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===DIEP. Note 20===
===DIEP. Note 20===
CP 2.418
* CP 2.418
===DIEP. Work Area===
==DIEP. De In Esse Predication • Discussion==
===DIEP. Discussion Note 1===
<pre>
<pre>
Re: CP 3.441
GR: given that two paragraphs later, Peirce writes:
| if the Devil were elected president of the United States, it would prove
| highly conducive to the spiritual welfare of the people (because he will
| not be elected), yet both Professor Schröder and I prefer to build the
| algebra of relatives upon this conception of the conditional proposition.
GR: and given the bizarre situation that the devil HAS been
elected President of the United States, what does this
say about Peirce's or Schroder's logic, especially in
its esthetical and ethical presuppositions?
JA: he means that if the name on the ballot were "The Devil",
the people would not thus knowingly elect him. of course,
putting his real name on the ballot would be the last thing
that the Devil would do.
JA: but hey, don't read ahead,
it'll spoil the surprise.
GR: Most interesting interpretation.
GR: Yes, I certainly try not to "spoil the surprise".
JA: of course, none of this applies in california ...
JA: With that last bit (CP 3.442) on the "state of information" (SOI)
in the mix, I guess that I can now follow-up without letting any
more categories out of the bag -- there are only three after all --
Peirce's simplex faith in the democratic process is conditioned,
simplexly or otherwise, on the evidently inessential contingency
of a "liberally informed electorate" (LIE).
</pre>
===DIEP. Discussion Note 2===
<pre>
CSP = C.S. Peirce
JA = Jon Awbrey
BM = Bernard Morand
CSP: | [A Boolian Algebra With One Constant] (cont.)
|
| To express the proposition: "If S then P",
| first write:
|
| A
|
| for this proposition. But the proposition
| is that a certain conceivable state of things
| is absent from the universe of possibility.
| Hence instead of A we write:
|
| B B
BM: All was going right till there for me.
CSP: | Then B expresses the possibility of S being true and P false.
BM: Now, I am stopped. May be there is an intermediary
implicit proposition that I am not seeing? If yes
which one? This could be of interest to Gary too:
I guess that for the whole passage the elements
of the demonstration count more than the
conclusion in itself.
CSP: | Since, therefore, SS denies S, it follows
| that (SS, P) expresses B. Hence we write:
|
| SS, P; SS, P.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 4.14, untitled paper circa 1880.
Peirce is working analytically here -- I mean that in the good sense of the word --
in the manner that Bentham calls "paraphrasis", Boole "development", or most math
folks "expansion", if I remember right. But he already knows the answer he wants,
so the whole analysis will have that "pulling a rabbit out of the hat" quality of
such performances.
The basic operation is unmarked, or you could think of the blank space as a symbol
for the logical operation of "joint denial", that Peirce counted as one of the two
possible "amphecks" (cutting both ways), Sheffer called a "stroke", and comp sci
folk call NNOR (neither nor). The punctuation marks are not really operators,
they just group terms, much like the "puncts" or "dots" of Peano that Russell
so butchered to the point of unintelligibility, like so much else.
In saying "S => P" one is saying "that a certain conceivable state of things
is absent from the universe of possibility" -- sounds awfully "intensional",
does it not? -- but anyway, the conceivable states of things that one is
excluding from the universe of possibility are any states of things that
would form a counterexample to "S => P", namely, those states of things
that are described by "S and not P".
That denial would take the form:
S and not P. S and not P.
Let's call that the Lady Macbeth denial.
It remains to analyze the metalanguage phrase "S and not P"
using only "S", "P", and the tacit joint denial connective.
If I wrote "S P", this would be saying "not S and not P",
so all I need to do is change the sign on the S part of it,
which I can do by doubling the S. As we have stipulated,
doubling is a way of putting things in doubt. Therefore,
"SS, P" says "S and not P", which is the thing we want
to deny, and which final denial we can make by writing:
SS, P; SS, P.
Voila!
</pre>
===DIEP. Discussion Note 3===
<pre>
JA = Jon Awbrey
TJ = Tom Johnson
Re: CP 4.517
This started out as an attempt to track down a 30 year old memory,
having to do with the phrase "predication (de?) inesse", which
I thought I saw first in Peirce, supposed that he got from
Leibniz (who I also read a lot of in those days), and had
a "clear and distinct" idea (the worst kind) that it was
an "intensional" account of predication. I used to have
access to the microfilm manuscripts of Peirce's nachlass
at that time, and if it's there I probably won't get back
to it. From what I have uncovered this time around, I seem
to be correct about the significance that Leibniz attached to
This started out as an attempt to track down a 30 year old memory,
having to do with the phrase "predication (de?) inesse", which
I thought I saw first in Peirce, supposed that he got from
Leibniz (who I also read a lot of in those days), and had
a "clear and distinct" idea (the worst kind) that it was
an "intensional" account of predication. I used to have
access to the microfilm manuscripts of Peirce's nachlass
at that time, and if it's there I probably won't get back
to it. From what I have uncovered this time around, I seem
to be correct about the significance that Leibniz attached to
the phrase -- will have to check again -- but all I find so far
the phrase -- will have to check again -- but all I find so far
in the CP is 'conditio/consequentia simplex de inesse' that Peirce
in the CP is 'conditio/consequentia simplex de inesse' that Peirce
discover the quantum of truth in the sign "physical causality".
discover the quantum of truth in the sign "physical causality".
</pre>
DIEP. Discussion Note 4
===DIEP. Discussion Note 4===
<pre>
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA = Jon Awbrey
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/fixation/fx-frame.htm
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/fixation/fx-frame.htm
</pre>
DIEP. Discussion Note 5
===DIEP. Discussion Note 5===
<pre>
GR = Gary Richmond
GR = Gary Richmond
That's all I can remember at the moment ...
That's all I can remember at the moment ...
</pre>
DIEP. Discussion Note 6
===DIEP. Discussion Note 6===
<pre>
JA = Jon Awbrey
JA = Jon Awbrey
I will pick up from there next time.
I will pick up from there next time.
</pre>
DIEP. Discussion Note 7
===DIEP. Discussion Note 7===
<pre>
BM = Bernard Morand
BM = Bernard Morand
http://www.louvre.fr/img/photos/collec/ager/grande/ma0399.jpg
http://www.louvre.fr/img/photos/collec/ager/grande/ma0399.jpg
</pre>
</pre>
==HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction==
==DIEP. De In Esse Predication • Work Area==
<pre>
<pre>
01. 1880, CP 4.12
02. 1880, CP 4.13
03. 1880, CP 4.14
04. 1896, CP 3.440
05. 1896, CP 3.441
06. 1896, CP 3.442
07. 1896, CP 3.443
08. 1896, CP 3.444-445
09. 1885, CP 3.374
10. 1902, CP 2.323
11. 1895, CP 2.356
12. 1903, CP 4.517
13. 1903, CP 3.606-608
14. 1897, CP 3.526
15. 1897, CP 3.527
16. 1897, CP 3.527
17. ????, CP 2.361
18. 1908, CP 3.527 note
19. 1867, 1.559
20.
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
1.559 x
2.323 x
2.347-349
2.356 x
2.361 x
2.382
2.394
2.407-409
2.418
2.546
2.
323
348
349
546
2.
231
250
260
293
364
409
416
418
418n
3.374 x
3.375
3.382
3.384 Peirce's Law
3.440-445 x
3.446-448
3.526-527 x
3.606-608 x
4.12-14 x
4.21
4.49
4.372-376
4.401
4.454
4.514-523
4.517 x
4.520
4.564
6.450
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Note 7===
==HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction==
===HAPA. Note 1===
<pre>
<pre>
| Exceedingly important are the relatives signifying "-- is a quality of --"
| When we have analyzed a proposition so as to throw into the subject everything
| and "-- is a relation of -- to --". It may be said that mathematical
| that can be removed from the predicate, all that it remains for the predicate to
| reasoning (which is the only deductive reasoning, if not absolutely,
| represent is the form of connection between the different subjects as expressed in
| at least eminently) almost entirely turns on the consideration of
| the propositional 'form'. What I mean by "everything that can be removed from the
| abstractions as if they were objects. The protest of nominalism
| predicate" is best explained by giving an example of something not so removable.
| against such hypostatisation, although, if it knew how to formulate
| But first take something removable. "Cain kills Abel." Here the predicate
| itself, it would be justified as against much of the empty disputation
| appears as "--- kills ---." But we can remove killing from the predicate
| of the medieval Dunces, yet, as it was and is formulated, is simply a
| and make the latter "--- stands in the relation --- to ---." Suppose we
| protest against the only kind of thinking that has ever advanced human
| attempt to remove more from the predicate and put the last into the form
| culture. Nobody will work long with the logic of relatives -- unless
| "--- exercises the function of relate of the relation --- to ---" and then
| he restricts the problems of his studies very much -- without seeing
| putting "the function of relate to the relation" into a another subject leave
| that this is true.
| as predicate "--- exercises --- in respect to --- to ---." But this "exercises"
| expresses "exercises the function". Nay more, it expresses "exercises the function
| of relate", so that we find that though we may put this into a separate subject, it
| continues in the predicate just the same. Stating this in another form, to say that
| "A is in the relation R to B" is to say that A is in a certain relation to R. Let
| us separate this out thus: "A is in the relation R^1 (where R^1 is the relation
| of a relate to the relation of which it is the relate) to R to B". But A is
| here said to be in a certain relation to the relation R^1. So that we can
| expresss the same fact by saying, "A is in the relation R^1 to the relation
| R^1 to the relation R to B", and so on 'ad infinitum'. A predicate which
| can thus be analyzed into parts all homogeneous with the whole I call
| a 'continuous predicate'. It is very important in logical analysis,
| because a continuous predicate obviously cannot be a 'compound'
| except of continuous predicates, and thus when we have carried
| analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we
| have carried it to its ultimate elements.
|
| Peirce, "Letters to Lady Welby", 14 Dec 1908, 'Selected Writings', pp. 396-397.
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.509, "The Logic of Relatives",
| Charles S. Peirce, "Letters to Lady Welby", pp. 380-432 in:
|'The Monist', vol. 7, pp. 161-217, 1897.
|'Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings (Values in a Universe
| of Chance)', Edited with an Introduction and Notes by
| Philip P. Wiener, Dover, New York, NY, 1966.
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Note 8===
===HAPA. Note 2===
<pre>
<pre>
| The logical term 'subjectal abstraction' here requires a
| Another characteristic of mathematical thought is the extraordinary
| word of explanation; for there are few treatises on logic
| use it makes of abstractions. Abstractions have been a favorite
| which notice subjectal abstraction under any name, except so
| butt of ridicule in modern times. Now it is very easy to laugh
| far as to confuse it with precisive abstraction which is an
| at the old physician who is represented as answering the question,
| entirely different logical function. When we say that the
| why opium puts people to sleep, by saying that it is because it
| Columbia library building is 'large', this remark is a result
| has a dormative virtue. It is an answer that no doubt carries
| of precisive abstraction by which the man who makes the remark
| vagueness to its last extreme. Yet, invented as the story was
| leaves out of account all the other features of his image of
| to show how little meaning there might be in an abstraction,
| the building, and takes the word "large" which is entirely
| nevertheless the physician's answer does contain a truth
| unlike that image -- and when I say the word is unlike the
| that modern philosophy has generally denied: it does
| image, I mean that the general signification of the word is
| assert that there really is in opium 'something' which
| utterly disparate from the image, which involves no predicates
| explains its always putting people to sleep. This has,
| at all. Such is 'precisive abstraction'. But now if this man
| I say, been denied by modern philosophers generally.
| goes on to remark that the largeness of the building is very
| Not, of course, explicitly; but when they say that
| impressive, he converts the applicability of that predicate
| the different events of people going to sleep after
| from being a way of thinking about the building to being
| taking opium have really nothing in common, but
| itself a subject of thought, and that operation is
| only that the mind classes them together -- and
| 'subjectal abstraction'.
| this is what they virtually do say in denying
| the reality of generals -- they do implicitly
| deny that there is any true explanation of
| opium's generally putting people to sleep.
