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Directory:Jon Awbrey/Papers/Inquiry Driven Systems (view source)
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<p> Now, I ask, how is it that anything can be done with a symbol, without reflecting upon the conception, much less imagining the object that belongs to it? It is simply because the symbol has acquired a nature, which may be described thus, that when it is brought before the mind certain principles of its use — whether reflected on or not — by association immediately regulate the action of the mind; and these may be regarded as laws of the symbol itself which it cannot ''as a symbol'' transgress.</p>
<p>Now, I ask, how is it that anything can be done with a symbol, without reflecting upon the conception, much less imagining the object that belongs to it? It is simply because the symbol has acquired a nature, which may be described thus, that when it is brought before the mind certain principles of its use — whether reflected on or not — by association immediately regulate the action of the mind; and these may be regarded as laws of the symbol itself which it cannot ''as a symbol'' transgress.</p>
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| align="right" | (Peirce, CE 1, 173).
| align="right" | (Peirce, CE 1, 173).
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<p> Inference in general obviously supposes symbolization; and all symbolization is inference. For every symbol as we have seen contains information. And … all kinds of information involve inference. Inference, then, is symbolization. They are the same notions. Now we have already analyzed the notion of a ''symbol'', and we have found that it depends upon the possibility of representations acquiring a nature, that is to say an immediate representative power. This principle is therefore the ground of inference in general.</p>
<p>Inference in general obviously supposes symbolization; and all symbolization is inference. For every symbol as we have seen contains information. And … all kinds of information involve inference. Inference, then, is symbolization. They are the same notions. Now we have already analyzed the notion of a ''symbol'', and we have found that it depends upon the possibility of representations acquiring a nature, that is to say an immediate representative power. This principle is therefore the ground of inference in general.</p>
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| align="right" | (Peirce, CE 1, 280).
| align="right" | (Peirce, CE 1, 280).
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<p> A symbol which has connotation and denotation contains information. Whatever symbol contains information contains more connotation than is necessary to limit its possible denotation to those things which it may denote. That is, every symbol contains more than is sufficient for a principle of selection.</p>
<p>A symbol which has connotation and denotation contains information. Whatever symbol contains information contains more connotation than is necessary to limit its possible denotation to those things which it may denote. That is, every symbol contains more than is sufficient for a principle of selection.</p>
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| align="right" | (Peirce, CE 1, 282).
| align="right" | (Peirce, CE 1, 282).
To put a finer point on this result I can do no better at this stage of discussion than to recount the "metaphorical argument" that Peirce often used to illustrate the same conclusion.
To put a finer point on this result I can do no better at this stage of discussion than to recount the "metaphorical argument" that Peirce often used to illustrate the same conclusion.
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<p>I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies some proposition or, what is the same thing, every word, concept, symbol has an equivalent term — or one which has become identified with it, — in short, has an ''interpretant''.</p>
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<p>I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies some proposition or, what is the same thing, every word, concept, symbol has an equivalent term — or one which has become identified with it, — in short, has an ''interpretant''.</p>
<p>Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a representation is something which stands for something. … A thing cannot stand for something without standing ''to'' something ''for'' that something. Now, what is this that a word stands ''to'' ? Is it a person?</p>
<p>Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a representation is something which stands for something. … A thing cannot stand for something without standing ''to'' something ''for'' that something. Now, what is this that a word stands ''to'' ? Is it a person?</p>
<p>We usually say that the word ''homme'' stands to a Frenchman for ''man''. It would be a little more precise to say that it stands to the Frenchman's mind — to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular remembrance or image in that memory. And what ''image'', what remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent of the word ''homme'' — in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or ''stands to'', is its interpretant or identified symbol. …</p>
<p>We usually say that the word ''homme'' stands to a Frenchman for ''man''. It would be a little more precise to say that it stands to the Frenchman's mind — to his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular remembrance or image in that memory. And what ''image'', what remembrance? Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent of the word ''homme'' — in short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or ''stands to'', is its interpretant or identified symbol. …</p>
<p>The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. Hence, since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it should stand to something, every symbol — every word and every ''conception'' — must have an interpretant — or what is the same thing, must have information or implication. (Peirce, CE 1, 466-467).</p>
<p>The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. Hence, since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it should stand to something, every symbol — every word and every ''conception'' — must have an interpretant — or what is the same thing, must have information or implication.</p>
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| align="right" | (Peirce, CE 1, 466–467).
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It will take a while to develop the wealth of information that a suitably perspicacious and persistent IF would find implicit in this unassuming homily. The main innovations that this project can hope to add to the story are as follows:
It will take a while to develop the wealth of information that a suitably perspicacious and persistent IF would find implicit in this unassuming homily. The main innovations that this project can hope to add to the story are as follows: