eorum, propositum autem aut in aliquo eorum aut in pluribus nec tamen in maximis. Itaque propositum pars est causae. Sed omnis quaestio earum aliqua de re est quibus causae continentur, aut una aut pluribus aut nonnunquam omnibus. A cause is determined by certain persons, places, times, actions, and things, either all or most of them; but a proposition is declared in some one of those things, or in several of them, and those not the most important: therefore, a proposition is a part of a cause. But the whole inquiry is about some particular one of those things in which causes are contained; whether it be one, or many, or sometimes all.
[81] Quaestionum autem 'quacumque de re' sunt duo genera: unum cognitionis alterum actionis. But of inquiries, concerning whatever thing they are, there are two kinds; one theoretical, the other practical.
[82] Cognitionis sunt eae quarum est finis scientia, ut si quaeratur a naturane ius profectum sit an ab aliqua quasi condicione hominum et pactione. Actionis autem huius modi exempla sunt: Sitne sapientis ad rem publicam accedere. Cognitionis quaestiones tripertitae sunt; aut sitne aut quid sit aut quale sit quaeritur. Horum primum coniectura, secundum definitione, tertium iuris et iniuriae distinctione explicatur. Coniecturae ratio in quattuor partes distributa est, quarum una est cum quaeritur sitne aliquid; altera unde ortum sit; tertia quae id causa effecerit; quarta in qua de commutatione rei quaeritur. Sitne sic: ecquidnam sit honestum, ecquid aequum re vera; an haec tantum in opinione sint. Unde autem sit ortum: ut cum quaeritur, natura an doctrina possit effici virtus. Causa autem efficiens sic quaeritur, quibus rebus eloquentia efficiatur. De commutatione sic: possitne eloquentia commutatione aliqua converti in infantiam. Theoretical inquiries are those of which the proposed aim is science; as "If it is inquired whether right proceeds from nature, or from some covenant, as it were, and bargain between men." But the following are instances of practical inquiry: "Whether it is the part of a wise man to meddle with statesmanship." The inquiries into theoretical matters are threefold; as what is inquired is, whether a thing exists, or what it is, or what its character is. The first of these queries is explained by conjecture; the second, by definition; the third, by distinctions of right and wrong. The method of conjecture is distributed into four parts; one of which is, when the inquiry is whether something exists; a second, when the question is, whence it has originated; a third, when one seeks to know what cause produced it; the fourth is that in which the alterations to which the subject is liable are examined: "Whether it exists or not; whether there is anything honourable, anything intrinsically and really just; or whether these things only exist in opinion." But the inquiry whence it has originated, is when an inquiry is such as this, "Whether virtue is implanted by nature or whether it can be engendered by instruction." But the efficient cause is like this, as when an inquiry is, "By what means eloquence is produced." Concerning the alterations of anything, in this manner: "Whether eloquence can by any alteration be converted into a want of eloquence."
[83] Cum autem quid sit quaeritur, notio explicanda est et proprietas et divisio et partitio. Haec enim sunt definitioni attributa; additur etiam descriptio, quam xaraktƒra Graeci vocant. Notio sic quaeritur: sitne id aequum quod ei qui plus potest utile est. Proprietas sic: in hominemne solum cadat an etiam in beluas aegritudo. Divisio et eodem pacto partitio sic: triane genera bonorum sint. Descriptio, qualis sit avarus, qualis assentator ceteraque eiusdem generis, in quibus et natura et vita describitur. XXII. But when the question is what a thing is; the notion is to be explained, and the property, and the division, and the partition. For these things are all attributed to definition. Description also is added, which the Greeks called charaktêr. A notion is inquired into in this way: "Whether that is just which is useful to that person who is the more powerful. Property, in this way: "Whether melancholy is incidental to man alone, or whether beasts also are liable to it." Division, and also partition, in this manner: "Whether there are three descriptions of good things." Description, like this: "What sort of person a miser is; what sort of person a flatterer;" and other things of that sort, by which the nature and life of a man are described.
[84Cum autem quaeritur quale quid sit, aut simpliciter quaeritur aut comparate; simpliciter: Expetendane sit gloria; comparate: Praeponendane sit divitiis gloria. Simplicium tria genera sunt: de expetendo fugiendoque, de aequo et iniquo, de honesto et turpi. Comparationum autem duo: unum de eodem et alio, alterum de maiore et minore. De expetendo et fugiendo huius modi: Si expetendae divitiae, si fugienda paupertas. De aequo et iniquo: Aequumne sit ulcisci a quocumque iniuriam acceperis. De honesto et turpi: Honestumne sit pro patria mori? But when the inquiry is what the character of something is, the inquiry is conducted either simply, or by way of comparison. Simply, in this way: "Whether glory is to be sought for." By way of comparison, in this way: "Whether glory is to be preferred to riches." Of simple inquiries there are three kinds; about seeking for or avoiding anything, about the right and the wrong; about what is honourable and what is discreditable. But of inquiries by way of comparison there are two; one of the thing itself and something else; one of something greater and something else. Of seeking for and avoiding a thing, in this way: "Whether riches are to be sought for: whether poverty is to be avoided." Concerning right and wrong: "Whether it is right to revenge oneself, whoever the person may be from whom one has received an injury." Concerning what is honourable and what is discreditable: "Whether it is honourable to die for one's country."
[85] Ex altero autem genere, quod erat bipertitum, unum est de eodem et alio: Quid intersit inter amicum et assentatorem, regem et tyrannum; alterum de maiore et minore, ut si quaeratur eloquentiane pluris sit an iuris civilis scientia. De cognitionis quaestionibus hactenus. But of the other kind of inquiry, which has been stated to be twofold, one is about the thing in question and something else; as if it were asked, "What is the difference between a friend and a flatterer, between a king and tyrant?" The other is between something greater and something less; as if it were asked, "Whether eloquence is of more consequence than the knowledge of civil law." And this is enough about theoretical inquiries.
[86] Actionis reliquae sunt, quarum duo genera: unum ad officium, alterum ad motum animi vel gignendum vel sedandum planeve tollendum. Ad officium sic, ut cum quaeritur suscipiendine sint liberi. Ad movendos animos cohortationes ad defendendam rem publicam, ad laudem, ad gloriam; quo ex genere sunt querellae, incitationes, miserationesque flebiles; rursusque oratio tum iracundiam restinguens, tum metum eripiens, tum exsultantem laetitiam comprimens, tum aegritudinem abstergens. Haec cum in propositi quaestionibus genera sint, eadem in causas transferuntur. It remains to speak of practical ones; of which there are two kinds: one relating to one's duty, the other to engendering, or calming, or utterly removing any affection of the mind. Relating to duty thus: as when the question is, "Whether children ought to be had." Relating to influencing the mind, when exhortations are delivered to men to defend the republic, or when they are encouraged to seek glory and praise: of which kind of addresses are complaints, and encouragements, and tearful commiseration; and again, speeches extinguishing anger, or at other times removing fear, or repressing the exultation of joy, or effacing melancholy. As these different divisions belong to general inquiries, they are also transferable to causes.
[87] Loci autem qui ad quasque quaestiones accommodati sint deinceps est videndum. Omnes illi quidem ad plerasque, sed alii ad alias, ut dixi, aptiores. Ad coniecturam igitur maxime apta quae ex causis, quae ex effectis, quae ex coniunctis sumi possunt. Ad definitionem autem pertinet ratio et scientia definiendi. Atque huic generi finitimum est illud quod appellari de eodem et de altero diximus, quod genus forma quaedam definitionis est; si enim quaeratur idemne sit pertinacia et perseverantia, definitionibus iudicandum est. XXIII. But the next thing to be inquired is, what topics are adapted to each kind of inquiry; for all those which we have already mentioned are suitable to most kinds; but still, different topics, as I have said before, are better suited to different investigations. Those arguments are the most suitable to conjectural discussion which can be deduced from causes, from effects, or from dependent circumstances. But when we have need of definition, then we must have recourse to the principles and science of defining. And akin to this is that other argument also which we said was employed with respect to the subject in question and something else; and that is a species of definition. For if the question is, "Whether pertinacity and perseverance are the same thing," it must be decided by definitions.