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 4.332, "Ordinals", circa 1905.
| C.S. Peirce, CP 4.234, "The Simplest Mathematics",
| Chapter 3 of the "Minute Logic", Jan-Feb 1902.
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Note 9===
===HAPA. Note 3===
<pre>
<pre>
| Predicate.
| Look through the modern logical treatises, and you will find that they
| almost all fall into one or other of two errors, as I hold them to be;
| that of setting aside the doctrine of abstraction (in the sense in
| which an abstract noun marks an abstraction) as a grammatical topic
| with which the logician need not particularly concern himself; and
| that of confounding abstraction, in this sense, with that operation
| of the mind by which we pay attention to one feature of a percept to
| the disregard of others. The two things are entirely disconnected.
|
|
| The view which pragmatic logic takes of the predicate, in consequence of
| The most ordinary fact of perception, such as "it is light", involves
| its assuming that the entire purpose of deductive logic is to ascertain
| 'precisive' abstraction, or 'prescission'. But 'hypostatic' abstraction,
| the necessary conditions of the truth of signs, without any regard to
| the abstraction which transforms "it is light" into "there is light here",
| the accidents of Indo-European grammar, will be here briefly stated.
| which is the sense which I shall commonly attach to the word abstraction
| Cf. Negation [CP 2.378-380].
| (since 'prescission' will do for precisive abstraction) is a very special
| mode of thought. It consists in taking a feature of a percept or percepts
| (after it has already been prescinded from the other elements of the percept),
| so as to take propositional form in a judgment (indeed, it may operate upon
| any judgment whatsoever), and in conceiving this fact to consist in the
| relation between the subject of that judgment and another subject, which
| has a mode of being that merely consists in the truth of propositions of
| which the corresponding concrete term is the predicate.
|
|
| In any proposition, i.e., any statement which must be true or false,
| Thus, we transform the proposition, "honey is sweet",
| let some parts be struck out so that the remnant is not a proposition,
| into "honey possesses sweetness". "Sweetness" might be
| but is such that it becomes a proposition when each blank is filled by
| called a fictitious thing, in one sense. But since the
| a proper name. The erasures are not to be made in a mechanical way, but
| mode of being attributed to it 'consists' in no more than
| with such modifications as may be necessary to preserve the partial sense
| the fact that some things are sweet, and it is not pretended,
| of the fragment. Such a residue is a 'predicate'. The same proposition
| or imagined, that it has any other mode of being, there is,
| may be mutilated in various ways so that different fragments will appear
| after all, no fiction. The only profession made is that we
| as predicates. Thus, take the proposition "Every man reveres some woman."
| consider the fact of honey being sweet under the form of a
| This contains the following predicates, among others:
| relation; and so we really can. I have selected sweetness
| as an instance of one of the least useful of abstractions.
| Yet even this is convenient. It facilitates such thoughts
| as that the sweetness of honey is particularly cloying;
| that the sweetness of honey is something like the
| sweetness of a honeymoon; etc.
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 4.235, "The Simplest Mathematics",
| Chapter 3 of the "Minute Logic", Jan-Feb 1902.
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 2.358, in dictionary entry for "Predicate",
| J.M. Baldwin (ed.), 'Dictionary of Philosophy & Psychology', vol. 2, pp. 325-326.
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Note 10===
===HAPA. Note 4===
<pre>
<pre>
| Relatives Of Second Intention
| Abstractions are particularly congenial to mathematics. Everyday life
| first, for example, found the need of that class of abstractions which
| we call 'collections'. Instead of saying that some human beings are
| males and all the rest females, it was found convenient to say that
| 'mankind' consists of the male 'part' and the female 'part'. The
| same thought makes classes of collections, such as pairs, leashes,
| quatrains, hands, weeks, dozens, baker's dozens, sonnets, scores,
| quires, hundreds, long hundreds, gross, reams, thousands, myriads,
| lacs, millions, milliards, milliasses, etc. These have suggested
| a great branch of mathematics.*
|
| Again, a point moves: it is by abstraction that the geometer says that
| it "describes a line". This line, though an abstraction, itself moves;
| and this is regarded as generating a surface; and so on.
|
|
| The general method of graphical representation of propositions has now
| So likewise, when the analyst treats operations as themselves subjects of
| been given in all its essential elements, except, of course, that we
| operations, a method whose utility will not be denied, this is another
| have not, as yet, studied any truths concerning special relatives;
| instance of abstraction. Maxwell's notion of a tension exercised upon
| lines of electrical force, transverse to them, is somewhat similar.
| this stage of its development may be called 'paradisaical logic',
|
| because it represents the state of Man's cognition before the
| These examples exhibit the great rolling billows of abstraction in the ocean
| Fall. For although, with this apparatus, it easy to write
| of mathematical thought; but when we come to a minute examination of it,
| we shall find, in every department, incessant ripples of the same form
| to write any which is necessarily false, or, in any way
| of thought, of which the examples I have mentioned give no hint.
| which that stage of logic affords, to find out that
|
|
| Probably it will not be doubted that every child in
|* Of course, the moment a collection is recognized as an abstraction we have
| to admit that even a percept is an abstraction or represents an abstraction,
| if matter has parts. It therefore becomes difficult to maintain that all
| never recognised that an idea may be erroneous;
| abstractions are fictions.
| and a stage that every child necessarily passes
| falsehood; for their instincts work
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.488,
| C.S. Peirce, CP 4.235, "The Simplest Mathematics",
|"The Logic of Relatives", 'Monist', vol. 7,
| Chapter 3 of the "Minute Logic", Jan-Feb 1902.
