Changes

Not every state of information allows the interpolation of a compact object with its own comprehension and extension, but this epistemic situation does.

Not every state of information allows the interpolation of a compact object with its own comprehension and extension, but this epistemic situation does.

* Cf: [http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001914.html ICE 2]

* [http://web.archive.org/web/20150302042625/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1913 Information = Comprehension × Extension] • [http://web.archive.org/web/20150302042603/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001914.html Selection 2]

* In: [http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1913 ICE]

* Cf: [http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-December/003280.html PLOI-DIS 1]

* [http://web.archive.org/web/20120512004315/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-December/thread.html#3280 Peirce's Logic Of Information • Discussion] • [http://web.archive.org/web/20081007062911/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-December/003280.html Note 1]

* In: [http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-December/thread.html#3280 PLOI-DIS]

As mentioned in the above Discussion Note, one of the difficulties that we encounter in trying to model Peirce's blind man story is the problem of how to handle ''improper implications'' or ''trivial intensions'' of the form ''X'' ⇒ ''X''.  On the one hand, any concept or term will significantly alter the informational situation when it first arises, for example, on the prompting of an abductive hypothesis or other creative intervention.  On the other hand, Peirce appears to discount these types of intensions by accounting for the information as the "superfluous comprehension" of a symbol, in effect, as the intension that a symbol has "over and above what is necessary for limiting its extension" (CE 1, 276).  I sought to finesse this issue in my retelling of the story by interjecting a prior episode where the abductive factorization is more explicitly considered.  Only time will tell whether this is a sensible direction to take or not.

As mentioned in the above Discussion Note, one of the difficulties that we encounter in trying to model Peirce's blind man story is the problem of how to handle ''improper implications'' or ''trivial intensions'' of the form ''X'' ⇒ ''X''.  On the one hand, any concept or term will significantly alter the informational situation when it first arises, for example, on the prompting of an abductive hypothesis or other creative intervention.  On the other hand, Peirce appears to discount these types of intensions by accounting for the information as the "superfluous comprehension" of a symbol, in effect, as the intension that a symbol has "over and above what is necessary for limiting its extension" (CE 1, 276).  I sought to finesse this issue in my retelling of the story by interjecting a prior episode where the abductive factorization is more explicitly considered.  Only time will tell whether this is a sensible direction to take or not.