[88] Loci autem convenient in eius generis quaestionem consequentis, antecedentis, repugnantis; adiuncti etiam eis qui sumuntur ex causis et effectis. Nam si hanc rem illa sequitur, hanc autem non sequitur; aut si huic rei illa antecedit, huic non antecedit; aut si huic rei repugnat, illi non repugnat; aut si huius rei haec, illius alia causa est; aut si ex alio hoc, ex alio illud effectum est: ex quovis horum id de quo quaeritur idemne an aliud sit inveniri potest. And the topics which are incidental to a discussion of this kind are those drawn from consequents, or antecedents, or inconsistencies, with the addition also of those two topics which are deduced from causes and effects. For if such and such a thing is a consequence of this, but not a consequence of that; or if such and such a thing is a necessary antecedent to this, but not to that; or if it is inconsistent with this, but not with that; or if one thing is the cause of this, and another the cause of that; or if this is effected by one thing, and that by another thing; from any one of these topics it may be discovered whether the thing which is the subject of discussion is the same thing or something else.
[89] Ad tertium genus quaestionis, in quo quale sit quaeritur, in comparationem ea cadunt quae paulo ante in comparationis loco enumerata sunt. In illud autem genus in quo de expetendo fugiendoque quaeritur adhibentur ea quae sunt aut animi aut corporis aut externa vel commoda vel incommoda. Itemque cum de honesto turpique quaeritur, ad animi bona aut mala omnis oratio dirigenda est. With respect to the third kind of inquiry, in which the question is what the character of the matter in question is, those things are incidental to the comparison which were enumerated just now under the topic of comparison. But in that kind of inquiry where the question is about what is to be sought for or avoided, those arguments are employed which refer to advantages or disadvantages, whether affecting the mind or body, or being external. And again, when the inquiry is not what is honourable or discreditable, all our argument must be addressed to the good or bad qualities of the mind.
[90] Cum autem de aequo et iniquo disseritur, aequitatis loci colligentur. Hi cernuntur bipertito, et natura et instituto. Natura partes habet duas, tributionem sui cuique et ulciscendi ius. Institutio autem aequitatis tripertita est: una pars legitima est, altera conveniens, tertia moris vetustate firmata. Atque etiam aequitas tripertita dicitur esse: una ad superos deos, altera ad manes, tertia ad homines pertinere. Prima pietas, secunda sanctitas, tertia iustitia aut aequitas nominatur. De proposito satis multa, deinceps de causa pauciora dicenda sunt. Pleraque enim sunt ei cum proposito communia. But when right and wrong are being discussed, all the topics of equity are collected. These are divided in a twofold manner, as to whether they are such by nature or owing to institutions. Nature has two parts to perform, to defend itself, and to indicate right. But the agreements which establish equity are of a threefold character: one part is that which rests on laws; one depends on convenience; the third is founded on and established by antiquity of custom. And again, equity itself is said to be of a threefold nature: one division of it having reference to the gods above; another, to the shades below; a third, to mankind. The first is called piety; the second, sanctity; the third, justice or equity. XXIV. I have said enough about propositions. There are now a few things which require to be said about causes. For they have many things in common with propositions.
[91] Tria sunt igitur genera causarum: iudici, deliberationis, laudationis. Quarum fines ipsi declarant quibus utendum locis sit. Nam iudici finis est ius, ex quo etiam nomen. Iuris autem partes tum eitae, cum aequitatis. Deliberandi finis utilitas, cuius eae partes quae modo eitae. Laudationis finis honestas, de qua item est ante dictum. There are then three kinds of causes; having for their respective objects, judgment, deliberation, and panegyric. And the object of each points out what topics we ought to employ in each. For the object of judicial judgment is right; from which also it derives its name. And the divisions of right were explained when we explained the divisions of equity. The object of deliberation is utility; of which the divisions have also been already explained when we were treating of things to be desired. The object of panegyric is honour; concerning which also we have already spoken.