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Note 11===
===HAPA. Note 5===
<pre>
<pre>
| Relatives Of Second Intention (cont.)
| Hypostasis. Literally the Greek word signifies that which stands under
| and serves as a support. In philosophy it means a singular substance,
| also called a supposite, 'suppositum', by the Scholastics, especially
| if the substance is a completely subsisting one, whether non-living
| or living, irrational or rational. However, a rational hypostasis
| has the same meaning as the term, 'person'.
|
|
| This paradisaical logic appears in the study of non-relative formal logic.
| J.J.R. [= J.J. Rolbiecki] in:
|
|
| By 'logical' reflexion, I mean the observation of thoughts
| Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), 'Dictionary of Philosophy',
| in their expressions. Aquinas remarked that this sort of
| Littlefield, Adams, & Company, Totowa, NJ, 1972.
| reflexion is requisite to furnish us with those ideas
</pre>
| which, from lack of contrast, ordinary external
| experience fails to bring into prominence.
===HAPA. Note 6===
| He called such ideas 'second intentions'.
<pre>
| But the highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make neither
| by the inward attractions of the feelings or representations themselves, nor by
| a transcendental force of necessity, but in the interest of intelligibility,
| that is, in the interest of the synthesizing "I think" itself; and this
| it does by introducing an idea not contained in the data, which gives
| connections which they would not otherwise have had. This kind of
| synthesis has not been sufficiently studied, and especially the
| intimate relationship of its different varieties has not been
| duly considered. The work of the poet or novelist is not so
| utterly different from that of the scientific man. The artist
| introduces a fiction; but it is not an arbitrary one; it exhibits
| affinities to which the mind accords a certain approval in pronouncing
| them beautiful, which if it is not exactly the same as saying that the
| synthesis is true, is something of the same general kind. The geometer
| draws a diagram, which if not exactly a fiction, is at least a creation,
| and by means of observation of that diagram he is able to synthesize and
| show relations between elements which before seemed to have no necessary
| connection. The realities compel us to put some things into very close
| relation and others less so, in a highly complicated, and in the [true?]
| sense itself unintelligible manner; but it is the genius of the mind,
| that takes up all these hints of sense, adds immensely to them, makes
| them precise, and shows them in intelligible form in the intuitions
| of space and time. Intuition is the regarding of the abstract in
| a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatization of relations;
| that is the one sole method of valuable thought. Very shallow
| is the prevalent notion that this is something to be avoided.
| You might as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided
| because it has led to so much error; quite in the same philistine
| line of thought would that be; and so well in accord with the spirit
| of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put it forward. The true
| precept is not to abstain from hypostatization, but to do it intelligently ...
|
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 1.383, "A Guess at the Riddle",
| circa 1890, 'Collected Papers', CP 1.354-416.
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.489-490,
|"The Logic of Relatives", 'The Monist', vol. 7,
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Note 12===
===HAPA. Note 7===
<pre>
<pre>
| One branch of deductive logic, of which from the nature of
| Exceedingly important are the relatives signifying "-- is a quality of --"
| and "-- is a relation of -- to --". It may be said that mathematical
| relates to the vitally important matter of abstraction.
| reasoning (which is the only deductive reasoning, if not absolutely,
|
| at least eminently) almost entirely turns on the consideration of
| Indeed, the student of ordinary logic naturally regards abstraction,
| abstractions as if they were objects. The protest of nominalism
| or the passage from "the rose smells sweet" to "the rose has perfume",
| against such hypostatisation, although, if it knew how to formulate
| to be a quasi-grammatical matter, calling for little or no notice from
| itself, it would be justified as against much of the empty disputation
| the logician. The fact is, however, that almost every great step in
| of the medieval Dunces, yet, as it was and is formulated, is simply a
| mathematical reasoning derives its importance from the fact that it
| protest against the only kind of thinking that has ever advanced human
| culture. Nobody will work long with the logic of relatives -- unless
| he restricts the problems of his studies very much -- without seeing
| that this is true.
|
|
| For by means of abstraction, the transitory elements of thought,
| C.S. Peirce, CP 3.509, "The Logic of Relatives",
|'The Monist', vol. 7, pp. 161-217, 1897.
|'Collected Papers', CP 3.456-552.
</pre>
|* William James, 'Principles of Psychology', vol. 1, p. 243.
|
===HAPA. Note 8===
<pre>
| The logical term 'subjectal abstraction' here requires a
| word of explanation; for there are few treatises on logic
| which notice subjectal abstraction under any name, except so
| far as to confuse it with precisive abstraction which is an
| entirely different logical function. When we say that the
| Columbia library building is 'large', this remark is a result
| of precisive abstraction by which the man who makes the remark
| leaves out of account all the other features of his image of
| the building, and takes the word "large" which is entirely
| unlike that image -- and when I say the word is unlike the
| image, I mean that the general signification of the word is
| utterly disparate from the image, which involves no predicates
| at all. Such is 'precisive abstraction'. But now if this man
| goes on to remark that the largeness of the building is very
| impressive, he converts the applicability of that predicate
| from being a way of thinking about the building to being
| itself a subject of thought, and that operation is
| 'subjectal abstraction'.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 4.332, "Ordinals", circa 1905.
</pre>
</pre>
==HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction • Discussion==
===HAPA. Note 9===
===HAPA. Discussion Note 1===
<pre>
| Predicate.
|
| The view which pragmatic logic takes of the predicate, in consequence of
| its assuming that the entire purpose of deductive logic is to ascertain
| the necessary conditions of the truth of signs, without any regard to
| the accidents of Indo-European grammar, will be here briefly stated.
| Cf. Negation [CP 2.378-380].
|
| In any proposition, i.e., any statement which must be true or false,
| let some parts be struck out so that the remnant is not a proposition,
| but is such that it becomes a proposition when each blank is filled by
| a proper name. The erasures are not to be made in a mechanical way, but
| with such modifications as may be necessary to preserve the partial sense
| of the fragment. Such a residue is a 'predicate'. The same proposition
| may be mutilated in various ways so that different fragments will appear
| as predicates. Thus, take the proposition "Every man reveres some woman."
| This contains the following predicates, among others:
|
| ". . . reveres some woman."
|
| ". . . is either not a man or reveres some woman."
|
| "Any previously selected man reveres . . ."
|
| "Any previously selected man is . . ."
