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experience.  But now, from the formal point of view, "how" means
 
experience.  But now, from the formal point of view, "how" means
 
only:  To describe the formal conditions of a formal possibility.
 
only:  To describe the formal conditions of a formal possibility.
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=====1.3.5.2. The Forms of Reasoning=====
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<pre>
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| The most valuable insights are arrived at last;
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| but the most valuable insights are methods.
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|
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| (Nietzsche, 'The Will to Power', S 469, 261).
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A certain arbitrariness has to be faced in the terms that one uses
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to talk about reasoning, to split it up into different parts and
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to sort it out into different types.  It is like the arbitrary
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choice that one makes in assigning the midpoint of an interval
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to the subintervals on its sides.  In setting out the forms of
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a nomenclature, in fitting the schemes of my terminology to the
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territory that it disturbs in the process of mapping, I cannot
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avoid making arbitrary choices, but I can aim for a strategy
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that is flexible enough to recognize its own alternatives and
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to accommodate the other options that lie within their scope.
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If I make the mark of deduction the fact that it reduces the
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number of terms, as it moves from the grounds to the end of
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an argument, then I am due to devise a name for the process
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that augments the number of terms, and thus prepares the
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grounds for any account of experience.
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What name hints at the many ways that signs arise in regard to things?
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What name covers the manifest ways that a map takes over its territory?
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What name fits this naming of names, these proceedings that inaugurate
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a sign in the first place, that duly install it on the office of a term?
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What name suits all these actions of addition, annexation, incursion, and
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invention that instigate the initial bearing of signs on an object domain?
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In the interests of a "maximal analytic precision" (MAP), it is fitting
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that I should try to sharpen this notion to the point where it applies
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purely to a simple act, that of entering a new term on the lists, in
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effect, of enlisting a new term to the ongoing account of experience.
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Thus, let me style this process as "adduction" or "production", in
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spite of the fact that the aim of precision is partially blunted
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by the circumstance that these words have well-worn uses in other
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contexts.  In this way, I can isolate to some degree the singular
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step of adding a term, leaving it to a later point to distinguish
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the role that it plays in an argument.
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As it stands, the words "adduction" and "production" could apply to the
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arbitrary addition of terms to a discussion, whether or not these terms
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participate in valid forms of argument or contribute to their mediation.
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Although there are a number of auxiliary terms, like "factorization",
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"mediation", or "resolution", that can help to pin down these meanings,
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it is also useful to have a word that can convey the exact sense meant.
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Therefore, I coin the term "obduction" to suggest the type of reasoning
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process that is opposite or converse to deduction and that introduces
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a middle term "in the way" as it passes from a subject to a predicate.
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Consider the adjunction to one's vocabulary that is comprised of these three words:
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"adduction", "production", "obduction".  In particular, how do they appear in the
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light of their mutual applications to each other and especially with respect to
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their own reflexivities?  Notice that the terms "adduction" and "production"
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apply to the ways that all three terms enter this general discussion, but
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that "obduction" applies only to their introduction only in specific
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contexts of argument.
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Another dimension of variation that needs to be noted among these different types
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of processes is their status with regard to determimism.  Given the ordinary case
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of a well-formed syllogism, deduction is a fully deterministic process, since the
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middle term to be eliminated is clearly marked by its appearance in a couple of
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premisses.  But if one is given nothing but the fact that forms this conclusion,
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or starts with a fact that is barely suspected to be the conclusion of a possible
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deduction, then there are many other middle terms and many other premisses that
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might be construed to result in this fact.  Therefore, adduction and production,
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for all of their uncontrolled generality, but even obduction, in spite of its
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specificity, cannot be treated as deterministic processes.  Only in degenerate
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cases, where the number of terms in a discussion is extremely limited, or where
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the availability of middle terms is otherwise restricted, can it happen that
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these processes become deterministic.
   
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