[92] Sed definitae quaestiones a suis quaeque locis quasi propriis instruuntur, . . . quae in accusationem defensionemque partitae; in quibus exsistunt haec genera, ut accusator personam arguat facti, defensor aliquid opponat de tribus: aut non esse factum aut, si sit factum, aliud eius facti nomen esse aut iure esse factum. Itaque aut infitialis aut coniecturalis prima appelletur, definitiva altera, tertia, quamvis molestum nomen hoc sit, iuridicialis vocetur. Harum causarum propria argumenta ex eis sumpta locis quos euimus in praeceptis oratoriis explicata sunt. But inquiries which are definite are all of them furnished with appropriate topics, as if they belonged to themselves, being divided into accusation and defence. And in them there are these kinds of argumentation. The accuser accuses a person of an act; the advocate for the defence opposes one of these excuses: either that the thing imputed has not been done; or that, if it has been done, it deserves to be called by a different name; or that it was done lawfully and rightly. Therefore, the first is called a defence either by way of denial or by way of conjecture; the second is called a defence by definition; the third, although it is an unpopular name, is called the judicial one. XXV. The arguments proper to these excuses, being derived from the topics which we have already set forth, have been explained in our oratorical rules.
[93] Refutatio autem accusationis, in qua est depulsio criminis, quoniam Graece stãsiw dicitur appelletur Latine status; in quo primum insistit quasi ad repugnandum congressa defensio. Atque in deliberationibus etiam et laudationibus idem existunt status. Nam et negantur saepe ea futura quae ab aliquo in sententia dicta sunt fore, si aut omnino fieri non possint aut sine summa difficultate non possint; in qua argumentatione status coniecturalis exsistit; But the refutation of an accusation, in which there is a repelling of a charge, which is called in Greek stasis, is in Latin called status. On which there is founded, in the first place, such a defence as may effectually resist the attack. And also, in the deliberations and panegyrics the same refutations often have place. For it is often denied that those things are likely to happen which have been stated by some or other in his speech as sure to take place; if it can be shown either that they are actually impossible, or that they cannot be brought about without extreme difficulty. And in this kind of argumentation the conjectural refutation takes place.
[94] aut cum aliquid de utilitate, honestate, aequitate disseritur deque eis rebus quae his sunt contrariae incurrunt status aut iuris aut nominis; quod idem contingit in laudationibus. Nam aut negari potest id factum esse quod laudetur, aut non eo nomine afficiendum quo laudator affecerit, aut omnino non esse laudabile quod non recte, non iure factum sit. Quibus omnibus generibus usus est nimis impudenter Caesar contra Catonem meum. But when there is any discussion about utility, or honour, or equity, and about those things which are contrary to one another, then come in denials, either of the law or of the name of the action. And the same is the case in panegyrics. For one may either deny that that has been done which the person is praised for; or else that it ought to bear that name which the praiser has conferred on it, or else one may altogether deny that it deserves any praise at all, as not having been done rightly or lawfully. And Caesar employed all these different kinds of denial with exceeding impudence when speaking against my friend Cato.
[95] Sed quae ex statu contentio efficitur, eam Graeci krinòmenon vocant, mihi placet id, quoniam quidem ad te scribo, qua de re agitur vocari. Quibus autem hoc qua de re agitur continetur, ea continentia vocentur, quasi firmamenta defensionis, quibus sublatis defensio nulla sit. But the contest which arises from a denial is called by the Greeks krinomenon; I, while writing to you, prefer calling it "the precise point in dispute." But for the parts within which this discussion on the point in dispute is contained, they may be called the containing parts; being as it were the foundations of the defence; and if they are taken away there would be no defence at all.
Sed quoniam lege firmius in controversiis disceptandis esse nihil debet, danda est opera ut legem adiutricem et testem adhibeamus. In qua re alii quasi status existunt novi, sed appellentur legitimae disceptationes. But since in arguing controversies there ought to be nothing which has more weight than the law itself, we must take pains to have the law as our assistant and witness. And in this there are, as it were, other new denials, which are called legitimate subjects of discussion.
[96] Tum enim defenditur non id legem dicere quod adversarius velit, sed aliud. Id autem contingit, cum scriptum ambiguum est, ut duae sententiae differentes accipi possint. Tum opponitur scripto voluntas scriptoris, ut quaeratur verbane plus an sententia valere debeant. Tum legi lex contraria affertur. Ista sunt tria genera quae controversiam in omni scripto facere possint: ambiguum, discrepantia scripti et voluntatis, scripta contraria. Iam hoc perspicuum est, non magis in legibus quam in testamentis, in stipulationibus, in reliquis rebus quae ex scripto aguntur, posse controversias easdem existere. Horum tractationes in aliis libris explicantur. For then it is urged in defence, that the law does not say what the adversary states it to say, but something else. And that happens when the terms of the law are ambiguous, so that they can be understood in two different senses. Then the intention of the framer is opposed to the letter of the law; so that the question is, whether the words or the intention ought to have the greatest validity. Then again, another law is adduced contrary to this law. So there are three kinds of doubts which can give rise to a dispute with respect to every written document; ambiguity of expression, discrepancy between the expression and the intention, and also written documents opposed to the one in question. For this is evident; that these kinds of disputes are no more incidental to laws than to wills, or covenants, or to anything else which is contained in writing. And the way to treat these topics is explained in other books.