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 2.358, in dictionary entry for "Predicate",
| J.M. Baldwin (ed.), 'Dictionary of Philosophy & Psychology', vol. 2, pp. 325-326.
</pre>
===HAPA. Note 10===
<pre>
<pre>
| Relatives Of Second Intention
of "hypostatic abstraction" (HA), the main thing
|
| The general method of graphical representation of propositions has now
| been given in all its essential elements, except, of course, that we
| have not, as yet, studied any truths concerning special relatives;
| for to do so would seem, at first, to be "extralogical". Logic in
| this stage of its development may be called 'paradisaical logic',
For example, a typical case of HA occurs in the transformation
| because it represents the state of Man's cognition before the
| Fall. For although, with this apparatus, it easy to write
| propositions necessarily true, it is absolutely impossible
| to write any which is necessarily false, or, in any way
| which that stage of logic affords, to find out that
| anything is false. The mind has not as yet eaten
| of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Truth
| and Falsity.
|
| Probably it will not be doubted that every child in
| its mental development necessarily passes through
| a stage in which he has some ideas, but yet has
| never recognised that an idea may be erroneous;
| and a stage that every child necessarily passes
| through must have been formerly passed through
| by the race in its adult development. It may
| be doubted whether many of the lower animals
| have any clear and steady conception of
| falsehood; for their instincts work
| so unerringly that there is little
| to force it upon their attention.
The chief thing about this form of grammatical transformation is that we
| Yet plainly without a knowledge
| of falsehood no development
| of discursive reason can
| take place.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.488,
|"The Logic of Relatives", 'Monist', vol. 7,
| pp. 161-217, 1897.
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Discussion Note 2===
===HAPA. Note 11===
<pre>
<pre>
| Relatives Of Second Intention (cont.)
|
| This paradisaical logic appears in the study of non-relative formal logic.
| But 'there' no possible avenue appears by which the knowledge of falsehood
| could be brought into this Garden of Eden except by the arbitrary and
of "abstract object", not just yet, and I honestly do not know if
| inexplicable introduction of the Serpent in the guise of a proposition
| necessarily false. The logic of relatives affords such an avenue,
| and 'that', the very avenue by which in actual development,
| this stage of logic supervenes. It is the avenue of
| experience and logical reflexion.
|
| By 'logical' reflexion, I mean the observation of thoughts
| in their expressions. Aquinas remarked that this sort of
| reflexion is requisite to furnish us with those ideas
| which, from lack of contrast, ordinary external
| To most otherwise "forest-minded" folk, the approach of autumn
| experience fails to bring into prominence.
| with its showers of many-colored leaves, spells the end of the
| He called such ideas 'second intentions'.
| season's activities in the indentification [sic] of deciduous
|
| It is by means of 'relatives of second intention'
| community, unless they be relatively large, seem to lose
| that the general method of logical representation
| much of their summer's identity and may even descend to
| is to find completion.
| the level of "brush". This is in reality not the case,
| as may be easily discovered by examining any leafless
| twig with a 10-x pocket lens, or even with the naked
| eye. A casual glance at Plate 1 will also serve to
| show that woody plants in winter are anything but
| featureless.
|
|
| Harlow, William M.,
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.489-490,
|"Twig Key to the Deciduous Woody Plants of Eastern North America",
|"The Logic of Relatives", 'The Monist', vol. 7,
| pp. 161-217, 1897.
| Dover, New York, NY, 1959. Originally published by the author 1954.
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Discussion Note 3===
===HAPA. Note 12===
<pre>
<pre>
| One branch of deductive logic, of which from the nature of
| things ordinary logic could give no satisfactory account,
| relates to the vitally important matter of abstraction.
|
| Indeed, the student of ordinary logic naturally regards abstraction,
| or the passage from "the rose smells sweet" to "the rose has perfume",
| to be a quasi-grammatical matter, calling for little or no notice from
| the logician. The fact is, however, that almost every great step in
| mathematical reasoning derives its importance from the fact that it
| involves an abstraction.
|
| For by means of abstraction, the transitory elements of thought,
| the 'epea pteroenta' [winged words], are made substantive elements,
| as James terms them, 'epea apteroenta' [plucked words].* It thus
| becomes possible to study their relations and to apply to these
| relations discoveries already made respecting analogous relations.
| In this way, for example, operations become themselves the subjects
| of operations.
|
|* William James, 'Principles of Psychology', vol. 1, p. 243.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.642, in dictionary entry for "Relatives",
| J.M. Baldwin (ed.), 'Dictionary of Philosophy & Psychology', vol. 2, pp. 447-450.
Incidental Musement:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Hom.+Il.+1.172
</pre>
==HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction • Discussion==
===HAPA. Discussion Note 1===
<pre>
Referring to a few of Peirce's standard discussions
of "hypostatic abstraction" (HA), the main thing
about HA is that it turns an adjective or some
part of a predicate into an extra subject,
upping the arity of the main predicate
in the process.
For example, a typical case of HA occurs in the transformation
from "honey is sweet" to "honey possesses sweetness", which we
could choose to represent in several different ways as follows:
Sweet(honey) ~~~> Possesses(honey, sweetness)
S(h) ~~~> P(h, s)
S P
o o
| ~~~> |
o o
h <h,s>
^
[S] ~~~> /P\
| o->-o
| | |
o o o
h h s
The chief thing about this form of grammatical transformation is that we
abstract the adjective "sweet" from the main predicate, thus arriving at
a new, increased-arity predicate "possesses", and as a by-product of the
reaction, as it were, precipitating out the substantive "sweetness" as a
new subject of the new predicate.
</pre>
</pre>
===HAPA. Discussion Note 4===
===HAPA. Discussion Note 2===
<pre>
<pre>
Abstractions And Their Deciduation Problems
I have studied mathematics one way or another most of my life,
and mathematics is nothing if not the study of abstract objects,
yet I do not believe that I am ready to venture my own definition
of "abstract object", not just yet, and I honestly do not know if
I ever will be, but what I have been attempting intermittently to
do all this while is to transmit the sort of information that the
typical backwoodsman in the wild wold of logic and mathematics
might regard as being analogous to a botanical key, useful in
recognizing various species of abstract objects, with which
I can genuinely say that I have some acquaintance, although
I would prefer to defer, in my reference, in my reverence,
to ones who I know know vastly more. So forgive a quote:
| To most otherwise "forest-minded" folk, the approach of autumn
| with its showers of many-colored leaves, spells the end of the
| season's activities in the indentification [sic] of deciduous
| trees and shrubs. Without leaves, the members of the forest
| community, unless they be relatively large, seem to lose
| much of their summer's identity and may even descend to
| the level of "brush". This is in reality not the case,
| as may be easily discovered by examining any leafless
| twig with a 10-x pocket lens, or even with the naked
| eye. A casual glance at Plate 1 will also serve to
| show that woody plants in winter are anything but
| featureless.
|
| Harlow, William M.,
|"Twig Key to the Deciduous Woody Plants of Eastern North America",
| 4th ed., reprinted in 'Fruit Key and Twig Key to Trees and Shrubs',
| Dover, New York, NY, 1959. Originally published by the author 1954.
</pre>
===HAPA. Discussion Note 3===
<pre>
I think that it would be useful at this time to run back through
one of Peirce's best descriptions of the two kinds of abstraction,
and try to tackle it line by line.
The first and simpler type of abstraction is "prescisive abstraction" --
where here I have taken something like the running average of several
different spellings of the term -- that merely extracts or selectively
attends to a feature or a property of a more concrete object. In this
case one passes from an object to one of its properties, very analogous
to the sort of mathematical operation that is usually called "projection".
Here, one speaks of "prescinding" the property in question from the object,
whereby prescisive abstraction acquires the equivalent name of "prescission".
The second, more substantial type of abstraction is "hypostatic abstraction".
This is the operation that we regard as bringing the abstract object proper
into being, or into the sphere of human thought, or at least into the frame
of a particular discussion. In this case one passes from a concrete object
or situation, via a selection of properties, to end with an abstract object.
| Look through the modern logical treatises, and you will find that they
| almost all fall into one or other of two errors, as I hold them to be;
| that of setting aside the doctrine of abstraction (in the sense in
| which an abstract noun marks an abstraction) as a grammatical topic
| with which the logician need not particularly concern himself; and
| that of confounding abstraction, in this sense, with that operation
| of the mind by which we pay attention to one feature of a percept to
| the disregard of others. The two things are entirely disconnected.
Here Peirce gives a first description of the two types of abstraction
and emphasizes the importance of distinguishing them one from another.
| CSP on HA: "It consists in taking a feature of a percept
| The most ordinary fact of perception, such as "it is light",
| involves 'precisive' abstraction, or 'prescission'.
| subject, which has a mode of being that merely consists
In other words, all attention is selective to some degree,
so any perception, such as that which we typically express
by means of the sentence "It is light" involves prescission,
a trimming of the whole experience to crop an observed fact.
| But 'hypostatic' abstraction, the abstraction which transforms
| "it is light" into "there is light here", which is the sense
| which I shall commonly attach to the word abstraction (since
| 'prescission' will do for precisive abstraction) is a very
| special mode of thought.
of Physical Earth and the realm of Abstract Heaven in his Philosophy, Horatio.
In the transformation from "It is light" to "There is light here",
the spelling "light" is transformed from an adjective into a noun.
This is the typical grammatical clue that an underlying operation
of "hypostatic" or "subjectal" abstraction has been accomplished.
| It consists in taking a feature of a percept or percepts (after it has
| already been prescinded from the other elements of the percept), so as
| to take propositional form in a judgment (indeed, it may operate upon
| any judgment whatsoever), and in conceiving this fact to consist in the
| relation between the subject of that judgment and another subject, which
| has a mode of being that merely consists in the truth of propositions of
| which the corresponding concrete term is the predicate.
This is very significant. It marks not just a grammatical
transformation that happens to be taking place in a given
example of hypostatic abstraction, but describes the very
form of a certain transformation that took place all along
the frontiers of thought in the formal sciences beginning
toward the middle of the Nineteenth Century, a development
in which C.S. Peirce was a major force and prime expositor.
But I'll need to save the rest of that story for tomorrow.
Reference:
| C.S. Peirce, CP 4.235, "The Simplest Mathematics",
| Chapter 3 of the "Minute Logic", Jan-Feb 1902.
|
| http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05091.html
</pre>
===HAPA. Discussion Note 4===
<pre>
By way of starting to compile a "key to abstractions and relatives"
in the spirit of an old-fashioned field study key, I have gone back
through our neck of the woulds and gathered these initial specimens:
1. HIROTUFIA. Handy Indexical Rules Of Thumb Used For Identifying Abstractions
1.1. One of the features that points to an abstract object or
a hypostatic abstraction is its being known by description,
in other words, by the predicates that are attributed to it
in remote reports of some variety, or in the various stories
and theories that are spun about it, instead of being known
more concretely and directly by acquaintance. That is one
of the marks of all of the things that I mentioned before:
dormitive virtues, egos, numbers, quarks, sweetness, the
Starship Enterprise, and last not not least, unicorns.
1.2. CSP on HA: "It consists in taking a feature of a percept
or percepts (after it has already been prescinded from the
other elements of the percept), so as to take propositional
form in a judgment (indeed, it may operate upon any judgment
whatsoever), and in conceiving this fact to consist in the
relation between the subject of that judgment and another
subject, which has a mode of being that merely consists
in the truth of propositions of which the corresponding
concrete term is the predicate."
2. HIROTUFIR. Handy Indexical Rules Of Thumb Used For Identifying Relatives
2.1. A practical test of whether a property of a thing
is a relative property of a thing is that one needs
additional information, beyond that which identifies
the thing, in order to make a decision about whether
the thing in question has the property in question.