[97] Nec solum perpetuae actiones sed etiam partes orationis isdem locis adiuvantur, partim propriis, partim communibus; ut in principiis, quibus ut benevoli, ut dociles, ut attenti sint qui audiant, efficiendum est propriis locis; itemque narrationes ut ad suos fines spectent, id est ut planae sint, ut breves, ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae, ut cum dignitate. Quae quamquam in tota oratione esse debent, magis tamen sunt propria narrandi. XXVI. Nor is it only entire pleadings which are assisted by these topics, but the same are useful in the separate parts of an oration; being partly peculiar and partly general. As in the opening of a speech, in which the orator must employ peculiar topics in order to render his hearers well disposed to him, and docile, and attentive. And also he must attend to his relations of facts, so that they may have a bearing on his object, that is to say, that they may be plain, and brief, and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration.
[98] Quae autem sequitur narrationem fides, ea persuadendo quoniam efficitur, qui ad persuadendum loci maxime valeant dictum est in eis in quibus de omni ratione dicendi. Peroratio autem et alia quaedam habet et maxime amplificationem, cuius effectus hic debet esse, ut aut perturbentur animi aut tranquillentur et, si ita affecti iam ante sint, ut aut augeat eorum motus aut sedet oratio. But since the belief which is given to a narration is engendered by persuasiveness, we have already, in the treatises which we have written on the general subject of oratory, explained what topics they are which have the greatest power to persuade the hearers. But the peroration has other points to attend to, and especially amplification; the effect of which ought to be, that the mind of the hearer is agitated or tranquillized by it; and if it has already been affected in that way, that the whole speech shall either increase its agitation, or calm it more completely.
[99] Huic generi, in quo et misericordia et iracundia et odium et invidia et ceterae animi affectiones perturbantur, praecepta suppeditantur aliis in libris, quos poteris mecum legere cum voles. Ad id autem quod te velle senseram, cumulate satis factum esse debet voluntati tuae. For this kind of peroration, by which pity, and anger, and hatred, and envy, and similar feelings of the mind are excited, rules are furnished in those books, which you may read over with me whenever you like. But as to the point on which I have known you to be anxious, your desires ought now to be abundantly satisfied.
[100] Nam ne praeterirem aliquid quod ad argumentum in omni ratione reperiendum pertineret, plura quam a te desiderata erant sum complexus fecique quod saepe liberales venditores solent, ut, cum aedes fundumve vendiderint rutis caesis receptis, concedant tamen aliquid emptori quod ornandi causa apte et loco positum esse videatur; sic tibi nos ad id quod quasi mancipio dare debuimus ornamenta quaedam voluimus non debita accedere. For, in order not to pass over anything which had reference to the discovery of arguments in every sort of discussion, I have embraced more topics than were desired by you; and I have done as liberal sellers often do when they have sold a house or a farm, the movables being all excepted from the sale, still give some of them to the purchaser, which appear to be well placed as ornaments or conveniences. And so we have chosen to throw in some ornaments that were not strictly your due, in addition to that with which we had bound ourselves to furnish you.
1. <Yonge, p. 460, note 1> Assiduus. Prop. sitting down, seated, and so, well to do in the world, rich. The derivation ab assis duendis is therefore to be rejected. Servius Tullius divided the Roman people into two classes, assidui, i.e. the rich, who could sit down and take their ease, and proletarii, or capite censi, the poor."--Diddle, in voc. Assiduus, quoting this passage. One does not see, however, why Aelius and Cicero should not understand the meaning and derivation of a Latin word. Smith's Dict. Ant. takes no notice of the word at all.
2. [Yonge, p. 463, note 1]: See chap. x.