2.2. Let me just throw out this thought: Words and phrases like
"ego", "number", "quark", "unicorn", "Starship Enterprise",
along with all of the rest of the words and phrases that
we use, have no meaning at all outside of some community,
context, or framework of interpretation, so all of their
meanings and all of their specifications on any semantic
or semiotic feature, like "abstract" or "concrete", are
relative to the given community, context, or framework
of interpretation that gives them those meanings and
those specifications.
</pre>
===HAPA. Discussion Note 5===
BM: I see it as the transformation of a fact into
<pre>
BM = Bernard Morand
| CSP on HA: "It consists in taking a feature of a percept
| or percepts (after it has already been prescinded from the
| other elements of the percept), so as to take propositional
| form in a judgment (indeed, it may operate upon any judgment
| whatsoever), and in conceiving this fact to consist in the
| relation between the subject of that judgment and another
| subject, which has a mode of being that merely consists
| in the truth of propositions of which the corresponding
| concrete term is the predicate."
BM: Could you give the source of this passage?
This came up in the context of several different threads on the SUO and
</pre>
Ontology Lists that involved different people's ideas about abstraction:
Cathy Legg mentioned HA a la Cyc and/or Davidson that piqued my interest,
but I am still waiting for clarification of its relation to Peirce's HA;
Matthew West has a distinction between the categories of <abstract_object>
and <possible_individual> in his Lifecycle Integration Schema, a datamodel
and/or ontology that is currently being considered by the SUO working group;
John Sowa dreams of a divine apportionment of every thing between the domain
of Physical Earth and the realm of Abstract Heaven in his Philosophy, Horatio.
Here is the stem cell of the LIS filiation:
LIS. Lifecycle Integration Schema -- Matthew West
01. http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10712.html
Here are the links to the source materials
and discussion notes that have accumulated
up to this point on HA and PA:
HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/b/bentham.htm
01. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05089.html -- Cain and Abel
02. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05090.html -- Dormative Virtue
03. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05091.html -- Honey is Sweet
04. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05093.html -- Math Abstraction
05. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05100.html -- Reading Runes
06. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05101.html -- Hypostatization
07. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05105.html -- Abstract Objects
08. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05108.html -- Subjectal Abstraction
D1. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05092.html -- Metaphormazes
D2. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05110.html -- Deciduation Problems
to use to adumbrate the spirit of abstraction in
D3. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05111.html -- Recapitulation
D4. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05112.html -- Key To Abstraction
D5. http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05113.html -- Self Reference?
The passage that you mention is quoted initially at No. 3, and
it is discussed further at D1, D3, D4, and prospectively at D5.
Have to break fast for breakfast as I am still semi-asleep ...
BM = Bernard Morand
BM: I wonder whether Peirce is refering here to second
BM: I wonder whether Peirce is refering here to second
(2) "Opium has a dormitive virtue".
(2) "Opium has a dormitive virtue".
BM: I see it as the transformation of a fact into
of "virtus dulcitiva", in lay terminology, "sweetness".
a more abstract concept, or say something like
"opium has the general property of putting to sleep".
It is hypostatic in the sense that it requires no further
proposition than (1) and that the transformation relies on
an "ens rationis". But from (2) we can also get for example:
(3) "this discourse has a dormitive virtue",
which requires a second subject (a fact about discourse).
from "honey is sweet" to "honey possesses sweetness", which we
I would be tempted to call this latter transformation
second intention, and it seems to fit with your quote
before. But going from (2) to (3) doesn't seem to be
an hypostatic abstraction stricly speaking.
BM: Thanks for throwing some light on this if possible.
</pre>
===HAPA. Discussion Note 6===
<pre>
BM = Bernard Morand
The genealogy of this circle of thoughts goes a bit like this:
| Bentham's "Theory of Fictions" begat (paraphrastically)
| Schönfinkel's "Bausteine" and this begat (independently)
| Church's "Lambda Calculus" and this begat (in good time)
| McCarthy's "Lisp" and all the rest is AI and IEEE ...
It is no accident, at least not from the right "state of information" (SOI),
how lambda abstraction got its tale, as it is truly most pertinently tagged.
It is said that the lambda came from Russell('s) and Whitehead's employment
of a caret (^) to mark a cousin operation of relational conversion, but let
me try to look that up later. At any rate, the main idea has been stock in
trade of mathematics for as long as anybody can remember, and in philosophy
more generally (or vaguely, I can never remember which) the laurel is often
placed on Bentham for his idea of paraphrasis. Here's a general/vague link:
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/b/bentham.htm
What we see here is the very same thing going on
in the colloquial homilies that Peirce attempted
in the predicate "is_sweet", but HA takes a step beyond that, as some would say,
to use to adumbrate the spirit of abstraction in
the formal sciences.
BM: It is hypostatic in the sense that it requires no further
BM: I wonder whether Peirce is refering here to second
intention or namely to hypostatic abstraction (HA).
BM: If we take as a starting case:
(1) "Opium puts to sleep",
in order to transform it by HA, we get:
(2) "Opium has a dormitive virtue".
Here is the diagram that I drew for the analogous case
of "virtus dulcitiva", in lay terminology, "sweetness".
Referring to a few of Peirce's standard discussions
of "hypostatic abstraction" (HA), the main thing
about HA is that it turns an adjective or some
part of a predicate into an extra subject,
upping the arity of the main predicate
in the process.
As for the matter of intentional orders, I foggily peirceive
For example, a typical case of HA occurs in the transformation
but the clue that it has something to do with the operations
from "honey is sweet" to "honey possesses sweetness", which we
could choose to represent in several different ways as follows:
Sweet(honey) ~~~> Possesses(honey, sweetness)
S(h) ~~~> P(h, s)
S P
o o
| ~~~> |
o o
h <h,s>
^
[S] ~~~> /P\
| o->-o
| | |
o o o
h h s
Figs. Are Sweet. If served in season. At just the right temps.
The chief thing about this form of grammatical transformation is that we
abstract the adjective "sweet" from the main predicate, thus arriving at
a new, increased-arity predicate "possesses", and as a by-product of the
reaction, as it were, precipitating out the substantive "sweetness" as a
new subject of the new predicate.
BM: I see it as the transformation of a fact into a more abstract concept, or
say something like "opium has the general property of putting to sleep".
Sticking, sweetly, if you will, to the notion that a concept is a mental symbol,
some might say that a sufficently "precise" abstract concept is already present
in the predicate "is_sweet", but HA takes a step beyond that, as some would say,
onto the flypaper of "abstract but substantial objects" like 'virtus dulcitiva'.
BM: It is hypostatic in the sense that it requires no further
proposition than (1) and that the transformation relies on
an "ens rationis".
Yes, this is the critical observation.
BM: But from (2) we can also get for example:
(3) "this discourse has a dormitive virtue",
which requires a second subject (a fact about discourse).
This is known as "application of the abstraction to another argument",
and it is analogous to the other half of the lambda calculus paradigm.
BM: I would be tempted to call this latter transformation
second intention, and it seems to fit with your quote
before. But going from (2) to (3) doesn't seem to be
an hypostatic abstraction stricly speaking.
As for the matter of intentional orders, I foggily peirceive
but the clue that it has something to do with the operations
that I throw together under the name of "reflection", and by
that I throw together under the name of "reflection", and by
this plurality of reflection to say I abstract some fraction
this plurality of reflection to say I abstract some fraction
'''Ontology List (Sep 2003)'''
'''Ontology List (Sep 2003)'''
* http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd10.html#05026
* http://web.archive.org/web/20070305021905/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd10.html#05026
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===DIEP. De In Esse Predication • Discussion History===
===DIEP. De In Esse Predication • Discussion History===
'''Inquiry List (Sep 2003)'''
'''Inquiry List (Sep 2003)'''
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/thread.html#786
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'''Ontology List (Sep 2003)'''
'''Ontology List (Sep 2003)'''
* http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd10.html#05032
* http://web.archive.org/web/20070305021905/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd10.html#05032
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05032.html
# http://web.archive.org/web/20070317221422/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05032.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05036.html
# http://web.archive.org/web/20070316003906/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05036.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05043.html
# http://web.archive.org/web/20121010204912/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05043.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05045.html
# http://web.archive.org/web/20070222033717/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05045.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05047.html
# http://web.archive.org/web/20070222033504/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05047.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05051.html
# http://web.archive.org/web/20070222033848/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05051.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05054.html
# http://web.archive.org/web/20070219072137/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05054.html
# http://web.archive.org/web/20070222033828/http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05046.html
===HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction 1===
===HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction 1 • Document History===
'''Ontology List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05089.html -- Continuous Predicate
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05090.html -- Dormitive Virtue
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05091.html -- Dulcitive Virtue
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05093.html -- Math Abstraction
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05100.html -- Reading Runes
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05101.html -- Hypostatization
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05105.html -- Abstract Objects
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05108.html -- Subjectal Abstraction
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05118.html -- Definition of Predicate
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05121.html -- Second Intentions
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05122.html -- Logical Reflexion
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05125.html -- Epea Apteroenta
'''SUO List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10964.html -- Continuous Predicate
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10964.html -- Continuous Predicate
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11290.html -- Epea Apteroenta
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11290.html -- Epea Apteroenta
====Ontology List====
===HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction 1 • Discussion History===
'''Ontology List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05092.html -- Metaphormazes
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05110.html -- Deciduation Problems
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05111.html -- Thematic Recapitulation
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05112.html -- Field Key, Kitchen Recipe
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05113.html -- Indirect Self Reference
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05114.html -- Genealogy & Paraphrasis
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05115.html -- Intention & Reflection
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05116.html -- Rhematic Saturation
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05117.html -- Relational Turn
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05119.html -- Tabula Erasa
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05120.html -- Directions
'''SUO List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10967.html -- Metaphormazes
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10967.html -- Metaphormazes
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11267.html -- Directions
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11267.html -- Directions
====Ontology List====
===HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction 2 • Document History===
'''Inquiry List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/thread.html#841
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/thread.html#899
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000841.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000842.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10964.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000843.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10965.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000851.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10966.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000858.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10991.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000859.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11022.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000863.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11025.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000866.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11028.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000899.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11079.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000902.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11239.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000903.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11271.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000906.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11277.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11290.html
'''Ontology List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05089.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05089.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05125.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05125.html
'''SUO List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/thread.html#841
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10964.html
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/thread.html#899
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10965.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10966.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10991.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11022.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11025.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11028.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11079.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11239.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11271.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11277.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11290.html
===HAPA. Hypostatic And Prescisive Abstraction 2 • Discussion History===
'''Inquiry List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/thread.html#844
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/thread.html#891
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/thread.html#900
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000844.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000891.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000892.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000893.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000894.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000895.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000896.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000897.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000898.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000900.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000901.html
'''Ontology List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05092.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05110.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05111.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05112.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05113.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05114.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05115.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05116.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05117.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05119.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05120.html
'''SUO List (Sep–Oct 2003)'''
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10967.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg10967.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11232.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11232.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11234.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11234.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11236.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11236.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11237.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11237.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11240.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11240.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11267.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg11267.html
====Ontology List====
===JITL. Just In Time Logic • Document History===
'''Inquiry List (Aug 2003 – Apr 2005)'''
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/thread.html#712
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05112.html
* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/thread.html#2542
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000712.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05114.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000714.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000717.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05116.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000719.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000722.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg05119.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000723.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000724.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000725.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000726.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000727.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000728.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000729.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000730.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000731.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-September/000844.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-August/000732.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000891.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002542.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000892.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002543.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000893.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-April/002544.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000894.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000895.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000896.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000897.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000898.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000900.html
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000901.html
'''Ontology List (Aug 2003)'''
* http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd11.html#04961
* http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd11.html#04961
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04979.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04979.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04980.html
# http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04980.html
===OLOD. Quine On The Limits Of Decision • Document History===
===OLOD. Quine On The Limits Of Decision • Document History===